CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

052
1008

JULY 1983

EAST-WEST STRATEGIC STABILITY
Robert McGeehan

LIBYA'S 'NEW' FOREIGN POLICY
Ronald Bruce St. John

VOTES AND SEATS
Paul Rose

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW
David Fingleton

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

212

98p

Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

July 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1410 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
Australia's New Government	Keith D. Suter	1
East-West Strategic Stability	Robert McGeehan	8
Libya's 'New' Foreign Policy	Ronald Bruce St. John	15
The Papal Trips	Roland Dallas	19
Votes and Seats	Paul Rose	26
Posters and Prejudice	John Elsom	30
The Role of Opposition	Ranajit Basu	35
Quarterly Record Review	David Fingleton	38
Correspondence: Literature in Education	Stephen Wade	42
The National Health Service	Tony Hughes	43
The Great Media Fudge	Michael Kelly	44
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		
Quarterly Fiction Reviews	Rosalind Wade	45
Non-Fiction Reviews		49
Esmond Wright, John Biggs-Davison, Betty Abel, Richard Whittington-Egan		
SHORTER REVIEWS		55

P2833

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster please send all address corrections c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Av New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010

Cca-H06388-212-P2833

Contemporary Review

052
.008

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

July 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1410

Editor: ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor: BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers: PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT, PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent: ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent: DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director: LEONARD SKIPP

AUSTRALIA'S NEW GOVERNMENT

212

by Keith D. Suter

AUSTRALIA has again proved the accuracy of Harold Wilson's statement that a week is a long time in politics. In January 1983 Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser became Australia's second longest serving politician in Australia's history. He looked set to rival the record of his political mentor, Sir Robert Menzies (1949-66) as Australia's longest serving Prime Minister. However, within two months he was out of power, no longer Party Leader and disowned by his former colleagues. A month later, he resigned from Parliament. Meanwhile, Andrew Peacock, who tried unsuccessfully to oust him as Liberal Leader a few months earlier and so was relegated to the back benches for disloyalty, became his successor. The new Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, had only been in Parliament since early in 1980 and had been Labour Leader for only a month before becoming Prime Minister. Like Mr. Peacock, he had only a few months earlier staged an unsuccessful attempt to replace his Party Leader.

The drama began on 3 February 1983. For some months, Mr. Fraser had been considering privately when the federal election should be held. It was not due until December 1983. But with the continuing economic decline, an early election provided a greater chance of winning. He was advised by his Liberal-Country Party colleagues against calling one in late 1982. The House of Representatives is elected every three years. To go to the country a year early could have been interpreted (quite rightly) as

the Government fearing further economic problems and so wanting to get the election out of the way as quickly as possible.

Meanwhile, on that same day, Bob Hawke became Labour Leader. Other than a complete economic collapse, Mr. Fraser's greatest fear was having to fight an election against a Labour Party united behind Mr. Hawke. Mr. Fraser was hoping for yet another contest against Bill Hayden, whom he defeated in December 1980.

Bill Hayden became Labour Leader following the 1977 federal election defeat. A pleasant, hard-working, unassuming person, he was very different from the active, colourful, charismatic Gough Whitlam. He was no match for Mr. Fraser. But whereas the Liberals prefer tough leaders who exude authority, the Labour Party is far less sure just what sort of leadership it wants. It resents authority figures but recognises that elections are virtually presidential contests in which party leaders are very important.

Labour's (and Australia's) two most popular leaders have largely been outside federal politics: Neville Wran, the Premier of New South Wales, and Bob Hawke, President of the Australian Council of Trades Unions (Australia's TUC). Mr. Wran was elected Premier in May 1976—only five months after Gough Whitlam's stunning defeat and at a time when there was only one other state Labour Government. An elegant and articulate lawyer without Mr. Whitlam's love of haste and drama, Mr. Wran has steadily consolidated his power by gaining and holding the state's political middle ground. The state Liberal Party, which had governed for several years prior to 1976, remains in a state of complete disarray—with a change of leadership occurring almost annually.

Bob Hawke was tipped by this author in this journal (in August 1976) as the potential Labour Prime Minister. Son of a Uniting Church (Congregational) Minister, he has a record for some excesses—especially in alcohol (in which he once had a *Guinness Book of Records* place), women (not as dangerous a diversion in Australia as in more conventional nations, like the UK) and intelligence (Rhodes scholar and lawyer). He has been in the public eye for about 20 years. He was the ACTU advocate before industrial wage award hearings and then in 1969 he became ACTU President. This rise was all the more remarkable through his not being a tradesman, or having shop floor experience and no evidence that he was authentically of the trades unions. Mr. Hawke earned a reputation for being an industrial moderate, who preferred reconciliation to confrontation, and who had a wide range of business friends. Indeed, his moderation and business contacts antagonised the left-wing of the Victorian Labour Party and there was some doubt whether a safe seat could be found for him.

He became an MP in 1980 and soon set about establishing an image of being the virtual Labour Leader elect. The left-wing, which previously had little faith in Mr. Hayden, closed ranks behind him to ward off the Hawke challenge. The Labour Party (unlike the more flexible Liberals) prefers the seniority system and so Mr. Hawke was seen as an over-eager upstart. He challenged Mr. Hayden as Labour Leader on 16 July 1982

and lost. But Mr. Hayden's margin of victory (42 to 37) was not wide enough to deter pro-Hawke forces from continuing the campaign.

Early 1983, with the Government's public rating continuing to fall, the Labour left-wing discovered the virtues of pragmatism. Mr. Hayden, himself confident of winning the federal election, was told by his colleagues that victory was not assured under his leadership and that, even though he worked hard for five years in rebuilding the Party, he ought to stand down. This he agreed to do. Whatever may be his private feelings, he did not display any bitterness—and was even talked out of standing for the Deputy Leader's position. Mr. Fraser was aware of the renewed leadership struggle and so hoped, by calling a snap federal election, to catch the Labour Party squabbling over its leadership. It says a great deal about both men, that Mr. Hayden should gracefully and immediately stand aside, while it never occurred to Mr. Fraser that any party leader could ever leave office without a messy and protracted fight.

Mr. Fraser never recovered from the shock of Mr. Hawke's appointment. The Liberal-Country Party strategists counted on a campaign of anti-Labour hate messages, extensive advertisements and an attempt to remind people of the so-called disastrous years of the Whitlam Labour Government, 1972-5 (which did not seem so bad after Mr. Fraser's period in office). At one point, for example, he advised people that if Labour were elected their money should be taken out of the banks and put under their beds—to which Mr. Hawke pointed out that there was not room there since that was where the communists were already. For days, Mr. Fraser refused to retract his statement—thereby forcing the bankers to criticise his views. On February 19, West Australians elected a Labour state Government. The new Premier (as in earlier South Australian and Victorian Labour state victories) based his campaign on NSW's Neville Wran's themes of moderation and slow reform. A nation-wide anti-Fraser band wagon was hurtling along to 5 March 1983.

The Labour Party was transformed. Mr. Hawke's election as Leader is an example of how one person can make a difference in politics. For the first time in federal Labour politics, the election theme was based on a person ('Bob Hawke—Bringing Australia Together'). The opinion polls from the outset predicted a Labour victory. The mass media were a little more sympathetic to Labour than in recent elections. But not all Labour people privately shared Mr. Hawke's confidence. Mr. Fraser had been written off just before the 1975 and 1980 elections and he proved the pollsters wrong. As the Liberals' most ruthless leader since 1966 (when Sir Robert Menzies retired) he was not to be underestimated for pulling off an election stunt at the last minute. Meanwhile, faith in the decency and wisdom of the average Australian had almost cost Mr. Whitlam the 1974 election. Given the cynicism among most Australian politicians for the apathy and political ignorance of most Australians, reliance on their wisdom can be suicidal.

At stake was something of even greater significance than the election of Mr. Hawke. Sir John Kerr, the then Governor-General, sacked the Whitlam Government on 11 November 1975 and paved the way for Mr.

Fraser's electoral victory the following month. For many Labour people, Kerr's action illustrated the futility of reformist politics—they had worked for 23 years to bring Labour to power only to have it ended by him. His action, for them, demonstrated the power of Australia's hidden financial and national security interests, which could conspire to defeat a Government elected to office twice in three years (1972 and 1974). In 1983, Labour was running with the most electorally marketable Leader it had ever had, with opinion polls running in its favour, with a declining economy, escalating inflation and unemployment, and against a Government which had no clear electoral strategy. If Labour could not win under those circumstances, then Labour could never win, and parliamentary politics would be seen as a waste of time.

But Mr. Hawke's confidence in the commonsense and wisdom of ordinary Australians paid off, as did his attention to consensus and reconciliation. Although it is likely that many Australians do not believe that Mr. Hawke will be any more successful at solving Australia's economic problems than was Mr. Fraser (since so much depends on the US recovery) they did see him as being less confrontationalist than Mr. Fraser. Both Mr. Whitlam and Mr. Fraser were members of the 'crash through or crash' school of thought. The 5 March 1983 federal election resulted in an overwhelming swing to Labour—one of its best since federation in 1901.

In December 1972, Prime Minister Whitlam embarked upon a 100 days of rapid reforms. He started as he meant to carry on. This immediate image of haste and reform haunted the minds of many conservative Australians. Mr. Hawke learnt from that error. Apart from some economic decisions he has deliberately avoided any image of haste.

The Hawke 27-person Cabinet is generally moderate. He broke with tradition by appointing an inner cabinet of 13 persons, only one of whom is a left-winger. The Cabinet contains Labour's first ever female minister (Susan Ryan: Education, Youth Affairs and Women's Affairs. The Liberals have recently been marginally more willing to have women in senior positions). On foreign affairs, the Labour Government on 18 March 1983 ended one of the Fraser eccentricities. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan, he retaliated by severing non-diplomatic links with the USSR—until he realised that Australia's growing trade with the USSR (including allegedly produce from his own property) would be jeopardised. The 'sanctions' impact was gradually narrowed so that the only Soviets excluded from Australia were sports people and artists. How the continued exclusion of these people from Australia would force Soviet troops out of Afghanistan was not fully explained. But Mr. Fraser had gone out on a political limb and it was impossible to extricate him. The restoration of full relations created little adverse comment.

Mr. Fraser's mentor, Sir Robert Menzies, often acted as though there were only three nations outside Australia: UK, US and a menacing red one (at various times, the USSR, China, North Korea, or Vietnam). Mr. Fraser came to office with a similar limited view of the world. But as Prime Minister, he suddenly discovered the Third World and the evils of South Africa's *apartheid*. He consistently went out on a limb in being

far more sympathetic to Third World aspirations and in opposing *apartheid* than his Party ever was. Mr. Hawke will continue this trend, which was initiated in a mild form by Mr. Whitlam.

A greater problem for the Hawke Government will be its relations with the US. The growing peace movement, fuelled by speculations of a limited nuclear war, wants the removal of US bases from Australia (which make it a nuclear target) and the development of a more independent foreign policy. It is still alleged that the CIA was implicated in the November 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam Government (since it feared—quite wrongly—that Mr. Whitlam would not renew the agreement on the Pine Gap base—the CIA's most important station outside the US). There are fears that if the new Labour Government goes too far against the US, it will suffer a fate similar to the Whitlam Government's.

There will be no shift to republicanism. The Labour Party, aware of the Royal Family's grasp on the popular mind, has long had a policy of gradually severing some Australia-UK ties (like the UK honours system and appeals to the Privy Council) but there has not been any official Labour endorsement of republicanism. Indeed, ironically, Kerr's dismissal of the Whitlam Government in 1975 was more akin to a presidential action than that of a monarchy. There is, it is true, far less public hysteria over Royal tours—but then Australians are now also more reserved at pop music concerts. This author coincidentally arrived at the tiny Albury, NSW airfield when the Prince and Princess of Wales were landing in March (to stay at her mother's property). The immense crowd who waited over an hour for a ten-second glimpse of the royal couple was clear evidence that the magic of majesty still works in Australia.

The Hawke Government has come to power at a time when Australia —except for the arms race—has no major foreign policy problem. The political campaign, in so far as substantive issues were touched upon, almost totally ignored foreign issues. Even Mr. Fraser had apparently learnt that the voters were no longer so gullible as to believe stories about 'reds under the beds'.

Australia's major problem is the economy. The Whitlam Government came to power with a long and costly agenda of social reform. Less than a year later (October 1973) OPEC increased oil prices and contributed to the slow down in the international economy. But the Labour Government, having been out of power for 23 years, was determined to press ahead with its reforms.

Mr. Fraser, in December 1975, campaigned on financial responsibility, the need to cut inflation and Government expenditure—ideas which were to be taken up by Mrs. Thatcher and President Reagan. But monetarist economic theory is difficult to apply and is politically unpopular where it can be applied. The Government was determined to reduce inflation, even though this meant a dramatic increase in unemployment (at least 11 per cent).

Social commentators remain divided over the impact of the Fraser Government's social welfare programmes. The Government, despite a constitutional power to do so, refused to confront State Governments

which refused full human rights to their Aboriginals. The two most recalcitrant states—Queensland and Western Australia—had non-Labour Governments and so Mr. Fraser did not want to antagonise them.

A February 1983 study claimed that there are now more than two million Australians living below the poverty line (out of a total population of 14 million). The figure is the first review of the number of people living in poverty since a study in 1976 estimated that a million people then lived below the poverty line.

Unemployment, poverty, malnutrition and ill-health feed upon each other. A March 1983 study, for example, said that Sydney has one of the world's worst tuberculosis problems. An examination of homeless men living in a major hostel disclosed a rate of around eight per cent among them. Australia's largest city is still attracting the homeless and unemployed, and so Sydney has a rate similar to that of developing nations.

The ultimate tragedy of all these monetarist eccentricities was revealed within hours of Mr. Hawke becoming Prime Minister. During the election campaign, Mr. Fraser claimed that the budget deficit, the altar upon which so many Australian lives and hopes had been sacrificed, would be $A4 billion (about £1.7 billion). The real figure will be about $9.6 billion. During the campaign, Mr. Hawke pledged to introduce some mildly expansionist economic policies to provide greater employment.

The full extent of the deficit stunned the media and the new Government. Mr. Hawke immediately devalued the Australian dollar by 10 per cent (to stop the outflow of capital—partly induced by Mr. Fraser's dire predictions of the consequences of a Labour victory) and indicated that his own policies would need to be revised. Mr. Fraser claimed that the deficit would have been reduced if he had been in power. But the damage was done. Mr. Hawke will be able to use the new deficit figure for a long time as an excuse for not being able to introduce all the election pledges. He has already blamed the need to devalue upon the Liberals. (It will take some time before the Liberal Opposition can again speak credibly on economic issues.)

Mr. Fraser has recreated the Labour Party and destroyed the Liberal Party, with the exception of Tasmania (where the population is heavily divided over a local environment issue). Every recent election has gone against the Liberals. Leaving aside Queensland (which has been controlled by the Country Party for almost 30 years) only Tasmania had a Labour state Government when Mr. Fraser came to power in 1975. Now Tasmania is the only state with a Liberal Government.

The Liberal Party has suffered its worst defeat since Menzies formed it in the 1940s. Many of the previous Government members have either not been re-elected or have decided not to be part of the shadow cabinet. Andrew Peacock, the new Leader, has to rebuild the Party. Mr. Peacock (aged 44) took over the Menzies seat when he retired and was the golden boy of the Liberals. He had a large private income (though not in the Fraser bracket) and has fostered the belief that he is destined for high office. He entered Parliament aged 27 and soon became a minister.

Mr. Peacock has a number of political advantages. He is not closely

identified with the 1975 dismissal of the Whitlam Government (still one of the most divisive issues in Australian politics). He is leading an Opposition which has accepted its role as the Opposition. The Liberal-Country Party could not adjust to being the Opposition during 1972-5 and so regarded the period as simply a temporary Australian deviation. It acted irresponsibly and did not give the Whitlam Government a fair chance to govern.

Mr. Peacock, however, has some obstacles to overcome. Despite his long ministerial career (almost eight years) most of his experience was in portfolios outside Australian domestic affairs. With the 'red menace' no longer a major political issue, most of the debate is focused on economic issues. He has made no mark at all in those issues. Indeed, he has still to overcome the 'suntan kid' image of a photogenic politician without much substance. Australians may not be too politically astute, but they do insist on more than mere political images.

Another problem for Mr. Peacock is that the Liberal Party has not completely foregone the monetarist policies which were rejected by the voters in March. The Deputy Liberal Leader is John Howard, the tough Treasurer who was responsible for those policies. He shows few signs of repentance. He may yet turn out to be as awkward for Mr. Peacock as for Mr. Hawke in continuing his monetarist campaign. The UK Conservative Party division between 'wets' and 'dries' is as bitter in Australia.

Finally, the Liberals as a political machine are weaker than at any time since the 1940s. Membership has been falling in most states for some years, party members are demoralised, and moderate Labour Governments attract the sort of favourable media coverage that the Liberals are accustomed to receiving. Mr. Peacock has to rebuild the Party—the task previously undertaken by his constituency predecessor, Sir Robert Menzies, in a very different, less complicated political era. Mr. Peacock has to develop and inspire support for Liberal long-term goals—something which the highly pragmatic Mr. Fraser was unable to do.

The next federal election is scheduled for March 1986. Some of Mr. Hawke's 25 member majority are in marginal constituencies and so will probably not get re-elected because such a massive swing cannot be repeated. But, on current trends, Labour—providing it follows the Wran formula of moderation—looks like governing until at least 1989. Labour will lose its image of being the party of protest and will become the party of power.

[Dr. Keith D. Suter is Dean of Students at Wesley College, University of Sydney.]

EAST-WEST STRATEGIC STABILITY

by Robert McGeehan

ARE the superpowers moving inexorably towards nuclear catastrophe? The horrific peril of atomic weapons lies, of course, not in their existence but in their use. The recently intensified public awareness of the destruction that would eventuate if nuclear war should occur has, unfortunately, overshadowed sensible appraisals of the more important question, which is, how likely *are* such weapons to be used? The irresponsible Russian deployment of hundreds of SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missiles, and the groundless American assertion of US strategic inferiority, combined with a rhetorical belligerence reminiscent of the Cold War, have exacerbated levels of apprehension and imputed a dangerous fragility to a quite-robust deterrence. This distortion of the strategic equation has brought a renewed focus on the weapons themselves (and on their effects) rather than on the infinitely more fundamental matter of the political and psychological context in which they exist.

The continuing debate about nuclear weapons is proper, even if the logic of some of the participants on both sides is spurious or ill-informed.[1] Until universal disarmament has been achieved and the conditions of its preservation perpetuated, there will be a chance that nuclear weapons will be used. Given the infinitesimal likelihood of effective disarmament, the nuclear problem must be examined on the unchallengeable assumptions that these weapons cannot be disinvented, and that they will be a major ingredient in the dynamics of power politics for the foreseeable future (however short that may be).

The intensity of the discussion has been heightened by the decline of the balanced analysis which has, until recently, been a prominently encouraging feature of an otherwise grim and arcane subject. Fear of the failure of the 'balance of terror' has led to a questioning of deterrence itself. It is understandable, although not logical, that diagnostic attention has become so preoccupied with the size of the thermometer that even specialists sometimes forget this has nothing to do with whether or not the patient has a fever.

The atmosphere of the debate is, moreover, somewhat polluted. While few qualified observers of contemporary strategic studies would trespass into other disciplines without thorough training and reflection, the nuclear debate is inundated with the would-be expertise of countless kibitzers. Foreign policy matters generally, and the nuclear question in particular, have been analysed by many without qualifications more profound than a gut reaction of opposition to unpleasant strategic scenarios. This is not to say that a subject which, in the end, is concerned with nothing less than the fate of humanity should be restricted to professionals. But nor is it to say that amateurs should be equated with experts, or that the intrinsic presumptuousness of casual observers should be encouraged if they are sufficiently 'sincere'.

In the United States, for example, the Bishops have discussed the ethics of nuclear weapons and concluded that the mindless slaughter of tens of millions of people in an atomic exchange would not fall within the concept of a Just War. In the United Kingdom, the board of science of the British Medical Association has, after an eighteen-month research effort into the effects of nuclear weapons, concluded that a sustained strategic attack would lead to the collapse of the country's medical facilities. These perfectly obvious conclusions are not, in themselves, either wrong or necessarily misleading; but they are simplistic and quite lacking any framework of comparative analysis which would temper the dramatic aspects of their policy implications, or put them into proper political context.

NATO is a nuclear alliance. It cannot be otherwise, because of a variety of factors none of which can be dispensed with without threatening its internal fabric and hence its viability as a collective deterrent force. The foremost analytical error of many participants in the nuclear debate is precisely the neglect or repudiation of the indispensability of the atomic ingredient. One hears views which purport to be anti-nuclear but pro-NATO; or in favour of maintaining deterrence but opposed to using nuclear weapons in order to do this; or which in other ways seek to combine Western security with a non-nuclear posture. Yet these views, even if innocently admirable in their motivations, are subversive in their potential effects.[2] This is so for several reasons.

To begin with, the Soviet Union is a nuclear power. Its prestige and international standing, such as they are, cannot be divorced from its military capabilities—and this has become increasingly the case as the ideological appeal of Marxism-Leninism has receded and as the Soviet economy has revealed itself as basically flawed and unable to provide its people with even minimal material comforts commensurate with super-power status. As a military empire, the USSR cannot have more than a superficial dedication to either nuclear or conventional disarmament. This observation does not suggest that Moscow lacks interest in advantageous arms control agreements—but whatever accords are reached in this sector are most unlikely to include any steps which cut to the heart of Soviet military power.

Faced with an array of potential adversaries, Moscow understandably maintains substantial nuclear forces. Put crudely, even if the West were utterly to renounce nuclear weapons the Soviet Union would be forced to remain a nuclear power, if for no other reasons, because of the Chinese threat. Were such a Western renunciation to occur, the same Russian weapons which legitimately deter China would inevitably be available for the blackmail and intimidation of Europe and America. Given these unavoidable linkages, it is not in the nature of contemporary international political realities that the West could contemplate nuclear disarmament without a prior decision to abandon the broader effort to maintain the balance of power.

Can it be expected that any Western State which could forswear the

strategic nuclear balance would so increase its conventional forces that credible deterrence would be preserved? Even if statesmen and governments did reveal such an unusual selective political will, it would be highly improbable that voters and legislators would expend huge sums to cover their nuclear nakedness with expensive but draughty and ill-fitting conventional garments. Nor is there yet any realistic prospect of Europe assuming responsibility for its own defence, even though the alliance with America might seem to involve as many risks as gains.[3]

On the last point: elegant pleas for more European self-reliance, and a less intimate security relationship with the United States, have recently been elaborated by Hedley Bull,[4] among others. While perhaps intellectually or philosophically attractive, such calls are unlikely to have any discernible impact on the profound public disinclination to make greater sacrifices for defence. This disinclination, has, predictably, accompanied the fading perception of the 'Soviet threat'. The same absence of a sense of imminent danger which ensures the preference for minimal security spending permits the luxury of displeasing the United States. But the failure of 'Europe', and of the European states which rely on America for their defence (referred to by Professor Bull as 'parasites'), to act in ways commensurate with Europe's dignity or worthy of its history, may be more profound if not more complex. As was pointed out many years ago by Raymond Aron,

> ... the Soviet-American conflict is partly the effect, and not entirely the cause, of European impotence. Europe is in danger of being a field of battle, and therefore the victim of the conflict between the big powers. But she is also, through her weakness, one of the causes of the conflict.[5]

'Europe' remains relatively weak, of course, not only because there is no coherent political entity which can properly be so designated, but also because the individual states which compose it continue to *prefer* to depend on American security guarantees, and to rely on nuclear weapons (which are cheap) rather than commit themselves to costly conventional force ameliorations. Nuclear parity has, supposedly, undermined the threat on which European deterrence previously rested, and made requisite the development of defence capacities to provide options other than nuclear escalation. Yet this 'need'—currently widely touted—may well remain politically and psychologically so remote from apparently rational military planning as to be effectively irrelevant.

In the light of these factors, the possibility of even a temporary conventional defence of Western Europe relies upon the continued presence on the Continent of United States forces. Were the American troops stationed in Europe not maximally protected, which is to say were 'strategic deterrence' abandoned, it is unthinkable that the United States would permit them to remain as conventional hostages to Soviet nuclear blackmail. The conceptual foundation of any military alliance is not only related to a shared sense of *threat* but of *risk*. Nuclear weapons symbolise the shared risk which cannot be discarded without undermining the alliance. Tempting as it might be to hope that a potential aggressor would exhibit generosity in not targeting 'nuclear-free' areas, there is no basis

in history or military planning for such optimism. As long as there is a NATO, its members must share the perils of a possible attack no less than the benefits of a stable deterrence. Nor is 'neutrality' a real option, since Western Europe's neutral states depend, ultimately, on US nuclear weapons for their independence.

The focus of popular concern with questions related to strategic stability has shifted from enhanced-radiation warheads ('the neutron bomb') to the alleged vulnerability of ICBMs to the imbalance in intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). The 1979 NATO decision, to begin deployment of new Pershing II and cruise missiles at the end of 1983 should arms control negotiations not succeed, was generally accepted as long as the emphasis remained less on deployment than on arms control (or on arms reduction via the 'zero option' or some interim variation of this). It became increasingly controversial as time passed without agreement in Geneva. Yet even before this, the Peace Movement chose to take little notice of the sustained Soviet deployment of more and more SS-20 missiles—which have continued to appear as a series of *faits accomplis*—and to agitate a great deal about NATO's *fait non-accompli* of postponed deployment. This bizarre situation, in which friendly weapons which do not exist cause greater consternation than hostile ones which do, reflects part of the contrast between open and secret societies (the latter enjoying the flexibility of unopposed military deployments without prior warning, while in the West hysterical concern may surround weapons still on the drawing boards).

NATO governments constantly face domestic political constraints upon their international obligations, a problem whose complexity is exacerbated in times of economic recession. The United States must lead the Alliance in the manifestation of political will no less than in the generation of advanced military technology; yet President Reagan's difficulties, for example, in winning acceptance of the MX missile are a reminder of the elusiveness of that ideal defence-request statement which concurrently frightens the Congress, reassures the Europeans and deters the Russians.

Whatever the outcome of the INF negotiations in Geneva, three points are fundamental.

1. NATO cannot, for political and psychological reasons of East-West relationships, eschew modernisation of its INF forces via the permanent exclusion of intermediate-range weapons from Europe as long as the Soviet Union has vast numbers of such weapons which are perceived to have tipped the balance in Moscow's favour.

2. For reasons of Western cohesion, NATO governments must explain to their peoples that the weapons exist in order not to be used, and that deterrence is a sound strategy for ethical and moral reasons no less than for political and military ones.

3. Finally, Western security decisions cannot be seen to be subject to the veto power of a Soviet Union which has with impunity deployed excessive weaponry whose primary purpose can only be intimidation.

For the first time the great powers dare not contemplate as a sensible

policy option the direct use of force against each other. The nuclear factor is thus different from previous mutations in military technology not only in degree but in kind, since its invocation promises mutual obliteration.

It is, paradoxically, on just this gruesome point that the Peace Movement has had its most accurate insights, although it has thereafter drawn incorrect policy conclusions. The anti-nuclear movement is, fundamentally, a rebellion against the prospect of uncontrolled war—yet the soundest guarantee against just this lies in the weapons which contain the prospect.[6] The instinctive urge to ban them has utterly failed to come to grips with the political realities which make a ban impossible, just as the governments whose deterrence policies rest upon the nuclear paradox have failed to put it into a perspective which their publics can properly comprehend.

The East-West context of stable deterrence is not an obscene phenomenon based on revulsion against the scenarios of madmen, but an alternative to the repetition of the wars of contemporary history. The graveyard of these struggles is littered with the wreckage of attempts to use force when the consequences of failure were still considered tolerable, and of efforts to ignore the vital importance of a military balance. On the latter point, it is not irrelevant to recall that it was the failure of the Western democracies to engage in an 'arms race' in the 1930s which made the ensuing tragedy more likely. Far from condemning the historical discontinuity which the nuclear weapon has fostered, one could perceive such a break with the past as a positive one.

Is the 'balance of terror' as fragile as once was thought? Perhaps the greatest analytical fallacy in the current debate concerns the relationship between the danger of war and the numbers of nuclear weapons the competing superpowers acquire.[7] While it may well be true that the danger of nuclear weapons being used increases with an increase in the number of states (or other international actors) which possess them, it does not follow that there is a greater likelihood of nuclear weapons being used as between the United States and the Soviet Union as the number of their launchers or warheads grows. Indeed, quite the contrary should be the case if Deterrence Theory is correct (and we have no evidence to suppose that it is not). As long as there does not develop so huge an imbalance as to tempt an aggressor to attack first, the risk of using atomic weapons will outweigh any possible advantage because of the incalculable consequences. Thus, the growth of the arsenals of the superpowers should bolster, not threaten, the deterrence relationship, since the certainty of retaliation will be beyond reasonable doubt.

Nor is there more than a remote possibility of the development of a qualitative imbalance so great as to threaten systemic stability. For more than three decades the simultaneity of independent major technological innovation by the United States and the Soviet Union has been remarkably consistent.[8] The much-discussed 'technological breakthrough' simply does not exist: even if one or the other side were to develop something

important which the adversary lacked, it would still remain wildly foolhardy to base policy which risks survival itself on an innovation which can only be properly tested when it has become too late to discover its flaws!

Would the world be safer with fewer weapons? The other side of the coin—of quantitative acquisitions not increasing the danger of war—is that arms reductions would not necessarily enhance stability. Token cuts might contribute to the improvement of the international atmospherics within which a new *détente* could be explored; but these would be more cosmetic than substantive. The 'deep cuts' or 'drastic reductions' which have been spoken of in the rhetoric of the START negotiations remain as much slogans as realistic objectives. It is not always appreciated that 'overkill' capacity is neither absurd nor destabilising (although it is economically costly). It ensures the positive functions of bolstering deterrence as between the superpowers and of keeping them so far ahead of possible additional rivals that the international system remains strategically bipolar.[9] It is nuclear *multipolarity* which would increase the threat of cataclysmic war. As long as bipolarity remains, no amount of substrategic instability should erode the mutual disinclination in Washington and Moscow to risk atomic confrontation. Peace, it might almost be said, is inevitable.

The conclusions which our analysis suggests may be summarised without ornamentation. Nuclear weapons exist in order not to be used, and their plentiful existence forms the solid basis for a deterrence which is indivisible and not contingent upon every weapon on one side being matched by its counterpart on the other. The balance of terror is stable precisely because the prospect of its failure is so horrendous and, whatever their other characteristics, the superpowers have proven that bipolarity need not lead (as it so often did throughout past history) to war.

Despite the superficially unpleasant atmospherics generated by mutual expressions of recrimination, the reality of East-West stability should not be confused with the rhetoric of the leaders in either Washington or Moscow. Russians and Americans both understand that deterrence is a process as well as a condition and a policy.[10] Nor is there reason to conclude that drastic tinkering with a condition of equipoise is either necessary or desirable. As Lord Carrington recently said to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'to disturb a balance that has worked for an imbalance that probably will not, is as naïve as it is irresponsible.' Thus, seen in perspective, the political context in which nuclear weapons exist, multiply and are *not* employed is one of superpower prudence, restraint, and so acute a degree of awareness of the price of strategic instability that war between them is even more improbable than it is unthinkable.

---

1. See Alun Chalfont, 'The Great Unilateralist Illusion', *Encounter* (April 1983).
2. For example, Dr. Frank Barnaby, former Director of SIPRI, has long argued

that the 'logic' of the nuclear arms race can only lead to war; his proposed alternative policies, for all their good intentions, could only invite instability. See 'Non-Provocative, Non-Nuclear Defence of Western Europe', *ADIU Report*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January-February 1983.

3. Nuclear weapons exist in order not to be used against other nuclear powers; their utility for political and psychological leverage is a different matter, although examples of 'nuclear blackmail' are rare indeed. See Lawrence Freedman, 'Europe between the Superpowers', in Gerald Segal et al., *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace* (Macmillan, 1983).
4. Hedley Bull, 'European Self-Reliance and the Reform of NATO', *Foreign Affairs* (Spring 1983).
5. Raymond Aron, *The Century of Total War* (Beacon, 1955).
6. Desmond Ball, 'Can Nuclear War be Controlled?', *Adelphi Paper No. 169* (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn, 1981).
7. See Michael Howard, 'Weapons and Peace', *Atlantic Quarterly* (Spring 1983).
8. As was brilliantly analysed and correctly predicted by Samuel P. Huntington in 'Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results', *Public Policy* (1958).
9. Cf. Michael Mandelbaum's analysis in David Gompert et al., *Nuclear Weapons and World Politics* (1977).
10. The conclusion of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (1982-83 *Strategic Survey*) is that on both sides the forces of moderation remain more powerful than the hawks—not because of pacifism or other such inclinations, but because of the logic of deterrence. 'For all that each side dislikes the other, neither wishes to risk the destruction of its own cities, its own standards of living, or ultimately its own civilisation, while there is any hope for working out a more agreeable future together.'

[Robert McGeehan is Director of Studies of the United Kingdom Graduate Programme of the School of International Relations, University of Southern California (London) and Senior Associate Member of St. Antony's College, Oxford. He is the author of *The German Rearmament Question: American Diplomacy and European Defense after World War II* (University of Illinois Press, 1971) and *American Foreign Policies and Western Security* (Macmillan, in preparation).]

The August issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Japan and South-East Asia* by Professor Ian Nish, *Albania's Muscular Socialism* by Michael Kaser, *Northern Ireland—the Realistic Solutions* by Hugh Munro (held over from July) and *The Child and the Video* by Martyn Goff.

LIBYA'S 'NEW' FOREIGN POLICY

by Ronald Bruce St. John

ON September 1, 1969, the Libyan Free Unionist Officers Movement overthrew the monarchy of King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi and established a military government headed by a Revolutionary Command Council. In the ensuing decade, Arab nationalism, Arab unity, and positive neutrality were the central tenets of a revolutionary foreign policy marked by its inflexibility.[1] Recent reports, some generated by the Libyan head of State Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, have suggested that a major shift is occurring in the means and goals of Libyan foreign policy.[2] A close examination of that foreign policy, especially its application over the last three yars, casts doubt on such assertions.

Arab nationalism remains the focal point of Libyan foreign policy. Like his mentor the late Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasir, Qadhdhafi has fostered an Arab nationalism based on a glorification of Arab history and culture which views the Arabic-speaking states as the Arab nation. Central to this belief is the argument that the Arab people are equal to any other people in the world and have the right to guide their own destiny. Like many Arab nationalists, Qadhdhafi sees the Palestinian question as the principal threat to both Islam and the Arab world. In his mind, the enemy is Zionism, seen as a European political movement, and not the state of Israel which he seldom identifies as such. His solution is for the Jews who immigrated to Israel after 1948 to return to the countries from which they came leaving Palestine to the Palestinians.[3] Consistent with this long-standing policy, Libya refused to attend the Arab summit meeting held in Fez, Morocco in September 1982; and in the spring of 1983, Qadhdhafi joined five radical Palestine Liberation Organisation groups in rejecting both the Fez and Reagan Middle East peace proposals.

Islam is an integral part of Qadhdhafi's variant of Arab nationalism. He argues that every nation must have a religion and that the religion of the Arab nation is Islam. He has even told Christian Arabs that they must adopt Islam if they are to become real Arabs. The fundamentalist aspects of Qadhdhafi's approach to Islam have much in common with the doctrines of the Sanusiya Order, a nineteenth century Libyan revivalist movement. At the same time, he has added reformist elements designed to reduce the role of the ulama or religious leadership and thus make Islam a more complete domestic and international instrument in support of the revolution.[4]

Jihad or holy war remains the action element of Qadhdhafi's nationalism. In the broadest sense, he sees it as the means to achieve social justice both in and out of Libya. In a narrower sense, he sees jihad as the most effective tool available to combat imperialism, the primary threat to Islam. Qadhdhafi's concept of jihad has led him to support liberation movements as diverse in approach and philosophy as the Somali National Salvation Front and the Irish Republican Army. Qadhdhafi's close

association with terrorism has led to much adverse publicity; and in recent years he has sought to differentiate between terrorism which he opposes and revolutionary violence which he continues to support. Predictably, the boundary between the two remains unclear. In February 1983, for example, the Libyan General People's Congress approved funding for revolutionary forces throughout the Islamic world and created 'suicide squads' to attack Arab lands occupied by Israel and other 'symbols of treason' in the Arab arena. Many observers felt the resolution presaged yet another campaign against exiled dissidents. The congress described the United States government as the leader of world terrorism.[5]

The revolutionary government has also made a concerted effort to develop Libyan nationalism. Libya is derived from three entities: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the Fezzan; and the resultant regionalism has had a negative impact on the development of Libyan nationalism. European colonialism increased the feeling of separation between Libya's regions; and while a feeling of national identity began to grow under the monarchy, it did not develop fast enough to preserve the monarchy from the stronger, more vibrant pan-Arab ideology articulated by Nasir. To develop support for both foreign and domestic policies, the revolutionary government has skilfully exploited the deeds of 'Umar al-Mukhtar and other participants in the Italian resistance as well as trumpeting its support for anti-colonial movements elsewhere.[6] These policies, of course, resemble those of other revolutionary movements which have attacked the past to justify the present while invoking traditional values and an historical heritage in support of the new regime.

Regionally, Qadhdhafi has been a strong and vocal advocate of Arab unity arguing that the Arabs must become a single state if they ever hope to regain their former glory and reach their full potential. He links the Palestinian question to this issue also, contending that the creation of the state of Israel was the result of Arab divisions and that the Arabs must unite if they expect to regain Palestine. It is Qadhdhafi's persistence in seeking to make Arab unity a reality that has separated him from contemporary proponets of the idea. In the last two decades, he has engaged in union discussions with Egypt (twice), Syria (twice), the Sudan, and Tunisia. His policy is also unique in the sense that Libya is the first Arab state with oil wealth to be a firm supporter of pan-Arabism.

Qadhdhafi has pursued unity at home as well as abroad. Like many revolutionary leaders, he has made loyalty to the revolution the crucial form of allegiance. In 1975, the Revolutionary Command Council approved a penal code which limits political activity to participation in government organised and controlled structures. Criticism of the government, the formation of opposition groups, and the expression of theories designed to change the basic political, social, and economic systems of the state are expressly prohibited.

In the late 1970s, Qadhdhafi broadened his appeal for unity by advocating both Islamic unity and African unity; however, his efforts have not borne fruit. An ongoing military build-up and sporadic border encroachments have aggravated regional problems and kept Libya's relations with

its neighbours at varying levels of tension. In the first two months of 1983, for example, Libya took military steps threatening to Chad, Tunisia, the Sudan, and Egypt. The failure of Qadhdhafi's quest for regional leadership was highlighted in March 1983 when the Organisation of African Unity moved its nineteenth summit meeting from Libya to Ethiopia. Qadhdhafi, originally scheduled to chair the meeting, was unable to attract a quorum of member states to Tripoli in large part because of Libyan policies in northern and central Africa.[7]

In the early years, the revolutionary government grouped the United States and the Soviet Union together as imperialist states pursuing spheres of influence in the Middle East. Colonel Qadhdhafi often dismissed them both as simply two sides of the same coin.[8] As a result, Libya's early relations with the superpowers followed a dichotomous pattern. Harshly critical of American foreign policy, Libya sold most of its oil to the European allies of the United States and used the proceeds to purchase massive amounts of Western technology. The revolutionary government was also very critical of the Soviet Union, especially its policy of allowing Soviet Jews to immigrate to Israel; however, it also purchased Soviet technology, particularly military equipment, in increasing amounts. By 1983, Libya had invested some $12 billion in modern weaponry.

Libya's response to the bipolarisation of world power resembles that of many Third World states, especially those in Africa and the Middle East. It formally rejects both the Eastern and Western blocs and defines neutrality in terms of the pursuit of an independent policy based on Arab national interests. Notwithstanding, the Arab concept of neutralism has never been evenly balanced between the two blocs; it is a revisionist stance aimed at the status quo long supported by established Western assumptions and positions.

Therefore, it is not surprising that the Libyan government's policy of positive neutrality has resulted in an increasingly close relationship with the Soviet Union. Long-standing, deep-seated policy differences, especially over the Palestinian question, are at the heart of the steady deterioration in Libyan-American relations. In contrast, Qadhdhafi has generally praised the Soviets in recent years for their support of the Arab struggle to regain Palestine. Libyan dependence on Soviet arms has also become an increasingly central element of their relationship as has an expanding programme of nuclear co-operation.[9] Over the last eighteen months, the Soviet-Libyan relationship has deepened; and there is renewed talk that the two will sign a treaty of friendship and co-operation similar to those the Soviet Union has signed with Syria, Iraq, and South Yemen. At the same time, Libya has expanded its ties with several Eastern European governments and increased its co-operation with Soviet allies such as Nicaragua.[10]

Over the last decade and a half, Libya's revolutionary government has pursued an aggressive, complex, and often violent foreign policy which has alienated numerous governments around and away from the Mediterranean Sea. In recent months, Libyan diplomats have talked increasingly of forging major new directions in Libyan foreign policy, in part

aimed at rebuilding the links with the West which were severely damaged in the late 1970s. The governments of Italy and France, for example, have been recent recipients of Libyan overtures for enhanced interchange and commerce.

Unfortunately, contemporary Libyan foreign policy is not all that it appears to be. Faced with increasing domestic opposition fueled by sharply declining oil revenues, Colonel Qadhdhafi is understandably seeking to reduce Libya's current political isolation and enhance his own political reputation. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that these tactical gestures portend a significant reorientation in Libyan foreign policy. The foundations of Libyan foreign policy continue to be nationalism, unity, and positive neutrality; and neither their interpretation nor their application has changed measurably since 1969. Hence, Libya's 'new' foreign policy is both self-deceptive and self-defeating as it continues to rest on the tenets and objectives which produced the political isolation it hopes to reduce .

---

1. Nathan Alexander [Ronald Bruce St. John], 'The Foreign Policy of Libya: Inflexibility Amid Change,' *Orbis*, 24, 4 (Winter, 1981), pp. 819-846.
2. For example, see 'Kaddafi Changes His Tune,' *Newsweek*, January 31, 1983, pp. 35-37.
3. Mu'Ammar el Qathafi, *Discourses* (Valetta, Malta: Adam Publishers 1975), pp. 48-49.
4. Ronald Bruce St. John, 'The Ideology of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi: *Theory and Practice*' forthcoming in the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (November 1983).
5. *The New York Times*, February 21, 1983.
6. Muammar Al Qathafi, *The Green Book, Part III: The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory* (Tripoli: Public Establishment for Publishing, Advertising, and Distribution, 1979), 18-26.
7. *The Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 1983.
8. The Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Information and Culture, *The Fundamentals of the Third International Theory* (Tripoli: Libyan Press, 1974), pp. 5-6.
9. Ronald Bruce St. John, 'The Soviet Penetration of Libya,' *The World Today*, 38, 4 (April, 1982), pp. 131-138.
10. *Middle East Economic Digest*, 27, 12 (25-31 March 1983), p. 39.

[Ronald Bruce St. John is an Affiliate at the Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, USA.]

THE PAPAL TRIPS

by Roland Dallas

POPE John Paul's journey in March through central America raised questions for the first time about the value of Papal trips. It was called 'controversial'. When the Pope returned to Rome, church leaders felt impelled to stage a demonstration in St. Peter's Square in his honour, almost as if he needed reassurance. People asked why the Pope was insisting on going to such difficult countries as El Salvador and Guatemala, where it was plain to see that his visit would have no effect on the blood-letting, and Nicaragua, where he would get caught up in the seamy side of Marxist politics. Any assessment of Papal trips should, however, look beyond any immediate political impact or long-term change; it should start with the man who launched the idea that Popes could and should fly around the world if they wanted to. Popes Paul VI and John Paul have displayed the advantages and limits of papal travel.

In the early years of his pontificate, Paul flew to India, Australia, the United States and Colombia, a dynamic if somewhat withdrawn figure who caught the imagination of millions. We are now accustomed to the exuberant greeting which ordinary people enjoy giving to Popes. But then it was astonishing to see the swirling throngs of Hindus in Bombay hailing this delicate, self-contained Italian and listen to the cheering Americans packing Yankee stadium in New York, unable to understand what the Pope was saying because his accent was so strong, but not caring.

To many observers of the Roman Catholic church, these early tours may well have been the most notable actions taken by Paul. Now, well after his little-mourned death, it is possible to make a broader assessment. Paul's strength was Vatican politics. His legacy to the church was the new structures which he carefully and cautiously built on the guidance of the 1962-65 Vatican ecumenical council. Paul internationalised the Roman curia (although the skilful Italians still managed to dominate it). He set up secretariats to make contacts with other Christians, non-Christians and Jews, and to help promote justice and peace.

Paul organised the first synods of bishops, giving the lower echelons a hint—but only a hint—of power-sharing. He listened carefully to all the bishops who paid ad limina visits to Rome, as Popes had done before him. But Paul, a veteran diplomat, was the first to deploy the international telephone and telex to reach out to his church.

With an outward display of calm but undoubted inner anguish, Paul presided over a trough in the fortunes of the church following the ecumenical council. Both priests and the faithful seemed to be shaken by the changes which it wrought, especially in the mass. 'Peter's pence' contributions from the faithful, which boomed under Pope John XXIII, slumped under Paul. Paul's purpose was to hold the church, increasingly divided between liberals and conservatives, together. He allowed countless priests to give up holy orders. But he carefully laid the groundwork of the

church of the future—a groundwork which is now being used with great profit by John Paul. Most notably, John Paul has been able to call upon the vast body of encyclicals and speeches which Paul delivered on a wide array of topics. The structure was there. It had all been carefully thought out.

In his declining years, this remarkable man seemed to be frail and querulous and aware of his limitations. He made speech after speech but rarely gained the world's attention. The cardinals and bishops observed this. On his death, the conclave reached the conclusion that the church did not need another skilled diplomat who had long padded the corridors of the palazzi in Vatican City State. They wanted a pastor. Out of obscurity in Venice, they plucked Albino Luciani, a man with no knowledge of the Vatican, a humble pastoral figure who was educated at a modest north Italian seminary. Pope John Paul I captivated his audiences and might have won the affection of the world if he had not been struck down. This brief experience confirmed the cardinals in their judgment: they wanted another pastor. Of the Italians, only Pappalardo of Sicily really filled the bill and the other Italians did not enthuse. The choice turned to Karol Wojtyla.

It was an odd choice in many ways. Wojtyla was a dull archbishop, a man much more at home with a small group of earnest Polish Catholic students of moral philosophy than with a throng; a scholar who sometimes seemed to prefer convoluted thoughts to plain speaking. But Wojtyla suited the moderate-to-conservative majority in the conclave: he was deeply devout, polyglot, handsome, healthy and energetic. He was to be the world pastor.

And so he has been. John Paul has travelled and travelled, benefiting from the patient and unsung labours of Paul. He has left the administration of the Vatican to others, with lamentable results in the case of the Vatican's bank. He has broken no new ground in Catholic thought: Paul's teachings were usually enough of a basis to go on with.

Why has he travelled? The first answer is that he travels to encourage local bishops, priests and religious and to urge young people to become priests or religious, and to defend the interests of the church. In virtually every country that he visits, the Pope addresses the local conference of bishops and congregations of priests and religious; he also usually visits a seminary.

Sometimes these occasions are full of bland goodwill, when there are no difficulties. But if there are difficulties, the Pope delivers a blunt message. Priests and religious in Mexico, for example, were told to keep out of politics and social service and become 'poles of unity' in the community they served. In Zaire, priests were instructed not to Africanise the mass too much.

When the church itself is in danger, the Pope uses forthright language. In Nicaragua, he said the idea of a 'people's church' parallel to the traditional church but not under its authority, was 'absurd'. The Pope was aware that this 'people's church' was being set up by the Marxist Sandinist revolutionaries and leftist priests who wished to undermine

the established church, mainly because it was the only organisation left in Nicaragua able to stand up to the Sandinists. He felt his bishops were threatened and he defended them. He paid a price: at times he was shouted down; but he made his point.

While the promotion and defence of the church is the basic motive for papal visits, it is not the only one. The Pope is not just 'the servant of the servants of God'. He is a world figure and can, if he is ambitious, become a 'messenger of peace and love'.

In this second role, Paul and John Paul have made passionate appeals for peace to the general assembly of the United Nations. John Paul made what is probably the best speech of his pontificate at Drogheda, north of Dublin, appealing to Catholics and Protestants in Ireland to end their murderous strife and warning politicians that things would get worse if they did not take the initiative and seek conciliation. In his tour of central America, he again preached conciliation.

There is a third role for a travelling Pope: that of an achiever. If you come, his bishops must tell him, perhaps things will change in our country! If only you could speak your mind to the president of the republic, in the presence of his wife, or his cabinet, what a difference it would make! If only you could initiate a dialogue! Single out a leader for very special treatment! Ask for greater social justice! Demand respect for human rights and call for the holding of elections! Instant achievements are, however, very rare.

Despite the sometimes surreal atmosphere in which he moves, the Pope is human and fallible. Sometimes when he visits a country it almost comes to a stop for a day or two. That certainly happened in Ireland. Everyone listened to what he had to say. And when he left, the killings continued. His old-fashioned preaching in Ireland about the dangers of divorce and the joy for a woman of raising a family did apparently have some impact: conservative Catholics felt strengthened. If there was any other impact, it was intangible.

Before he arrived in Guatemala, the authorities went ahead with the execution of six guerrillas despite pleas from the Vatican. In Quetzaltenango, the Pope let rip a fierce denunciation of the way Guatemala's Indian population had been suffering. A few days later, the president of Guatemala accepted his culpability in public. That was an achievement.

In Brazil, John Paul made speech after speech warning of the danger of social unrest if the authorities and the privileged classes did nothing to improve the lot of the poor. He underlined his concern by visiting two *favelas*, one fairly tidy and well-established, the other a squalid mess. After he left, not much was changed.

In the Philippines, the Pope talked about the rights of the poor and made it clear that he thought President Marcos ought to be doing much more for them. He visited the worst slum in Manila. After he left, little was done. In Zaire, John Paul spoke about the evils of corruption. After he left, President Mobutu remained in power and showed no signs of changing his ways. In the Far East, the Pope sent out a call for better relations with China, where once the church ran hundreds of schools

P2833

and hospitals and thousands of priests preached to a growing Catholic community. Since then, the Chinese have only bent a little and show no sign of permitting Chinese to split their loyalty between Peking and Rome. John Paul visited Istanbul and Canterbury to talk to the ecumenical patriarch of the Orthodox church and the leader of the world's 65 million Anglicans. These visits were occasions for many well-meaning words but scarcely a sign of progress towards the unity for which most Christians say they yearn. All of these examples can only be regarded as failures if the Pope is elevated to the stature of a miracle worker.

If the substantial benefits of papal tours seem so intangible, or hard to quantify, it might be asked: why does the Pope not stay at home most of the time and leave his hierarchy to do its job? The most immediate answer is that with the church we are dealing with a mystery, in the best sense of the word. Who can say what impact the Pope's visits have on the local churches? Fifty more boys may join a seminary than would have done so otherwise; one of them might become an outstanding cardinal. A brilliant girl might become a 'bride of Christ' and, later, another generation's Mother Teresa. A dull speech, poorly delivered by a tired Pope might, however, switch enthusiastic young people off the church. A successful visit cannot fail to encourage bishops and priests; strong words of guidance must be listened to and, if at all possible, followed. If the Pope cannot influence his most loyal followers, what can he do? The impact of papal visits on local churches will probably only be appreciable several years afterwards.

The same may be true of the Pope's impact on the society which he addresses on a tour. The Pope does not take geo-political decisions nor can he alter the economic structure of the country which has invited him. Lay people have notoriously short memories for what they are told by priests. And yet no one who has accompanied the Pope on one or more of his tours can fail to be impressed by the force of the popular welcome. This too is a mystery. Many of those who throw confetti, hang from windows, stand on parapets, climb trees, jump up and down or simply call out for a blessing are not Catholics at all. Yet they are drawn strongly to this foreign high priest in his white robes. It may be that 30 seconds after the motorcade passed they resume their ordinary life, unaffected. It is hard to say how their lives might have changed. And yet, an observer of dozens of throngs cannot escape the conclusion that the people are there because their presence fulfills a certain longing.

In Brazil, for example, the welcome of the Pope was enormous, even through large numbers of Brazilians believe in various forms (respectable or otherwise) of macumba. Why the reaction? Perhaps because in a world where the generals had been ruling for many years, and where there were no heroes except possibly the footballer Pelé, ordinary Brazilians had no one whom they could admire and respect. The visit of the Pope released this pent-up emotional need and gave it full scope. It is impossible to assess the significance of that outpouring of excitement, admiration, respect and affection. It may be here today and gone tomorrow. It may, on the other hand, provide a sea-change in the spiritual attitudes of a

generation. At the very least, the Brazilian welcome to the Pope cannot fail to have underlined the modest standing among the people that was enjoyed by the army.

There were also stirring welcomes for the Pope in the capital of scepticism, Paris, throughout Britain, where the decaying official religion has been replaced in many hearts by a sort of worship of royalty, and in that hotbed of materialism, the United States. Again, many who waited and waved were not devout Catholics. No public opinion polls have revealed what the crowds thought, but is it too imaginative to suggest that for many people the Pope's visit served as a reminder of a neglected and forgotten traditional morality and sense of godliness? For most people, it may have been a memory quickly forgotten when television images of the Pope waving goodbye were replaced by those of snooker players or soap operas.

One of the strongest reservations held by those who worry about Papal trips is that the Pope finds himself associating with evil, crooked or at least disreputable men and women. It is certainly true that this has happened. In Haiti, he made a public appearance with President-for-life Jean-Claude Duvalier, despotic chief of a discredited regime. In the Philippines, the Pope was the guest of President and Mrs. Marcos. During his extensive tour of the Philippine islands, the Pope was welcomed at every stopover by Mrs. Marcos, whose plane flew ahead of the Papal airliner. At every arrival ceremony, Mrs. Marcos was on centre-stage with the Pope in front of the television cameras; she took front seat at many of the masses which the Pope celebrated. The Pope has been seen shaking hands with President Mobutu of Zaire, President Rios Montt of Guatemala and General Galtieri of Argentina. He is not, however, the first Pope to have acted in this way: Pope Paul received, and shook hands with, President Idi Amin of Uganda at a time when Amin was being accused of committing atrocities (Paul was defending the interests of missionaries in Uganda).

It can be argued that these associations tarnish the Papacy and the mission of the Pope. This case would be strong if the Pope is seen as an exalted figure of unstained purity placed on a pedestal and given solely to making pronouncements of great goodness and gravitas.

Yet a hard-working Pope is not like this. To be a world pastor requires travel and when the Pope travels, he does so with two roles: those of head of the church and head of the Vatican City State. As head of the church, he communicates with the local primate and conference of bishops; as head of Vatican City State, he deals with the president of the republic or, in the case of Britain, with the Queen.

So it is that at every arrival ceremony the Pope is met by the head of state of the country which he is visiting. Frequently, there is a 21-gun salute. The Pope, looking sometimes disconcerted, inspects an honour guard. He stands, together with the president of the republic, as the national anthems of his host country and Vatican City State are played. The Vatican has a national anthem: an eminently forgetable piece for brass band which would do as well for the Upper Volta. It is, therefore,

impossible for Popes to visit countries with which the Vatican has diplomatic relations without meeting their opposite numbers as head of state.

It can be argued that this arrangement is rather ridiculous for a church which, as Campion said, comes 'only for souls'. But state-to-state relations have their advantages. The Vatican, and the Roman Catholic church, thereby gains a status far above any other church. The Pope's ambassadors (nuncios or pro-nuncios) have access to governments and diplomatic corps around the world. Many of them are wily Italian archbishops who are very well informed. The Pope's envoy is meant to send back to Rome reports on church and state which will complement the reports sent to Rome by the local primate and conference of bishops. He may see things in a wider perspective. There may be times when a Papal envoy is in a better position to protect and advance the interests of the church in its relations with the government than is the primate. The envoy is also meant to send back to Rome objective advice about appointments to dioceses. Even if he wanted to escape the government-to-government relationship during a visit, the Pope could not do so.

In any event, this does not seem to trouble John Paul. Frequently, he makes critical comments while answering the welcoming speech of the president of the republic, or in later speeches on his tours.

A deeper concern is that Papal visits inevitably embroil the Pope in politics to the detriment of the church's eternal nature and present prestige. This argument can most strongly be put in the case of Nicaragua, where an organised Sandinist claque's chanting was amplified out of all proportion to its size by the manipulation of the sound system and seemed to drown out some of the Pope's words.

Papal politics seem a mystery. On one hand, the Pope repeatedly insists that his priests should abjure politics and serve all of their communities, trying to unite them. On the other, the Pope himself seems quite happy to make seemingly political pronouncements on many of his tours and political gestures in the grand manner, like his formal public meeting (following a private one) in the Vatican with Lech Walesa and a Polish Solidarity delegation.

The Pope's attitude to political priests needs no repeating: he believes most are attracted by Marxist thinking and that those who devote too much of their time to political and social work lose both their religious devotion and their honoured position in the society which they are meant to serve.

Papal politics are more complex. The Pope and his aides are deeply religious but also intensely political. Karol Wojtyla of Krakow has strongly-held views about the evil of war, about communism and about the Soviet Union, all rooted in extremely painful personal experience. He also has views about the liberty which exists in the democratic west. As Pope, however, he expresses himself in terms of principles based on the teaching of Christ or in the encyclicals.

Thus Papal views on the right of workers to organise into free trade unions will usually contain at least one reference to Pope Leo XII's

encyclical Rerum Novarum, written in 1891, which took note of the existence of unions and gave them the Papal seal of approval. Opinions about the need for more aid for the third world can be based in Pope Paul's under-valued encyclical *Populorum Progressio.*

The Pope, the Vatican and the church in general take a strong political line but always in terms of principle. The church is in favour of the fulfilment of man (the male-dominated Vatican prefers the old-fashioned generic word 'man' to 'humanity'). In its principal statements, it says that humanity should have the chance to develop its relationship with God (it is against any limits on religious education or the activities of the church); that humanity should participate in the decisions which are taken affecting its destiny (it favours regular free elections and respect for human rights); that humanity has a right to work and to organise groups to protect the rights of workers (it favours free trade unions); that humanity has a right to property but not in excess, and that excess should be shared out appropriately (a social democratic view of society); that peoples have the right to their own particular forms of culture and self-expression and should not be dominated by others. It favours Africa for the Africans, Poland for the Poles; and that western materialism is ungodly and not the solution to humanity's needs (the church takes this position because materialism has a deadly effect on religion and because criticism of western materialism gives the church the image of even-handedness in east-west affairs and more legitimacy to its strictures on Marxism).

These and other principles related to the fulfilment of man 'as a whole' can be pulled out of the Vatican's hat and stressed appropriately for any state occasion at which the Pope wishes to make a particular point. It is politics, yet it is also reaffirmation of constant, broad principles. The Vatican's speech-writers are past masters at getting a point over by allusions to general principles without being specific. Great care is taken to ensure that the Pope never gets down to details.

Pope John Paul will make more tours and cause more controversies. Perhaps the most important, in geo-political terms, may be his visit to Poland. There will be others. It would be fascinating to observe the Pope lecturing President Pinochet of Chile or the cowed and cautious Hungarian bishops. Wherever he goes, this hard-working Pope is likely to continue to stir things up.

[Roland Dallas is on the staff of *The Economist*. Before taking up this appointment he covered seven papal trips.]

VOTES AND SEATS

by Paul Rose

WITH a fall in the popular vote Maggie Thatcher took the Tories back into power with an overwhelming Parliamentary majority. With seven and three quarter million votes the Alliance failed to hit the point where seats reflected their 26 per cent while Labour with 28 per cent, driven back into its heartlands, achieved its worst performance for half a century. That was the overall picture but as I forecast in my pre-election article (*Contemporary Review*, No. 1406, Vol. 242), which had the distinction of predicting the date correctly, there were curious individual happenings: split votes in many natural Labour seats where SDP incumbents polled enough to permit a Tory to slip between; Alliance wins in Leeds, Woolwich or Scotland; Labour victories in vulnerable West Midlands marginals. No doubt there was much more tactical voting than before but the regional divide is now a chasm and politics may become increasingly extra Parliamentary, reflecting the frustration of those denied representation by our unique voting system.

There are, however, certain features which stand out in my mind in an unusually dull election with repetition, scaremongering and little in the way of creative thinking dominating the campaigns.

The most obvious factor was the lack of credibility of the Labour Opposition and its leader for whom I have great personal affection. He just isn't a leader but a great publicist, propagandist and perhaps the best debater in the House of Commons when I entered it in 1964. A man of generous spirit, gentle and yet with passionate convictions and courage—but nice guys come second. In the light of the predestined outcome according to the pollsters the pre-election jockeying amid the chaos and confusion of new boundaries and Constituencies with strange sounding names assumed the dimension of a mini-election itself.

The battle to get to the starting line was tougher for some than the race to the winning post. Sir Anthony Meyer sprinted towards the High Court and galloped back to Wales to topple a would-be iron lady, Beatta Brooks, descending upon his territory from Brussels. The Rt. Hon. Joel Barnett was discarded in favour of local rivals to his left. Leader in waiting Tony Benn was consigned to an undesirable seat which he was ultimately to lose. The peripatetic Mr. Huckfield got lost between stations while Ian Sproat read the tea leaves wrongly. One ended up throwing away a winning seat only to be beaten by the lone new SDP youngster riding out of the West.

As they approached the start, I looked back on the five elections which I had fought (and won) with a strange feeling of detatchment about this one. To be truthful with the reader, my decision to opt out of Parliament in 1979 was so traumatic that I have no recollection of the last campaign. Only those whose whole adult life has been in that ethos can understand such a reaction and my sympathy goes to many colleagues and opponents

who will find the next year difficult to cope with psychologically. I at least had my profession and my passion for sport. By the end of the campaign this time the old addiction was driving me to nostalgia about declarations, walk abouts, shouting into loundspeakers, distributing stickers and cuddling babies. My confession to burying my head in the sports pages in 1979 was almost equalled on June 9th, 1983 by my listening to the commentary on England and New Zealand rather than the tedious repetition of results and comments only this time out of boredom not self preservation. That was a sunny day, particularly for Mrs. Thatcher but it may yet prove to be a disaster for the social fabric of a nation where consensus has been more elevated than confrontation in our daily lives as a virtue that was peculiarly British. The talent for compromise has gone.

As the Election battle began and the Walworth Road artillery began to fire I was still more carried away by the wild enthusiasm at Wembley where I aplauded my beloved Manchester United and their gallant rivals, Brighton. If the red army of the North won at Wembley I was in no doubt that the Blue of Brighton would win the other battle going on in that Constituency—where I happen to live, and in Britain as a whole. Wembley, at the heart of the London Borough of Brent in a sense symbolises the British political scene or rather the reasons for the failure of its most novel feature in terms of seats.

This was a three horse race and yet from Wembley one views Rhodes Boyson's unassailable Conservative majority to the North, Laurie Pavitt's Labour bastion to the South and the scene of Reg Freeson's pre-election battle, saved by the bell from the dreaded Livingstone in Brent East. The Alliance's support is spread fairly evenly throughout; a microcosm of what was to come. The novelty of the Alliance was that it brought to the battle a quintuple leadership. Never have I seen a campaign where the media and opinion polls played such a part in blatant marketing.

Above all, however, the personalisation of the leaders and the trivialisation of philosophies and blurring of policies dominated the campaign. Hate her or love her, Mrs. Thatcher personified the tough resolute approach which she has set out to display since the Falklands and the last Conservative Conference. Many who doubted the wisdom of her policies saw in her a determination and singlemindedness that others seemed not to possess. At a time of self doubt she was the reassuring voice that many had wanted to hear. Whatever her culpability before the conflict she demonstrated that reassurance during the Falklands campaign; that the same reassurance was displayed in respect of a semi-crippled economy only served to show that what was bad was outside her control.

However, as we moved into the second week, former Admiral of the Labour fleet, the Rt. Hon. James Callaghan, did his own Belgrano on the Labour Party's old battleship, firing a torpedo into the most vulnerable unilaterally disarmed part of it. This was intended and premeditated. Although most people are uneasy about Trident and Cruise they do not favour abandoning the independent deterrent; neither did the old sailor nor many of those fighting on that manifesto. The engine room exploded

and the Labour dreadnought began to list.

In the second of a catalogue of self-inflicted wounds, the affable Dennis Healey, who had become a popular figure on the screens, good for a laugh and not lost for a serious remark, fired a torpedo which exploded the wrong way. His reference to the Prime Minister 'glorying in slaughter' brought howls of disapproval from all sides. From the dockyards of Plymouth Dr. or perhaps now Naval Commander David Owen fired back by accusing him of descending from the gutter to the abattoir. An SDP Officer and Gentleman coming to the defence of the Lady's honour at this point was followed by the former major's retreat, substituting the word 'conflict'. Why an experienced soldier and politician should make the elementary mistake of fighting on his opponent's terrain is remarkable, but the Labour Party seemed to be accident prone. Subliminally, the Falkland's factor was Mrs. Thatcher's greatest asset but sometimes it spilled over into a headmistressy arrogance or repugnant stubborness. It is not done to rap one's foreign secretary's knuckles before the whole school, but she did. One addresses Knights by their titles and accepts Sir Robin Day's figures as infallible—she didn't—but not before committing a logical fallacy in relation to the total reliability of our US allies and the need for an independent deterrent.

Labour appeared to find a new Tory document each day as it desperately sought to terrify the public with tickets for schools, the dismantling of the health service and six million out of work. Even if they were right these accusations seemed to lack conviction. Labour's own manifesto, hastily cobbled together, and Mr. Foot's appearance on Militant platforms permitted Mrs. Thatcher to sound the first note of alarm by scaring every child in the land with the threat of Marxist Socialism if they didn't vote Tory. In this atmosphere the Alliance, which started the campaign from a low threshold following the Darlington defeat slowly began to gain ground and in the South at least established itself as the only credible opposition. Its lack of a class and geographical base meant that it had to break through an insuperable barrier. Its Prime Minister designate was coming into his own as a doughty street campaigner with cheerful countenance but less telegenic than Alliance leader David Steel. Their roles changed as it became clear that the boy David's ratings were so high in the polls.

One problem the SDP faced was that the Liberals still retained the plum target seats while most of their M.P.s had been elected on a Labour ticket in Constituencies with natural Labour majorities. Of these four only survived, but not Bill Rodgers. Shirley Williams in an altered Constituency did remarkably well but like several Liberal heirs to Conservative seats, not well enough. George Cunningham deserves a special word of sympathy as do the Liberals of Richmond. In total, the third force moved from 13 to 23. Even opponents could not deny that to come within two per cent of Labour and gain a tenth of the number of seats was unfair. Indeed, the result will have advanced the cause of electoral reform among the public but reinforced its impossibility of implementation by reason of the result.

There will be strains in the Alliance. Some Liberals resent having to sacrifice candidatures. In the event they would be foolish not to realise that their limited breakthrough was due precisely to their Alliance with the two year old SDP. Their relationship, far from becoming distanced, ought to be made closer since in many areas it was cemented at grass roots. Where it was not, as in Liverpool Broadgreen, the result was catastrophic for both. David Steel had the right to lead, with Roy Jenkins as the father figure at his side.

For Labour, a new leader is inevitable, while recriminations have already begun within hours of the result. The Left will accuse the right of failure to fight on the Manifesto; the Right will point to the fact that the Party faithful are far removed from the aspirations of ordinary people and look at the fate of known Militants. Arthur Scargill advocates extra Parliamentary action. If Labour emulates the German Social Democrats it will leave the SDP in the cold. It is more likely to become an ideological rump, playing the same role and commanding the same support as the French Communist Party. Most likely of all it will go on feuding, bound only by a common interest in survival unless another master political juggler like Sir Harold Wilson emerges to keep it together. In the election it was at its strongest when defending the Health Service and at its weakest when cutting us off from Europe, in any event a fairly peripheral issue. Its plans to get Britain back to work were just not believed. If Peter Shore, the architect of these policies, is to follow Michael Foot—and he is no left winger—it will be a curious creature. Roy Hattersley has much of the opportunism and realism required without the appeal to the Left. That appeal now seems to descend upon Neil Kinnock, cast in the role of successor to the ideas of Michael Foot but with an image more akin to his contemporaries, the two Davids. But what of Wedgie, I hear you ask. What indeed? Has the fire gone out along with seat or will the Phoenix rise from the flames and lead the Labour Party into the wilderness? This at least should be a contest for the punters.

Mrs. Thatcher has her majority. Plaintively, James Prior told Conservatives that the Party needed people of his point of view. Mr. Pym expected to be Foreign Secretary. Mrs. Thatcher would do well to spread her favours rather than try to build a Party in her image. As one leading Conservative pointed out, 'we will have to provide our own opposition'. What the sixty diehards did on immigration, the wets can now do with impunity. The larger the majority, the freer is the backbencher to raise the standard of revolt without endangering the Government. Ian Gilmour inalliance with St. John Stevas and former Prime Minister Edward Heath is one thing; but if they were joined by Peter Walker, Francis Pym and James Prior, the knives may be better concealed than on the other side of the House but no less sharp.

For me, the question to be answered in the next five years is whether the Alliance will replace Labour as Labour replaced the Liberals. I fear it will do so only in part and in specific areas, for tradition dies hard, although there is an underlying trend.

POSTERS AND PREJUDICE

by John Elsom

FOR the first time in twenty years, I have more or less sat this election out. During the long run-up to election fever, while Mrs. Thatcher was making up her mind and waiting for the local election results, I was in Norway, awed by my first sight of the fjords, fascinated by the Hanseatic League houses in Bergen, dazzled by the infinite variety of interest groups represented by the May Day demonstrations in Oslo. During the election campaign itself, I spent a week in Vienna, taking part in a conference of theatre writers and drinking white wine *G'spritzters* in sunny *Gasthof* gardens, under vine leaves no less.

Both experiences had the effect of rubbing the mind clear from the dust and turmoil of campaigning, in which I would otherwise have been grimily covered. The ward, for which I have been organiser for some twelve years, was in the hands of a more capable successor. Even the local candidate was SDP, not Liberal; and although I took my share in the election chores, the local responsibility was no longer mine. Detachment crept in—and with it the contemplation of national images.

Let's start with Britain's image. Most of the people I met in Norway and Austria could speak English, had visited Britain and claimed a reasonable knowledge of, at least, London's underground system. I, on the other hand, had never visited Norway before, and Austria only twice, and spoke neither Norwegian nor German. Their knowledge of my country was greatly superior to mine of theirs. My rag-bag of gleaned impressions invariably proved wrong—and common sense dictates that their views of Britain were probably much more accurate . . . and yet . . . and yet . . .

Britain does seem so Ruritanian abroad, more Disney than Disneyland. Apart from the almost universal obsession with that fairy-tale romance, Charles 'n' Di, so many British figures are turned into childlike myths—the Iron Maiden, Worzel Gummidge, even Jeremy Thorpe who has become simultaneously a typical example of a victim of British hypocrisy and of British predilections. Our cartoons are their reality; except that abroad our cartoons never quite capture the monstrous and lovable absurdity of what we do. I could never understand how Norwegians and Austrians, representatives of such civilised countries, could hold such clear-cut images as to how dreadful the British are—and at the same time make such kindly excuses for us.

Margaret Thatcher is the current source of amazement, a kind of English Brunhilde, a bizarre cross between Mary Poppins and Boadicea. The mention of her name is enough to provoke sympathetic and not-so-sympathetic chuckles. As for the Falklands Affair, well it *may* have been magnificent, although the stress is heavily and ironically on the 'may', but it wasn't war. It wasn't anything, except a totally incredible British farce—with overtones of grand guignol. How is it possible, I was asked in Norway, for 1,500 lives to be lost in defending a population of 2,000, most

of whom would not have been allowed to settle in Britain had they wanted to return? What was involved, apart from some mysterious twinge of the imperial nerves, an ancient sciatica?

It was widely assumed among those I met that Britain was still empire-minded and only restrained from pursuing her ambitions by poverty, laziness and the presence of the superpowers. Any idea that we were defending liberty and democracy against the Argentinian junta is laughed to scorn. The Falklands merely provided a convenient excuse for our imperial longings to re-assert themselves. For that reason too, Britain is not really to be trusted as an ally, or indeed as an enemy. To sink the General Belgrano, Margaret Thatcher and the War Cabinet changed 'the rules of engagement'—but what is the point of declaring a certain area an 'exclusion zone' if you then deliberately trespass outside it? Should rules of engagement in war be thus unilaterally re-written and if so, what is the point of having them?

Nor is the British Left spared. The Labour Party's proposal to pull out of the EEC is interpreted, even in non-EEC countries like Norway and Austria, as a typical example of the cavalier attitude in Britain towards international agreements. Labour's so-called unilateralism is also taken with several grains of salt. Nobody really believed in it. In Britain, we naturally complain about Russia's refusal to contemplate verification proposals to monitor the spread of nuclear weapons; but nobody abroad believed that Britain would allow foreign observers to check her military installations either. As for the idea that Britain, by giving up nuclear weapons, would set a moral lead to the rest of the world, well, nobody but an Englishman could put forward that view with a straight face. It was inherently ridiculous.

Why then did Norwegians, Austrians and my fellow critics from some twelve different countries in Vienna treat me so warmly—and generally speak of Britain in terms of great affection? Partly, no doubt, because they have friends in Britain, or know friends who have friends; and partly, in some countries, because Britain was on the right side in their war. I would also like to believe that at least some of our so-called national virtues are generally accepted, if not quite at their face value, at least without being too clipped by their currency devaluation—such as tolerance, a rough freedom, a courage amounting sometimes to bravado, a faith in a kind of democracy, if a distorted kind, a cheerful pragmatism and an underlying common sense. But I also suspect that all these virtues would be seen in a more negative light if it were thought that Britain were genuinely powerful, if we still had the capacity to pursue what others assume to be our ambitions.

We don't, and in any case the various tourist images of Britain relentlessly emphasise the cosiness of the place. The British Tourist Board is partly to blame—all those vivid covers of the BTA Journal, *In Britain*, showing beefeaters, thatched cottages and rivers winding through fields dotted with sheep. There was a famously misleading BTA poster in the United States, offering a leafy country lane with the slogan 'Bring back

the long-lost joys of motoring'. Any American who gets stuck in a traffic jam on the M1 and wants to sue the BTA for wrongful information has my total support.

Then there are the castles, and Buckingham Palace, and the Grenadier Guards, and Henley Regatta, and Ascot, and Bertie Wooster, and all the other bits of tourist memorabilia, from cheap little union jacks and postcards from the London Dungeon, and *Nicholas Nickleby*, and rolled brollies, and bulldogs, images which no more reflect the British way of life than Donald Duck illustrates the behaviour of the wild mallard or its Aylesbury descendant—and yet is accepted abroad as undeniably, authentically British. At a determined *avant-garde* theatre production in Vienna, we were herded from room to room in the Dramatisches Zentrum, bombarded by fairground stalls, manned by characters from a European cultural heritage—Charlie Chaplin, Medea, Nina from *The Seagull*, Hamlet, Pozzo and Lucky, Mammon and Buster Keaton. For the Finale, these characters all joined us in the ballroom for a Grand Ball. What tune was played, in Vienna of all places, which has such a strong imperial (and musical) history of its own? *Land of Hope and Glory*, for heaven's sake! As if the Tower of Babel (for that was what the production was called) had originally been built about half-way between Hampton Court and the Tower of London. I suspected, wrongly, that they were playing it for my benefit.

When the British put on airs, and claim to be defending the free world, or setting an example of one kind or another, the effect is irresistibly comic, like Liechtenstein's national army who died in 1948; and I wince at how many statements made during the election campaign would be interpreted abroad simply as part of our genius for self-caricature. Inevitably I take them more seriously, inevitably when Margaret Thatcher talks about Britain leading the world out of its recession and when Eric Heffer asserts that nothing of value will be lost if Britain leaves the EEC, I assume that they have some grounds for what they are saying; but looked at from a distance, our election, together with so much else that belongs to Britain, seems redolent of a toy-town self-importance, parochial pomposity masquerading as an international dignity. Are we becoming a nation of Dogberrys?

Tourist posters, like election posters, do not reveal a country so much as massage prejudices. If the BTA did not so often present a thatched-cottage-and-bearskin view of Britain, there is a chance that visitors from abroad might see our strengths and follies in a clearer light, though not necessarily a more sympathetic one. I have a standard tourist vision—of an American landing at Heathrow, battling through the customs to get to the service-car for the Kensington Hilton, where he sinks exhausted into the Japanese Restaurant, having previously hired a Hertz car for the following day (by American Express, of course)—so that he can fight along and through the roadworks on the M40 to arrive eventually somewhere in the Cotswolds or Warwickshire, where he can at last stand in front of a cottage and know he is in Britain.

But, let's reverse the case and consider how our images of other countries tally with the first experience of them. I had many strong impressions of Norway before I went there. They came from several sources, of which in my case the most powerful seeped through Ibsen's plays. More than any other dramatist of the past 150 years, Ibsen not only altered our conception of the theatre, and what can be achieved through the theatrical medium, but also influenced our outlooks on many social issues. No other feminist play has had the same impact as *A Doll's House*, which is only partly feminist. American theatre, television and films have been obsessed by the theme of Ibsen's *An Enemy of the People*; and there is a list of other subjects, introduced and well-expressed by Ibsen, which have since been re-worked by alien hands. My visit to Norway was a kind of pilgrimage and I hope to describe in a later *Contemporary Review* article how my brief experience of the country affected my understanding of Ibsen's plays.

But Ibsen was not the only source of Norwegian images. There are the tourist posters, of fjords sparkling in an unnatural sunshine, of roof-of-the-world ski slopes with snowy mountains extending to the immeasurable distance, of rugged new Vikings with shaggy beards and blue eyes, of those extraordinary Scandinavian girls who always look more physically perfect than those from Britain and France, of churches cut from huge logs and swan-like boats which do not seem to rest on the waves they skim across. Norway is our Northern Arcadia, freed from the threatening ice-flows and volcanic pools of Iceland, innocent of Swedish complexities of character, neutral of the Finnish political commitments, rich in natural wealth and sturdily independent.

Well, these images do not seem to me as altogether misleading as a thatched-cottage poster of Britain. There are many villages in the fjords which do seem to have stepped straight out from the tourist posters, Balestrand on Sognefjord being one. I cannot imagine any time of year, any combination of weathers, which could damage Balestrand's beauty. Lowering skies? Magnificent. Drizzling rain? Haunting. Snow? Superb. The summers are hot and you can swim in the unnatural clear water of the fjord: the winters are for ski-ing, the springs for walking and the autumns for scenting the air. The village has only 1,500 inhabitants and it was once famous for attracting British tourists: there is even a British church. But nowadays the tourist trade has somewhat dwindled and you are left with the plain impact, of nature and a few friends, man and wilderness; and it is also, incidentally, comparatively cheap for Norway, with an excellent Balestrand Pensjonat, offering half-board for little more than £15 a day.

What the posters miss, and understandably so, is the threatening side to the Norwegian landscape. I could imagine visiting Balestrand for a good holiday, but what would draw me back to Norway, and will do so, time and time again, is the sense of physical danger, real or imagined. The country is so large, the population of 4 million so comparatively small. The little twin Otter planes which weave in and out of the mountains on the way

from Bergen to Sogndal or on to Forde and Trondheim look like mosquitoes; while the summer farms on the upper slopes of the mountains are simply buried in snow for six months of the year. I arrived in Norway at the end of the winter and left well into spring. The country was transformed by a conjurer's sleight of hand within three weeks. The journey by train from Oslo to Bergen took me across a high ridge of mountains where the grey snow merged with the grey sky, and lakes were locked in iron ice. Ten days later, and the snows from the lower slopes had melted, rivulets cascaded down the mountains, the spring flowers shone abundantly and the wooden houses creaked as the soil lost its winter rigidity.

Such metamorphoses, from punishment to reward, from pessimism to optimism, from anguished doubts to hope, seemed to me to characterise a certain pattern in Norwegian life, which has learned to take these extremes with temperance. Ibsen's moderation is Norwegian, not Swedish, certainly not British. It is a way of coping with the landscape and the weather; and the true weakness of tourist images of countries, as of our election posters, is that they express not how we cope, but how we try to congratulate ourselves. Self-congratulation is much less interesting than how we manage to survive. Just as elections are the boring part of politics, so tourism is the tedious side to travel.

THE ROLE OF OPPOSITION

by Ramajit Basu

THE office of Speaker in India, although similar to Westminster, is different in at least one respect. The Speaker in the Indian Parliament does not usually sever party connections, as is the case in the United Kingdom. The Speaker in India hails from the ruling party, yet he tries to be impartial and fair to the Opposition. The important and vital role of the Opposition is generally recognised by the Speaker.

The first event of its kind in the history of the Indian State Legislature was a motion for rescission which was admitted by Speaker Saila Kumar Mukherjee in the West Bengal Assembly (India).[1] The Opposition Parties declared that, owing to a strike scheduled to be staged the following day, they would be absent from the House. Next day, in the absence of the Opposition, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Bill, 1956, was passed, and also the consideration motion regarding the West Bengal Panchayat Bill of 1955. The Leader of the Chief Opposition Party gave notice of a rescission motion for reconsidering the said two bills and the Speaker permitted the motion.[2]

Redlich has clearly stated the significance of a motion for rescission:

> It is necessary finally to refer to one principle which is of vital importance to the course of business and to the whole procedure of the House. A motion or a bill on which the House has given a decision may not be brought again in the same session. The rule is of great importance from a constitutional standpoint. It protects the judgement of the House on any point from being attacked in the same session as that in which it is given and thus provides for some amount of stability in legislation. To a certain extent it is analogous to a rule of law which prevents *res judicata* from being tried over again. . . The rule has important practical results in the not impossible event of its being absolutely necessary to reconsider some decision at which the House has arrived. If the decision is positive in form, the rule causes no difficulty, the direct negative (a motion to rescind) is technically a new matter.[3]

This procedural fact was utilised by Speaker Mukherjee on the principle that Opposition is a useful part of parliamentary democracy. The Speaker not only admitted the motion but also played an important role in obtaining government agreement to the motion by persuading the then Chief Minister to agree.

The matter is not only technical or procedural but is based on sound democratic principle. By the Speaker's decision the importance of the role of Opposition in parliamentary democracy has been admitted. Ernest Barker has correctly pointed out that parliamentary democracy is governed by discussion and consultation. We are tempted to quote the author of *Cabinet Government:*

> Democratic government . . . demands not only a parliamentary majority but also a parliamentary minority. . . If there be no Opposition there is no democracy. . . His Majesty needs an Opposition as well as a Government.[4]

It would not be out of place to remember what Herbert Morrison observed in *Government and Parliament:*

> The duly elected majority must rule; but the Opposition has its rights and duties. The Opposition has been elected by its supporters to put their point of view in Parliament. And it is in accordance with the spirit of our Parliamentary Democracy that the Government should be prepared to listen to and to consider

> Opposition arguments and representations for our belief in government by majority certainly does not mean that majority should act in an arbitrary spirit.

Mukherjee's decision has greatly influenced many decisions in later years in West Bengal. It has been noted that in the absence of the Opposition the House has deferred sitting or delayed taking any decisions or in raising questions. On March 17, 1964, which was the day of the general strike when members of the Opposition absented themselves and the Minister for Parliamentary Affairs requested the Chair to postpone the day's work, his request was acceded to.[5] On February 17, 1966, while introducing a Finance Bill, the mover (Finance Minister) himself having requested that the Bill should be held back, the Speaker agreed to his request for discussion of the Bill in the presence of the Opposition although two other bills of less importance were passed on the same day in the absence of the Opposition.[6]

Although the 1966 Budget Session was concluded amidst interuptions and boycott by the Opposition and despite the Government's intention to introduce several bills, Speaker K. C. Basu declined to continue the Assembly session without the opposition.[7] It is obvious that without financial business transactions it is extremely difficult to carry out the functions of the State. There is provision in the Indian Constitution that the Legislature cannot remain closed for more than six months, but no such provision in the United Kingdom. However, as Sir Thomas Erskine May has said:

> Although the Queen may determine the period for calling Parliament, her prerogative is restrained within certain limits, as she is bound by statute to issue writs within three years after the determination of a Parliament, while the practice of providing money for the public service by annual enactments renders it compulsory for her to summon Parliament to meet every year.[8]

This indicates that the British Parliament is to be convened at least once in each year. Otherwise, the entire government machinery would be met with unimaginable problems for want of money. Hence, Speaker K. C. Basu has rightly permitted matters relating to the Budget to be passed in the Assembly without any Opposition present.

Subsequently, the Presiding Officers of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council of West Bengal did not consider it necessary to block the Bill on the grounds that members of the Opposition went before the Bill was passed.[9] As Speaker K. C. Basu puts it:

> On the day of the strike I postponed taking up this Bill. Yesterday, after Honourable Members left the House, whatever may be the reason, the Chair cannot have the House adjourned because one party, be it the majority or minority, had left under protest. But still, as I felt that some scope should be given to Honourable Members, I have not concluded the rest of the portion of this Bill yesterday and I have adjourned the matter.[10]

It is instructive to survey the practice of other State Legislatures in India. As has already been stated, West Bengal is the first State Legislature in India to allow rescission motion. A few others have followed suit. In 1957, Madras Legislative Council allowed such motion and in February 1974, is the Maharastra Legislative Council a motion for rescission was moved in respect of a resolution passed earlier by the House. On January 16, 1975, Punjab Vidhan Sabha allowed to rescind their earlier decision of that day only.[13]

Motion for rescission is allowed in certain Commonwealth Legislative Bodies, e.g., British House of Commons,[14] Canadian House of Commons,[15] New Zealand,[16] New South Wales.[17]

Thus the West Bengal Speaker introduced this procedure for the first time in India, in recognition of the role of the Opposition.

NOTES:

1. *Annual Report of the Working of the Assembly* for the years 1955, 1956 and 1957, page 36.
2. *West Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings*: Vol. XIV, No. 2, 28.2.56, pp. 60-62.
3. *Procedure of the House of Commons*, Vol. III, p. 36.
4. *Cabinet Government* (1937), p. 15.
5. WBLAP: Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, 17.3.64, p. 1281.
6. WBLAP: Vol. XLII, No. 1, 17.2.66, pp. 14-18.
7. Oral interview with Mr. S. Banerjee, former Secretary, West Bengal Legislative Assembly.
8. Sir Thomas Erskine May, *Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament* (1976), p. 57.
9. (a) BWLAP: Vol. XLV, No. 1, 28.6.67; (b) *West Bengal Legislative Council Debates*: Vol. XXXIV, 24.8.64, pp. 784-785.
10. WBLAP: Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, 25.9.64, pp. 359, 368, 533.
11. Data collected through mailed questionnaire, through tape-recorded oral interview, through ordinary oral interview of Officers of the respective Secretariats and also from books.
12. WBLAP: Vol. XLV, No. 1, 3.7.67, pp. 232-233.
13. Data collected through mailed questionnaire and book.
14. *Parliamentary Debates* (1912), Vol. XLIII, Col. 2003.
15. Beaucheene's *Parliamentary Rules and Forms*, para. 347.
16. Standing Order 114.
17. Standing Order 115.

[Dr. Ranjit Basu, a specialist on the role of parliamentary decisions in the procedures of democratic governments, has published articles in many journals, including *The Parliamentarian* (U.K.), *Parliamentary Journal* (U.S.A.), *Indian Journal of Political Science* and *The Calcutta Review*.]

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

WAGNER. *Tristan und Isolde.* Dresden Staatskapelle/Carlos Kleiber. (5 records) Deutsche Grammophon 2741 006.
WAGNER. *Lohengrin.* Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra/Herbert von Karajan. (5 records) EMI SLS 5237.
WAGNER. *Parsifal.* Orchestre Philharmonique de Monte Carlo/Armin Jordan. (5 records) Erato NUM 750105.
WEILL. *The Seven Deadly Sins.* City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra/Simon Rattle. EMI ASD 4402.
MOZART. Operatic Arias. Kiri Te Kanawa/London Symphony Orchestra/ Sir Colin Davis. Philips 6514 319.
CANTELOUBE. Songs of the Auvergne. Kiri Te Kanawa/English Chamber Orchestra/Jeffrey Tate. Decca SXDL 7604.
BRAHMS. Piano Music. Claudio Arrau/Concertgebouw Orchestra/Bernard Haitink. (5 records) Philips 6768 356.

IN Salzburg last year, the great conductor Herbert von Karajan heard for the first time a demonstration of the new Compact Disc System. Having done so, the maestro declared: 'All else is gaslight'; he was right. After listening for a week at home to this remarkable new system with a selection of tiny, mirror-surfaced Compact Discs, I can state without any doubt that Compact represents the greatest single advance in recorded music since those fragile and unwieldy old 78s were replaced by long-playing records over 30 years ago.

Now, those black, 12 inch plastic records, playing for up to half an hour each side, have, in turn, given way to discs that measure just 4¾ inches (12 cm.) in diameter, of which only one side is used, giving a playing time of more than an hour. This Compact Disc is scanned by a laser beam instead of having its grooves transformed into sound by a stylus, so there is virtually no wear and tear. No longer will we have to worry about those irritating scratches, dust, or even finger-marks: the Compact Disc can be played literally thousands of times, and, given reasonable treatment, will come up with sound as impeccable on the thousandth playing as on the first. Moreover, with its system of laser scanning, the succession of snaps, crackles and pops that has invariably been present on even the most carefully manufactured long-playing records is a thing of the past. Now, unless the music is actually being played, there is total and absolute silence: it is an uncanny experience, silence of an altogether more golden quality than the succession of coughs and splutters that passes for it in the concert hall.

The equipment that has been developed to play these remarkable new discs is, of course, an example of the latest advanced electronic technology. I was lent the Sony CDP-101, which costs nearly £550. It is a neat, box-shaped unit about 13 inches square and 4 inches high. It is designed to fit in with one's existing stereo system, using the same amplifier and speakers as those already there for the conventional turntable, and takes no more than a couple of minutes to connect up. On one side of the box there is a drawer which slides silently out at the touch of a button. Place the disc onto the drawer, touch the button again, the drawer slides

back, the disc revolves at a speed that varies between 500 and 200 revolutions per minute, scanned by the tiny laser beam which works from the centre to the outside of the record, and the music begins to play.

But, in the case of the Sony player, though not, as yet, the other makes on the market, there is another enormous advantage: a remote controller. This means that from the vantage point of your favourite chair, at the touch of a button, you can turn the player on and off, move forwards and backwards on the disc, for example, from the first to the last movement of a symphony, repeat part or all of the recording as many times as you want, or even repeat a certain section, such as a piano cadenza or a particular aria, whenever you want to. Meanwhile, on the player's control panel, there is a display which tells you which band of the disc is playing, how much time has elapsed from the start of the record and, should you wish to know, how much time is left until the end. Other players on the market, at present Philips, Hitachi, Marantz and Technics, with others, no doubt, to arrive, also incorporate these functions, without, at present, having the remote controller, which I have little doubt they will develop in due course. Nor will the advance of technology stop there: I have already heard of development research to produce a fully automatic player which, working on the juke-box principle, it will be possible to programme to play the whole of one's Compact Disc collection of up to hundreds of records, with the selection being made by remote control from the comfort of the armchair.

The Compact Discs that I played on the new equipment were all, of course, compact versions of existing conventional digital recordings, but what an amazing difference there was in the sound quality when I compared them with the same recordings on black disc played on my turntable. My selection came from Decca, Deutsche Grammophon and Philips, and all had totally silent surfaces, a frighteningly neighbour-attracting dynamic range, and a quite superlative clarity and presence, so that even in the loudest tutti every orchestral instrument could be heard separately. Among outstanding examples of Compact Discs I heard from Decca were a superbly sensitive performance of Ravel's *Daphnis and Chloe*, with the Montreal Symphony conducted by Charles Dutoit (400 055-2), Bartok's Concerto for Orchestra with Sir Georg Solti and his Chicago Symphony (400 052-2), and a selection of highlights from Christopher Hogwood's wonderfully lively 'authentic' performance of Handel's *Messiah* with the Academy of Ancient Music and the Choir of Christ Church Cathedral, Oxford (400 086-2). On Deutsche Grammophon, Saint-Saens's 3rd 'Organ' Symphony, with von Karajan conducting the Berlin Philharmonic, had a predictably thrilling impact (400 063-2), as did The English Concert under Trevor Pinnock playing Vivaldi's 'Four Seasons' on original instruments (400 045-2), and the recording of Michelangeli playing Brahms's 4 Ballades and Schubert's Sonata D.537 really made it sound as though there was a concert grand being playing in one's sitting-room (400 043-2). From Philips, Mozart's Piano Concertos K.450 and K.467 played by Alfred Brendel with the Academy of St. Martin's and

Neville Marriner sounded even brighter and more impressive on Compact than in the conventional recording I reviewed so enthusiastically last quarter (400 018-2), and Brendel again, in Schubert's 'Trout' Quintet with the Cleveland Quartet, also made compelling listening (400 078-2).

But before you throw away your existing turntable and records, it should be remembered that, at present, the range of recordings on Compact Disc is very limited—about 200 issues in all so far—and that the discs themselves, in their rather awkward little plastic boxes, cost £10, a great deal more than a conventional record. Moreover, even the cheapest Compact Player costs about £400. Gradually, no doubt, prices will come down as recordings are produced in greater quantities and research and development costs are absorbed, but I do not believe that it will be for a decade at least that the new system will replace the old. Meanwhile, for those who have the funds and the interest, Compact is here, and here to stay, and may be sampled alongside its conventional ancestors.

One sphere of recording into which Compact has not yet ventured is that of complete operas and here there has been one quite outstanding recent release. Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*, from Deutsche Grammophon, has the magnificent Dresden Staatskapelle Orchestra conducted with blazing drama and passion by Carlos Kleiber, who truly makes a great love story of the work, with Margaret Price singing the role of Isolde for the first time in her career. I dare say that this very great Mozart soprano would not even now attempt the role on stage, but on disc her performance is a revelation in its total vocal beauty and immense dramatic persuasiveness. Her Tristan is René Kollo, wholly professional and dependable, though not on her level of inspiration, and also in the cast are Brigitte Fassbaender as a hauntingly beautiful Brangäne, Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau as a somewhat elderly-sounding Kurwenal, and Kurt Moll, sonorously authoritative as King Marke. DG's digital recording is of the highest class, and this is an issue that no Wagnerian should miss.

Two other recent releases of Wagner's operas are to be less strongly recommended. *Lohengrin* has von Karajan conducting his Berlin Philharmonic on EMI with a solid, Bayreuth-style cast of Kollo, rather dry-voiced in the title-role, Anna Tomowa-Sintow a fine Eva, Dunja Vejzovic, a dramatic if slightly squally Ortrud, Siegmund Nimsgern a highly competent if somewhat disinvolved Friedrich von Telramund, and Karl Ridderbusch as King Henry. There is nothing actually wrong with this recorded performance, except that it sounds from start to finish like a recorded performance, having little of the magic and mystery that the opera can achieve in the theatre. EMI have supplied a perfectly sound analogue recording. Erato's recording of *Parsifal* is, in fact, the soundtrack of Hans-Jurgen Syberberg's truly appalling film of the opera, and may at least be recommended as markedly superior to the cinematic experience. It was recorded in Monte Carlo with the Monte Carlo Philharmonic, a competent if undistinguished band, competently and carefully conducted by Armin Jordan, who actually appears in the film as Amfortas, the role sung here by Wolfgang Schöne. Parsifal is taken, ably but not excitingly,

by Reiner Goldberg, and Aage Huagland is a somewhat stolid Klingsor. The recording's two most distinguished performances come from our own Robert Lloyd and Yvonne Minton, both highly musical and dramatically persuasive as Gurnemanz and Kundry. If you happen to disagree with me and actually enjoyed Syberberg's film—and there are those who did—then this set will provide a fine souvenir; otherwise, there are more distinguished recordings of *Parsifal* to be had, such as Karajan's on Deutsche Grammophon.

An opera of an entirely different scale and type is Weill's one-act *The Seven Deadly Sins*, with words by Bertold Brecht. It lasts little over half an hour, but within its brief length carries enormous dramatic and musical conviction and punch, particularly in this truly excellent new recorded performance by the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra under their Principal Conductor, Simon Rattle. Rattle is unquestionably the most promising and exciting young conductor of our day; he is still only 28, and in a decade I have no doubt that all the top orchestras and opera houses of the world will be clamouring for his services. Meanwhile, be sure to get this record, which, in the focal role of Anna—pioneered by the great Lotte Lenya—has Rattle's wife, the fine young American soprano Elise Ross, achieving miracles of musical and dramatic distinction.

As a fine companion piece to the recording of Mozart concert arias by Kiri Te Kanawa that I mentioned last quarter, there is now available a new recording of the soprano in a selection of Mozart's operatic arias, conducted by Sir Colin Davis with the London Symphony Orchestra. The arias come from eight different operas: not only from *Idomeneo, Così, La Clemenza di Tito,* and *Die Zauberflöte,* but from such early and rarely heard works as *La Finta Giardiniera, Lucio Silla,* and *Il Rè Pastore,* whose gorgeous 'L'amerò, sarò costante' is quite exquisitely sung by Dame Kiri, who makes this aria, for me, the outstanding feature of an extremely beautiful record. To hear her in lighter, but no less musical, vein try Canteloube's beautiful arrangements of Songs of the Auvergne, most sensitively conducted by Jeffrey Tate with the English Chamber Orchestra. These songs have a wonderfully haunting quality and might have been written with Kiri Te Kanawa in mind, so perfectly does she sing them.

This year, as well as being the 150th anniversary of the birth of Brahms, also marks the 80th birthday of the great Chilean pianist Claudio Arrau. These events may be jointly celebrated by acquiring a five-record box of Brahms's piano music played by Arrau, which is one of several boxed sets recently issued by Philips containing most of Arrau's recorded repertoire. This set has both the piano concertos nobly played and superbly accompanied by Bernard Haitink and the Concertgebouw Orchestra of Amsterdam, as well as the piano sonatas opus 2 and 5, the four Ballades, the opus 4 Scherzo, and the Handel and Paganini Variations. All are quite splendidly played by Arrau and make a worthy tribute to both composer and pianist; and at only about £15 for the five records, they represent a quite remarkable bargain which no music lover should be slow to snap up.

CORRESPONDENCE

ARE THERE NEW DIRECTIONS FOR LITERATURE IN EDUCATION?

Am I alone in thinking that literature in education needs a radical revision in terms of the theory and methodology involved? The idea that literature is profoundly important for culture and individualism, is one that I, as a teacher and poet, need not defend.

My first query is: are we not too concerned with *English* literature? I refer to the writing coming from the British Isles rather than the whole corpus of literature written in all the varieties of English. V. S. Naipaul has raised this question forcefully and has said that we study our own authors with an intensity and a sense of claustrophobia that amounts to an obsession. There is some truth in this. University departments have increasingly widened the scope of English Studies to include Soyinka, White, Narayan and so on, yet the best writing from the Commonwealth is not filtering through to the literature of recognised examination syllabuses, or to the school English lesson in an influential way.

My second question concerns the actual teaching of literature. English teachers need all the help they can get in learning about how to extend those of their activities that centre on textual study. We must escape the restrictions of close textual analysis by itself. The teaching of Shakespeare, for instance, needs just as much dramatic activity as (say) the study of Pinter. The recent television series, *Shakespeare Lives*, has demonstrated this very well. Teachers have to achieve the balance of classroom study and stage work before the English classics lose their force in any universal way. We are in danger of shutting out the very types of people who need the moral perspectives that such literature provides—and the pleasure and fun it gives, too!

My final point is really a plea. Before a true understanding of literature can emerge, the student should have attempted to write himself, in any way or in any form. Even a total failure in such activity (in terms of conventional 'rules' and criteria) is a lesson. A few years ago the Australian poet, Paul Kavanagh, gave a poetry lesson to a class in my college. The class consisted of hairdressers, plumbers and caterers. After an hour's talk and practice, almost all of them had produced some kind of Japanese haiku or list poem in the manner of Adrian Henri. A few were good enough to publish; many were adequate but lacked true feeling; many failed to do anything but find the required syllables per line. But what a lesson they had in what literature is all about! Too often, an explanation of what imagery is, with blackboard definition and examples studied, will fail, where an effort at creative writing will do the job. I think most teachers are afraid of failure, but what is there to lose?

Yours faithfully,

STEPHEN WADE

Scunthorpe, DN17 1DF.

THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE

Dear Madam,

Reading Brynmor John's article 'To Bury Beveridge or to Praise Him?' (*Contemporary Review*, Vol. 241, No. 1403) I am reminded of what Aneurin Bevan said of the Health Service: 'The rich and the poor are treated alike as poverty is not a disability and wealth not an advantage.' So was launched the greatest achievement of post-war Britain, the National Health Service, a monument to a civilised society.

This was the ideal, but one that was sadly abused from its very beginning by doctors and patients alike—with expensive drugs being prescribed for imagined or invented ills, abused by an administrative system clogged with unnecessary bureaucrats who fed in ever-increasing numbers on the body of the service, while providing inefficient administration and, most of all, abused by the multi-national drug companies who used the service as a source of never-ending profits.

The Government continually advises us that it is committed to the Health Service, but these are sentiments which are hard to believe. In fact, I have no doubt that now they are returned to power, particularly with a large majority, one of their priorities will be the further dismantling of the Welfare State as was originally planned, and whose principal pillar was the Health Service.

The usual political double-talk pours forth as we are advised that during 1983/84 health authorities will get an extra £100 million, representing an additional 1.2 per cent for growth. In fact, there will be a decrease in services as the £100 million is only worth £60 million due to the remaining £40 million being found from so-called efficiency savings, another description of cut-backs at the expense of patients.

Drug companies use dubious methods to promote their products, some spending about £120 million a year in advertising their wares, but who, last year alone, were amply recompensed with a total drugs bills of £1.7 billion.

Need it be said that the belated report prepared by the Government's Principal Medical Officer, Dr. Peter Greenfield, with its recommendation of a system under which cheaper, unbranded drugs would be substituted for the equivalent branded version, has been bitterly attacked by the drug companies. It should be added that, in any case, medical research should be under government control, for it is too important to be left to the multinationals whose sole interest is in profit.

The Greenfield Report shows ways of saving the NHS millions of pounds as the vast majority of branded drugs, existing to provide the drug companies with their profits, are exactly the same as their generic counterparts, other than price! Branded drugs are usually twice and sometimes as much as nine times the cost of generic drugs. Statistics show that of 4,000-odd branded drugs, only about thirty could not be substituted by a generic drug, and substitution of only eleven of the 4,000 drugs on the market would save the NHS £29 million a year.

The activities of the pharmaceutical companies are very much open to question in this country. One shudders to think how they operate in the

Third World, as one is equally appalled at how successive governments have treated them so generously through the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, a scheme that actually regulates profits, not prices.

We all look on life from our own narrow little window in time, but today every aspect of public life leads one to believe that we are all living in the world of *Alice in Wonderland*, with the subtle difference that its characters were at least honest, whereas we have a lack of leadership of those who are honest and sincere, whose integrity cannot be questioned.

Our priorities are indeed wrong when thousands are waiting for hospital beds—children, geriatrics, kidney transplants, hip operations and so many other complaints.

Wrong, when this can happen for lack of money which can always be found for adventures in the South Atlantic, and military hardware in this country which, in the end, will achieve absolutely nothing.

Brynmor John is so right in stating that the United Kingdom of the 1980s needs no less than its 1940s counterpart a reaffirmation of the compassion, the zeal for improvement and the recognition of the mutual dependence by which alone it can scrape away the warts of self-interest and reassert its claim to be a humane and just society.

Yours faithfully,

Harrow Weald, Middlesex. Tony Hughes.

THE GREAT MEDIA FUDGE

Dear Madam,

Recently, I watched a television programme about women's magazines. The bulk of the interviewing was connected with *Woman's Own* and *Spare Rib*. *Woman's Own* sounded cautiously eclectic. No coloured model covers because if they put on one every fortnight the readers wouldn't recognise the magazine's image.

Surprisingly, I got a similar impression of status quo stagnancy from the *Spare Rib* interviewees. They made *Spare Rib* sound like a nest of heart-warming cosy feminist complacency. The clips may very well have been misleadingly selective, but I don't know of any other general publication which appears so savagely to have it in for men. There was even a complaint that babies were exposed to heterosexuality from infancy and, as I understood it, a defence of Lesbianism. My thoughts turned to the non-Third World contemporary societies with their tolerance of homosexuality.

Is anyone in the media willing to open up real issues which real-people could, with benefit, care about and explore?

Yours faithfully,

Hull, North Humberside. MICHAEL KELLY

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

A Farewell to France. Noel Barber. Hodder & Stoughton. £8.75. *The Philosopher's Pupil.* Iris Murdoch. Chatto & Windus. £7.95. *Fools of Fortune.* William Trevor. Bodley Head. £7.50. *Screenplay.* Macdonald Harris. Cape. £7.95. *Prince Ombra.* Roderick MacLeish. Hutchinson. £8.95. *Aunt Julia and the Scriptwriter.* Mario Vargas Llosa (translated by Helen R. Lane). Faber & Faber. £7.95.

Some years ago a novel narrated in the first person was a rarity. It is difficult to imagine Jane Austen or Thomas Hardy entering the 'confessional', although from the first Charlotte Brontë recognised the advantages of a person-to-person relationship with her readers. Now, it can be said that the technique has become the norm, providing an opportunity for intimate revelations undreamed of by our forefathers. The principle disadvantage is that first person singular can make for monotony: at the same time there are some stories which would be difficult to tell in any other way. A notable example is Noel Barber's *A Farewell to France*, a brutal, nostalgic and romantic account of France before and during World War II, in which the narrator is a journalist, Larry Astel, who explores his memories of the nineteen-thirties and beyond. Together with his French-American family, he enjoyed a life of luxury at home amid the vineyards in idyllic Douzy and professional advancement on a Paris newspaper. Of course, the pangs and tribulations of puberty were not entirely absent. There was the passionate love affair with a beautiful Italian, seventeen year old Sonia, abruptly terminated by parental disapproval, while Larry's sister, Anna, seemed hell-bent on marrying a German. Another brother, Guy, was attracted by a Jewess, and as the storm clouds gathered over Europe it became inevitable that the conflicting loyalties would lead to separation and bereavement. And so it proved, since even dual French/American nationality offered no easy solution. The creeping paralysis of German occupation and the 'grey' world of collaboration and compromise bore little relation to the situation in beleaguered Britain or to the highly coloured adventure films with which we are even now regaled. It is a dismal picture and one which with hindsight often seems barely credible. Yet alas, we are well aware that the bestiality and ineptitude were only too true. Not that *A Farewell to France* is entirely immune from cloak-and-dagger elements. Sonia's marriage to a high-ranking Italian and the machinations which enable her to organise Anna's escape from the Gestapo do not always come across convincingly: nor do the affectionate exchanges between the star-crossed lovers, although it is reassuring to know that a Papal annulment will enable Sonia and Larry to marry in the fullness of time; while the blow-by-blow account of the destruction of Douzy tunnel seems to have been written with the cinema in mind. But it is the depth of information about events which led to World War II and the vignettes of French statesmen about whom we know all too little which add up to an absorbing if long read (more than 700 pages).

In *The Philosopher's Pupil* Iris Murdoch also employs a narrator although, as he himself asserts, a discreet and self-effacing one. This unidentified person wishes to be known simply as 'N' while flitting around the spa town of Ennistone

observing the antics of the McCaffrey clan. No explanation is offered as to the means by which 'N' is privy to their private thoughts and conversations. In the dramatic opening chapter of the novel he plays no part at all. The chilling situation of hatred and strife between George McCaffrey and his wife, Stella, is acted out during a drive to their home. Frustrated beyond endurance by the claustrophic atmosphere inside the car, George attempts to kill Stella by heading the vehicle towards a canal. Both escape death in this near-disaster but from the sombre episode the events of the novel fan out into an elaborate study of the McCaffreys. Their ramifications are impressive, running the gamut of generation and circumstance and presenting Iris Murdoch with an opportunity to design a complex mosaic of family interaction. Much space is devoted to backtracking the characters' past, also to lengthy passages of unreal sounding dialogue. The reader will not rebel, for on almost every page are finely observed valuations of situations and events, often trivial in themselves but which assume overwhelming, even frightening importance. One which stands out is the loss of a small pet dog during a summer outing. The desolate beach and the proximity of a holiday home unwisely disposed of takes on an aspect which is truly menancing.

It might seem reasonable to accept *The Philosopher's Pupil* as yet another family saga, although an outstanding one, yet that is by no means all that the novel is about. Cunningly camouflaged by day-to-day occurrences is a formidable range of philosophical debate, initiated by the enigmatic philosopher and mentor, Rozonav, who has recently returned to Ennistone, thus providing the strength and purpose expected of a Murdoch novel. Iris Murdoch's first novel, *Under the Net*, was a brilliant, never-to-be-forgotten romp. *The Philosopher's Pupil* is totally different and of her recent novels the most satisfying.

William Trevor is such an accomplished writer that it comes as no surprise if he chooses a variety of themes for his novels. In *Fools of Fortune* he discards the closely plotted narrative for an episodic account of a frustrated love affair spanning over sixty years. Two families, the Quintons and the Woodcombes, live in County Cork and Dorset respectively, drawn together through blood relationship as well as romance. In the opening of the novel, which contains by far the most effective passages, young Willie Quinton is a mere child living out the tranquil days in an Ireland redolent of the old mythologies. The Quinton family business is a thriving mill at Killneagh, yet commerce does not lean too heavily and the father and his staff have plenty of time for Willie and his sisters, Geraldine and Deirdre. As well as Mrs. Flynn, the cook, and Josephine the maid, there are such delightfully individual characters as Tim Paddy, the 'unfrocked' priest, Father Kilgarriff and various aunts and pet animals. The Quintons are a Protestant family, although advocates of Home Rule. And then over the tranquil scene falls the shadow of a horrific revenge killing by the Black and Tans. Mr. Quinton and the two girls are killed and part of the house is burned down. From that point *Fools of Fortune* takes a different direction. Willie, his mother and Josephine move into a town house where life becomes a drab nightmare for Willie, battling with school terrors, and Mrs. Quinton, slowly drinking herself to death.

Yet there were or could have been compensations. Willie and his cousin, Marianne Woodcombe, have already met in happier times. After Mrs. Quinton's funeral Marianne seeks to console her grief-stricken cousin with the result that she becomes pregnant with his child. But by this time Willie has disappeared without leaving a forwarding address, and the two families treat Marianne like some kind of shuttlecock until she forces herself on the

surviving remnants of the Killneagh family, there to give birth to her child, Imelda.

A poignant and credible enough situation, conveyed with William Trevor's usual sensitivity and skill, yet the very brevity of *Fools of Fortune* means that some major issues are glossed over. The de-flowering of Marianne and the absence of Willie over so many years needs closer and more rational explanation. When, in old age, the disappointed pair come together again their reunion has an empty ring and the indication that their by now mature off-spring is mentally handicapped gives rise to incredulity rather than pity; although even as these reservations surface they dismiss themselves under the pervasive influence of the Irish scene and character.

A very different young person is the central character of *Screenplay*. The curiously named youth, Alys, is the indulged child of 'progressive' American parents. When they are killed in a road accident he is left to make what he can of a solitary adolescence in the palatial family home. Eventually, he succumbs to the temptation of taking in a lodger, who turns out to be the once famous film producer of a by-gone era, Nesselrode. Anywhere but in the realm of fantasy it would have been obvious that there was some mystery about this eccentric figure. Nesselrode has a set purpose, to lead Ayls back some sixty years through time to the age of the silent movies. Alys has no objection, for it seems that in his boyhood he adored the celluloid world and in particular the twenties' star, Moira Silver. He falls in love with her all over again, only this time in a more realistic and adult manner. However, the ill-assorted couple are not destined to remain forever in a dream world. Together, they drift back into the eighties, when of course Moira is revealed as a very old woman, thankful to bask in the comforts of the luxuriously equipped house and to indulge her *penchant* for buying new clothes. Alys loves her still, despite the wrinkles and grey hairs, and vows to be faithful unto death. And if all this sounds too confused and incredible to merit serious attention, MacDonald Harris' sensitive and light-handed treatment makes it acceptable. So much truth and keen observation is interwoven with the fantasy that the reader is persuaded to accept Alys and Moira and their unlikely relationship.

Once again, the reader is invited to suspend disbelief as a condition of understanding, even enjoying, *Prince Ombra*. Roderick MacLeish appreciates the problems and traumas of an eight-year-old boy very well indeed. Bentley Ellicott is motherless, and has a congenital limp, yet he has largely surmounted these disadvantages and runs around his home town of Stonehaven quite happily, hobnobbing with a fine collection of indigenous characters. Yet beneath the veneer of self-sufficiency Bentley suffers from a massive sense of inferiority which he seeks to overcome by acts of hair-raising foolhardiness. One of these is to 'dare' a fast moving truck on the highway to run him down, and the resulting enquiry into a near-fatal accident brings him before a famous child-psychiatrist of German origin.

During the clinical sessions it is revealed that Bentley possesses occult powers. He speaks ancient languages he could not possibly have known, and can explain what motivated King Arthur in the dark British ages as well as the heroes of Greek legends. Yet it is no mere supra-normal manifestation. Over all is the power of a character known as Ombra. He is the evil that lurks everywhere beneath the surface and must at all costs be combated. How Bentley accomplishes this is the basic theme of *Prince Ombra*, ending with him as an elderly man, having long since forgotten the fables which haunted him in childhood.

And finally, *Aunt Julia and the Scriptwriter*, another novel not very firmly rooted in reality. Over the years, Mario Vargas Lhosa has built up a formidable reputation outside his native Peru. His main assets are a racy, forthright style and a readiness to take an irreverent look at people and institutions. *Aunt Julia* is well up to his usual standard. The story of the young journalist, Mario, who among other diversions wishes to marry his aunt, is further enlivened by Mario's passionate interest in a series of radio-scripts, penned by a fantasy-ridden Bolivian dwarf, Camacho. *Aunt Julia and the Scriptwriter* is funny, improbable and at times, sad.

Also Received:

The Blue Man and Other Stories. Adolf Muschg (translated by Marlis Zeller-Cambon). Carcanet New Press. £6.95. Excellent examples of the acclaimed and widely translated work of the Swiss writer, Adolf Muschg, are given in *The Blue Man and Other Stories.* 'Something Else', a rather longer piece, is virtually a novella, a strongly told story of personal relationships. The title piece and 'Brami's View' are more typical of Adolf Muschg's work as a short story writer.

A Stolen Biography. Szymon Szechter (translated by Nina Karsov and Frances Carroll). Nina Karsov. £6.00. By describing it as a 'brilliant social satire', the poet Stephen Spender has rightly bestowed an accolade on this amusing short novel. The author, Polish by birth, has written a light-hearted though revealing account of the conflicting influences which can beset the sensitive human being. These influences are deployed as three separate beings. The translation is sympathetic and wholly acceptable. Szymon Szechter has already received important and favourable reviews in English translation.

The Colonel. David Hart. Blond & Briggs. £6.25. This unusual, abrasive account of a Jewish survivor of Hitler's holocaust hovers between fact and fantasy, and may not be to everyone's taste although it will repay time and attention, for in *The Colonel*, a first novel of considerable promise, David Hart displays an impressive imagination as well as a talent for forceful prose.

Plotting and Writing Suspense Fiction. Patricia Highsmith. Polar Press Ltd. £4.95. Anyone who enjoys reading crime and detection fiction merely as a pastime will be impressed by the amount of sheer hard work and planning which goes into the writing of a form of fiction often taken for granted. Few writers of suspense novels have achieved more prestige than the American writer, Patricia Highsmith in this exacting field, as much for her ingenuity in plotting as for her unusual and authentic backgrounds.

Lord of the Dance. Robin Lloyd-Jones. Gollancz. £8.95. The winner of the BBC/Bookshelf/Arrow/£5,000 First Novel competition is Robin Lloyd-Jones. His *Lord of the Dance* is a racy, highly original historical story of sixteenth century India.

The 1983 Hawthornden Prize was awarded to Timothy Mo for his novel *Sour Sweet* (Andre Deutsch) at a Reception given by the Society of Authors on June 21st. The presentation was made by Iris Murdoch, C.B.E.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

BRZEZINSKI'S MEMOIRS

Zbigniew Brzezinski: 'Power and Principle, Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-81'. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £15.

To write up in self-justification your own political experience is natural enough—unsuccessful British commanders in the War of American Independence 200 years ago followed up a practice begun by Julius Caesar 2,000 years ago and it has continued ever since! What this book reveals is the scale of the self-justification practised not so much by politicians after *their* defeats but by their advisers, their *chefs de cabinet* and the officers in their think-tanks relishing in retrospect their days of glory. And it is a reminder of the legion of them, the non-elected kitchen cabinet officers of today.

Brzezinski supported Carter when the Georgia Governor seemed to be an outsider in the Presidential race in 1976; he flooded him with paper and analyses and, according to this story, with recommendations of who should get what job and why. His own reward was the call to the post of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; close to the throne but not a bureaucrat, with neither a large department to run nor a precisely defined mandate. And he gives us here an account of his stewardship and of how good he and his President were. It is very detailed: particularly the 'structure' of Presidential policy-making, on Camp David (reflecting great admiration for both Sadat and—even—Begin), on Iran, on Europe (great respect for Giscard, none at all for Schmidt), and on the normalisation of relations with China. It is indeed as useful and detailed an inside story of the sad Carter Presidency as we have had so far. It is good on the relationship between the two men, and revealing in its asides—on, for instance, the parallels between the history of Poland and of the Old South. Inevitably its tone is self-important, egotistic and in places cloying, not least in the frequent quotations of notes from the President telling him how good he was. He kept a detailed journal throughout the four-year 'reign' and encouraged the President to do the same; like Kissinger before him he was determined to exploit his role, and his sense of being an outsider in contemporary America.

'Zbig', of course, did bring a European background to the job, as thorough as Kissinger's. He was born in Warsaw. His father was a Polish diplomat on station in Canada when the Communists took over Poland in 1945, and he promptly retired. The son, then aged seventeen, studied at McGill University, specialising in communism. He married a grand niece of Edouard Benes, Czechoslovakia's last democratic president, so he was doubly a Central European. After some years of University teaching and writing he joined the Policy Planning Council of the State Department and, later, the Trilateral Commission of David Rockefeller's devising. Here he met the then-Governor Carter, and began advising him and speech-writing for him. He saw himself not as policy-maker but as syntheaiser and analyst or—one of his favourite words—'conceptualiser'. He admits—though he seems surprised at the discovery—that in the White House pressure-cooker, where it was 'go, go, go,' it was hard to find time for reflection and for the conceiving of concepts.

If there is a political thesis running through the book it is not merely that there is a deep-seated ideological tension between the US and Russia, but that the US must learn to play the part of an honest broker in world affairs and become more aware of Europe, Japan and not least of the Third World. 'The

menace confronting humanity . . . is not Soviet hegemony but global anarchy'. For him the reconciliation of power and principle seems to mean acceptance of the concern with human rights, which might mean much to well-heeled liberal Americans or to Central European immigrants but was and is simply a slogan for Russians to exploit. Power should be 'a means for attaining morally desirable ends'. Andrew Young gave this moralistic policy a special Third World orientation. Brzezinski saw himself as the 'single source of larger strategic thinking and innovation in the government'. Indeed he is curiously a prisoner of words and phrases, and yet he wanted to be at times not only a mortalist but a super-realist. He criticises the Carter Administration's softness over Soviet-Cuban intervention in Ethiopia, and implies that he—unlike Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—would have taken a tougher line. He saw himself as tough, hard-nosed and realistic—and is not the first academic to think so of himself. Indeed, far from confirming the author's thesis that this was a happy team and that it was only a wicked press 'with a passion and a vengeance' that talked of his rivalry with Vance, this book in fact confirms how wide was the gap between them; and between many of their colleagues too. ('I was struck, even in the very early months . . . by how much pressure there is from one's own subordinates to engage in conflict with one's principal peers'). It is perhaps no accident that in a couple of months Cyrus Vance's own account of these years is expected. It will be welcome, but it is unlikely to be any more successful than this in offering a new perspective on Jimmy Carter.

If this book is evidence of anything it is of Carter's fundamental decency, serene temperament and wide culture, and his skill as a negotiator. Brzezinski notes the Pope's comment that 'after a couple of hours with President Carter I had the feeling that two religious leaders were conversing'—and that the President was immensely pleased to hear it. The book is also, however, a revelation of the extent to which this President and his team fell for words and phrases, how much they remained 'outsiders' and failed to adapt to or to master the ways of Washington—'Hypocrisy seems to be the dominant style in personal relationships around here'—and how much the President confused mastery of details and voracious reading with policy-making and with statecraft. His mastery of detail and his skill as negotiator, nevertheless made Camp David the success it was at the time—even if it spelt martyrdom for Sadat. What was missing from both President and Assistant was magic in communication, and skill, blarney and if necessary, low cunning in their dealings with Capitol Hill—despite Brzezinski's awareness of the dangers of a 'Lone Ranger' approach in foreign policy, and his early urging of a need for close relationships with Capitol Hill. The Hill gets little attention here. But then what was absent from both of them was political experience, and political adroitness and skill at in-fighting. It is a frank and revealing story, but its revelations are not as flattering to the boss or to his acolyte as the author intended.

ESMOND WRIGHT

A TAPESTRY OF BRITISH CHRISTIAN HISTORY

The Pope and Britain. John Norton (Author and Artist). Calligrapher: Kevin Riley. Preface by the Duke of Norfolk. Burke's Peerage Ltd. £35 (limited edition of 1,000), £11.95 hardback.

The first visit of a Bishop of Rome to British shores was preceded and accompanied by a number of hastily written and photographic paperbacks. Not all of them were worthy of so auspicious an event. Nor were the orders of service for the Papal masses up to the standard set in Canterbury. John Norton,

the eminent portrait painter, himself a Roman Catholic, had something to do with the latter.

After fifteen months of concentrated application he has now unfolded a brilliant tapestry of British Christian history from 597 to 1982. This beautiful volume gives an artist's eye view of the ecclesiastical vicissitudes since Augustine landed at Thanet with the great Gregory's commission of conversion. It is a work of excellence by a talented team, including printers and bookbinders of quality, all overseen by Mr. Norton.

The latter has essayed the psychology of religion and has presented history through personalities and their conflicts. There are two special contributions: that of the Regius Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, Dr. Henry Chadwick, on ecumenism; and the Editor of the Jesuit journal, *The Month*, Hugh Kay's analysis of the Pope's encyclical on labour, *Laborem exercens*.

The history and the heritage are portrayed through drawings. John Norton is a Holbein for our time. His drawings of the Plantagenets are from the lovely fifteenth century choir screen at York Minster. We see abbeys and monasteries lost by the Dissolution and the cathedrals of Winchester, Salisbury and Westminster. There are some lively sketches of choristers.

The written word embraces profiles of prominent Catholics—Mr. Norton is a bit of an Aubrey as well as a latter-day Holbein; an Introductory Guide to Britain's Religious Art Heritage, complete with a railway map—Jimmy Savile, Knight of St. Gregory, should also be glad that the appropriate station is appended to each historic site!—royal genealogical tables; maps of war and dominion; a list of popes and one of Archbishops of Canterbury since Augustine.

There is a useful bibliography.

JOHN BIGGS-DAVISON

ROBERT LOWELL'S POETRY

Robert Lowell: a Biography. Ian Hamilton. Faber. £12.50.

The long shadow of Robert Lowell on the poetry of our time is inescapable Yet it has caused some critics to denigrate his poems on the ground that he was a practitioner of 'extremist' art. Even Stephen Spender, friend and admirer though he was, characterised him, along with John Berryman, Theodore Roethke and Sylvia Plath, as one of the poets who 'cultivate their hysteria' to produce confessional poems of a narcissistic kind. Ian Hamilton, however, in his excellently researched and presented literary biography, goes far to disprove this assumption. He shows how serious a misnomer is 'Confessional Poetry' when applied, as it commonly has been, to Lowell's influential and important book, *Life Studies* (1959), the third of his major collections of poems. It certainly contains many personal confidences about his marriage problems: but Lowell's particular authority comes from a belief that the contours of his life have a significance greater than is implied by their immediate context. In *The Mills of Kavanaugh*, his second volume, the poet had often found it difficult to draw the line between interior and exterior reality, conscious as he was of the historical parallels between the loyalist, puritan tradition of his illustrious forbears and his own continuous involvement in the peripheral aspects of the politics of protest. Jailed during the Vietnam war as a conscientious objector, he was widely regarded as a traitor to his class and to his militarily distinguished ancestors.

In the poetry from *Life Studies* onwards Lowell increasingly dwelt on the

details of his private life but his growing technical proficiency and linguistic sensitiviness allowed him to impart universality to life-experiences, an ability which he shared with John Crowe Ransom and Robert Frost. Married three times, he had a daughter and a son. All three marriages were seriously affected by the manic-depressive illness which had dogged him since childhood. Ian Hamilton tells for the first time the full story of his long quest for health and of the many kinds of treatment to which he subjected himself throughout his troubled life. His first marriage, to Jean Stafford, a novelist and critic, ended in 1948. The second wife, another writer, was Elizabeth Hardwick who, with their daughter Harriet, figures in some of the most moving lyrics but also in bitterly recriminatory passages where even some of her letters are quoted against her. In 1972, after the divorce from Elizabeth, Lowell moved to England to marry Lady Caroline Blackwood, the last of the three and possibly the one most vulnerable to his increasingly violent bouts of manic-depression. The fourth book of poems, *The Dolphin*, chronicles more explicitly than ever the emotional stresses of his life with Elizabeth—perhaps because she was the strongest of his wives. Indeed, she proved to be his final refuge for, at the time of his death from a heart attack in 1977, Lowell was planning to rejoin her and divorce Caroline who could no longer withstand his spells of madness.

All the more extraordinary, then, does it seem that Lowell could live so turbulent a life, finding distinguished women to share it, and at the same time write, prolifically and brilliantly, poems on international as well as personal issues. His political involvement with the Democratic Kennedy administration was constant and the Kennedys, along with Adlai Stevenson, were his devoted friends. His exacting lecture programme at Harvard and Kenyon, his wide-ranging tutorial work with young poets in many universities, all demonstrate the extent of his literary influence and the vigour of his intellect when not disabled by illness. He was proposed for the Chair of Poetry at Oxford but suffered defeat for two reasons: one was that Enid Starkie campaigned vigorously against his election, the other his own renewed illness at the vital time. It seems likely that in holding this curious professorship Lowell might have made an interesting contribution to Oxford life, for his tutorial work at Kenyon had shown how seriously he regarded the aspirations of young poets.

In spite of literary fame and public recognition on both sides of the Atlantic, Lowell was always perilously near to personal disaster. Ian Hamilton has written a balanced, workmanlike biography, quoting much contemporary criticism as well as skilfully using the letters and documents generously provided to him by Lowell's family and friends. Many of his sources show the life-related poems as different in kind from the self-indulgent versifying practised by the 'pop' poets with whom Lowell has often been associated. Critics such as John Thompson and Richard Eberhart judged his work by its 'lasting tensile strength', forged out of bitter experience. His style is original and, whilst acknowledging the debt owed by all contemporary poets to T. S. Eliot and Ezra Pound, Lowell became the Eliot of his generation. A full, perceptive biography such as Mr. Hamilton has written is timely.

BETTY ABEL

A JEWISH FAMILY OF NOVELISTS

The Brothers Singer. Clive Sinclair. Allison and Busby. £8.95.

The Brothers Ashkenazi. I. J. Singer. Translated by Joseph Singer. Allison and Busby. £9.95.

Deborah. Esther Kreitman. Translated by Maurice Carr. Virago. £3.95.

In the beginning, in the provinces of Poland, Pinchos Mendel Singer married Bathsheba Mordecai, thus uniting two ancient rabbinic houses, and they begat Esther, Israel Joshua, Isaac Bashevis and Moshe. Isaac Bashevis, the third of those offspring, born in 1904, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1978. His elder brother, Joshua (1893-1944), had gone before him as a powerful novelist —a realist and pessimistic social commentator—but, except in Yiddish scholarship, is today eclipsed by Bashevis, even though Bashevis acknowledges a great debt to him, calling him his father, his teacher and his master. Mr. Sinclair indicates the substance of that debt, and the family background and cultural heritage which form the Singer testament. Joshua's novels were translated and did receive publication in English, but his panoramic *The Brothers Ashkenazi* (the translation of which by his son, Joseph Singer, is currently re-published) is by far the best known, and approaches a great novel. This Mr. Sinclair examines, together with the body of Joshua's novels, and shows how they illuminate Bashevis' writings. The common cultural heritage of their father's rabbinical court, the Hassidic directive (to which neither son remained faithful) and the earthy realities and occult superstitions of village life in Poland—the windows stuffed with rags, the crowing of cocks, the creak of pedlars' carts, the shrieking dybbuk to be exorcised—bind the brothers together inexorably, however metaphysical and sophisticated the later, questioning, Americanised Bashevis may appear to be.

There is also (Mr. Sinclair has unearthed) a third creative Singer, a Branwell, perhaps, rather than an Edith: Esther Kreitman, the first born, whose autobiographical novel, *Deborah*, was first published in English translation by her son, Maurice Carr, in 1946, and is now reissued by Virago Press. Esther, whose family memories contribute to Mr. Sinclair's discussion, was an interesting woman who survived rejection by the dominant mother, Bathsheba, and rebelled against the second-class domestic status which was pressed upon her. Escape into an arranged marriage did not release her and in later life she developed a paranoid illness. She lived in London from 1914 to her death in 1954. *Deborah* is a good, strong, non-self-pitying novel.

Mr. Sinclair's book is kite-shaped; after the promising early biographical material, it tapers off into densely-written exegeses of Joshua's novels (which still cleverly encapsulate biographical material), and ends abruptly. It makes, obviously, a contribution to learning, but it remains of an introductory nature as regards Israel Joshua Singer.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

A NEW LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN

Benjamin Franklin, a biography. Ronald W. Clark. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. £18.50.

More than forty years ago Carl Van Doren spoke of 'a Franklin science', having himself written a magisterial biography that has for long been treated as the definitive study of the man. But since Van Doren's big but one volume study appeared, there has been a still-more striking development of 'a Franklin science'. Almost every aspect of Franklin's long life—he was eighty-four when he died and he had lived thirteen years in Britain as agent and nine in France as ambassador in stormy times, as well as making himself First Citizen of Philadelphia—has been lovingly studied and analysed. And for the last twenty years, there have been appearing at regular annual intervals the now twenty-two volumes of the *Papers of Benjamin Franklin*, meticulously edited in

the Yale Library by a dedicated and able team of editors; and there are at least thirty more volumes to come, finance and editorial stamina permitting! To attempt, therefore, to survey this man's life in a single-volume study is a brave act. And Ronald Clark brings considerable experience as well as courage to his task, as a distinguished biographer of Freud, Einstein, and Bertrand Russell among others.

Mr. Clark has been successful in a different task. He writes well on Franklin as scientist, and has a commendable knowledge of the confused political scene in London during Franklin's sojourn there as agent for the colony of Pennsylvania. He has a wide knowledge of the secondary sources and uses them well. As a biographer of Franklin myself, I found his book very interesting—and in places fresh. Inevitably, for anyone who has tried to keep up with the Yale papers, there is not much that is new here; but it is a useful survey of a long and busy life.

If I have a reservation, it is on the treatment of Franklin in Paris. The Yale Papers are now just reaching them, but there is a vast archive on Franklin in Paris to be explored in Yale. Some indication of the quality and range of its resources has been given in the study of Franklin as a diplomat by Jonathan Dull published by the American Philosophical Society last year—an original and probing analysis—and the delightful insights into Franklin as a private man coming from Claude-Anne Lopez, both of them drawing on their knowledge as editors of the Yale archive. (Mr. Clark, it should be said, has used these, and many other books.) Nor is there in Mr. Clark's book a full sense of the varied contrasting worlds through which Franklin moved with such skill, the republican and bourgeois world in Philadelphia, the complex Parliamentary scene in London and aristocratic Paris. Mr. Clark fully recognises there are still problems here to be analysed. But this is no criticism. It is just to say that there is still room for even more studies of this fascinating, shrewd and warm personality! I am sure these will be coming in the wake of the massive archive that Yale has made available.

EDMOND WRIGHT

MRS. OSCAR WILDE

Mrs. Oscar Wilde. Anne Clark Amor. Sidgwick & Jackson. £8.95.

The Constance Wilde of Anne Clark Amor's book is a romantic heroine at whose wedding 'suddenly there was a buzz of excitement, and a gasp, and then the congregation rose. At the door of the church, dressed in cowslip yellow, crowned with myrtle and looking radiantly happy, stood Constance Mary Lloyd.' Oscar Wilde described to Lillie (sic) Langtry his 'grave, slight, violet-eyed little Artemis', did he not? Very well, then—'As she pored over the newspapers day after day with tears spilling from her violet eyes she saw that they could not escape from the painful publicity even in Ireland.' Anne Clark Amor's favourite adjective is 'terrible' and she babbles of Oscar's 'genius' to the point of embarrassment. 'As a parent Oscar was absolutely marvellous.' Her book is absurdly partisan and naïvely judgemental: Lord Alfred Douglas is 'evil' and 'this unfortunate specimen'. Her stance that Wilde was heterosexual before and during marriage until he met and was corrupted by Lord Alfred Douglas is frankly ridiculous. Not surprisingly, Rupert Croft-Cooke's *The Unrecorded Life of Oscar Wilde*, with its parade of young Greeks, is not acknowledged in her bibliography. It is a gross over-simplification to state that 'The fact is that, quite simply, he (Oscar) fell in love with her.' The situation

was much more complicated than that, although Anne Clark Amor's new research into the exact nature of Constance's reputed riches, which minimises them, is of great interest. 'Constance was very comfortably circumstanced, it is true, and her income was secure. Her means were not, however, adequate to meet the needs of a young couple determined to lead a life of elegance and style.'

Anne Clark Amor makes much of Constance's solacing activities—editorship of the *Rational Dress Society's Gazette*, support of Lady Sandhurst's political campaign—while 'One major problem in the Wildes' marriage was Oscar's social life, from which Constance was by now to some extent excluded', as the author innocently records. She relies overmuch upon refuting Frank Harris. Her manuscript sources include a collection of Constance's holograph letters in the Library of William Andrews Clark, Jnr. at the University of California, further holograph letters in the British Library, and the typescript of Constance's correspondence with Carlos and Carrie Blacker, belonging to Mr. H. Montgomery Hyde. None of these, however, alleviates the painful experience of enduring Anne Clark Amor's rehashing of the Wilde saga. Her style, sometimes gushing, sometimes bald, is riddled with really shocking infelicities: 'a lovely Beardsley drawing' is followed two paragraphs later by 'Donoghue's lovely bas-relief' (at 16 Tite Street). 'Somewhere along the way', as the blurb has it, 'things went desperately wrong.'

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

My Russia (Macmillan. £10.95). This is Peter Ustinoff's personal tribute to Russia, to whom, both in historical and contemporary terms, he is clearly devoted. With 'a salutary scepticism in the air . . . it is perhaps just the time to examine the history of prejudice to which a nation has been the victim from early in her history to the present day'. Certainly his approach is controversial, and he can be profoundly wrong on facts. For example, comparing Soviet Russia with the United States and the West, he states: 'We are all subject to the rule of law, and even if the laws are different, they are far less different than we imagine'. Tragically, there is blatant disregard in Russia for the rule of law, where even the safeguards in the constitution are regularly ignored. There is no redress for illegal detention in the courts, which are not independent. Perhaps Mr. Ustinoff's most weighty point is Russia's fear of encirclement. He dismisses the basic evangelical nature of communism. He concludes: 'Her recognition of the folly and horror of war is a measure of her responsibility, not a mask for her desire to conquer the world.' This is an interesting study which provokes criticism. There are a large number of excellent illustrations, including some in colour.

The Penguin Complete Novels of Franz Kafka (Penguin Books. £4.95). This volume, together with two others, has been published among the Penguin books to celebrate the centenary of the birth of the celebrated Czech writer on the 3rd July, 1883. The volume of novels contains *The Trial*, *The Castle* and *America*. They are all translated from the German by Willa and Edwin Muir. Each novel has, of course, been separately published. A reprint of *The Trial* also appears

separately in Penguin Modern Classics (£1.75). The other centenary reprints are *The Penguin Short Stories of Franz Kafka* (£3.95) and *Franz Kafka, Letters to Milena* (£2.50). As to the volume of short stories, the Editor, Nahum N. Glatzer, writes: 'It is the purpose of this volume to provide ready access to the entire corpus of Kafka's stories.' *The Letters to Milena*, reprinted in Penguin Modern Classics, edited by Willy Haas and translated by Tani and James Stern, are letters to Milena Jesenska with whom Kafka first became acquainted in 1920 when she was translating his early short prose into Czech. There developed a love affair for two years before Kafka's death in 1924.

The Intelligent Traveller's Guide to Historic Britain (Sidgwick and Jackson. £12.95). This is an admirable guide to the main historic sites in England and Wales, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. The author, Philip A. Crowl, is an American, with a distinguished academic career as an historian, who has spent ten years on the preparation of this volume. Combining detachment, scholarship and enthusiasm, he has provided a gazetteer and a narrative history linking the sites to our national history. 'It is a chronological account of Britain's past, but primarily in terms of the visible and visitable remains of that past.' John Julius Norwich provides a Foreword. Leafing through his gazetteer, one is again and again astonished by his thoroughness; no distance is too great, no journey is too arduous, no hamlet too remote.' Of course, there are bound to be some queries. For instance, he describes Cambridge's oldest college, Peterhouse, as being founded in 1280. In fact, the college will be celebrating its seventh centenary in 1984. Nonetheless, Hugo de Balsham did introduce a body of scholars as part of the Hospital of St. John in 1280, though not as a college. This shows, indeed, the author's erudition. There is also a great deal of useful information for the traveller, including maps, mileages, road numbers and grid references.

The Great Little Madison (The British Academy. £2). Professor Esmond Wright's important Sarah Tryphena Phillips Lecture on the Father of the American Constitution, delivered in November 1981, has now been very usefully published. Professor Wright's verdict: 'A modest man, with no presence and little money who by studying and by reason constructed—in all its omissions—the most intricate and longest surviving Constitution in human history'.

VERTICAL LINE

By

Peter Preston

'... We looked in. Here were the eyes of the prisoner. So frozen that only the slightest movement was possible, was the delicate head of the huge and beautiful figure. Eyes with the lids partly closed stared into the dark space. The lids over which frozen cascades of tears bulged were pinned by lashes part open, part closed, for this figure was imprisoned by cold ..'

Paperback £1.95. ISBN 0 946373 00 0.
ST. PANCRAS PRESS,
149 St. Pancras Way, London, N.W.1.

The Wings Appeal Fund helps to maintain the RAF Association Home for Disabled and Chronic Sick. Care is essential for those who have served their country and who are in need. So please help by giving all you can for an emblem in WINGS WEEK in September or send a donation to show that you care.

Give as they Gave

To: Royal Air Forces Association, Appeals Dept. (DB) Portland Rd., Malvern, Worcs WR14 2TA.
I enclose a donation of..... for the Wings Appeal Fund
Name.....
Address.....
Please tick if receipt required ☐ or information on RAFA Membership ☐

Space donated by
Contemporary Review

NAVVYMAN

by Dick Sullivan

The definitive history of navvies and navvying, 1760-1940.
Paperback £5.75. Hardback £8.75. Carriage paid.

From bookshops or from Coracle Books, 1 Prince of Wales Passage, Hampstead Road, London NW1 1EE.

SOMETHING ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Facts and Pictures about Authors and Illustrators of Books for Young People. Volume 29. Edited by Anne Commire. 328 pages. 8½ in. x 11 in. Author Portraits; Illustrations from the Authors' Books; Bibliographies; Cross References; Cumulative Indexes to Authors and Illustrators in Vols. 1-29. Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, USA, 1982. ISSN 0267-826X. L.C. Card No. 72-27107. ISBN 0-8103-0081-8. $50.00.

If you were born in the USA you believe in a Republic. If you were born in the UK you believe in a Monarchy. Born in east Europe — a Communist: in west Europe, a Capitalist. On the north side of the Mediterranean, a Christian — on the south side a Muslim. And so on through the 57 varieties of each.

These fundamental beliefs are held by us without any thought on our part. This proves that we are programmed. The media do not create but simply cater for this inherent conditioning of the masses, which applies, in varying degrees, to all countries. Common decency, human dignity — and perhaps survival, depend on all sides of public issues being brought out into the open. If you doubt this, you should send for your free copy of:

The Delegate

It is independent and impartial and is compiled by Peter Thomson, Haughhead Farm House, Uddingston, Lanarkshire, U.K. G71, who is a former County Judge.

HEADS, OR THE ART OF PHRENOLOGY

By Helen and Peter Cooper

A beautifully illustrated description of the art of reading character: from the Ancient Greeks, through Astrology and Mysticism, Physiognomy and Phrenology to Modern Day self-awareness. **£5.95**

Obtainable from The London Phenology Company Ltd.
15 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2 4EA. (01-836 6040)

ExecHotels

the key to comfort in
Great Britain's
independent hotels

For free Guide, write to: ExecHotels, 190 Church Road, Hove, East Sussex, England BN3 2DJ.

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG Tel. 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

AUGUST 1983

THE CIVIL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
Sir Kelvin Spencer

THE LEBANESE POWDERKEG
Paul Wilkinson

ALBANIA'S MUSCULAR SOCIALISM
Michael Kaser

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW
David Shipman

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement

98p

Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

August 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1411 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
Nordic Security	Clive Archer	57
The Lebanese Powderkeg	Paul Wilkinson	64
Northern Ireland—the Realistic Solutions	Hugh Munro	72
Japan's Second South-East Asia	Ian Nish	79
The Civil Application of Nuclear Energy	Sir Kelvin Spencer	83
Albania's Muscular Socialism	Michael Kaser	89
The Video and the Child	Martyn Goff	95
The Evils of Superstition	Melville Hawthorn	99
Cinema: a Quarterly Review	David Shipman	101
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		105
Kenneth Lindsay, John A. Loraine, Richard Whittington-Egan, Rosalind Wade		
SHORTER REVIEWS		112

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

● 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S Mailing Agent: Expeditors of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47 50 Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections c/o Expeditors of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

August 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1411

NORDIC SECURITY

by Clive Archer

OVER the past few years the Nordic states have expressed their doubts and fears about international security, and their leaders have been prominent in suggesting alternatives to the re-emergence of an East-West Ice Age in Europe. Olof Palme, now Swedish prime minister, was chairman of the independent commission on security and disarmament which suggested, inter alia, the establishment of a battlefield nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Europe. President Koivisto of Finland in May of this year reiterated the proposal of his predecessor, President Kekkonen, who twenty years earlier had called for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Nordic region. This idea had already been disinterred in October 1980 by a former Norwegian cabinet minister, Ambassador Jens Evensen. The conservative governments in Norway and Denmark have been under strong parliamentary pressure to renounce the NATO Dual Track decision taken in December 1979 which involved the proposed stationing of cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe.

Such activity by the Nordic governments appears to run contrary to the seeming fixed pattern of security policies adopted by these states since 1949. Are the Scandinavians breaking out of the mould formed in the immediate post-war years? Has the appearance of alien submarines in their fiords (and sometimes in more prominent positions) pushed the Nordic peoples into an agonising reappraisal of their defence postures?

Each of the five Nordic states emerged from the Second World War with a different experience of defence and security.

Finland had been attacked in the winter of 1939 by a Soviet Union anxious to extend the flank around Leningrad. The Finns sued for peace after an effective defence of their territory but joined in the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. At the end of the Second World War, Finland was forced to switch sides and expel German soldiers from their territory—this way they avoided liberation by the Red Army though they were obliged to pay a large indemnity to the USSR and provide it with military bases on Finnish soil.

Norway, Denmark and Iceland were all occupied during the war, the first two by Germany after a *blitzkrieg* attack and Iceland by British and then American troops.

Only Sweden found that it could continue the pre-war policy of neutrality successful in a period of conflict and this was due partly to it being buffered by Norway, Denmark and Finland and partly to its rearmament

programme in the immediate pre-war years. After the war, the five countries returned to a policy of neutrality with a strong emphasis being placed on the new collective security system of the United Nations. Norway and Denmark stressed their role—similar to that of Czechoslovakia—as 'bridge builders' between the Great Powers of Britain, the US and the Soviet Union. By 1948 it had become apparent that the gap between East and West had widened and by Easter 1948 the Czech 'bridge' had been retracted into the emerging Soviet bloc. The situation was not eased by Soviet approaches to Finland to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance, the name of which seemed to belie its intention. The Danish and Norwegian response was one of near-panic and they turned first to their Scandinavian neighbour, Sweden, for help. However, the Swedes could not provide the materiel for Norway and Denmark and in April 1949 these two—together with Iceland—joined NATO in order to obtain the protective cover and arms supplies of the United Kingdom and the US. Finland had fared better than expected with its Soviet treaty, as the Finnish government, without Red Army troops on its territory and able to crush a communist putsch, was able to negotiate a settlement based on neutrality.

By the end of 1949 the pattern of Nordic security which was to endure until the present had been decided.

Denmark, Iceland and Norway have been members of NATO but on their own terms. Danish and Norwegian governments have made it clear that they will not allow nuclear weapons on their territory or the permanent basing of foreign troops in their metropolitan territories. The Danish possession in North America—Greenland—has American military personnel based there, as does Iceland which is without its own armed forces. Since joining NATO, both Denmark and Norway have built up their armed forces and weaponry especially during the Korean War. Despite having small populations in large tracts of land, they have aimed at creating a defence which can hold the line against a conventional attack, thus allowing time for reinforcements from other NATO states and for political decisions to be made by the Alliance leadership. During peacetime, Allied forces regularly exercise in Denmark and Norway and both countries have made agreements in the last three years to pre-stock heavy US equipment and to have collocated bases, both of which could be used in times of war or crisis by incoming American forces.

Sweden has continued to build up its defence forces in order to provide a naval and air guard against intruders into its territory. Swedish economic and civil defence, with its armed forces, provides such resistance against any invasion so that potential aggressors might find it easier to go round the country. This 'hedgehog' posture has been complemented by Sweden's policy of remaining outside alliances and of acting in international relations in a way that encourages diplomacy, negotiation, peaceful settlement and a low level of conflict.

Since 1949 the Nordic states cannot be said to have had common or even similar security policies. Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of the NATO alliance, Sweden maintains an alliance-free

posture and Finland is neutral but with a special relationship with the Soviet Union. The failure of negotiations for a Scandinavian Defence Union in 1948–9 demonstrated that the states had different security needs and they chose different solutions. Even the positions of Denmark, Iceland and Norway within NATO reflect their individual needs. Norway, having a common border with the Soviet Union in the north, has placed a restraint on allied military activity in its northern country, Finnmark. Denmark has allowed US bases in Greenland, seeing them as continuations of a wartime agreement and as strategically necessary for the defence of North America. Iceland has considered the US base at Keflavik to be its major contribution to the Alliance. Yet the security policies of the Nordic states are often written and talked about collectively in a way that is rarely done for the Balkans or the Iberian peninsula. Indeed, the post-1949 configuration of policies is frequently referred to as 'the Nordic balance'. What is meant by this term?

Normally the concept of Nordic balance is used in one of three ways. First, it has a descriptive use, covering the present arrangement of Denmark, Iceland and Norway belonging to NATO but with certain self-imposed restraints, of Finland 'balancing' this by its treaty with the USSR, and alliance-free Sweden acting as a fulcrum in between. It has been remarked that three (the NATO members) against one (Finland) is scarcely a balance and that all five Nordic states are ideologically situated in the same camp—that of West European pluralistic parliamentary democracies with open, mixed economies.

The second use of the term 'Nordic balance' is more dynamic by nature. This indicates a movement in policy to counteract any factor that may upset the stability of the five Nordic security policies. This does not refer to a redressing of any military imbalance in the north but to political-diplomatic manoeuvring. A classic example is supposed to be that of the 1961 'Note Crisis' when the Soviet Union sent the Finnish Government a note requesting joint consultations under the terms of their 1948 Treaty. The Finns stalled, fearing that this would lead to Soviet hegemony over their security, and the Norwegian Foreign Minister hinted that such a Soviet move would lead to a reappraisal of Norway's policy of having no foreign bases on their soil. The Soviet Union retracted their demand and a triumph for the Nordic Balance was acclaimed by some observers. The details of the 1961 crisis may show that the Norwegian attempt to redress the balance was not as crucial as supposed and there are few other examples of the Nordic equilibrium being restored after outside interference. There are several occasions when the security policy of a Nordic state has been tilted in one direction without a 'balancing' response by other Nordic countries. For example, the creation of a joint Danish-West German command for the Baltic area (COMBALTAP) in 1961 did not merit the response from Finland of closer co-operation with the USSR—indeed, as mentioned, the Finns resisted such Soviet suggestions later that year.

'Nordic balance' has also been an expression used by policy-makers in Scandinavia, especially since the Note Crisis of 1961. The Norwegian

Long Term defence Plan, 1974-78 talked about the Nordic balance having been unchanged over the previous decades and considered it to have contributed to the security of the Northern region. Other official documents have used the term with varying regularity and enthusiasm. A former Norwegian prime minister, Per Borten, preferred to call it the 'so-called Nordic balance' which in his opinion did not represent a common Nordic security solution as this option had been rejected in the Scandinavian Defence Union talks of 1948-49. Swedish governments have used the terms 'equilibrium' and 'balance of stability in the North' whilst the Finns have plumped for 'balanced factors'.

The concept of a Nordic balance has been confusing rather than clarifying. It suggests a balance between factors that cannot be equated, such as Norwegian NATO membership and Finland's special relationship with the USSR. It implies a dynamic of deliberate equilibrium that has been absent from Nordic security policies which, on the whole, have been remarkably tolerant of change. It has certainly not been a deliberate policy on behalf of any of the Nordic states and at most is an *ex post facto* rationalisation. Finally, it tends to suggest a self-containment of Nordic security policies that does not exist: these countries are as dependent on the European security order and on the East-West balance as other small European states.

Having noted these reservations, the term 'Nordic balance' does reflect the desire of Nordic governments to give consideration to the security policies of their immediate neighbours when fashioning their own. It is a tacit understanding that each should avoid harming the interests of their Nordic colleagues and that there should at least be mutual consultation on important matters.

The Nordic security policies since 1949 can be typified by a degree of consistency and stability and, though each is different from the rest, a strong element of interdependence nevertheless exists between them. Furthermore, the five policies have shown a common pattern depending greatly on a judicious mix between elements of insurance and reassurance.

Each of the Nordic countries has attempted to insure itself against an attack or a threat of attack. Denmark, Iceland and Norway have taken out their insurance policy with NATO and as premiums they have paid increased military preparedness and territory, manpower and defence installations, and information made available for general NATO use. All three of these countries pay a slightly different form of premium. Sweden contributes to its insurance by a robust defence posture and by earmarking a certain amount of its civilian resources for use during a crisis or invasion. In its 1948 Treaty with the Soviet Union the Finns have a promise of Soviet aid should Finland be attacked by Germany and its allies. Within the constraints of its Second World War peace treaty and its budget, Finland has also created an effective defence force which could at least sustain resistance against any aggressor. These forms of insurance have the added advantage, not possessed by most conventional forms issued by commercial companies, that they also help

to prevent the damage insured against.

On the other hand, all of the Nordic states have sought to reassure surrounding countries, including potential adversaries, about the defensive nature of their security provisions. There has thus been a strong element of restraint in the military postures of these states, they have abjured activity near sensitive frontiers and banned Allied presence in certain areas; they have, on the whole, declined to host foreign bases or nuclear weapons and preferred arms control to rearmament. They have looked to other states—especially the Soviet Union—to respond to reassurance and to reciprocate in this restraint so that the Nordic states may pay a lower insurance premium.

What has happened over the past few years to upset the cosiness of the quiet corner of Europe?

Both the people of the Nordic area and their political leadership have shown increased signs of concern with the deteriorating superpower relationship, in particular its effect on Europe. Events at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s have sown doubts and dissension. By 1978 President Carter had proposed the placing of Enhanced Radiation Weapons—'Neutron Bombs'—in Western Europe and had postponed this step only after strong criticism from the West Europeans. Discussions had already started about the deployment of cruise missiles in Europe, with their potential to fly low over the airspace of allied, neutral and enemy territory alike. This development spurred President Kekkonen of Finland to re-iterate his earlier call for a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone in May 1978. It was the 'Dual Track' decision by the December 1979 NATO Ministerial meeting which accepted the proposal to deploy cruise and Pershing II missiles, followed by the election of President Reagan in 1980, that led to tangible West European doubts about the development of the arms race. Other events did not help. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 helped kill the US ratification of the SALT II Treaty, and uncertainty over Poland, especially since the imposition of martial law in December 1981, has created further unease between the two superpowers.

In October 1980 Jens Evensen, a top Norwegian Foreign Office official who had previously been a Labour cabinet minister, gave support to the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone. The hope was that the region would be able to insulate itself against the worst consequences of the arms race in Europe and maybe any war there. Katarina Brodin, in the July 1981 issue of *Contemporary Review* (No. 1386 Vol. 239), considered that it 'could be asked whether a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone would in actual fact be of such great value to the Nordic countries'. For many ordinary citizens in those states it represents a way of extricating themselves from the arms race. The details do not concern them: it is the spirit behind the proposals which is important.

The Nordic area is already free of nuclear weapons and a treaty would have the effect of ruling out the Danish and Norwegian option of allowing such weapons on their territory in times of crisis or war. As such it could be seen as a way of separating these two countries from NATO's

strategy of nuclear deterrence and many in the Danish and Norwegian peace movements have supported it for this reason. When Finnish governments have advanced their nuclear free zone proposals, they have stressed that these would not affect the basic security policies of the Nordic states. They have looked for approaches more modest than that of the treaty suggested by Jens Evensen and more in the way of confidence-building measures or moves aimed at relaxing tension in the North. The Soviet Union has currently responded to Finland's proposals by hinting that they might make reciprocal changes in those Soviet weapons affecting the Nordic area and based in the adjacent regions and that they would welcome discussions on a nuclear free Baltic. Almost certainly their version of a nuclear free Baltic would still allow Soviet nuclear weapons in and around the Baltic Sea.

The discussion about a Nordic nuclear free zone has had a similar effect on the Norwegian Labour Party and Danish Social Democrats (now both in opposition) as the nuclear debate has had on the British Labour Party. Both parties have reflected the current distaste with nuclear strategy and have renounced the NATO Dual Track decision which they themselves were instrumental in formulating. Whether this is a sea-change in these parties' attitudes towards defence generally remains to be seen but it certainly seems that the days of the Scandinavian social democratic Atlanticists are numbered. As well as the Nordic nuclear free zone proposals, there have been other developments which have indicated possible change in Nordic security policies.

One result of heightened tension in Europe has been an increase in the premium on their 'insurance'. The Norwegian and Danish governments in the past few years have been willing to safeguard defence expenditure against inflation and even increase it. They have modernised their armed forces—especially with F-16 fighter aircraft—and have signed agreements with the USA to pre-stock heavy equipment in their own bases ready for use by Allied troops reinforcing Denmark and Norway in time of crisis or war.

The Swedish parliament has given the go-ahead for the development of JAS, the Swedish-built, multi-role replacement for the Viggen aircraft for the early 1990s. The 1982-87 Defence Plan includes an expanded submarine and anti-submarine warfare programme—a move made before intrusion of foreign submarines in Swedish waters became public knowledge. This seems to be a reversal of the trend over the last couple of decades of a decreasing proportion of government money—and GNP—being devoted to defence in Sweden.

Finland has also bolstered its defences in recent years. Its parliamentary defence committee has recommended an increase in defence expenditure for the years 1982-86 and in December 1982 parliament voted for a 19% increase in the defence budget. The effectiveness of Finnish troops in the north of their country has received particular attention.

At the same time these Nordic countries have attempted to strengthen the element of reassurance in their policies. New conservative governments in Norway and Denmark have been less willing than their pre-

decessors to pursue the discussions about a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone but they have voiced their concern about the slow progress made in various arms control negotiations, especially the INF talks at Geneva. The Social Democrat government of Mr. Palme in Sweden has taken up the cause of a battlefield nuclear weapon free zone in Europe, something recommended by the independent disarmament commission headed by Palme when he was in opposition. The new Finnish President, Mauno Koivisto, has repeated his predecessor's call for a Nordic nuclear free zone now that official support for that proposal has cooled in Norway.

All this diplomatic activity by the Nordic governments has displayed their concern that, as objects of international relations, their small nations were being dragged along by events over which they had little control. Nordic peace movements have shown an eagerness for their countries to disengage themselves from the source of this tension—the East-West struggle. Nordic governments have on the whole attempted to ameliorate the sharper symptoms in Europe of any new Cold War. The extent to which they succeed will determine their ability to head off pressures within their own countries to break away from the Nordic security pattern developed since 1949.

[Dr. Clive Archer is deputy director of the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, and pays particular attention to Nordic security questions.]

THE LEBANESE POWDERKEG

by Paul Wilkinson

SURVEYING the international situation in the Middle East engenders growing feelings of helplessness and desperation. The rest of the world seems almost to have forgotten the Iran-Iraq war which broke out in September, 1980. Now, almost three years later, it has cost many thousands of lives on both sides, and there is no settlement in sight. Wave after wave of ill-trained soldiers, including many children of secondary school age, have been the cannon-fodder in this terrible and pointless conflict. The International Red Cross has pleaded unsuccessfully for both sides to respect the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners. There is evidence of prisoners being tortured and killed. The UN Secretary-General and the Arab League have made spasmodic efforts to bring an end to the fighting. Meanwhile, the rest of the international community appears no longer to care about the war. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are keeping the Iraqi warchests filled, while at the same time benefitting substantially from the fact that the war has knocked out a considerable proportion of the oil production of both belligerents. The fear of Iranian attacks against their own territories and oil installation, worries about the spread of Khomeini-style Islamic fundamentalism among their own Shiite populations, and the danger of ecological damage to their own territory and resources caused by the war, do not appear to cause the Arab states sufficient concern to concentrate their combined efforts on ending the conflict.

Meanwhile, in Lebanon, a year after the Israeli invasion, events appear to be drifting inexorably towards a new Arab-Israeli war. And this time that prospect carries a heavier risk than ever before of superpower involvement which could trigger a Third, and final, World War. Neither Moscow nor Washington desires a direct military confrontation with the other. They know full well that this could signal the beginning of a nuclear Armageddon. The present generation of superpower leaders on both sides remember how close the world came to nuclear war in the 1962 Cuban Missiles Crisis: they surely do not wish to repeat that experience. But in the Cuban Missiles Crisis the confrontation was direct, superpower to superpower. In the final showdown we know that it was President Kennedy and his closest advisers who directed the delicate and dangerous operation of the US naval blockade of Cuba and the critical handling of interceptions of Soviet ships, just as Moscow was in direct command of its convoy and its cargo of surface-to-air missiles.

It is an infinitely more complex and dangerous situation when the major powers are attempting to avoid a direct clash while their respective allies and clients are spoiling for a fight. It is certain that the United States and the Soviet Union have been trying, behind the scenes, to counsel caution, and to warn their allies to avoid any major act of provocation against its adversary. But as both superpowers should by now have learned from their previous experience in the Middle East, they

cannot really hope to control the actions of proud, stubborn and independent leaders such as Prime Minister Begin and President Assad. Not only are there severe limits to the superpowers' ability to control events in this dangerous and volatile region: both the Americans and the Russians are in a sense trapped by their repeated investments of political, ideological, military and economic support for their clients. Just as President Reagan cannot really afford to be seen to weaken or withdraw support to Israel, particularly in the lead-up to the next Presidential election, so Mr. Andropov and his colleagues in the Politburo will be anxious to convince their few remaining allies in the Middle East and elsewhere that they can offer credible support and protection as a superpower ally, and hence are anxious to demonstrate the firmness of their commitment to Syria's security. The Russians clearly believe they cannot afford a further humiliation of the kind they suffered in 1982, when the weapons they supplied to Syria were simply overwhelmed by Israeli military superiority, and when they were unable to lift a finger to help their PLO allies in the fighting in the Lebanon and the siege of Beirut.

What makes the present situation in the Lebanon so dangerous is not simply the fact that roughly 30,000 Israeli forces confront roughly 40,000 Syrians and 10,000 PLO fighters in positions sometimes no more than 25 yards apart right across to the Bekaa Valley in Eastern Lebanon. Nor is it due solely to the continuing faction fighting between Phalangist militia and Lebanese Leftist and Druze groups struggling for control of sectors of Lebanese territory, though this remains an important destabilising factor. It is the presence of large numbers of Soviet and American personnel in an area of such high tension. Since the end of the major fighting in Lebanon in September 1982, the Soviets have rebuilt a complex and impressive new missile system for the Syrians, together with an improved system of command, control and communications and a complete air-defence system, including radar-guided missiles, to protect new batteries of SAM-5 missiles. This system is entirely manned and controlled by Soviet 'advisers' and technicians, and is linked directly to Moscow via Cosmos satellite. It is now estimated that there are roughly 5,000 Russian personnel involved, and some of these have moved across the Lebanese border to advise on the consolidation of Syrian positions and defences.

The Russians have also deployed an intelligence-gathering ship, the *Kilden,* together with one of its Kashin-class destroyers, equipped with SAM anti-aircraft missiles and a frigate, off the Lebanese coast, to keep an eye on Israeli movements. The main Israeli supply line to Beirut is along the coastal highway, and the Russians can listen in to Israeli communications and give early warning to Damascus of any major move, such as an Israeli pullback into Southern Lebanon, or an Israeli preemptive strike. Clearly in any fresh outbreak of Syrian-Israeli hostilities there would be a high probability of Soviet personnel being killed. The same is true of American personnel. US marines form a major part of the multi-national peacekeeping force in Beirut. There are US support-

ships of the Sixth Fleet on the coast. Nor should we forget that, although no American personnel are engaged directly in Israeli combat forces, or as advisers in Israel, the US government is totally committed to support of Israel in any conflict. President Reagan, despite his deep differences with the Begin government over the invasion of Lebanon last year, has frequently reiterated America's readiness to guarantee Israel's vital security. Israel is still seen as the most valued and dependable US ally in the Middle East. There is still a very strong domestic lobby for Israel in the US which will stay loyal through thick and thin, and with an election looming President Reagan cannot afford to offend this lobby. Thus in any new Arab-Israeli war the superpowers would very soon be deeply and dangerously embroiled, just as surely as Germany and Russia became drawn into the conflict between their respective allies, Austria-Hungary and Serbia, which triggered the First World War.

A year after Sharon and Begin launched their long-planned invasion of Lebanon, the absurdly misnamed 'Operation Peace in Galilee', where does Israel now stand? Sharon, Begin and the other 'hawks' presumably believed that their blitzkrieg in the Lebanon would impose a military solution to their security problem, both in Lebanon and, indirectly, in the West Bank and Gaza. Sharon and Begin hoped that by destroying the Palestinian military bases in Southern Lebanon and Beirut they would remove the PLO as a military and political threat. And by crushing the PLO as a political force they hoped to smash its influence on Arabs in the occupied territories. Thus the way would be clear for the creation of alternative organisations to be set up, on the model of the village leagues, which would be co-operative and acquiescent to Israeli demands. In the Lebanon they planned to set up a new government, to be controlled by their Phalangist allies, which would be willing to follow pro-Israeli policies and sign a formal peace treaty with Israel so that Israel's northern border could, by such means, be made as secure as the border with Egypt had become through the Camp David Agreement.

Now the real balance sheet for Israel is becoming clear. An overwhelming majority of international opinion holds the Begin government's policy in the Lebanon responsible for the thousands of dead and wounded among the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations, for the thousands made homeless, and for the immense sufferings and destruction inflicted by the war. Even in America, public opinion, the media, and Congress, all swung decisively against Israel's invasion. Long-standing friends of Israeli democracy came out with ringing denunciations of Begin's and Sharon's policies in speeches and in TV interviews. Israel, already somewhat isolated in the international community, thus lost the support of some of its staunchest friends. And in Israel itself, for the first time a powerful pressure group, 'Peace Now', began to get mass support for its own campaign against the war. 400,000 Israelis turned out to support its first major demonstration. Considerable numbers of young Israelis refused military service in the war, arguing that for the first time in its history Israel was fighting a purely offensive war which could not be morally justified under Judaic religious law and moral principles.

Recently this domestic opposition to the war has intensified as the guerrilla attrition attacks against Israeli forces in Lebanon have claimed more and more Israeli lives. Already, since September 1982, the Israeli government's occupation of the Lebanon has cost almost 25 times the number of *Israeli* lives lost in the entire period of the 1981-82 truce with the PLO.

Far from having been destroyed as a military and political force, Palestinian groups have now regrouped and consolidated positions in the North and East of Lebanon, behind Syrian lines, and they have carried out many of the attacks against Israeli troops from these new positions. The PLO is split into pro- and anti-Arafat factions. Even so there are now over 10,000 PLO fighters, with some Lebanese Leftist allies, now at large in Lebanon. Moreover, it now looks as though Asafat and his 'moderate' faction in Fatah are being pushed aside in favour of those who back a more militant strategy of renewed and intensified war against Israel. To all intends and purposes the militants have now thrown their hand in with Syria and, in return for Syrian protection and support, they are being expected to conform to Assad's line. As for the West Bank Arabs, far from becoming more conciliatory and acquiescent to Israeli control, they have been mobilised into yet more militant opposition to Israel by the events in the Lebanon and the intensification of the Israeli West Bank settlement programme.

So far as the future of Lebanon is concerned the Begin government has also failed to attain its war aims. President Amin Gemayel, with American support, has flatly refused to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel. Instead of their ambitious scheme for realigning and reorganising Lebanon the Israelis have had to make do with an agreement for the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon, leaving them with a merely token presence as part of the Lebanese Army's security patrols in the South of the country. And this agreement, hammered out after long and patient efforts by Mr. George Shultz, the US Secretary of State, and his aides, and formally agreed by Israel and Lebanon in May, is now a dead letter because Syria refuses to withdraw its forces, and the Israeli pull-out was conditional on the withdrawal of Syrian and PLO forces. Faced with the prospect of being permanently imprisoned in the Lebanese quagmire the Begin government has made plans for a limited Israeli withdrawal into a security zone in the South of Lebanon, extending about 27 miles from Israel's northern frontier, and removing Israeli troops from areas such as the Chouf mountains where they have suffered heavily from guerrilla ambushes. However, this pull-back will not significantly reduce the risk of an Israel-Syria clash: both sides will face each other directly in the Bekaa Valley and the South East, and Syrians and Israelis will continue to wage political warfare with the aim of dominating the political vacuum caused by Israeli withdrawal. It is likely that we will see the Israelis setting up a similar security structure in South Lebanon to the one they have used in the West Bank, with a combination of village militias and village leagues co-opting willing stooges of the Israelis, by-passing the traditional village elders. Judging by the

vehemence of local opposition it is likely that the Israelis will find themselves compelled to turn the screws of increasing repression, just as they have in the West Bank, in order to retain total control and minimise Israeli losses. All this amounts to the de facto partitioning of Lebanon, solving none of Lebanon's problems and only adding to the sufferings of its people.

There is no doubt that the US government was quite sincere in its desire to avoid this tragic outcome. The Reagan administration is clearly totally committed to bringing about a withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, to upholding the integrity of the country and aiding its reconstruction. President Reagan is also committed to attempting to secure a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole: his proposed framework for this long-term peace was sketched in the Reagan Plan, announced on September 1st, 1982. This plan, involving the creation of an autonomous Palestinian homeland out of the occupied territories of West Bank and Gaza in confederation with neighbouring Jordan, has encountered numerous and basic difficulties. Some observers have already pronounced the Reagan Plan dead, and they may well be right. Begin's government damned it from its inception by adamantly refusing to relinquish full sovereignty over the occupied territories, and by stubbornly consolidating Israeli settlement on the West Bank. In April 1983 the PLO leader and King Hussein of Jordan began backing away from the US plan.

The failure of American efforts to get the Israelis to withdraw their troops from Lebanon is only one of the reasons for the debacle of the Reagan Plan, and not necessarily the most important. Nevertheless the United States government's handling of the Lebanese crisis reveals, in microcosm, many of the serious weaknesses and errors of current American foreign policy. No one who has observed them in action could doubt the dedication and professionalism of individual US officials and diplomats such as Mr. Philip Habib and Mr. Harold Saunders. But if the foreign policy is basically mistaken, however good your diplomats may be, the policy will fail.

Firstly, there was the failure to bring the Syrians into negotiations at an early stage. On the face of it it is clearly absurd to expect to plan a phased withdrawal of all foreign forces from a country without involving *all* the occupying powers as fully as possible in the discussions. The fact that Syria was not consulted or brought into the conference with the Lebanese and Americans only increased President Assad's strong suspicion of US intentions and confirmed his view of the outcome as an American-Israeli scheme to establish a virtual sphere of influence or hegemony over Lebanon. It is important to remember that the Syrians see themselves as the last remaining bastion against Israel, the only front line Arab state that engaged the Israelis directly in the 1982 war, and a last real champion and hope for the Palestinian cause. Moreover Assad now has an added interest in seeing progress towards a Palestinian state. Many of the PLO fighters and leaders took refuge in Damascus or behind Syrian lines in 1982. He is a tough autocrat and he will try to constrain their activities to ensure they do not conflict with Syrian national interests or challenge

or weaken his authority within Syria. But handling the PLO is a problem for any Arab leader, even one as ruthless as Assad.

The PLO is, after all, an inter-Arab phenomenon and has powerful friends and financial backers on whom Assad also depends. It is thus in his interests to canalise PLO activities against Syria's external enemies, and to see some permanent Palestinian base established which can absorb all the 'troublesome' PLO exiles temporarily resident in Syria.

The Syrians are also opposed to the Lebanon-Israeli withdrawal agreement on strategic grounds: they see the agreement as putting their security at risk by exposing their flank to an Israeli attack, and they are totally unwilling to accept the participation of Israelis in the joint security arrangements in Southern Lebanon as they see this as giving the Israelis a strategic advantage and influence over Lebanon.

In view of the fact that the Syrian President's response to the American-backed Lebanese-Israeli agreement was fairly predictable, it seems extraordinary that the US government deliberately decided to exclude the Syrians from withdrawal negotiations from the outset. It was hardly likely that their last-minute effort to get the Saudis to use their financial pressure on Syria would succeed. It is true that the Saudis pay generously towards the Syrians' military costs as a front-line state with responsibilities in the Lebanon, but they will continue to provide this conscience money in any event, and President Assad knows this. The last minute effort to send Mr. Habib to Damascus to coax Syria into agreeing to withdraw was doomed to failure. It came far too late. And in any case America had no tangible inducement to offer President Assad. Washington had been unable to persuade Israel to offer even the vaguest proposal for discussions on the Golan Heights which Israel has annexed from Syria. Nor did they even offer Assad a role in the discussions on the broader Palestinian question and the future of the occupied territories. It is hardly surprising that Assad ultimately refused to receive Mr. Habib.

There was a second equally basic flaw in the American approach, a weakness which has vitiated the whole American efforts towards a general peace settlement in the Middle East, and which obstructs crisis management and resolution in other high-tension regions of the world. They have been totally unwilling to bring their rival superpower, the Soviet Union, into even the broader diplomatic discussions of Middle East problems. Yet it seems obvious that the Soviets have, if only for geo-strategic reasons, an enormous interest in the balance of power in the Middle East, a region which impinges on their land frontiers. Russia, whether the US government likes it or not, is a major factor to be reckoned with in the region: it has clients and allies, and a great capacity for obstructing peace settlements and negotiations. It is no use President Reagan and his top advisers simply refusing to talk to the Russians about the Arab-Israeli conflict or about the future of Lebanon, simply on the grounds that the Soviets are always going to be trouble-makers. For a number of very practical reasons (such as the damaging and costly Russian involvement in Afghanistan, the Polish crisis, and

economic weaknesses) Moscow may well realise that it has a vested interest in keeping international peace in the Middle East. At very least they have an interest as great as America's in preventing any conflict that might escalate into a direct superpower conflict. Yet the Reagan administration evidently simply do not want even to attempt such a dialogue. It is surely clear, with regard to the withdrawal of foreign forces in Lebanon, that the only power in a position to exert really significant leverage on President Assad to get him to agree to a Lebanese withdrawal is the Soviet Union. Thus we see that the second fundamental error of US policy in the Middle East is that it stubbornly pursues unilateral proposals and plans, with a series of piecemeal bilateral discussions with individual Arab states and Israel, and yet refuses to enter into any debate on these matters with the other superpower which is deeply involved in the region. President Reagan and his top advisers have reluctantly and belatedly realised that they have a basic strategic interest in bringing the START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) and INF (Intermediate) Nuclear Forces) arms control talks to successful conclusions, and that dialogue with the Soviets is vital to this effort. They have not yet realised that this reality also constrains their efforts at crisis-management in Third World areas. In any case the US simply has not got the military power available in the Middle East to impose a unilateral solution.

Finally, it is urgently necessary to draw attention to a tragic failure which cannot be blamed entirely on US policy. The way in which the UN's standing and role in the Lebanese crisis has been trampled on and ignored or neglected is a scandal, and an indictment of the whole international community. It is true that many Western governments have been quietly acquiescing in the US initiative and simply leaving it to Washington to make all the running. But this cannot excuse the total failure to use the available Security Council machinery to deal with what is clearly a grave threat to international peace. Why haven't Britain and France and the non-permanent members of the Security Council campaigned more determinedly for activating the Security Council? After all, the UN already has a remit from the Security Council to maintain its peacekeeping role through the UNIFIL based in Southern Lebanon. The remit of this force has recently been renewed. Yet UN members are content to allow it to be humiliated, harassed and ignored by the Israelis and bypassed by the major powers. As if this dereliction of UN responsibilities was not enough, UNWRA which has direct responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinian refugees still suffering intimidation and harassment in the ruins of their refugee camps in Lebanon, has been totally unable to perform its vital welfare functions. The UN has major legal responsibilities for peace and human right in Lebanon, although it is prevented from carrying them out. This marks a further serious stage in the erosion of UN credibility and authority. The international community has, time and again, depended on the legitimacy and authority of the UN and its peacekeeping machinery to contain and damp down potentially dangerous conflicts. The danger of unilateral approaches to conflict

resolution, or of non-UN ad hoc peacekeeping efforts of the kind we see currently in Beirut, is that they do not enjoy this international acceptability and they may well get embroiled in an escalating conventional war.

The major lessons of the Lebanon crisis are surely: (i) unless both superpowers quickly make a major diplomatic effort to manage and resolve the crisis they may get drawn into a major war and direct confrontation with all the risks this involves; and (ii) the international community as a whole has a major interest in resuscitating the UN's potential role in the diplomacy of crisis management and the tasks of mediation and peacekeeping. Any plan for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon that is to have any chance of success must provide for a truly neutral and acceptable body to oversee the withdrawal and to guarantee the honouring of the agreement and the long-term protection of the integrity of Lebanon. What possible alternative is there to using the UN, with its enormous international legitimacy and authority? A much enlarged and strengthened UN peacekeeping force will be needed in the long-term to take over the duties of the small improvised multinational force in Beirut and the underpowered forgotten units of UNIFIL now trapped in the South.

Finally, limited superpower co-operation in crisis-management over Lebanon and the restoration of a key role for the UN in neutralising and rehabilitating this shattered little country should not be regarded as mutually exclusive alternatives. Superpower support, or at least acquiescence, is a prerequisite for the Security Council to act in strengthening the UN role and presence. If, on the other hand, one superpower alone tries to impose a settlement unilaterally on the area, it will inevitably provoke obstruction and resistance from its adversary. The UN machinery is the vital neutralising agency for the defusing of the Lebanese crisis. The oft-repeated hostility of the Begin government towards the UN would no longer be an insuperable difficulty if the US and the Soviet Union and the Security Council as a body resolved that the UN should supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces and restore Lebanese sovereignty and stability. In any case, the Begin government, with the Israeli casualty toll mounting, domestic criticism intensifying, and the economy in dire trouble, is at present in a chastened mood. If the US government, their vital backer and ally, decided to support a major international intervention through the UN to resolve the Lebanese crisis, most Israelis would sigh with relief and demand that their government bring the soldiers back home forthwith.

[Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen. His recent publications include *British Perspectives on Terrorism* (ed.) 1981, and *The New Fascists* (revised edition 1983). His book, *The Defence of the West* is in preparation.]

NORTHERN IRELAND—THE REALISTIC SOLUTIONS

by Hugh Munro

IT is uncomfortable for the mainland British to be reminded that in Dublin in May 1974, 25 innocent people were killed by three no-warning bombs, placed by people who declared themselves to be British and saw themselves as acting in the cause of maintaining the Union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

It is uncomfortable for the Southern Irish to be reminded that the people who killed Lord Mountbatten have the same national flag as themselves.

Given the atrocities which the Northern Irish situation generates one can see why the mainland British and Southern Irish have need of a scenario of that situation which portrays them as set apart from it, which minimises their direct or indirect responsibility.

They need a scenario which portrays the problem as one internal to Northern Ireland and also with a minimal political content. For insofar as it is political and constitutional, the London and Dublin governments will be seen to be responsible for resolving it.

The sectarian scenario, which sees the matter as primarily religious and totally confined to Northern Ireland, fills this bill perfectly.

Of course, sectarianism exists in Northern Ireland. But it is important to realise that the British and Southern Irish have an unconscious need to exaggerate its implications so as to diminish the political content of the problem.

But insofar as we portray sectarianism as being more important than it really is, we leave the ordinary Northerner, who knows himself not to be as bad as he is being painted, feeling baffled, misunderstood and hurt.

Denunciation of violence can only have useful effect to the extent that those who do the denouncing have influence over those who are engaged in violence or may be tempted so to engage.

The trouble with the sectarian scenario is that it tends to be adopted by people who are antipathetic to, or at least feel themselves above, the sectarian commitment out of which sectarian politics arise. They will, therefore, be without positive influence on the sectarian groupings (insofar as they exist) who are engaged in violence. They will as likely as not (because of the resentment generated by their assumption of moral superiority) do more harm than good.

The most important duty of those who wish to see Northern Ireland once more at peace is not to denounce its violence but to understand its causes.

While the politicians and media people have no sympathy for the violence, they can have an indirect responsibility for it, in that they are largely responsible for how the problem is perceived; and if the general perception of it is wrong the violence will be apt to continue, because its

true causes are not being attacked.

The policy of ignoring the political aspects, of trying instead to reconcile the 'two traditions' has, however unreal, unsuccessful and positively damaging in its effects it may be, genuine advantages at the public relations level for the mainland British and the Southern Irish.

The policy may fail and fail again. The failure will appear to be the fault of the Northern Irish.

The fact that the choice of Northern Ireland, and not Ireland-Britain as a whole, as a forum for the desired reconciliation was a choice which ensured confrontation and not reconciliation is not adverted to. The general view is that once again Northern Irish Protestant and Northern Irish Catholic have put their religious prejudices before the crying need for proper government of the province.

The mainland British and the Southern Irish are confirmed in their moral superiority; whoever is to blame it is accepted that it cannot be them. The trouble is seen as lying inside Northern Ireland; and it is inside Northern Ireland that, at least so far as Britain is concerned, the solution continues to be sought.

What then are the realistic solutions, as opposed to the purely cosmetic approach of looking for accommodation between two traditions which cannot accommodate, and then blaming them when they fail?

They are three in number. First, there is integration with Britain, ending the separate political existence of the province as far as may be, so that there are as few as possible specifically Northern Ireland institutions above the district council level. Second, there is the creation of an independent Northern Irish state. Thirdly, there is Irish unity, a policy which is the mirror-image of integration with Britain. It is in fact an integration policy, but with a different state.

Most obvious (from the British point of view), is integration with the mainland. Clearly it has important attractions for Britain. It would end all the anomalies in the province's constitution. There would be no need for Protestant politics, since there would be no separate Northern Irish political institutions to offer an arena for such politics. In these conditions genuine Unionism would have a field of action and could campaign without sectarian help, and the question as to whether there is a genuine Unionist majority feeling in Northern Ireland (as opposed to a combination of genuine Unionism with a political Protestantism eager to use British help to help fight its Irish battles) could at last be answered.

But although there is a movement of opinion in Britain in favour of integration, it does not look as if the kind of British cross-party approval which would be needed for so important a move will be arrived at in the foreseeable future. The mainland British do not see the Northern Irish as fellow-nationals. If anything they see them as Irish; all the indications are that the British see a unity between the Irish, North and South, to a greater extent than the Irish do themselves.

And even if there were a positive wish for Northern Irish integration, the possibility of Scottish devolution would inhibit it. For if Northern Ireland were to be integrated and Scotland to have devolution, Northern

Ireland would have to be integrated with England—which is hardly conceivable.

Integration would also meet with strong objections from the Republic. The Republic is entitled to claim that the idea of Ireland as a political unit, actual or potential, is implicit in the negotiations which led to the 26 Counties gaining independence. The Home Rule Bills of 1886, 1893 and 1912 were all drafted for a united Ireland. The Government of Ireland Act of 1920 certainly envisaged a partitioned Ireland but with a single Governor-General and with a co-ordinating Council of Ireland. The Treaty of 1921 gave independence to the whole of Ireland but with the North having the right to opt out, which it did. The Royal Style, from 1926 to 1949, recognised the unity of Ireland in that the sovereign was 'of Great Britain, Ireland and Dominions beyond the seas, King'. Certainly, in 1949, Northern Ireland obtained a guarantee that it would not be driven out of the United Kingdom against its wish; but the guarantee was perhaps more than anything a response to the appalling ineptness of the sudden repeal, without notice or consultation, by the 26 Counties of its External Relations Act which had given up in 1949 a role for the Crown in the conduct of the state's external relations. What is perhaps significant is that the North had to wait 28 years, from 1921 to 1949, to get that guarantee. From all this, it can be seen that Irish nationalists would be entitled to claim that integration of Northern Ireland with Britain would be a breach of the understanding under which the Republic, by the Boundary Agreement of 1925, agreed to partition of the island. A new legitimacy would be given to IRA subversion in the province.

Is northern Irish independence a way forward? It is to be doubted. There is the strategic interest to consider. London has since the time of Henry VIII been concerned to ensure that no foreign power should control Ireland. With sovereignty over a quarter of the island and with every assurance of benevolent neutrality on the part of the rest of it, she has at present a satisfactory answer to her strategic problems. But if the island were divided into two independent states with (on past form) the Northern state antipathetic to the Southern and having a perpetual need to picture itself as under threat from the South, the island of Ireland would offer an open invitation to outside countries to interfere. In supporting one Irish state, Britain would inevitably antagonise the other.

If Britain's sovereignty over Northern Ireland has to be ended, it would seem to be in her interest to have that sovereignty transferred to a united Irish state.

More and more British politicians are open to the idea of a united Ireland. The burden of maintaining sovereignty over Northern Ireland is great; and it seems fair to say that if the transfer to a united Ireland could be made without excessive objection from the Northern majority, Britain would encourage that transfer.

We turn now to that curious political compound, Loyalism, or Protestant Unionism. Every loyalist is a walking coalition. Insofar as he is dealing with Northern Ireland, a loyalist thinks as a Protestant, for

Protestantism is of the essence of Northern Ireland; and Unionism on the other hand has nothing to do with Northern Ireland. (A true Unionist would wish the province to disappear as a separate entity and be merged with the rest of the UK to form a unitary state.)

There is no doubt that loyalism is a strong and highly motivated force —for the defence of the Union, given that the defence of the Union has to be conducted in the Northern Ireland context.

But none of the real-world solutions—integration, independence or a united Ireland—provide loyalism, in the sense of a coalition of genuine Unionism and political Protestantism, with this role. They all imply a separation of the two components.

Integration offers a field of action for Unionism alone. There is no point in Protestant politics if there is no separate Northern Irish entity. Insofar as the Protestant people of the North might feel that their identity needs would be unfulfilled by integration with Britain they would turn either towards independence or Irish unity. Those most inclined to take their politics from their religion would incline towards independence; but all indications are that they would be few in number. Others would revert to the Protestant Republican tradition, never quite dormant in the North; it has always to be remembered that the North was the cradle of Irish republicanism.

Independence, by definition, offers no field of action for Unionism. The only patriotism available to motivate an independent Northern Ireland is political Protestantism; but it is highly unlikely that, even with British assistance, a move for an independent Northern Ireland would succeed. The political temper of Northern Irish Protestants, insofar as it can be judged from elections, has admittedly been hardening all through the past decade. In the 1975 Convention election, when for the first time in a PR election the moderate (UPNI and Alliance) Unionists presented a separate front from the hard-line Loyalists (UUUC), the loyalist vote was about 55% of the total poll. In the 1982 Assembly elections it was 57%.

But one must first deduct from the loyalist vote the genuine Unionist component, the component which inclines the voter towards voting loyalist, not because of the attractions of political Protestantism per se, but because political Protestantism is an essential ally for Unionism if the majority vote for the Union is to be maintained. One must further remember that the Catholic share of the population is increasing at about 2% a decade. There is also the fact that independence candidates at elections get minimal votes. All in all, it seems abundantly clear that a majority vote for independence will not be obtained if any form of union with Britain, however colonial in nature, is the alternative. It is probably true indeed that there would not be a vote for independence if Irish unity were the only alternative. Would the great bulk of the ordinary population commit their future to a state in which 40% (and rising) of the population would be ipso facto traitors, a state which had to rely on Andy Tyrie's UDA for an army? It seems highly doubtful.

In a united Ireland, there would be no political role for either political

Protestantism or for Unionism; not because there would be any legal objection to these forces organising politically, but because there would be no point in their doing so. There would, no doubt, be a Unionist tendency, manifested by people holding on to British citizenship and enlisting in the British armed forces, but it would not be active in Irish affairs.

Political Protestantism is a negative supremacist force. It is in business to give representation to the identifying patriotism of Northern Ireland, so that a motivated organisation may be available to keep Northern Ireland in the Union and, if called on, to govern Northern Ireland under the Crown. With Northern Ireland abolished, there would be no point in political Protestantism. Being a purely sectarian force it would have no answers to the social and economic questions which would be the stuff of all-Ireland politics.

There is a precedent for this. After the 1914-1918 war, when Home Rule in some form for Southern Ireland was inevitable, the Southern Irish Unionists tried actively to ensure that there would be a role for them in the new state. (It is to this campaign, for instance, that Ireland owes its multi-seat PR system.) They saw themselves as a separate force in the new Irish politics, a force for what they saw as stability and common-sense. In fact, as soon as the new state was set up Unionism dissolved as a separate political force. The Union being ended, there was no role for it; and those ex-Unionists who wished to participate in politics entered the new Southern Irish parties.

We have already seen in 1973-74 a striking example of how unsure of itself loyalism can become when it ceases to have its role of speaking for Northern Ireland. In the Northern Irish Assembly elected in 1973 a majority (including SDLP, Alliance and some Unionists) was assembled to form a power-sharing government for the province. The loyalist bloc, which had always seen its role in politics as being legitimated by its having a majority of the North's representation, was disoriented. As the anonymous '*The Ulster General Strike*' written by activists in the loyalist workers' strike of 1974 puts it:—

> In mid-January the Loyalist Coalition had little popular support, and Loyalist politicians expressed their frustration by disrupting the Assembly by brawling.

But the situation was transformed by the Westminster election of February 1974, which revealed that there was a majority in the province against the Sunningdale government scheme. Suddenly, the loyalists were legitimated in their own terms; they developed a new confidence and, four months later, the power-sharing government was swept out of existence by the strike.

To those who query whether political Protestantism, now so strong, could wither away another and perhaps more apposite example can be quoted. Up to 1600 or thereabouts, the Irish 'garrison' was defined as being those inhabitants of Ireland who had benefit of English law. The 'mere Irish' were excluded. But with the Reformation a new technique emerged of divide-and-rule. The scope of English law was extended to include everyone, but special laws were passed to discriminate against

Catholics. The 'garrison' had a new definition. The old garrison—those 'old English' who still remained Catholic—had a massive problem of adjustment. They still thought of themselves as a significant, important caste; but their significance had disappeared now that the garrison had been redefined. They had been important as long as London had a role for them. But now, as far as London was concerned, they were 'mere Irish' Catholics, with no particular place in the scheme of things. It took them upwards of a century to re-adjust, to realise that they had to become Protestant, and so once more part of the 'garrison', or accept that they would be submerged among the rest of the 'mere Irish'.

Insofar as London may decide that she will rule Northern Ireland without calling political Protestantism in aid, Northern Protestants are going to have to make the same adjustment that the old English Catholics of Ireland made, with so much travail, in 1600-1700. They are going to have to learn that however much they think of themselves as a separate caste, they became such only because London had a role for them—that of defending the British presence in Israel—and that if London writes them out of the script they have no further part to play in the action.

In short, political Protestantism may look to be a powerful force; but it is a force which has only one purpose—to speak for Northern Ireland. If it loses its majority in Northern Ireland, or if Northern Ireland ceases to exist as a political arena, political Protestantism will also cease to exist.

Given integration with mainland Britain or given Northern Irish independence, Nationalism would be a subversive force, aimed at overthrowing the status quo. If it is to be held that integration (or independence) is to be a permanent solution, there would be no point in organising politically for the cause of Irish nationalism; it would be a matter of marching up a cul-de-sac.

If, then, we assume, if only as an academic exercise, that integration has been enacted, it does not follow that that will be the end of the matter. The Northern Irish would still be seen to be largely non-British; Protestant politics would have lost its point; and Irish nationalism, whether of the traditional or the Protestant Republican type, would be the mode in which the North's distinctiveness from Britain would be expressed.

While then the Republic would no doubt vehemently object to integration with the mainland, it would probably not be all that damaging so far as from Irish nationalism is concerned.

Northern Irish independence would offer a much more difficult challenge to Nationalism. It would be in the same position as it was under Stormont in 1921-1971, with the extra complication that the British presence, acting to moderate the excesses of Protestant politics, would no longer be available.

It would have its 1921-1971 role—as a kind of scapegoat. Nationalism, as the hate-object for the national patriotism of Protestant politics, would serve to integrate and make sense of the state, just as the Jews did for Hitler's Germany. It is not a role Catholics would relish, anymore than the Jews did; but, as with the Jews, it would be a role they could not

escape. The whole point of having an independent Northern Ireland is to give expression to a specifically Protestant identity, to which Catholics are by definition alien. If Northern Protestants can accommodate with Northern Catholics, the whole point of having an independent Northern Ireland is lost.

Since an independent Northern Ireland is necessarily built on discrimination, on refusing all power and influence to the Catholic minority, it follows that the only expression open to Catholics would be violent or semi-violent activity.

It should be remembered that Dublin, as a member of the EEC, has an effective veto on the creation of an independent Northern Irish state. Such a state would have difficulty in maintaining itself at the best of times, but it surely could not survive at all unless it was in the EEC: and Dublin can give warning that it will block the admission of the new state.

The third of the realistic solutions—Irish unity—is of course the fulfilment of Nationalism. In a united Irish state, Nationalism would cease to be a contending 'ism' but would be the belief which informed and gave identity to the state.

The results of the recent Westminster elections fit in well with the foregoing conclusions. The Paisleyite wing of loyalism, which inclines to emphasising the 'Ulster' in Ulster Unionism, received a significant rebuff, winning only 40% of the loyalist vote in the constituencies where it competed with the more 'Unionist' official Unionist Party. A Paisleyite challenge to Enoch Powell, the only Northern Irish representative who carries Unionism to the logical conclusion of advocating full integration, failed badly.

On the nationalist side, Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, made significant advances against the moderate SDLP. This is probably due, not so much to a preference by the nationalist electorate for the IRA's violence but to the fact that the IRA spells out clearly what the SDLP fudges; the fact that there is not, and likely can never be, any significant role for nationalists in Northern Irish politics.

[Hugh Munro will contribute a second article, *Northern Ireland: An Unworkable Political Unit,* in a later issue.]

JAPAN'S SECOND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

by Ian Nish

EARLY in May the Japanese prime minister, Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone, barely six months in office, visited the countries of South-East Asia. His exhausting schedule took him around the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia, and ended with a brief visit to Brunei. Because of the war, only forty years ago, when these countries (together with China) were those which suffered most from Japanese occupation, any visit by a Japanese prime minister to this area is bound to be sensitive and risky.

Mr. Nakasone, who came to power in November as the leader of one of the minority factions within the ruling Liberal-Democratic party, has not enjoyed 'the honeymoon period' which previous prime ministers have had from the media. Partly this may be because he has been branded as presiding over a right-wing cabinet which could only have come to office with the support of the discredited Mr. Tanaka; partly because he has been provocative by bringing out into the open the defence issue which is one of the most sensitive areas for Japanese people. He has always been regarded in Japanese politics as a defence expert. No sooner had he come to power than he seemed to speculate that it would be possible and perhaps desirable to amend the Japanese 'peace constitution' of 1947. He has dwelt in his speeches and interviews on the need for Japan to undertake a more active defence policy under the security treaty which she has had with the United States since 1952. When he went to Washington in January, he described Japan as 'an unsinkable aircraft carrier'—an image which raised a storm of protest in his homeland and revived memories of the bombing attacks of the Second World War.

Despite these storms, there has been a sneaking admiration for Nakasone who is clearly trying to establish a reputation as an international statesman. His predecessors have either preferred to concentrate on domestic politics or not been outstandingly successful on the world stage. Shortly after coming to power, Nakasone visited South Korea, the first Japanese prime minister in recent days to have done so. Later, in January, he made the pilgrimage to Washington which has now become a necessary duty for all new Japanese prime ministers. In both these places there were difficult problems of trade and finance; but the prime minister coped well and, on the whole, struck up a good rapport with the leaders. But a series of visits around the capitals of South-East Asia in order to present the Japanese case for an increased defensive role was likely to be particularly testing. Nakasone had prepared carefully by recalling his diplomats from ASEAN nations for consultations. Moreover, he had had the benefit of conversations in Tokyo with Mr. Lee Kwan-yew of Singapore and Dr. Mahathir of Malaysia. He had therefore been able to cover the ground in advance with the leaders of the countries which were most amenable to the Japanese case.

It is, of course, significant that this visit should occur within one month of the summit of world leaders at Williamsburg at which the Japanese prime minister was present. It appears that in the past Japanese leaders have always taken steps to canvas the opinions of Asian countries before these economic summits. True to form, Nakasone said that one of the main purposes of his mission was to listen to the views of South-East Asian leaders on world peace and economic recovery in order that these could be adequately taken into account at the Williamsburg summit. Evidently Japan sees herself as a channel of communication in the east-west and north-south dialogue.

Whether she can be regarded or accepted as an 'honest broker' is of course another matter. Obviously there are historical reasons for distrust of Japan; and there are inevitably those who see Japan's successful economic expansion in South-East Asia as the thin end of the wedge. On the other hand, Japan had tried over the years to remove doubts about her aggressive intentions. She operates under the 'peace constitution' and Mr. Nakasone reaffirmed that he has no intention of amending article 9 of that constitution. Moreover, Japan has foresworn the use of nuclear weapons and their production and availability in Japan by her 'three nuclear principles'. Again, she has given assurances in what she calls 'the Fukuda doctrine' (after the former prime minister, Mr. Fukuda Takeo) about her intentions in the South-East Asian area:

> Japan, as a true friend of South-East Asia, will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on 'heart-to-heart' understanding.

To show further evidence of goodwill, Nakasone had to give additional reassurances about defence and trade during his recent trip.

Under the heading of defence, Nakasone sought to wipe away any misunderstanding that Japan in any gradual build-up or increase in spending would become a threat to South-East Asian countries. Of course, these issues have been discussed frequently in recent years at an academic and political level. It was opportune that they should be raised at the highest bilateral level. The particular issue of anxiety is Japan's long-term intention to take over the defence of the sea-lanes, especially those extending south and west from Japan towards Singapore. These lanes have become vital to Japan since 1974 as they ensure supplies of oil from the Persian gulf as well as other raw materials. In view of the anxieties expressed by President Marcos in the Philippines, Nakasone stressed that Japan's intention was merely to assume responsibility for lanes several hundred miles from Japan's shores, extending to one thousand miles in the event of an emergency. In other words, it would not come close to Filipino shores in any event. It appears that there was a certain meeting of minds on this and other defence points.

Under the heading of trade, the countries of the area have been campaigning for some time for greater access to the Japanese market. ASEAN countries, while they have not suffered as much as others in the world recession, are gloomy about the future. ASEAN's exports to Japan exceeded £21 million in the last financial year and represented a large surplus in visible trade in ASEAN's favour. The trouble is that ASEAN

is not really a trading area; and, while Indonesia and Malaysia are offering Japan energy and raw materials on a large and profitable scale, others, notably Thailand and the Philippines, are complaining of deficits in their bilateral trade. Nakasone therefore brought with him a promise of a 50 per cent increase in quotas for imported mineral and industrial products under the preferential tariff, knowing that he would face some domestic opposition on this account.

Over the related question of aid, Nakasone gave assurances in each of the countries he visited. In general, he promised programmes for economic co-operation with ASEAN, based on the transfer of industrial technology by exchanging experts and by inviting 3,750 youngsters from ASEAN countries over the next five years for training in Japan. In addition there would be loans for the renovation of factories and plants in ASEAN countries which were originally built with Japanese financial help. By these bold initiatives, Japan was seeking to improve productivity throughout the area. Without prosperity in ASEAN, Nakasone argued, Japan herself would not be able to prosper. That was said in order to appease his domestic critics. To his audiences in South-East Asia, he tried to clear away any insinuations that Japan is merely an industrial giant out to exploit, and capitalise on, the valuable resources of a neighbouring area which consists of small countries. By and large, he succeeded in this.

Things have obviously come a long way since Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to the region in 1974. Then there was abundant evidence of Japan's unpopularity in all these countries and the prime minister was subjected to indignities. Tanaka had almost to run for cover and was forced to take positive remedial measures when he returned to Tokyo. It was then said: 'beware of the Japanese bearing gifts'. But, on the whole, the leaders of ASEAN today are accepting gifts with open arms and doing everything to encourage this largesse. As in the case of Prime Minister Fukuda's tour of 1977, there are even whispers of complaint that not enough has been offered or that promises, once made in the course of a tour, may not be fulfilled. The South-East Asian leaders are content that a special relationship of sorts is in existence. For the time being it suits the political leaders of the area. While President Soeharto and President Marcos are vigilant in their approach, Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia has welcomed Japan's co-operativeness as one response to his 'Look East' policy. Under this Dr. Mahathir hopes to persuade his countrymen to imitate the work ethic and accept the sense of loyalty of Japanese citizens. Although there are domestic opponents of this conception, it was like music to Mr. Nakasone's ears. The relationship between the ASEAN countries and Japan, both collectively and individually, will know its ups and downs in the future but for the present it has received a beneficial boost from the Japanese prime minister's visit.

For the Japanese prime minister, also, the visit was a considerable personal success. The style that wins friends in Seoul or Washington cannot be relied on to win friends in South-East Asia. But Nakasone by

his energy and direct manner did secure a rapport with the leaders that he met. This writer is sceptical about the emphasis in the various speeches placed on the 'kinship' between the peoples of South-East Asia and Japan. But it was a rare event to hear a Japanese prime minister say, as Nakasone is quoted as saying, that Japan's current attitude 'is more than a matter of policy. It is deeply rooted in strong and unchanging Japanese national sentiments, *deriving from our sincere contrition for the past'* Such a modest approach is one that has hitherto stuck in the throat of Japan's leaders. It suggests that Mr. Nakasone (despite his domestic image as a hawk) may have a capacity for listening to voices from overseas and responding to them. The quality, in short, of an internationalist statesman.

[Ian Nish is Professor of International History at The London School of Economics and Political Science.]

The September issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *What After Kreisky?* by Hari Stajne, *International Financial Markets in Hong Kong and Singapore* by B. Narpati, *Mrs. Thatcher's North Britons* by R. D. Kernohan and *Reformation and Excommunication* by Father Francis Edwards, SJ.

THE CIVIL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

By Sir Kelvin Spencer

The toad beneath the harrow knows
Exactly where each tooth-point goes;
The butterfly upon the road
Preaches contentment to that toad.

Kipling.

(For 'toad' read electricity bill payer. For 'butterfly' read Central Electricity Generating Board and the rest of the powerful nuclear energy lobby.)

THE Editor of *Contemporary Review* has invited me to write about my views on the civil application of nuclear energy. My concern is that an encouraging dream has, after some three decades, turned into a nightmare. I must be one of the dwindling number of people still alive who were personally or professionally connected in some way with this new form of primary energy from its earliest days. The Editor may have in mind, too, that I was Chief Scientist at the Department of Energy (then called the Ministry of Fuel and Power) in the 1950s when the decision was taken to embark on a programme of nuclear power station construction and so, presumably, in a position to influence, in however small a way, that decision.

I began to take an interest in the structure of the atom when, as a back-room boffin at the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, in the 1920s and 1930s, I attended lectures by Lord Rutherford describing the research he and his team were doing at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge. I had been demobilised from the Royal Engineers in 1919 and, when reading for my London University degree in science, the course I took dealt very perfunctorily with atomic structure. For the most part, to get a science degree then it was sufficient to regard the atom as an indivisible entity, a concept carried over from the last decades of the previous century. Hence it was natural that Rutherford's lectures on his work on atomic structure should have excited my interest. To a small extent, the subject was relevant, too, as having some connection with the research on which I was working. I well remember Rutherford telling us of the immense energy locked up in the atom. But he emphasised that this was so firmly bound that more energy was needed to unlock it than would be got out, so it would never be of any practical use. His lectures continued till a short time before his death in 1937, and he reiterated this statement in the last lecture I heard him give.

If it had not been for the war of 1939-45, the probability is that that means would not have been discovered—not, at any rate, so soon—for extracting net energy from splitting the atom. The scientific and industrial effort needed to prove that this was a practicable possibility was immense. Even the initial experimental work to reach the stage of predicting was formidable, with no more than a 50-50 chance of being right in believing that it *could* be done. It is now well-known that the starting point for such experiments to show that a chain reaction was possible is a critical mass of

a specially enriched, rather rare element, uranium. Mining this was and is a big task in itself. But more formidable still in the enrichment of natural uranium by increasing the proportion of one of its isotopes, uranium 235. In our days, nothing less than the emergencies of war would have persuaded governments to make the large investments needed when the outcome was so doubtful.

By the time the war came I had been transferred to the Air Ministry, to that part of it which was hived off in 1940 to become the Ministry of Aircraft Production. I had climbed up a few of the rungs of my professional ladder, high enough to be involved occasionally in top secret matters. Among these was whether or not the stretched resources in scientific and technical manpower could be further stretched so as to work on an extension of the Cavendish Laboratory findings in an attempt to make an atomic bomb. This was stimulated by military intelligence suggesting that Germany was trying to make such a bomb and, should it prove possible, our survival turned on the Allies getting that fearful weapon first. We reported that any further depletion of scientific and technical staff in the aircraft industry would have a serious adverse effect on keeping our air-war planes and equipment up to date in the light of battle experience. No doubt the same question was put to Departments that sponsored other parts of industry, with the same answer. This, together with the unwisdom of undertaking the work in bomb-stricken England, led to the decision to hand over the work to the USA, who, at the time, had not become involved in the war. So the English scientific team, together with their two volumes recording the work to date, joined the Manhattan Project in America. At the time we in Britain were hard pressed with staving off defeat, fighting without allies. It was not a time to haggle over the division of the spoils of nuclear energy should it turn out to be a formidable weapon of war; nor to make any bargain about sharing benefits if nuclear energy should later be developed for civil use.

This brief summary of the very early days of the nuclear energy epoch is relevant to the current world-wide controversy about the use of atomic energy for war or for peace. It is relevant, too, as the background which has given the nuclear lobby so much power. In the words of a former Secretary of State for Energy with a long and distinguished career, it is the most powerful pressure lobby he has ever encountered.

As we all know, the atomic bomb was made, and two were dropped on Japan. Their use has been justified—a justification by no means generally accepted—on the grounds that it was these two bombs that brought the war against Japan to an abrupt end.

In 1945, the USA emerged from the war as the only nation with what is now called nuclear capability. She and she alone knew not only the science and technology of atom bombs but, of even more importance, she had the know-how and the industrial plant to make them.

During the late 1940s, I spent several periods in the USA and Canada working on the setting-up of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, one of the functional parts of the United Nations Organisation. We were a

multi-national group working closely together, happy to be involved in something constructive after the war years. I remember many a discussion about the possible ways in which atomic energy might be developed, both for military and for civil applications. We realised how necessary it was to prevent the spread of atomic bombs as part of the arsenals of the nations of the world. USA then had a world monopoly of this weapon, and to some of us, and naturally to the Americans, it seemed only common sense that the USA should retain that monopoly as long as possible. This did not appeal to other governments, especially to the UK and to Russia. The USA passed the MacMahon Act prohibiting collaboration or transmission of information on atomic matters to other countries, including the UK, in spite of the close partnership between the UK and the USA in discovering the secret of unlocking the energy of the atom. So, in the greatest secrecy, work went ahead at Capenhurst and Windscale to bring into existence the vast and very costly research and production organisation to make the British bomb. This was pressed ahead regardless of cost; no idea of planning restrictions had then come over the horizon. The work was done without even all Cabinet members knowing, let alone Parliament. It was disguised from Parliament by including the expenditure under various Votes in the annual budget.

The first, experimental, British bomb was successfully exploded within a remarkably short time, a great achievement from an engineering and industrial point of view.

Soon after that (1950), I transferred to the Ministry of Fuel and Power, first as Deputy, then as Chief Scientist. It was then, in the first half of the 1950s, that the team who had so successfully made the British bomb were looking for fresh fields to conquer. They were effectively out of a job, or, at any rate, of the kind of job that excites scientists and engineers. Mass production of bombs and their progressive 'improvement' was but a humdrum task compared with what they had just achieved. To adapt nuclear energy to the commercial generation of electricity was an obvious goal to strive for. It had already been done during the production of bomb material, as in that process much 'waste' heat is made. Instead of wasting this up the chimney stack, some of it had been harnessed for electricity generation to meet the demands of the works. The proposal now put to the Government was that if more bomb material was needed, it would be a good plan to make this as a by-product of commercial electricity generation—electricity to feed into the grid. This had, in addition, the political attraction that it hid from Parliament and people the continued manufacture of bomb material. It is not surprising that the idea appealed to the Government.

At that stage, the civil exploitation of nuclear power was transferred to the sponsorship of the Ministry of Power, and thus I once more became involved. It seemed to me then a good idea to harness this new power for civil purposes; it did, too, to the many scientists within and outside Government service with whom I had contact. It was welcomed as a way to make some small expiation for such part as some of us had played in contributing to the creation of the bomb—metaphorically, turning swords into

ploughshares. I and my immediate colleagues knew nothing of the intention to design the first generation of power stations, the Magnox ones, so that they had the dual purpose of electricity generation and providing spent fuel from which bomb material could be extracted.

At about this time, the period of office of the chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board (then the Central Electricity Authority) expired and the Ministry of Power was responsible for appointing a successor. The electricity supply industry, with its hands full rationalising a newly-nationalised industry, did not want to be bothered with this new source of energy. To overcome this, the Minister had the idea of inviting one of the top men who had so successfully made the British bomb to be the next chairman of the CEGB. He accepted. In my view, but this is only speculation, he brought with him some of his best staff from Windscale and Capenhurst, and from then on one's career in the industry depended on jumping onto the nuclear bandwagon.

In the decades that followed, a nuclear lobby gathered influence and political power. This lobby, an ill-defined, trans-national collaboration between several institutions, all with an interest in the quick expansion of nuclear energy, was greatly helped by the oil crisis caused by the temporary closure of the Suez Canal which, combined with other causes, started a rapid increase in the cost of oil which, at that time, was being used increasingly in power stations. Large financial interests here and abroad became deeply committed to promoting nuclear power stations, and to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.

As sponsoring Department, we knew, of course, something of the hazards of nuclear energy. But not very much, due, I think, to the secrecy which had long prevailed and still operated—as now—in all matters connected with the bomb. We learned much, of course, from the scientists who had worked so effectively on making the bomb, but accepted too readily the comforting conviction that all major hazards had been identified and were of a kind that could be provided for, given a large enough programme of research and development, and a steady accumulation of operational experience. There is, perhaps, some excuse for this attitude. The war had shown the power of research applied to practical problems when pressed ahead with determination and regardless of cost. I think some of us suffered from a disease dating back to the Greeks: hubris. The dictionary definition of this is 'insolent pride or security; overweening pride leading to nemesis.' And now, in the 1980s, that nemesis is upon us.

A second generation of nuclear stations, the Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor type (AGR), was approved by Government long before any operational experience had been obtained with the first generation, i.e. the Magnox ones. The new CEGB chairman did his best to warn the decision-makers not to press ahead so fast, but his voice was drowned by clamour of an energy gap that would be disastrous for industry if nuclear energy delayed taking over from oil as the major diversification from coal, the supply of which was vulnerable if the mining industry exploited its near-monopoly too ruthlessly.

This unhappy situation led to enormous sums of money being poured into the development of several kinds of nuclear reactor. The capital so invested has been variously estimated at between £3,000 million and £11,000 million up to the beginning of the 1980s. References for these estimates are summarised in a study by the Centre for Energy Studies at the Polytechnic of the South Bank, London, in the publication *The Costs of Nuclear Power*. Now, after all this expenditure, the CEGB propose to switch from the two British types of reactor—the Magnox and the AGR—and start a programme of American type reactor stations, using pressurised water—the PWR reactors; yet it was the PWR type reactor which was involved in the near-disastrous accident at the Three Mile Island power station, near Harrisburg in the USA, in March, 1979. The CEGB has applied for statutory consent to build such a station at Sizewell in Suffolk, in the hope that, if consent is given, it will herald the springing up of similar stations on other sites in the United Kingdom. This is the nightmare I mentioned in the first sentence of this article: that after this lavish capital investment and decades of work by skilled and, presumably, highly intelligent people, the outcome should be to abandon the British designs and pin our hopes on the PWR. This, too, at a time when the PWR, and nuclear generation of electricity too, is becoming discredited in America itself. The USA journal *Business Week* (25.12.78) summed up the trend in 1978, a trend reinforced by the Three Mile Island incident just one year later:

> One by one, the lights are going out for the USA nuclear power industry. Reactor orders have plummeted from a high of 41 in 1973 to zero this year. . . . There has been a severe erosion of both public and political support for nuclear power. . . . Not soon, but within ten years, the USA nuclear industry is apt to contract dramatically and it may collapse altogether.

But, four and a half years after the above statement was written, that particular USA industry is still very much alive. This is because of its successful promotional activities to sell PWR power stations to other countries. As Lord Bowden told the Select Committee on Energy of the House of Commons in February 1980:

> We have, in effect, succumbed to the blandishments of the Westinghouse salesmen who, beyond doubt, are the most efficient, effective and skilled salesmen of the PWR which the world has ever seen.

It is not possible in the confines of an article to summarise adequately the many reasons why the British attempt to develop a satisfactory type of reactor has been unsuccessful. It has been a dismal story of misjudgments, responsibility for which is so widespread that no one party can be held responsible. That rather nebulous entity, the nuclear lobby, with its overweening power, must shoulder much of the blame. By proposing now to abandon further development of the AGR or the original Magnox, and proposing to pin our faith to a reactor type that has become discredited in its country of origin, we are exposing to the world our sad decline from the days when we led the field in engineering innovation and achievements.

Whether or not the CEGB will be given Government consent to build the proposed Sizewell PWR station depends, to some extent, on a public inquiry now in progress. It held its first Hearing in July, 1982. At the time of writing, it has reached its 71st Day of Hearings. The indications are that

it is still not even halfway through its task. So far, the CEGB has been presenting its case; cross-examination by objectors being confined at present to 'elucidatory questions,' that is, probings to make sure that the Inspector and his Assessors fully grasp the arguments advanced. In due course, objectors will give their evidence, which, in turn, will be subjected to rigorous probing. From what I have read of the daily Transcripts, the case that will be advanced by the objectors will be hard to refute.

But this gives no assurance that the CEGB will not triumph in the end. The whole setting of this public inquiry puts those who have the public spirit and ability to oppose the CEGB's application at a serious disadvantage. Whereas the CEGB is lavishly funded by all of us who use and pay for electricity, such funds as the objectors have must be raised by passing the hat round. The Government has refused financial help to opposers.

Both the preparing of Evidence and its convincing presentation to the Inquiry cost money, a great deal of money. The CEGB rest their case on a multiplicity of detailed technical arguments and speculations, with supporting papers being produced as the Inquiry proceeds. All of this material must be studied if the opposers are to present effective refutation. Furthermore, experienced people from abroad, particularly from the USA, should be invited and funded to come and give evidence. It is not to be expected that the CEGB will bring anyone from abroad unlikely to support their case, and so far as is yet known, the Inspector has no power to use public funds to meet the cost.

Judging by progress to date, Hearings will continue for at least the rest of 1983, and it will be well into 1984 before the Inspector's Report is presented to the Secretary of State for Energy.

That report will be one factor, but one only, in determining the decision the Government makes: whether to sanction or to refuse consent to building the proposed station. A more important factor will be the public and political climate at the time the decision is made. Thus, much depends on the growth of public awareness of the issues involved. A spate of books on these issues are coming out now and have been for some years. Many of these are by responsible and knowledgable persons. But little attention is paid to the subject by the mass media.

It is up to all intelligent citizens with the future of our country at heart to study some of the many serious books that give all sides to a complex issue, and then to reach an informed judgment. In that way, public opinion based on sound knowledge and on reason may emerge and grow till we regain control of this powerful but short-sighted nuclear lobby. Ultimately, we, the electorate, pay the nuclear piper. It is up to us to equip ourselves so that we can call the tune.

[Sir Kelvin Spencer has been Chief Scientist to the Ministry of Power and a foundation member of Scientific and Medical Network FCGL]

ALBANIA'S MUSCULAR SOCIALISM

by Michael Kaser

THE guide at the Tirana exhibition of economic achievements 'Albania Today' ponted to the earth dam in the model of the 500 hydroelectric station at Fierze, completed in 1978: 'If the earth in this dam were a wall 3m. high and 3m. thick, the wall would go around the entire frontier of Albania.' A wag in our party of academics whispered: 'That's their next task' and it is indeed an isolation almost beyond belief which the Albanian Party of Labour has chosen for the country. That dam more directly epitomises Albania's extreme of labour-intensive investment, the equal of which is only to be found in its one-time mentor, China, but, while Albania no longer depends on that or any other Power, its leadership chose, after the 1978 break with China, to pursue a path of self-reliance and defensive insulation from the rest of the world. Signs which our group noted in an April 1983 visit (23 university staff and students, mostly social scientists) could suggest, nevertheless, an emergence into normal international intercourse, though not off a path of economic development describable as 'muscular socialism.'

The isolation which the Party of Labour has imposed on Albania accords with the country's past five centuries, but not with its early history. Under Roman occupation, following the twin defeats of Illyrian and Macedonian armies in 168 B.C., the country was an important Imperial granary and on the trunk road between Rome and Byzantium: the Via Egnatia began from the Adriatic harbours of Dyrrachium and Apollonia. The latter was ruined for maritime access by an earthquake in the Fourth Century A.D., but the former—Durazzo under medieval Venetian rule, Dürres today—is still the country's principal port. As a trade route, the Via Egnatia flourished in the Middle Ages, while piracy rendered risky and costly Mediterranean shipment between Western Europe and the Eastern Empire. But when Venice made the sea-routes safe, the balance for traders was reversed: the packhorse was dearer than the sailing ship, even without the loss from Balkan brigands, as local rule collapsed under Ottoman occupation.

Government by the Porte, which lasted more than four centuries, was effectively subjugation, conversion to Islam and the exaction of tribute. For thirty years after independence (1912), economic activity remained dominated by subsistence farming and handicrafts, and the country as a whole was left further from the beaten track than any European nation. Railway projects to link Albania with the European network—one before, the other after, the First World War—came to naught (but, under a 1979 agreement with Yugoslavia, should be completed this year).

In the economy, as in politics, the Second World War was the turning-point. Mussolini's Italy, which invaded Albania in 1939, needed oil and raw materials for aggressive autarky. Italian companies were already by then sole concessionaires for extracting oil, copper and chrome, but it was the War which forced ahead the opening up of Albania's natural resources.

A start was made on modern transport links. The first bitumen roads (200 km of them), an international airport and numerous local airstrips were laid. The first railway was begun, but was not operational until after the War, and took thirty years of youth-brigade labour to reach the nickel mines it was chiefly to serve (Prrenjas by 1974 and Pogradec by 1979).

The War, of course, brought still more profound changes: the Albanian Communist Party was founded in 1941 and its partisans proved victorious not only over the Italian and German occupiers, but also over all domestic opposition. For the entirety of its history, in wartime struggle and in the subsequent socialist state, Enver Hoxha has been in charge. But not until now has he been in sole charge.

The group around Hoxha in the mountains of Peza in 1942 (when the National Liberation Front was formed) included two who, until recently, took the highest offices under him—Hysni Kapo, No. 2 in the Party until his death in September 1979, and Mehmet Shehu, the Prime Minister until his reported suicide in December 1981. They had sided with Hoxha as each change of international partner brought purges in party and government—from Yugoslavia to the USSR in 1948, from the USSR to China in 1961 and in the prolonged deterioration of relations with the latter between 1972 and 1978. Midway in those turbulent six years, the triumvirate purged Beqir Balluku, the Minister of Defence in 1973, ostensibly for planning to defend Albania from the mountains and apparently for siding with a faction in China, and Abdyl Këllezi, Koço Theodhosi and Kiço Ngjela (the three ministers dealing with economic affairs) in 1975, ostensibly for seeking to introduce Yugoslav forms of worker-management and apparently for enlarging trade with the West.

Having thus disposed of ministers looking to China and the West and continuing the anti-Comecon line, the triumvirate could only base economic development on self-help and foreign policy on severe isolation. Implementing the first, the new Constitution of 1976 forbade the acceptance of any loans or capital from capitalists. As a symbol of the second (and in refutation of Balluku's theory of an Albanian defensive redoubt), thousands of hive-shaped concrete pillboxes were erected throughout the coastal plain and in the foothills. It could be surmised that it was not Hoxha, but Shehu and Kapo who were the keen isolationists. The building of the pillboxes went on into 1980, but to us on our tours out of Tirana (to Durrës, Krujë, Elbasan, Pogradec and Korçë), they seemed disused and overgrown with grass and weeds. Kapo is still honoured—his grave on a hillside overlooking Tirana (and Hoxha's residence) had fresh flowers when we saw it and his speeches were on sale in bookshops. Shehu has been erased from public view—his name and picture have been removed from museums where chronology would have placed him, his books have disappeared—and Hoxha's latest volume of memoirs, *The Titoites*, 1982, brands him 'a multiple agent of the imperialist-revisionist secret services.' If Hoxha was the least isolationist of the triumvirate, the few signs we saw of an opening up could be a trend.

We were only in Albania on a group-tourist visa, but the keenness with

which academic exchanges were discussed and our access to Albania's most distinguished economists, suggested to us a break in isolationism. We had, of course, neither official status on our part nor political contacts with theirs, but to those we met from the Academy of Sciences I observed that academic links with the UK would remain tenuous until diplomatic relations were re-established.

The contentious issues are well-known: Albania claims its pre-war gold reserve (1.1 tonnes, now worth some £10m) from the Trilateral Commission of the U.K., U.S. and France, which we decline to return until compensation is paid for the damage caused by mines laid in the Corfu Channel, which cost the lives of 44 Royal Naval officers and men in October 1946 (the International Court determined it at £0.8m, which, if 5% interest were accumulated, would equal some £4m today). The evidence on which the International Court reached judgement on specifically Albanian liability was circumstantial and I suggested in conversations in Tirana that deadlock could be broken by a request by both parties, simultaneously with the resumption of diplomatic relations, to the International Court to re-examine the evidence. Since this would be tantamount to postponing the Court's judgement (and hence any liability thereupon proved), there would be no need for the gold to be retained: it would be enough for the Albanian Government to undertake to abide by the reconsidered judgement.

Diplomacy with the U.K. is but one feature of Albania's relations with the West. Those with Italy and France are normal: each has small embassies in Tirana, whereas others, such as Switzerland, designate their Ambassador in Belgrade as a non-resident envoy to Tirana. The Albanian government is pushing for diplomatic relations with West Germany (a folk-dance ensemble performing there was reported while we were in Tirana), with which commercial contacts are good—the nickel mines are to be equipped with a West German refinery. Its relations with Yugoslavia remain poor because the Socialist autonomous province of Kosovo has not been granted the status of a Yugoslav Federal Republic: our interlocutors stressed that Albanian policy was non-interference in the affairs of other states on the presumption that others would not interfere in Albania, but that there is popular sympathy for their ethnic neighbours.

Enver Hoxha describes his book, *The Titoites*, as 'in general outline the history of our relations with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the revisionist Yugoslav state: on their part it is the history of interference and traps, of ceaseless plots to damage our Party and socialist state.' Yugoslav public reaction has been relatively muted, but a change may have been signalled by the publication in the Belgrade *Politika*, 24 May, 1983, of the accounts of repression in Albania of four Albanians who defected to Yugoslavia two years ago. Its closest Western relationships are with Italy, from which supplier credits have been provided for machinery deliveries (being interpreted as deferred payments to avoid the stigma of a capitalist loan), and with Sweden (which, like other smaller countries recognising Albania, has no physical presence in Tirana). China and all the members of Comecon other than the USSR maintain small embassies.

By the isolation from which Albania may now be emerging, much development assistance was forfeited. Aid from Comecon members, above all from the USSR, which ended in 1961, financed imports triple the value of Albanian exports to them and Chinese aid, which ended in 1978, seems to have enabled imports to have been 1½ times exports (the figures are rough estimates from a few official indications of bilateral trade, for Albania publishes no trade returns and those of China, in its newly-released statistical abstracts, lists every major trade partner except Albania). Albania has, since the break with China, had to rely on its own means, but they are, nevertheless, considerable. The country is rich in non-ferrous metals and in energy resources (oil and hydroelectricity) and has immense tourist potential (the road between Tirana and Elbasan along the very ridge of the hills, the sandy beach of Dürres and a water garden by Lake Ohrid were among the scenic beauties our group most appreciated). But the very hills and mountains whose succeeding crests give immense depth to the tourist's perspective restrict the area of arable land: the plan since collectivisation a quarter-century ago has been to terrace the uplands for vineyards, orchards and olive-groves, thereby freeing for field crops the valley bottoms, the plains and the drained marshland. I saw the first terraced vines on my 1960 visit, but the transformation of hillsides by 1983 was almost incredible. The statistics bear out that the total sown area in 1960 was 370,000 hectares and since then (to 1978, the latest year available), 30,000 more hectares have been gained. Terracing and drainage are labour-intensive works which the Chinese particularly encouraged; a Fellow of my Oxford College who was in the show commune of Da Zhai[1] in 1976 reported teams of Albanians being shown how to terrace.

The concentration of manpower on cultivable land reflects the abundance of the one and the scarcity of the other, for Albania boasts the highest demographic increase in Europe—2.4 per cent per annum during 1950-80, with 4 million forecast by the end of the century (1.6m in 1960 and 2.8m today).

In neighbouring Kosovo, where population growth far outstrips the Yugoslav average, the outlet is migration, but such is not permitted from Albania and the massive emigration under Ottoman and Zog's rule is attributed to the exploitation and miserable poverty of those times.

With nowhere else to go, the pressure to find jobs for all is more acute because very few are of retirement age (just over 7 per cent are more than 60, but dependency is high because 37 per cent are under 15): useful manual labour is the chosen solution. Since 65 per cent of the Albanian population live in rural areas, labour intensity is mostly in agriculture and we saw from our bus a myriad teams of men and of women digging and hoeing in the spring fields. There were so few tractors or motor vehicles that one wondered at the derivation of the official estimate that by 1980 90.5 per cent of farm work was mechanised and 9.5 per cent was by animals (against 89 and 11 per cent respectively in 1950). There are some large industrial plants (we passed the Elbasan steelworks, commissioned in 1978, and a big sugar refinery at Maliq, of 1979), but most were small—at the knitwear combine

we visited in Korçë there was one woman to each machine, from spinning to sewing. The nationalisation of all handicrafts has by no means eliminated the artisan: although there must be many fewer in Elbasan than I saw in 1960, and the bazaar in Korçë was all but derelict, new rows of craftshops had been set up in Krujë.

If I describe the Albanian model as 'muscular socialism' it may convey the sheer effortfulness of economic life where the rarity of imported machinery, motor-car and even the bicycle is in amazing contrast with the rest of Europe. But there is also a simile with the 'Muscular Christianity' idealised by Charles Kingsley in the mid-19th Century. When all organised religion had been abolished, all churches and mosques being closed in 1967, Hoxha claimed that 'the religion of the Albanians is Albania'; earlier, the Party name had been changed from 'Communist' to 'of Labour,' and the mystic attachment to muscular activity is epitomised in a quarter-century of compulsion that every desk-bound worker must spend 30 days a year on physical duties and the long continuance of 'youth brigades' for railway building.

Physical work is a great leveller and homogeneity has its part in the Albanian rule of life. A one-party state is by definition politically monolithic; there has only been one list of candidates for elections since 1945, when the Democratic Front had 93 per cent of votes (100 per cent in the elections of April 1983). The campaign for 'Workers' Control' launched in 1966 is intended to eliminate the difference between shop-floor and management, as is the virtual equality of income introduced by two stages—each decree instant in application—in 1967 and 1976. The highest salaried official has, since 1976, earned no more than twice that of the average worker and whether in state farm or factory, the wages quoted to us in 1983 were in the range 900 leks a month for the manager to 400 leks for the average worker, the same maximum as in the 1976 decree. Income tax was abolished in 1967, since its redistributive function was not thereafter required. As Adi Schnytzer points out in the most comprehensive analysis of the Albanian economy,[2] egalitarian income distribution solves the problem of microeconomic monetary equilibrium. Even if macroeconomic equilibrium can be assured by making the aggregate of wages and farm incomes equal to the consumer goods and services on offer at fixed retail prices (the standard Soviet system which broke down so disastrously in Poland in the 1970s), it is very hard to set each price so that households buy just the amount offered by the state (a 'market-clearing' price, even if there is no market in the accepted sense). Egalitarian incomes means that consumer demand is more or less the same for all households.

Until I appreciated this, I was surprised that the range and qualities of retail goods in Tirana shops were as poor as I recalled them from 1960. There is still only a relatively small 'bundle of goods' on offer, but there are now many more who can buy that bundle. The urban population has nearly doubled (499,000 in 1960, 898,000 in 1980) and the wage-earners have more than doubled (202,000 in 1960, 584,000 in 1978). Every village now has a shop, and many two or three, the number of rural shops having

also doubled since 1960. In a sense, the standard of living of the established townsman has been held constant, despite a rise in his average productivity, while many others have joined him at that level.

A final element in economic uniformity lies in the nationalisation of agriculture. The private plot freely tilled by the co-operative farmer has been much reduced in size and produce surplus to household needs must be sold to the co-operative. Private sales on the farm market are no longer permitted. 'Higher-level co-operatives,' which began to be formed in 1971, are becoming more like state farms: the one we visited near Korçë was actually to become a state farm this year.

A cultural levelling and uniformity is lastly to be noted. The abolition of overt religion—one of our number was convinced of some covert adherence to Moslem practices—also severed the historic regard toward international links with co-religionists, Byzantium and present-day Greece for the Orthodox Church, Venice and the Vatican for the Catholic Church and the Turkish and Arab worlds for Islam. Historically, the Illyrian people, whose culture goes back to the end of the third millennium B.C., are stressed, in museums as in books, as the progenitors of the Albanians, ever fighting to defend their national identity—from Macedon, from Rome, from Constantinople, from the 'Social-revisionists' or the 'imperialists' of today.

NOTES

[1] Formerly Ta Chai (then Mao's most favoured rural model): the Chinese transliteration of 1978 seems the one lasting gift of Albania, for it was Albanian linguists who reportedly advised on the new system, some of which is best pronounced by one who knows Albanian.

[2] *Stalinist Economic Strategy in Practice. The Case of Albania*, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 132.

[Michael Kaser is Reader in Economics at the University of Oxford and Professorial Fellow of St. Antony's College. Among his publications are *Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economies* (2nd edn., 1967), *Economic Development for Eastern Europe* (ed., 1968), *Planning in East Europe* (with J. Zielinski, 1970), *Soviet Economics* (1970), *Health Care in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (1976) and *Soviet Policy for the 1980s* (ed. with A. Brown, 1982).]

THE VIDEO AND THE CHILD

by Martyn Goff

THE book world was electrified to learn recently that in the past decade the sales of children's books had dropped by 35%. True, of course, that this drop ran parallel with a major fall in the birth rate and so with the numbers of children about. True, it also accompanied a considerable switch from hardbacks to paperbacks. True, too, it was at a time when institutional purchases were dropping. Surrey and Berkshire, for example, both closed or severely limited their school library services.

Even a drop of a few per cent would be alarming, but this is tangential to a large concern. Our real worry, backed by many conversations with parents and teachers, by researchers and HMI's, is simply that children are reading less . . . and less . . . and less.

At a Conference of publishers and booksellers in the summer of 1982, the overall message was that we should not be too anxious about video and allied contenders for people's time. I would not like such a simple sounding sentence to indicate that a clear-cut infallible judgement was made and that was the end of that. In fact there was considerable debate with some present still feeling that videos and computers would swamp the former (or rather the present) book market. But the assumption behind the qualified optimism was that we would continue to fight for the place of the book in every possible way and on every possible occasion and that this fight entailed considerable changes of attitude both by publishers and booksellers.

The cost of the development of all forms of videos and computers is such that their producers are bound to support the vast investments they have made with further huge sums for the exploitation of their products. In the sort of society in which we live, they have no need to brand those products with a health warning. Yet our children, and so the next generations of grown ups, may easily be severely damaged in health—in emotional health, imaginative health, communicative health—unless we do everything in our power to persuade them to read, to enjoy reading, to make reading a significant part of their lives. As Margaret Meek says in her book, *Learning To Read:*

> Can you really imagine what life would be like if you had never learned to read? The special disadvantages—not being able to read street signs or notices in the post office—are easy to understand. But what about the encounters with new ideas?

Every day we come across some extraordinary new example of contemporary technology. A phone that tells a retailer whether a customer's credit card can be used for a given sum if the card is dropped into a slot in the phone and a certain number dialled; an on-line computer that tells us how many free seats there are in an aircraft still 6,000 miles away; a lightpen that reads a minute ticket on an object being sold and alters stock and re-orders instantly. And yet . . . and yet . . . the people

operating these modern marvels are just as liable to misunderstandings with their colleagues as ever were their forerunners in the steam operated age. And those misunderstandings arise from imprecise or ambivalent use of words. For words remain the way in which we talk to each other, inform each other, programme each other; and words are learnt and understood, words are *felt*, by reading. But television, some people tell me, is not anti-book or anti-words; on the contrary it stimulates the interest in both. So many programmes derive from books; so many extra sales are made when a series of programmes is made into a book. We may seek solace with this argument but it is *not* supported by research. The Independent Broadcasting Authority's findings are unambivalent about this:

> Television has not really functioned as a stimulus to reading, but as a *substitute* on a really widespread scale.

It might be worth adding that those findings go on to say:

> Of those small numbers, and 3% is the largest figure yet recorded, who have bought or obtained works after seeing TV adaptations, a noticeable proportion have clearly not finished reading them.

The Daily Telegraph recently suggested that delinquency arises from an atrophied facility for fantasy, and that it is no coincidence that the delinquency rate has increased in those western societies which have moved from the influence of fiction and radio drama to that of television, which 'instantly gratifies our senses'.

While agreeing this, I think the threat even more serious. Margaret Meek, whom I have already quoted once has written:

> It is also important to realise that not all the electronic media in the world will replace what happens when a reader meets a writer. Reading . . . is the active encounter of one mind and one imagination with another. Talk happens; the words fly, remembered or not. Writing remains; we read it at our own pace which is the rate of *our* thinking. Real reading cannot be done without thought. As it is a kind of 'inner speech', it is bound to have a marked effect on the growth of the mind of the reader.

So not only is the child affected in terms of human communication, but also in terms of the development of his mind. But to communicative and imaginative impoverishment, if we fail to persuade our children to read, we must also add emotional impoverishment.

Jung has told us of 'race memories'. The inherent greatness of myth and fairy tale is poetic greatness. Leon Garfield and Edward Blishen in *The God Beneath the Sea* remind us that:

> The human experience brought to mind by myth and fairy tale extends beyond the situation described by psychologists and anthropologists. It is conscious as well as unconscious, and civilised as well as primitive.

The child who is deprived of having fairy stories and myths read to him or her is a child lacking in one dimension, and an important dimension, of his or her possible development. It is no good us mouthing easy words about the quality of life, as we do now so often—and, I fear, so ineffectively—unless we understand what we are doing if we deprive

children of a source of feeling about their emotional development that is imprinted in them as they listen to or read the myths and fairy stories to which I have alluded.

Jerome Singer, Professor of Psychology at Yale University, has shown us that the 'cognitive revolution' of the past few decades has demonstrated that 'we have at least two major systems for processing information for restructuring it within our memory. One system has been called lexical and involves sequences of words usually organised into dictionary-like hierarchies. The second system relates to the specific representation of events we have seen, heard, touched, tasted or smelled'. Carl Pribram of the University of California, in confirming that the lexical system is primarily related to the left side of the brain and the imagery to the right, has suggested that neglect of the left hand side will actually lead to the atrophy of the development and well-being of that half of the brain. Its food is words; and the child starved of enough words, starved from our point of view, of books, will actually be a less well equipped, less rounded, less able child than the one who reads constantly.

Pribram, commenting on a theory of Julian James about the change in Man's consciousness says:

> I think that the change came about with the invention of writing. Once one writes down something, one has the chance to validate it through consequential means, that is, with other people.

A sudden new change in Man's development which led to this sort or print and word training being precipitately cut off could lead to severe withdrawal symptoms. Thus my use of the word Atrophy. I am suggesting, then, that both society and its members, indeed the very human being as developed over hundreds of years on print training, will be deprived of this training at a high cost.

> To be literate in the civic or material sense of belonging to a literate society is to be able not only to read but also to question the authority of even the most official-looking document that makes demands on us (Margaret Meek again).

> Books, (says Barbara Tuchman), by their heterogenity can never represent a managed culture, whereas the airwaves by their nature and control by licensing might.

In bearing in mind the very real threat to the child from the world of the new technology, and indeed other new competing interests for a child's time, it is important to stress that these pressures are most applied and felt at an age when the child is already finding his or her leisure time facing strong competition. I refer, of course, to the ages 11–13 when school work, puberty and a host of new interests loudly jostle for attention. Deflected from the book at that age, there may be little chance to go back to reading before the different, all-engulfing pressures of adulthood—earning a living, marriage, etc—make the chance of recovering so valuable a habit minimal.

All these are words, true words, important words. But can we convince the teacher, the parent, the publisher, the bookseller and the librarian of this? It certainly ought to be easy where publisher and bookseller are

concerned: books are their living. They must sell them if they are to thrive and this presupposes their need for buyers and readers. The child who reads books today, who enjoys books, who learns to love books, collects them, borrows them, lends them, that child becomes the book-buyer of tomorrow. So the trade has a vested interest. But the trade's need coincides with that of the individual as communicator and indeed with the individual's imaginative and emotional needs. To make sure these needs are satisfied we must convince every parent and teacher of their urgency and importance. School Library system contracting or closing? We must fight them. Libraries open for shorter hours: we must oppose such cuts. Booksellers being chased from the market places by hideous rents determined by boutiques and jewellery shops? We must find ways of helping them to stay where all the world will find them.

I am aware of the dangers of over-dramatising a situation. But I am also aware of the very real dangers surroundings us. The situation *is* new; we must find new ways of dealing with it. In Judy Blume's *Are You There God? It's Me Margaret,* the 11 year old child says:

> I just did an exercise to help me grow.
> Have you thought about it, God? about my growing
> I mean. I've got a bra now. It would be nice if
> I had something to put in it.

No electronic medium, gadget or invention in the world can substitute for all the marvellous emotions evoked by those few words. Our job is to make sure that the next generation and the next and the one after that will have access to the Judy Blumes of this world as often and as easily as they want them.

[Martyn Goff, OBE, is Director of the National Book League.]

THE EVILS OF SUPERSTITION

by Melville Hawthorn

SUPSERSTITION and witchcraft are still at large in certain parts of China. There have been reports recently of fortune-tellers and clairvoyants caught plying their trade. After the apparently atheistic Chinese party came to power in 1949, this is still happening despite the party's eagerness to stamp out the ancient beliefs that have been a burden on the Chinese people since time immemorial.

'Acceptance of witches and wizards, magic potions, elixirs, fortune-telling and exorcisms are basically absurd and people with a little scientific knowledge would not believe in them,' declared a local daily newspaper recently in a major condemnation.

Since liberation, superstition has gradually lost ground among people . . . but because of the havoc caused by the Gang of Four (extremists purged in 1976) it has raised its head again in recent years in a few backward places where their effect was greatest.

Surprisingly, the paper revealed that superstitious practices (which in Communist Chinese terminology can also include certain types of religious practices) were not just confined to older people who grew up before the present government took power . . . but that some young people have joined in superstitious activities. And to demonstrate the scope of the problem, the paper published a series of letters from different parts of China exposing various supra-normal practices.

'Recently we have discovered that many young people, both in urban areas and in villages have been going to fortune-tellers' . . . a communist Youth League member reported from Hunan in Southern China. 'Some who are given an unfavourable reading become pessimistic about life, which does not tally with the needs of Socialist modernisation and I hope that all league organisations will increase youth education and encourage young people to smash the evil influences of superstition.'

In the western province of Sichuan another Communist Youth League member wrote in to say he had actually caught a young palm reader in the act, telling fortunes for 50 fen (about 15p) a time. Another league member wrote from Guangdong: 'Most of those cheated by these activities are young commune members'.

But the most horrifying of the cases recently come to light was the murder of two children in the village of Quilin near Shanghai. This was reported by the local newspaper published in Najing (Nanking) which stated that the two six-year-old boys were tortured to death in front of a crowd in the village square. The witch and her accomplice were reported to have beaten the boys with branches, poured boiling water over them and then strarngled one and set fire to the other in their endeavour to rid a paralysed woman of spirits that were haunting her.

Later, an article in the same paper tried to convince readers that there

were no such things as ghosts or spirits . . . but it hit on an interesting dilemma. 'When we hold a memorial service we often use the phrase; "may comrade so-and-so rest in peace." But this does not mean that the dead person has a soul. It is simply an expression of the people's grief.'

The West, too, has its superstitions, as has been proved in many instances; one of which concerns the boy who, after a spending three months in a psychiatric clinic in West Germany hardly speaks to anyone. The doctors have diagnosed schizophrenia.

Letters arriving from Italy, Spain and Portugal come from parents who say they have almost given up hope of ever seeing their children again. These are from parents whose children have left home to join so-called religious sects. Now the West German government is taking a tough line with these organisations, which are at present experiencing an unprecedented boom.

The sects are believed to have a membership of up to 35 million worldwide. The new 'prophets' are simply interested in profits, say Bonn officials, yet exert as powerful an influence as drugs or alcohol. And in a report published by an association of several hundred parents in Lower Saxony, North Westphalia, Hesse and Bavaria, 34 cases are listed of young people who ended up in misery after uprooting themselves from their families. The parents who call themselves 'The Working Group for Spiritual and Physical Freedom' offer sample cases which are almost certainly an understatement.

Bonn's Ministry of Youth and Health affairs has publicised the risks involved, pointing out that its scope for action is limited because most of the young people who leave home have reached the age of 18 — the age of maturity — and because the constitution guarantees religious freedom. Roughly one in ten of the sect's followers devote their lives to these organisations. One father wrote: 'My son fell into the hands of canvassers on his way home from university.' When we found him again he had become a fanatic. Another wrote that he had tracked his daughter to the Swiss capital where she told him she slept with men who needed God's love and that was the only way in which men of influence and wealth could be converted to Christianity.

Indian sect member, Erika Ruppert, (25) died after setting fire to herself outside West Berlin's memorial Church. And in a farewell letter said she had committed suicide 'Out of a love of mankind'.

State Secretary in the West German Youth Affairs Ministry, Professor Hans-George, declared that many of the new evangalists were coldbloodedly using thousands of young people to satisfy their own lust for power and money, and compared their methods of gaining recruits to the brain-washing of prisoners of war. 'It is pure spiritual seduction', he declared.

All of which proves that not only those in the East and Asia still believe in fable and superstition . . . but that rogues in the west use human gullibility to gain their own ends.

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

INGMAR Bergman has said that *Fanny and Alexander* will be his last film, and if he keeps his word we can at least say that he went out in a blaze of glory. It lasts just over three hours (the version made for television lasts five) and doesn't seem a moment too long. His last few films—those made during his self-imposed exile, after difficulties with the taxmen—often seemed to be made simply for their own sake. *From the Life of the Marionettes* in particular seemed like artificial *angst*, despite its superb technical quality: that is available in equally pronounced form in *Fanny and Alexander*, which also contains the real Bergman speaking—and well may we speak of the master's voice. It starts with a portrait of a family Christmas in 1907, a sequence probably influenced by the last part of Visconti's *The Leopard*, for it celebrates in detail a way of life as it once was. The Ekdahls are an extrovert theatrical family, hugely enjoying the good things in life, including food and sex; they also demonstrate care, tolerance and patience. When one of its members dies, his widow marries a bishop, and with him her two children find life very different from that to which they were accustomed. If the film has a fault, it is that we can see that she is in for trouble when he says that she must leave behind all her worldly goods, including the children's toys. We cannot tell what she sees in the bishop, though we hear that he is a ladies' man; Bergman could not have shown us this husband and wife making love, as we had seen others earlier in the film, for his purpose is to show that the new family is the reverse of the earlier one—puritanical, spiritual, repressed, authoritarian. The children are spirited away by an aging Jewish shopkeeper (Erland Josephson), and with him appears the third influence on Swedish life and character and Bergman's work, also providing stimulus—the foreign and the fantastical. It is here, or at least with the old man and his nephews, that Bergman offers his familiar messages ('Everything that is alive is God, or God's life, even the bad things') and refers to his earlier films, e.g. *Wild Strawberries*, *The Face* and *Persona*. We had seen the two aspects of Sweden and/or Bergman, the secular and the religious, and in this third part is the outsider who moves between the two, the one in an unreal world (his house is filled with magic and mechanical dolls) but capable of profundity—though in view of the film's own terms we cannot be sure that Bergman feels his remarks are of great importance. All the same, the Josephson character has something of Prospero, still capable of magic but intending to retire: and it is perhaps this way that Bergman wants us to remember him.

Fanny and Alexander has found admirers among those who do not usually warm to Bergman's films, and with *Heat and Dust* we have another film currently much admired and likely to be cherished in memory. This is another case of a director returning to his best form, and, indeed, this is James Ivory's best film since the fondly remembered

Shakespeare Wallah. Like that and *The Householder* it is about India; and it is the first film written by Ruth Prawer Jhabvala from one of her own novels since they began their collaboration with the latter movie. Julie Christie (and it's great to see her again) plays an ex-BBC researcher whose interest in a great-aunt's correspondence sends her to India; and then side by side we see the two women's experience of that country. Christie finds modern India a place of teeming people, offices, busy streets, bus-rides, a fake American pilgrim; the India of the Raj, in the Twenties, as experienced by Olivia (Greta Scacchi), is a place of idleness, spacious lawns, ceremony, of dressing for dinner and of picnics with a romantic nawab (Shashi Kapoor) distrusted by the British. As both women have taken lovers and consider abortions, the film becomes too schematic, but despite moments of over-emphasis, Ivory shows a confidence missing from many of his films. Particularly telling are the brief shots of the mansions of old, showing what has become of them; Walter Lassally's photography is probably the best that even he has done. Ivory's best work has always been that which reflected a more glorious past and/or that in which two cultures have tried to come to terms with each other. There is no one theme in the film which, as the title implies, is a summary of impressions of India—and it is one of the best and most loving on that huge subject.

Gandhi is less about India than about goodness and Imperialism. Like *Reds*, it is a long and detailed account of a major twentieth century figure: the protagonists of both films are men who questioned the beliefs of those set in authority over them—and since, then, *Gandhi* has an important theme, it is greatly to be preferred to the now discredited epics of the Sixties which, in some ways, it resembles. Those who, like myself, disliked the earlier films directed by Richard Attenborough, will find that he has lost his penchant for pretension and found one for subtlety, so that, to some extent, the acclaim that has greeted *Gandhi* is justified. I do think, however, that Attenborough believes that by combining the 'epic' form with a radical or liberal stance he is thereby making an important film. *Gandhi* hates Imperialism so much that it is prepared to distort, leaving out Gandhi's pro-British attitudes and making him a proponent of home rule—whereas he believed that India must first discover why the British ruled in the first place so that it could then dislodge them. The Indian critic Prabhu S. Guptara has written eloquently on this film, and it is worth restating his chief objections, that the film simply omits Gandhi's 'spiritual quest, which was at the centre of everything he attempted as a man and politician' and the emphasis on Westerners in Gandhi's life is entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, the film strongly conveys Attenborough's reverence for the man and for India; he had the good sense to invite Ravi Shankar to compose the music; and if you have not already seen Ben Kingsley's performance as Gandhi you should certainly do so. This actor projects goodness and wisdom with such unshowy skill that he may be responsible for many people's liking of it.

Obviously, it has been a time for the Orient, and you may also want to experience *The Year of Living Dangerously*, which is set in Jakarta in

1965, when the Communists tried to overthrow Sukarno and establish their own government. The source is a novel by C. J. Koch which may be autobiographical; the hero is a young Aussie reporter (Mel Gibson), who grins nervously through all the dangers and who doesn't want to be sent back to the newsroom. The world of the foreign correspondent is familiar to all of us, but the only previous movie to touch on the subject is *The Quiet American*. Of course, movies since they began have followed the adventures of journalists in exotic places but this one, rather, is about their cliqueish drinking clubs, hobnobbing with the people at the embassy, being in hostile territory. We might have guessed from the Cairo sequences in *Gallipoli* that this director, Peter Weir, would make an admirable film about one young man abroad, and from his earlier films that he might provide a mystical element—here in the person of the all-wise, all-scheming dwarf Chinese-American photographer, Billy, a role, in fact, played by a woman, Linda Hunt. There is also a girl, Sigourney Weaver, an attaché at the British Embassy, who tries to hold our hero at arm's length because she is leaving shortly and doesn't want to get involved. That is not a situation movies have often used, and it is handled very freshly. In fact, *The Year of Living Dangerously* is to be seen at all costs, but the underlying current of violence makes it a somewhat tense occasion.

It is the first Australian film funded completely by one of the Hollywood studios. A more typical Australian film is *We of the Never Never*, based yet again on an autobiographical book published in the early years of the century—by Mrs. Aeneas Gunn, and since that is the name of the character played by Angela Punch McGregor, we may feel reasonably assured that she will neither die nor remarry during the course of the film —which slightly restricts our interest as to what will happen to her. It is about her first year of marriage, living with her husband and the drovers, days away from the nearest town and deeply resented by the men. She does not understand them nor they her, and the film very sensibly does not supply what Mrs. Gunn omitted from her book. She is a feminist and very much in favour of friendship with the aborigines, both aspects dealt with in other movies from Australia. I believe that since Melbourne and Sydney, the film-making centres, became so cosmopolitan and sophisticated (they were neither twenty years ago), the people have become fascinated with the Australian past—the vastness of the outback (the Never Never of the title) and how it was conquered, and the wrongs done to the native population. To this extent, of course, the film resembles the pioneer epics made by Hollywood in the Twenties. It is an absorbing movie, directed by Igor Auzins with the skill we have come to expect of the film-makers working Down Under.

In fact, this has been an excellent season for the cinema, and there is a sixth film to be recommended, *Tootsie*, a comedy. Men dressing up as women seems to have become as popular in films as it once was in the old stage farces. *Some Like It Hot* was so clever as to be irresitible, but I must say that I couldn't see much wit in *La Cage aux Folles*. I therefore went warily to *Tootsie*, having watched an insufferable television discussion of

its handling of role reversal. Forget it. *Tootsie* is simply a modern-day equivalent of 'Charley's Aunt': Dustin Hoffman, in another of his fine performances, gets into drag in order to get a job and, like all those who practise deceit, the complications start to mount. He is eventually thought to be gay by both sexes, and while such jokes these days offend no one, it is nice to have them lightly handled—without the clumsiness of *Victor/Victoria*. The director is Sydney Pollack, who also gives a splendid performance as Hoffman's agent. I believe that it is the good jokes about show business that have made this movie popular, plus the fact that everyone in the cast is enormously sympathetic, including Jessica Lange and Terri Garr as the two women in Hoffman's life, Bill Murray and Charles Durning. As in *Nine to Five*, Dabney Coleman plays a chauvinist male pig, and in these cheerier circumstances he now has the role off to perfection.

I'm afraid I laughed much less at *Local Hero*; indeed, I smiled wanly a couple of times. Perhaps it was a pity that I heard its producer, David Puttnam, explain that he had taken its writer-producer, Bill Forsyth, to some of the Ealing comedies in the hope that he would come up with something similar. He made him see *Whisky Galore*, but this is more like *The 'Maggie'*, being about an American businessman among the canny Scots. He (Peter Reigert) has been sent to buy up a village so that his Houston-based company can build an oilfield there. There are certainly possibilities for comedy here, but Forsyth will have none of them; he also fails to find humour in the village dance, a feature of many rural comedies—including the Czech films of Milos Forman. The jokes about the Houston executive (Burt Lancaster) and his psychiatrist look desperate. For all that, it is a likeable film, with another set of pleasing characters and, of course, some beautiful views of the Western shore; but don't go expecting to laugh. Of course, it may be that Forsyth thought Ealing comedy not worth emulating, but there is little evidence within the movie that he did not.

Finally, a brief recommendation of *Handgun*, though it disappeared from cinemas with record speed, so you may have to wait till it comes on television. This is the first American film written and directed by Tony Garnett, who has an American wife and has gone to live in Los Angeles. It is set in Dallas, where a young teacher (Karen Young) has moved after an unhappy love affair. She meets a young lawyer (Clayton Day) who believes that she should start another one; he's a firm believer in male superiority so that when he doesn't get his own way, about her getting into his bed, he locks the door and pulls out the gun. This is the crucial scene, and Garnett does it so superbly that we also believe what follows. The dénouement was given away by the ads, which may be why few people went to see this movie.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A NATION AT WAR

Finest Hour. Winston Churchill. 1939–1941. Martin Gilbert. Heinemann. £15.95.

From the moment (September 3, 1939) when Churchill was appointed by Neville Chamberlain to the Admiralty, a perceptible change came over British government. From May 10, 1940 onwards, when Churchill became Prime Minister, after the Norwegian disaster, the *perceptible change* grew into a totally new style of government, a near-dictatorship. A new kind of *minute* was invented, usually full of questions demanding speedy answers from civil servants and top military staff alike, leading inevitably to *'Action this day.'* Confidential Cabinet papers reveal that Chamberlain himself wrote: 'Until America could be induced to come to our help, it would be imperative for Britain to resolve on a form of government which would approach the totalitarian.' Indeed, until Chamberlain's death of cancer, Churchill always showed him great respect for 'his fortitude and firmness of spirit,' whereas he could write strong and even bitter minutes to Halifax, Amery, Admiral Chatfield, Stafford Cripps, Rab Butler and several others. Nevertheless, Churchill, on suitable occasions, deferred to those he trusted, or had his own second thoughts. But his will-power and indefatigable spirit astounded his Cabinet and staff and braced up the people of Britain and the world during very dark days by his unconquerable language and assurance that *'all will come right'*—the motto of the Orange Free State president, and heard by Churchill forty years earlier in South Africa.

The German offensive in Western Europe, Dunkirk, the fall of France, the bombing of Britain, the continued threat of invasion, the submarine sinking of merchant ships, Greece and Crete, disasters to the *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales* in Malayan waters, Churchill's generous hand to Russia and, above all, the long-drawn-out love-match with Roosevelt and the United States—this is the very stuff of drama.

Although many people know this story, or think they know it, because of Churchill's historic speeches in Parliament and over the radio, not to mention his own *The Second World War*, it has taken the master historian, Martin Gilbert, to produce the full drama in narrative form. Of course, he has had access to private and secret papers and diaries, but in addition he has interviewed scores of persons who were actually present on historic occasions, whether at week-ends at Chequers or at bombed sites in Coventry, Plymouth or East London, or again at momentous meetings with French leaders and later with Roosevelt himself. Equally important, Mr. Gilbert has made skilful use of the messages, intercepted by the cryptographers at Bletchley Park, which revealed so much of Hitler's strategy and which constantly influenced Churchill's military decisions. Mr. Gilbert rightly pays tribute to the first volumes of the Official History of British Intelligence in the Second World War by F. H. Hinsley and others. Churchill's secretaries, Sir John Martin and Sir John Peck, obligingly kept diaries, while a third, the twenty-six year-old John Colville, who is most frequently quoted, and is called by Gilbert 'the Boswell of Churchill's Premiership,' adds some notable personal insights into Churchill's style of working and living.



I often wonder how Martin Gilbert can hold together so much inter-related information from such diverse sources and then re-tell the whole story in such clear and captivating prose. Those who have read Martin Gilbert's other three Volumes and four Companion Volumes will realise better than anyone else that they were all preparing us for this near final act of the drama. We have not been dealing with an ordinary man. He might have been killed or have died on more than one occasion. His life was preserved so that his Finest Hour coincided with and helped to create Britain's Finest Hour. In common language, the man and the moment produced the genius.

Winston Churchill's whole life within government or as a prophet outside government was an apprenticeship to the supreme years of personal leadership. Whatever his mistakes, he learned from his own experience and that of Lloyd George in the Great War, that if he was to maintain aggressive initiatives, he must also retain personal authority to carry them out. More than anyone, Churchill brought the United States step by step into the war; more than anyone and, against some opposition, he seized the opportunity of aiding Russia and took upon himself complete responsibility for all that it involved, until fighting ceased.

At the time of Dunkirk, Churchill asked his secretary to look up for him a passage in George Borrow's *Bible in Spain*, the prayer for England at Gibraltar. It reads: 'Fear not the result, for either shall the end be majestic and an enviable one, or God shall perpetuate thy reign upon the waters': he said that these words 'matched his mood.'

While witnessing from the Air Ministry a bombing raid on London, he recalled Tennyson's Locksley Hall: 'airy navies grappling in the central blue.' Before sending Sir Arthur Salter to America on a shipping mission, he read to him some lines from Arthur Hugh Clough's poem 'Say not the struggle nought availeth' and in the following month, April 27, 1941, quoted two stanzas from the same poem. Here is the second stanza with the memorable and matching last line:

> And not by Eastern windows only,
> When daylight comes, comes in the light
> In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly!
> But westward, look, the land is bright.

Then follow Martin Gilbert's notes.

After the broadcast and before dinner, Churchill rang his old friend Violet Bonham Carter to ask whether she heard it. Her reply was: 'Of course I did, Winston, everybody in England listens when you speak.' 'And did you recognise the poem?' he continued; she did, in fact, she read it to him thirty-five years ago. Churchill later dined with Sir Alan Brooke, C.-in-C. Home Forces, Lord Ismay and Professor Lindemann. The talk continued to 3 a.m. and was summarised by Brooke in his diary. See Arthur Bryant, *The Turn of the Tide* (1939-43), London, 1957. On the following day, Brooke wrote to Churchill as follows:

'This is just a short line to thank you for your great kindness in inviting me periodically to Chequers and thus giving me an opportunity of discussing the problems of the defence of this country with you and of putting some of my difficulties before you. These informal talks are of the very greatest help to me and I do hope you realise how grateful I am to you for your kindness.' Churchill replied the following day: 'My dear General, I do not agree with your views, but you were perfectly entitled to express them.'

I have shared with the readers of this review a few of the notes which grace

so many of the 1,274 pages of this glorious book. Churchill could be rude, impatient and, at times, maddening, but never malicious; on the other hand, he handled a wide variety of people with superlative skill and uncanny understanding. He often wept, as in the House of Commons when Roosevelt died, or on the rare occasions of good news from the war fronts. It was on these occasions, feeling occasions, that he prepared his great speeches and because the speeches came from the heart and rang true, he was able to identify himself with a nation at war.

KENNETH LINDSAY

HITLER'S HEALTH

Adolf Hitler: The Medical Diaries. The Private Diaries of Dr. Theo Morell. Edited by David Irving. Sidgwick & Jackson. £10.95.

For as long as history remains fascinated with Adolf Hitler, his personal physician, Theo Morell, will be also a subject of consuming interest. People remain hypnotised by men of influence and authority and by the mental and physical condition of those who wield these instruments. The doctors which such men employ also come under careful scrutiny because of the power which is devolved to them. Lord Moran has provided us with a medical memoir of Winston Churchill, a book which proved both informative and highly controversial. Stalin kept around a large population of doctors, the lives of many of whom he eventually terminated for political reasons.

The confidential Morell diaries remained hidden for many years. Then, in 1981, they re-emerged from a health agency in Washington and the editor of this book, David Irving, obtained the exclusive permission of Morell's widow to publish this fascinating and unique manuscript.

Morell first came into contact with Hitler in 1936 and was his personal physician for the last eight years of his life. He became most unpopular with many of Hitler's colleagues and with his immediate entourage, who regarded him as being over-influential with the Führer. Medically, there was no question that Hitler was a typical hypochondriac and probably had been for most of his life. He invariably travelled with a huge medicine cupboard and believed himself to be incapable of survival without batteries of pills and injections. Over the years, Morell dosed him with a quite extraordinary volume and variety of medicines, amounting to a veritable pharmacopoeia. A sizeable part of this book is devoted to the types of treatment employed.

The claim is made that, between 1941 and 1945, 77 different medicines and preparations were administered by Morell to Hitler. These included glucose in varying forms and in differing concentrations, so-called 'supportive' drugs of the peripheral circulatory system such as Coramin, Cardiazol and Sympathol, non-specific 'tonics' such as the Omnadin of I.G. Farben and a drug called Mutaflor, designed to alter bacterial flora in the intestines. Vitamin products, containing a variety of substances including calcium and ascorbic acid, were also given, often in combination with glucose. At one time, leeches were applied in an attempt to stop buzzing in the ears. But probably the most controversial of all forms of treatment were various types of endocrine product. These were reported to contain male adrenocortical and thyroid hormones; they were given in the form of dried glands processed into tablets and their value as therapeutic agents must be regarded as doubtful in the extreme.

A vivid description is given of Hitler's deteriorating medical and psychological condition as the Nazi war effort went from one disaster to another. A whole variety of symptoms manifested themselves, including headaches, stomach cramps, marked tremors of the limbs, constipation, insomnia and depressive attacks. By 1945, Hitler was a mental and physical wreck, quite incapable of logical thought and action. A colleague who saw the Führer in April 1945 described him as scarcely able to walk, doing so with a stooped back, 'his right leg dragging, his head shaking and his left hand violently trembling on the limply dangling arm.' How much of this was due to the circumstances of the war, how much to the inherent hypochondriasis and how much to the questionable treatments prescribed by Dr. Morell must remain a matter for speculation.

This book is easily read, beautifully compiled and remains of intense human interest. *Par excellence*, it illustrates the close relationship which can exist between the practice of medicine and the exercise of power at the international level. David Irving is to be greatly congratulated on the production of a treatise which has added a new dimension to the history of the 20th century.

JOHN A. LORAINE

THE MODERN AMERICAN NOVEL

The Modern American Novel. Malcolm Bradbury. Oxford University Press. £9.95.

There is already a plenitude of works on the modern American novel, but Malcolm Bradbury, who is Professor of American Studies at the University of East Anglia, and a wickedly clever novelist, brings an acute perception and perspective to that form, ranging from Naturalism and Impressionism in the 1980s to the recent work of Barth, Heller, Pynchon, Vonnegut and others. The novel, for Professor Bradbury, is at its best 'not simply an infinitely repeatable type, a body of habitual and therefore apparently innocent styles and modes of expression' but rather 'an ever-changing act of apprehension, belonging in the world of our changing thought, our changing history, our changing ways of naming experience, and it cannot stand still.' That would seem to be an excellent definition of the novel-form. The American novel, as he well demonstrates, has been particularly sensitive to the flux of history, of progress, and of the dehumanising of the individual. Over the near-century, it has moved from marginality to centrality: it has grown steadily more cosmopolitan and is to be viewed more as a connection with European fiction than as having sprung, rough-hewn from native grounds—the received stereotype.

In America, especially, a vital questioning force has challenged old modes of expression and pursued experiment and innovation. After the Second World War, 'along with the weakening of ideological commitment came a qualification of naturalism, a growing preoccupation with form and with moral and metaphysical complexity.' A powerful new generation of novelists emerged, equipped with a double heritage—that of naturalism concerned with social experience, the pressure on the self, and also that of modernism—the optimism of a Dos Passos as well as the bleaker outlook of Dostoevsky, Mann, Joyce and Kafka, whose modernism was a response to historical disorder and nihilism. Jewish intellectuals such as Isaac Bashevis Singer, Saul Bellow, Norman Mailer, Bernard Malamud and Philip Roth spoke most firmly for a new humanism. How should a good man live, what ought he to do? That was Bellow's question.

The displaced Black hero, too, became the dark other in American culture: Ralph Ellison and James Baldwin contributed to a fiction profoundly conscious of alienation and *anomie*. A period ensued in which the novel appeared to be a proper medium to express the strivings of a new American culture. Finally, when liberal compromise began to falter, there came the exponents of more extreme liberal dissent, like Jack Kerouac and William Burroughs. Vladimir Nabokov embarked upon 'a major enquiry into the nature of fiction and fictionality in which the word does not attach referentially to the thing'. The "postmoderns" of the 'sixties and 'seventies enlarged their themes and looked outwards. Thomas Pynchon's *V.* (1963) was a remarkable endeavour 'to reconstitute world history while insisting on the disintegrative, entropic processes functioning through it.' Professor Bradbury's criticism of the experimental novels of the 'sixties and 'seventies uses the least familiar material and is particularly interesting. Now that phase is weakening and John Barth has written of a new 'literature of replenishment'. Professor Bradbury seems to mine open even the most obscurantist writing to discover and extract a nugget of *ratio decidendi*. Formidable.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

HISTORY AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS IN THE MAKING

English Literature in History: Medieval Readers and Writers, Janet Coleman; *An Equal Wide Survey*, John Barrell; *Pastoral and Politics*, Roger Sales. Series Editor Raymond Williams. Hutchinson. £13.50 each volume.

At a first glance the terms of reference for the series, *English Literature in History*, seems straightforward. On closer inspection the three volumes reveal a more ambitious objective. This is to delve deeply into the work of little-known as well as acclaimed authors to discover at first hand some hard facts about the political and social realities of their respective periods. By applying directly to contemporary writers, whether progressive thinkers or mere time-servers, a spontaneity is assured, too often lacking in the work of 'official' historians.

In his Editor's Preface Professor Williams outlines the purpose of the series:

> The aim of the present series is to provide a place for essays of an open investigative kind, which do not have from the outset to be committed, or to pretend to be committed to explanatory completeness. Its emphasis is on literature *in* history: the study of actual works, practices and conditions, in a particular place and period: some 'literary', some 'historical', but never assumed to belong, by definition, to pre-formed bodies of 'literature' in 'history.'

Inevitably, the three contributors to *English Literature in History* have interpreted their assignments in different ways. In *An Equal Wide Survey*, John Barrell aims at a simple but effective goal by asking what were the main conclusions reached by writers during five decades of almost unprecedented change (1730-80). He sees these as a mounting concern for the rapidly increasing population in an uncaring society and a growing readiness to question the status quo. Detailed and lengthy quotes from James Thomson's neglected poem, 'The Seasons' and John Dyer's 'The Fleece' suggest that posterity should be grateful to these two and many others for their courage and perspicacity.

Janet Coleman, in *Medieval Writers and Readers*, might seem to have a more difficult task in correlating relevant material for her period (1350-1400). She leads off in her Introduction with a quotation from the Hainault chronicler employed by Queen Philippa, in which the shrewd and experienced commentator delivers penetrating comments on the structure of society in England, some of which have the ring of truth today. From then on she is able to assemble a rich harvest from the works of Chaucer, Langland and Gower as

well as the meticulously inscribed records from the monasteries. Already, the device of weaving heretical observations into apparently innocuous verses had been adopted, as was the case some five hundred years later in occupied France. There emerges a picture of formidable intellectual activity as well as a 'golden age' for the agricultural labourer, due perhaps to religious single-mindedness and a steady rise in social standards.

Coming nearer to our own times, in *Pastoral and Politics* (1780-1830) Roger Sales has the advantage of discussing writers already known to most people—among them Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley and John Clare. It is not surprising if Jane Austen emerges as the star performer. As she wrote to her niece, Anna, when giving guidance to the aspiring novelist, . . . 'three or four families in a country village is the very thing to work on.' She herself, however, saw the 'little social commonwealth' as a more complicated tatrget for the X-ray eye, disposing for all time of the pervasive myth, propagated by such dedicated 'village' exponents as Mary Russell Mitford, that the rural resident had no higher calling than to 'love his parish.'

Yet perhaps an even more important function of *Pastoral and Politics* is to illuminate the purely political climate of the chosen period. Roger Sales' presentation of the facts which surrounded that strange uprising known as the 'Cato Street' affair has a welcome clarity and objectivity.

When eventually completed with *1580-1830* by Margot Heinemann, *English Literature in History* will provide a unique record of the manner in which writers down the years have felt the urge to communicate their judgments and hopes to their own and future generations.

ROSALIND WADE

A REMARKABLE RAPE CASE

The Glasgow Rape Case. Ross Harper and Arnot McWhinnie. Hutchinson. £5.95 (Paperback only).

Any person undertaking an account of this beastly case of 1980/82 has a paramount duty to record the events in such a way as to disentangle the many misconceptions and preconceptions which bedevil it. The combination of solicitor for the rapee and involved journalist must constitute a strong team and they have discharged their main obligation admirably. An ongoing explication of the relevant Scottish law is also obviously necessary, and is, indeed, provided. A detailed study of the rapee, Carol X, her actions and thoughts, is a bonus, and provides much totally new material. The book appears to me to be a model of clarity and restraint, and no conservative reader should be deterred by the journalist's 'get-them-on-the-hook' beginning.

The joint authors thoroughly elucidate the circumstances whereby an Advocate Depute in the Crown Office made the decision so resoundingly complained of to mark the case 'No Proceedings.' The construction of the successful private prosecution which followed is carefully charted. A criticism not levelled by Harper and McWhinnie is that Carol X was permitted to present herself for the original trial (not proceeded with because of her psychiatric condition) in a state of collapse: the prosecution should have known how she was *before* the brink of trial and taken advice accordingly. There seems no doubt from the testimony of this book that Carol X was later willing (and just about fit) to give evidence. Let there be no mistake; she had a history of three serious suicide acts. The authors support the requirement that a rapee must be present in court to give that evidence, and are neutral upon the decision that the rape

and the assault (frightful razor-slashings apparently inflicted by one of the three boys indicted) were too inextricably intertwined for the Crown to proceed only on the assault in the absence of Carol X. Nor can the authors comment upon the Solicitor-General Nicholas Fairbairn's alleged comment to a journalist that 'There is no doubt in my mind that the matter of this unfortunate woman's mental stability was irrelevant'—which was at variance with his statement in the House of Commons. The authors are fair to him, and not vindictive. A Great Train Robber sent him a potted begonia.

Two 'positive and beneficial effects' of this case, they summarise, are that, in future, no murder or rape case will be dropped without reference to the Lord Advocate himself, and secondly that, in the previously unreported words of the new Solicitor-General, Peter Fraser, Q.C., 'Procurators Fiscal had been instructed that they should, in general, inform persons who had alleged that they had been the victim of crimes and who had given statements to the authorities, if it was eventually decided not to proceed with the charge.' Carol X, of course, had not been so informed.

As for the three convicted boys, with the fourth, who ultimately gave evidence for the prosecution, and their statements to the police, it is still difficult to be sure exactly what happened that gory night in Barrowfield. The jury recognised this (having unanimously found the oldest boy guilty of both the razor assault and the rape) by finding the two younger boys guilty only of indecent assault. It will be remembered that it is a serious problem of the crime that Carol X has imperfect recollection and awareness of the events. She was drunk, and alleges that she received a blow on the head. There are legal intricacies over the state of consciousness of a rape victim. Sentences (not affected by appeal) were twelve years in a young offenders' institution, and, for the two younger boys, sentences deferred for one year. The authors are not clear in their analysis of the effect of the verdicts upon the implications of the separate charges—and this is something which should be adjusted in any future edition.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Andropov File (Sidgwick and Jackson, £9.95). This 'life and ideas of Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR' by Martin Ebon is a lively analysis which deserves careful attention. The author is well known as a student of Soviet affairs and has written this comprehensive reference book, World Communism Today. He traces Andropov's steady and shrewdly organised career in the Communist Party hierarchy. He was Soviet Ambassador in Budapest from 1954 to 1957, which included the crushing of the Hungarian rising in 1956. He was head of the KGB for fifteen years, 1967–1982 when he left to join the Central Committee Secretariat. Mr. Ebon stresses his close association over many years with Suslov, the leading and dominant ideologist of Marxist-Leninism. Andropov was himself, over many years, a writer and exponent of communism. As such he was determined to crush dissenters and dissidents. Mr. Ebon gives the picture of a man who purported to give superficially at least a humane face to the KGB but was quite ruthless in his aims and methods: a person of intellectual quality but latterly intolerant of dissent. He also developed a vast network of espionage abroad. After Suslov's death, Mr.

Ebon contends that Andropov had, apart from Chernenko, no rivals in the Politburo. Indeed on Brezhnev's death, Andropov's succession as General Secretary of the Communist party was almost of course. He sees the USA as the main threat. He has never visited a non-communist country: on the other hand he has received a wealth of information about the Western world from his agents. We are given the picture of a hard cool calculator who nonetheless wants an accord with America, but on his own terms. The future will show.

The Guadalupe Madonna (Souvenir Press. £8.95). 'Myth or Miracle' is the sub-title of this absorbing study by Professor Jody Brant Smith, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Pensacola College, Florida. For 450 years the Image of Our Lady of Guadalupe has been venerated in Mexico City as a miraculous portrait of the Virgin Mary. It derives from a tradition dating back to 1531 when the Virgin Mary appeared to an Aztec peasant requiring him to take to the local bishop an armful of roses wrapped in his rough cape of cactus cloth. Upon delivering the roses, his cape was found to have on it the image of the Virgin in wonderful colours. In the ordinary course of events, the cloth should have disintegrated long ago, but it has remained in perfect condition and the colours have remained as bright as ever. This contrasts with painting put on the bottom of the robe very much later. This has greatly deteriorated or has been renewed. The original has not been touched. This appears from Professor Smith's detailed scientific examination and his study of the historical background. The church authorities having custody of the Image have been co-operative in his investigations. He also refers to the computer assisted examination of the eyes by Dr. Jose Aste-Tonsmann who has confirmed reflections in the eyes, including that of a human bust, which are as yet unexplainable. Professor Smith also refers to a report that fibres from the original cactus cloth had been given a micro-chemical analysis by organic chemists in Germany. 'The only record of the results of the tests was . . . they were "neither animal, vegetable, or mineral'. The author has been unable to obtain further information of these tests. He agrees that although historical and scientific research 'will answer some of the remaining questions, . . . the essential mystery of Guadalupe — her hold on millions of Christians over the centuries—is irreducible.' This is a most fascinating piece of research. The book is well illustrated, including the enormously enlarged items shown in her eyes.

Expeditions and Explorations (Macmillan. £12.95). This is essentially a practical volume of advice by Nigel Gifford, with his long experience in climbing and other expeditions. Every year an increasing number of expeditions, large and small, leave Britain upon some adventure. This book is a guide to planning, preparing and organising an expedition together with advice on food and equipment in varying conditions, and other basic needs. Dr. John Hemming, Director of the Royal Geographical Society, commends the volume in his Foreword. It may 'inspire some future RGS gold medallists—and it will certainly help them make a better job of that wonderful adventure of organising an expedition'. The text has a large number of comments on particular topics by well known and experienced leaders and members of expeditions.

'FIRST TIME'

A Bi-annual Magazine designed to encourage First Time Poets.
Poems are invited for the **FIFTH ISSUE** of the twice-yearly publication **'FIRST TIME'**, being the publication of the Hastings National New Poetry Society.

NATIONAL HASTINGS POETRY COMPETITION 1983—Cash Prizes.
Adjudicator: Josephine Austin, Editor of 'FIRST TIME'.

Details of both from Josephine Austin, 80 St. Helen's Road, Hastings, East Sussex TN34 2LH. Please enclose stamped and addressed envelope.

CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS

A Bio-Bibliographical Guide to Current Writers in Fiction, General Nonfiction, Poetry, Journalism, Drama, Motion Pictures, Television, and Other Fields. New Revision Series, Vol. 9. Edited by Ann Evory and Linda Metzger. 549 pages. Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, USA, 1983. L.C. Card No. 81-640179. ISBN 0-8103-1938-1. ISSN 0275-7176. $76.00.

Matter, Life, Evolution

by John G. Elliott, D.A.

A philosophical book on how life works in the main degree of consciousness. A new positive perspective on the re-birth of man's bio-electromagnetic plasmic body (spirit).

$4.50 softcover, $6.95 hardcover, plus 60c postage. Available from: Gibson-Hiller Co., Publishers, P.O. Box 22X, Dayton, Ohio, 45406.

PRE-REQUIEM FOR A CLOWN

Rupert Strong's Seventh Book of Poems

However keenly responsive to tragedy, he is always remarkably conscious that comedy is just around the corner.

£3.00 paperback **£4.50 hardback**

RUNA PRESS, MONKSTOWN, DUBLIN

Distributed in the U.S. by Dufour Editions Inc.

POETRY NATION REVIEW

the bi-monthly magazine of poetry, translation, essays, reviews and features

General Editor MICHAEL SCHMIDT
Editors DONALD DAVIE and C. H. SISSON

'I can't think of a current literary magazine that's more spirited, catholic, and distinguished.'—**Richard Wilbur**

'**PN Review** is a real poetry magazine: it is always interesting, it is hospitable to different kinds of poetry and to different points of view, and it prints work by most of the best practising British poets.'—**Thom Gunn**

'**Poetry Nation Review** both honours and belies its proud name. It *is*, today, the most incisive voice of a vision of poetry and the arts as central to national life—a vision with a vividly British quality. But it is *also* an international meeting-place, a denial of parochialism as are things deep-rooted.'—**George Steiner**

'. . . it is the liveliest magazine of poetry in the language.'
—**Donald Hall**, *Parnassus*

Annual subscription (six issues) £9.90 (£11.90 institutions) to PN Review, 208-212 Corn Exchange, Manchester M4 3BQ

Single copies @ £2.00 (trade terms apply)

I should like to subscribe to *PN Review* and enclose a cheque/p.o. for £.....

Name: .....

Address: .....

.....

.....

.....

18 NOV 1980

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD, 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG. Tel. 01-242 5215. All business matters should be addressed to the publishers.

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

SEPTEMBER 1983

INSIDE EUROPE
Hugh Dykes, M.P.

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE
B. Narpati

MRS. THATCHER'S NORTH BRITONS
R. D. Kernohan

IBSEN AND THE LOST BOHEMIA
John Elsom

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement

98p

Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

September 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1412 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
International Financial Markets in Hong Kong and Singapore	B. Narpati	113
Inside Europe	Hugh Dykes, M.P.	118
Violating Salt II	Adam M. Garfinkle	123
Poland and Papal Power	Martin McCauley	128
Reformation and Excommunication	Francis Edwards, S.J.	133
Ibsen and the Lost Bohemia	John Elsom	137
Mrs. Thatcher's North Britons	R. D. Kernohan	143
Care for Handicapped Children	Peter Niecke	148
New Horizons for Liberal International	Urs Schoettli	150
Poems: Paradise Man		
Moment of Freedom	William Oxley	156
The Strangest Well in Britain	David Gunston	157
Correspondence: The Forgotten Builder	Edward Grist	160
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		161
Esmond Wright, Mark Cook, Paul Rose, Ernle Money, Richard Whittington-Egan		
SHORTER REVIEWS		167

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leaton Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex. U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U S A. and Canada $47.50 Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd, 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

September 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1412

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS IN HONG KONG AND SINGAPORE

by B. Narpati

THE growth of the Hong Kong market has been spontaneous under the traditional *laissez faire* policy of the government. Singapore has grown by vigorous support policies of the authorities. Both markets have made steady progress in the field of fund employment and fund raising.

The word 'offshore' refers to banking business which takes place within a country's boundaries but outside its banking system. Such transactions are only possible if the banking legislation of that country permits the separation of offshore business from other banking business and dispenses with controls and some or all charges and fees. Any city or country where banks conduct this kind of business is designated as an offshore centre.

Offshore business can be divided roughly into short-term and long-term components. The short-term business is often described as the offshore money market or Euro-money market. It is based on deposits made by non-residents. International business in the medium-term and long-term sectors of the offshore market comprises bond issues and loans. The bond issues to which a private investor can subscribe are organised by international syndicates for simultaneous sale in a number of countries. International loans are granted by a single bank, or a consortium of banks, which bear the risks involved.

Most of the long-term loans are the roll-over type. Instead of carrying a fixed rate of interest, the loan carries a rate marginally above a specified reference rate. The banks are able to refund long-term loans on a short-term basis without running an interest risk.

There has also been recently a marked increase in the exchange of information between the offshore centres themselves. Offshore centres are after all, to a greater or lesser extent, competing with each other and with the centres where the parent banks are located to attract business and their interests and concerns appear to be rather different.

One imponderable is the effect of the new International Banking Facilities in the United States, particularly in New York, which came into being at the end of 1981 in response to pressure to counteract the loss of banking business from the United States.

New York now offers high quality banking expertise without the inconvenience of doing business in more isolated locations.

Depositors may feel wary about banking there on ground of secrecy or even of political risks. The freezing of the Iranian assets and the Freedom of Information provisions may well deter potential customers.

The establishment of IBFs in the United States may prompt similar developments in other countries, particularly Japan and Germany.

Hong Kong and Singapore have been developing into international financial markets since the early 1970s. The number of financial institutions and the volume of funds in these markets has been steadily increasing and with it their shares in the Euro-money market.

A major part of syndicated loans to Asian countries has been arranged in both markets. Hong Kong is ahead in the use of funds but Singapore leads in fund-raising. The two markets complement each other.

Both markets are faced with a number of problems such as mounting debts of Asian developing countries and market rivalries of the two economies consequent on their expansion. The oil problem is likely to be protracted, and with the industrialisation in mainland China gathering pace, much more is expected of the two regional financial centres.

Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s was characterised as a money centre or as a transit-trade settlement centre for the Chinese merchants in South East Asian countries. Since January 1973 as foreign exchange controls were abolished, many finance companies have been established by foreign banks. Financial transactions have been mounting especially in 'out-out transactions' and more recently the market has been playing the role of a 'window' for international financial transactions of China.

The rapid development of Hong Kong in recent years as one of the world's largest financial centres continued during 1981, according to the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce. By the end of the year, there were 121 banks, including many of the world's largest, operating in Hong Kong with full banking licenses. In addition, 351 registered Deposit Taking Companies continued to expand their regional and international financial services. The overall scale of banking and other financial transactions in 1981 place Hong Kong immediately after London and New York as a financial centre. The free market and low tax policies followed in Hong Kong give the territory an advantageous position for further growth in this sector.

The establishment of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) in January 1971 was a milestone in the history of financial and monetary development in Singapore. The strategy in future would be to build on the existing infrastructure and to improve the capital market and related activities such as portfolio management. It is intended to develop Singapore as an international funds management centre.

The MAS has encouraged the entry of reputable financial institutions from a wide geographical area offering sophisticated financial services. These institutions have contributed significantly to the development of the domestic money, gold, and foreign exchange markets, and the Asian dollar and bond markets. The MAS promotes conditions for further expansion of these markets.

Singapore has an advantageous position in world time zones. Singapore is 7½ hours ahead of Greenwich Mean Time and has a working day overlapping that of Europe and Asian financial centres.

Figures at end June 1981 show that of the 103 commercial banks, 13 are local banks and the rest foreign. Of the 103, 37 have full banking licences, 13 restricted banking licences and 53 offshore banking licences.

At end June 1981, there were 48 representative offices of foreign banks. There were, in addition, four representative offices of merchant banks. There were 39 merchant banks in Singapore, of which 34 are also operating in the Asian Dollar Market.

The Asian Currency Unit is a separate accounting unit of banks and other financial institutions given approval to transact in the Asian Dollar Market.

The growth of Singapore as a financial centre is based on the experience of centres in America and Europe. The Foreign Exchange and Money Market Practices Committee, set up in 1974, published a guide in 1979 laying a common standard and code for professional conduct and trading practices in the market. Other developments in 1979 included a reduction in brokerage rates on spot and outright forward deals in third currencies and the introduction of direct dealing. The Telecommunication Authority of Singapore reduced telex and telephone charges by 30 per cent in 1979.

The development of the foreign exchange and Asian dollar markets in Singapore in a form based on the London foreign exchange and Eurocurrency markets commenced in 1968. Only a small foreign exchange market existed prior to this date.

The Asian dollar market is geared essentially to external markets with the basic purpose of channelling to Singapore deposits of US dollars and other convertible currencies to fund productive investments in Asia. The bulk of funds in the market consists of US dollars, but there is an increasing participation in other hard currencies, notably the Deutschmark, Swiss franc, and Japanese Yen.

The region had no financial centres at the start of the 1960s but now has four. Singapore, followed by Hong Kong, Tokyo, and more recently, Manila.

In its efforts to promote Singapore as an international financial centre, the Government has encouraged the establishment of the Asian dollar market. Certain banks operating in Singapore are authorised to accept deposits and make loans in United States dollars and certain other specified currencies. The participating banks are required to maintain separate accounting units called the 'Asian Currency Units' (ACU) to handle these transactions.

A complementary relationship exists between Singapore and Hong Kong. The former provides the main inter-bank money market for the region through the Asian dollar market, with Hong Kong taking the lead as a centre for commercial loans.

Singapore's money market links with Hong Kong and Bahrain are fostered by Singapore's strategic geographical location and a time zone in

which business hours in the three centres partly overlap. Over the years, the Asian dollar market has experienced an active and increasing two-way transaction with Hong Kong and Bahrain.

Since August 1973, dealings in the gold market have been completely liberalised. The Gold Exchange of Singapore started trading on 22 November, 1978. The Exchange is the first in the Asia-Pacific region to have a comprehensive gold futures market open to international investors.

Number of Banks, by Nationality

(at the end of month)

	Hong Kong (banks)		Singapore (commercial banks handling ACUs)	
	Dec. '76	Feb. '80	June '76	Feb. '80
Local banks	21	21	6	7
American banks	9	25	22	25
European banks	12	30	15	22
Asian banks	19	26	12	19
(of which, Japanese banks)	(3)	(5)	(6)	(10)
Chinese banks	13	13	0	1
Total	74	115	55	74

Source: The Bank of Japan. Special Paper No. 88, August 1980, page 3.

Hong Kong developed into an international financial centre in the 1970s. Excellent infrastructure together with unrestricted currency movement and a simple low-rate tax system made it possible to build and expand an international financial centre in the Colony. The development was furthered by rapid economic growth based on trade and industry. The most important factor was freedom of movement for capital and money.

The importance of Hong Kong as an international financial centre is highlighted by the number of its financial institutions. At the end of 1981 there were 123 authorised banks, comprising 34 banks registered or domiciled in Hong Kong, 20 US banks, 6 Canadian, 27 European and 36 Japanese or other Asian banks. In addition, there were 123 representative offices of foreign financial institutions and 349 merchant banks and finance companies grouped under the general classification of 'deposit-taking companies' (DTC's). At the end of 1980 the combined assets of banks and DTC's amounted to HK$ 435 billion, of which 56.2 per cent was denominated in foreign currencies.

During the 1970s, Hong Kong became the centre for syndicated loans and at the same time an active market for currencies and deposits was developed. Trading in third country currencies assumed growing importance.

A market developed for international loans in the latter half of the 1970s and certificates of deposit were introduced as a local refinancing instrument. Ancillary services, particularly for legal advice, are better developed in Hong Kong than in Singapore.

Hong Kong is without a central bank, which makes it difficult for the government to impose an effective monetary policy. Hong Kong dollar interest rates are one of the few monetary factors which are not left to the free play of the market. They are fixed in consultation between the government and the Hong Kong Association of Banks. A restrictive monetary policy operating through interest rates carries the risk that high rates would discourage investment rather than restrain the growth in money supply. Banking interests are advocating the introduction of other instruments such as short-term money market paper or minimum reserves.

Hong Kong and Singapore have grown steadily throughout the 1970s as free international financial markets. The economic progress of the Far East will only be possible with the help of foreign capital and the services of Hong Kong as a financial centre will continue to be in demand.

Hong Kong and Singapore markets have been strengthening relations with the Asian developing countries, with local finance in Hong Kong and Singapore itself, and with China. These two markets will continue to develop in the future as regional financial centres.

China's Law on Joint Ventures, enacted in July 1979, aims at introduction of foreign currencies through the establishment of joint ventures. In October 1979, China International Trust and Investment Corporation (head office in Peking) started to operate in conformity with it, through its Hong Kong office. The Bank of China decided, in April 1980, to establish two Deposit-taking Companies as international joint ventures with Japanese foreign exchange banks and US banks. Since May 1979, the Bank of China also participated in the field of fund employment in international loans syndicated in Hong Kong and other areas.

In Hong Kong, the authorities are giving more consideration to the maintenance of market order. The Singapore Monetary Authority is undertaking the task of fostering a secondary market for bonds and in attempting to create a BA market, in co-operation with other ASEAN countries, aimed at the expansion of intra-regional trade.

REFERENCE MATERIAL

The Bank of Japan: Development of International Financial Markets in Hong Kong and Singapore. Special Paper No. 88, August 1980.

The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, Swire House, Hong Kong. Annual Report for 1981.

Singapore International Chamber of Commerce: Investor's Guide to the Economic Climate of Singapore. July 1981.

McMahon, C. W., Deputy Governor of the Bank of England. Lecture given to the Institute of Bankers in Bristol. 23 November, 1982.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore, Economics Department, Singapore.

Swiss Bank Corporation: Prospect 1982.

[B. Narpati is a financial journalist. Since the mid-1970s he has visited several countries for compiling a treatise on international finance.]

INSIDE EUROPE

by Hugh Dykes, M.P.

RECENT events between the Member-States have placed a strain on relations within the Community and have once again raised the question of benefits of membership. In the Labour Party's *New Hope for Britain*, published earlier in 1983, they state that the Community 'was never devised to suit us and our experience as a member of it has made it more difficult for us to deal with our economic and industrial problems.' They claim that membership has interfered with their commitment to international policy and radical, socialist solutions for the ailing British economy; and that the Treaty of Rome has harmed growth and full employment policies as well as industrial, trade, overseas development and pricing policies. For these reasons they wish to withdraw from what has been termed, 'the noose'.

Labour's original opposition was based on budgetary, food costs and sovereignty claims. They proposed what has been termed an alternative economic strategy put forth by Cambridge economists. In this they suggest a halt to de-industrialisation by reflation and interventionalist industrial policies combined with severe import controls. They hope to avoid a balance of payments crisis and expand into new areas for the purpose of creating jobs by regulating the direct flow of overseas investment and restoring exchange controls.

As far as Agricultural Policy is concerned, they feel the United Kingdom should pursue a national policy much like the 'deficiency payment system' in practice before 1973; a system that would cost as much if not more than the current Common Agricultural Policy adopted by all Member-States in the EEC, thus, returning the burden of agricultural support to the taxpayer and differentiating between social and agricultural needs of rural communities and renewed negotiation of preferential agreements with Third World countries.

True, there are difficulties arising from co-operation amongst EEC countries. But the growth of supranational institutions as well as the actual dilution that accompanies enlargement both send out encouraging signs of reforms within the structure of the EEC, at one and the same time.

Looking at a short catalogue of benefits derived by membership, one must see the dramatic increase in exports to EEC countries. From 1973-1982 the total has risen 560% (in dollar terms), but non-EEC countries have only seen a 290% increase (in dollar terms) and two and one half million jobs are directly related to those exports. There has also been a positive boon of foreign investment in the United Kingdom. It has increased by 21.5% as the United States and Japan seek to launch their bids to win the Continental market. Numerous other improvements, in the choice and quality of consumer durables, health care, industrial training schemes (the EEC is paying for 15% of the Youth Training Scheme),

long-term energy projects such as the 'Jet Project' in Oxfordshire, are all the direct result of co-operation and exchange within the Community.

For some time now there has been a major dispute over the Common Agricultural Policy and its relation to Britain. Article 39 of the Treaty expounds its tenets to be: 'increased productivity through technological progress and the best use of all factors of production, in particular, manpower; a fair income for the farming population; the stabilisation of markets; security of supply and reasonable prices to consumers. Most of what is now known as the CAP is Commission decisions in the post-Treaty period and as such run the danger of not following original aims closely.

Britain has become more self-sufficient since her membership. In 1972, she produced just 65% of her cereal needs, this has been increased to 96%. Other substantial increases in beef/veal, sugar and butter production are also attributed to CAP payments to British farmers. These payments are set by the Council, according to what farmers should get on the open market during certain times of the year. They also fix threshold prices for items imported into the Community, set up so as to not undercut EEC farm prices to British farmers.

Some critics have concentrated on the excess production of butter—the butter mountains that have been created by this form of price support system. In actuality the once plentiful mountain of 200,000 tonnes of public butter was earlier this year as low as 54,000 tonnes, or a three-day supply for the Community. And the remainder is in the process of being sold to nations that require butter, as they have not been blessed with a 2.6% increase in dairy production (in 1982-83 alone).

I refer to the EEC vs. New Zealand—Britain vs. USSR butter import-export quarrels. Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and its associations with the crises in Poland, the EEC Commission decided to accept the United States' resolutions for economic sanctions in the form of food stuff embargoes (i.e. butter and grain sales). Over the past several years the Soviet Union has become the second largest importer of New Zealand butter after the United Kingdom, because of this 18-month embargo. According to the *Accounts of the New Zealand Dairy Board*, for the year 1981-82, ending in June 1982, New Zealand exported 51,850 tonnes of butter to the Soviets.

Seeing the lucrative market lost by the implementation of the embargo and spurred on by the loosening of the grain embargo in the United States, with a strong indication that they might attempt to 'launder' some of their huge butter excesses through New Zealand, the Commission decided to resume EEC butter sales. West Germany and the United Kingdom both objected to this plan as it would mean that excess EEC butter would be sold to the Soviet Union at below cost to their domestic markets. Britain led the attack as it was immoral and an outrage to EEC households. The French, the Republic of Ireland and the Italian Government said they would block a permanent agreement on preferential import rates for the entry of New Zealand butter into the United Kingdom

if the British would not co-operate in the resumption of sales to Moscow. The amount proposed was 56,000 tonnes, just about the size of the market New Zealand has carved for itself during the embargo!

The subsequent decisions on the matter were in line with the British Government's desire not to subsidise EEC surpluses any more than necessary to depreciate the excess. The Commission decided to open the market and release 25,000 tonnes of butter, with strict control over pricing and timing as they wished to avoid friction between the United Kingdom, West Germany and other Member-States. The French, however, held the British responsible for the stiff terms and the lack of sales of surpluses and blocked the implementation of the previously agreed upon United Kingdom-New Zealand butter importation agreement (October 1982), except on a monthly basis.

In March of this year this rift was abruptly settled. The Commission decided to go ahead with butter sales to the Soviet Union, in spite of continued opposition by the United Kingdom, West Germany and the European Parliament. Thus, the United Kingdom can now import 65,250 tonnes of butter from New Zealand, between 1 April and 31 December 1983, this being the remainder of the 87,000 tonnes quota from last October, and the Soviet Union will be able to draw on two competing markets to fill their ever-increasing need.

The Community Budget and Britain's contribution towards its sum has also been the subject of much well-founded concern. But recent developments have seemed to alleviate most of the present disparities while the Community searches for an equitable long-term solution. Community finance, at the moment, is derived through a series of quite complicated systems of 'own resources'. This means that agricultural levies, sugar levies, customs duties and a uniform 1% Value Added Tax (VAT) base have provided revenue for the past twelve years. In 1979, the earlier budgetary entry terms began to buckle. The seven-year period of modest contributions and the envisaged proportional contributory scheme was still under discussion and the free trade allowances for British industry did not cover excess budgetary contributions.

In 1980, Mrs. Thatcher's Government campaigned very heavily to reduce the inordinate payment burden placed on the United Kingdom, as a major importer of non-Community goods with a small agricultural base, negatively affecting budget contributions. The Council of Ministers invoked the *30 May Mandate*. This is a three-year formula whereby the United Kingdom was/is to reclaim refunds totalling about £1,500m for 1980 and 1981. This was reluctantly extended for 1982, totalling £490m with a clause to refund more if net contribution should be more than projected. This was implemented on the understanding that a reconstruction of budgetary resources would take place. The negotiated refunds have been returning to Britain in the form of public investment categories or 'supplementary measures' in the North, Northwest, Yorkshire, Humberside, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. These investments are pursuant to the improvement of trunk roads, rail links, sewerage, tele-

communications and housing. The latest rebate is of the same order, and is yet further progress along a difficult road.

Last year, the Thorn-Tindemans compromise was introduced. Their four-part plan included the following:

(1) Part of the net British Contribution to the EEC budget would be repaid for five years.

(2) For the first three years—1982, 1983 and 1984—the rebate would be fixed in advance and would be based on the difference between British receipts from EEC spending policies and its share of Community GDP in 1981.

(3) A further adjustment would be made to reflect variations in the gross payments to the EEC.

(4) For the last two years, 1985 and 1986, the size of rebates would be decided by a unanimous vote of the Council of Ministers based on a proposal by the Commission.

It sounded plausible but the French Government refused to negotiate on these terms. And a temporary solution was found for 1982, an extension of previous contracts. The rebates of £490m would be made payable in the first quarter of 1983, thus making the net 1982 contribution £390m. A disappointing settlement after a 75% rebate over a three-year period, and a pledge by the Ministers to make a permanent solution known by the end of November 1982.

Other suggestions have been introduced since this time. In the Commission's paper entitled *The Future Financing of the Community* of 4 February 1983, possible sources of increased general revenue are discussed. Such things as a lifting of the 1% ceiling on VAT. It has such a large and reliable 'audience'. Since it is consumer's tax it would grow over a period of time in proportion to the GDP and is less subject to evasion than other forms of taxation. The introduction of progressivity into revenue systems also means Member-States with an above average wealth would have an increased tax burden as those with a lower GDP would be expected to contribute less, something this Government has been pressing for years. In relation to the CAP Budget, a new calculation of resources in relation to overall production would be taken into account.

The latest plans from Brussels, announced in May of this year, followed most of the above recommendations. The Agricultural Sector would receive progressively less and less from an enlarged Community Budget. The scheme promises to reduce Britain's budget contributions by 10% and increase non-agricultural interests specifically for Britain, to avoid more rebate payments. The three main points revolve around: (1) A 33% share of budgetary contributions to be earmarked for Agricultural purposes and these to be disbursed on the basis of agricultural production, GDP per head of population and individual contributions to the net operating surplus, (2) The VAT is to be increased by 0.4% to 1.4% but this awaits a majority vote in the European Parliament, (3) A tax based on non-industrial energy consumption. True, these are outline proposals only, but the EEC should finally approve these substantial reforms next

year and permit the anti-EEC brigade to pack it in finally and go home.

Admittedly there are problems in any institution of international co-operation, and the EEC is no exception. But withdrawal poses far more drastic effects than any of its policies could ever have. Living standards would decrease, protectionist tariffs reappear, the new southern democracies (Spain, Portugal and Greece) could weaken and it might strike an irreparable blow to the Atlantic Alliance, indirectly speaking.

A final note on the basic value of the EEC, especially in Britain's time of need. During the Falklands War, the French were extremely helpful to the UK. They embargoed 12 Etendard fighters that remained undelivered to the Argentine from a previous order. The entire European Economic Community condemned the invasion of the islands on 2 April 1982 and joined with the United Nations on 10 April in calling for the implementation of Resolution 502. They announced a ban on all imports and exports to Argentina as well as an arms embargo (excluding prepaid contractual obligations); thus effectively suspending the system of generalised preferences and export credits so heavily used by Argentina. It was a far more unified and positive response than that which was forthcoming from the United States. Actions by a united Community that still believes in the tenets of the Treaty of Rome and the value of European integration must not be lightly brushed aside, even if there are still a few 'wrinkles' to be smoothed away.

[Hugh Dykes has been Conservative Member of Parliament for Harrow East since 1970: PPS to three Parliamentary Under-Secretaries for Defence: and member for the European Parliament at Strasbourg from 1971.]

VIOLATING SALT II

by Adam M. Garfinkle

THE Reagan Administration has been in a dilemma over how to react to a probable Soviet violation of the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Tests of Soviet missiles on February 8, May 5 and 30 of this year may have violated the ICBM modernisation/new type provisions of the treaty, the ban on telemetry encryption for those aspects of testing related to the verification of the Treaty, or both.[1]

Here is the dilemma in simple form. If the Administration makes no formal accusations in public, but rather takes the complaint to the Standing Consultative Committee set up in 1972 to handle such issues, then we are likely to have a repeat performance of dozens of doleful past experiences. It goes like this: (1) we note a Soviet Treaty violation and they deny it or invent a US violation to 'trade off'; (2) we offer evidence, they claim it is inconclusive or fabricated; (3) we insist they reverse the violation, they deny the violation; (4) we insist on our perspective, they insist on theirs, we eventually see the futility of the exercise and, in the end, *nothing happens.* This is what Ambassador Paul Nitze referred to in 1979 when he admitted in Senate testimony that there were no unresolved issues before the SCC because 'they were resolved by accepting what was done in violation.'[2]

But if, on the other hand, the Administration makes an open diplomatic dispute out of the violation, it will be accused of cynical manipulation of a sensitive issue in order to influence Congress and public opinion on the FY1984 budget, the 'freeze' resolution before the House of Representatives and the Senate, the future of the MX missile in the aftermath of the Scowcroft Commission report,[3] and the Administration's go-slow approach to the two sets of US-Soviet negotiations in Geneva. Another pitfall of going public is that in order to make an open case for US contentions, we will have to reveal aspects of what we know about Soviet programmes, and by implication, how we know them.[4] This violates common sense in intelligence work, where it is prudent to keep the other side guessing about what you can do. Finally, as President Reagan let on in his April 22 news conference, we do not have courthouse tight evidence of violations because there were 'loopholes' in the treaties.[5] Clearly, there is nothing to be gained by going public only to be rebuffed by a pestilence of lawyers —Soviet and American.

After the President's news conference of April 22, and a flurry of public comment over the dilemma,[6] the United States took the issue to the SCC but without explicitly charging the Soviets with a violation. According to Administration sources, this polite demarche was followed by higher level representation: Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam went directly to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and told him that American data indicated violations. According to Hedrick Smith's version of events in the *New York Times,* Dam asked for a rapid Soviet reply.[7] Evidently the Soviets

were silent until May 5, when they again violated the terms of the Treaty with another test. Some American officials are concerned that this test was meant as the Soviet 'reply.'

Indeed, there were loopholes in the Treaty; and the present dilemma over the February 8, May 5 and 30 tests is especially illustrative of one of the worst of SALT II's many flaws. It arises from the conjunction of two American concessions in the SALT II negotiations that are bad enough by themselves, but that together represent a disaster for the otherwise marginal usefulness of the Treaty. The first concession concerns the modernisation and 'one-new-type' ICBM limits written into the Treaty in Article IV, and the second concerns telemetry encryption of ICBM test flights, written into Article XV, Paragraph Three, Second Common Understanding.

Article IV of the SALT II Treaty allows each side one new type of ICBM during the duration of the Treaty—i.e., until 1985. This new type could be mobile, it could be MIRVed up to ten warheads per launcher, but it could not be a heavy missile like the Soviet SS-18. In addition to the one new type provision, each side could modernise its ICBMs, but within certain (broad) limits. Old ICBMs could be made a bit larger; the Treaty allows increases in length, diameter, launch-weight and throw-weight of up to 5 per cent. Thus 'light' ICBMs could not be turned into 'heavy' ICBMs, could not be made mobile, could not be made to carry more warheads by additional fractionation, and could not be changed from liquid to solid fuelled. Despite these restrictions, quite a lot could be done to an old missile to improve it. Improvements without limit could be made in a missile's reliability, connectivity, accuracy, and warhead yield. A missile's propellant could be improved as well. This means that, in effect, the Treaty allows for improvements that could enlarge the useful range of a missile, giving Soviet forces as a whole a much larger and more flexible footprint. It also means that the effective throwweight of a missile could be improved without adding to its launch-weight. And, finally, it means that a countervalue-capable weapon could be transformed into a counterforce-capable weapon, all without violating the Treaty.[8]

The Carter Administration argued that the restrictions on the Soviet ICBM programme were important because of their absence, the Soviet threat might be even worse. But this argument was spurious, as Senator Jackson and others pointed out. Given the lead-times involved in developing an ICBM and the fact that the Treaty was to expire in 1985, the Soviets would not be capable of doing more than they were already planning, and that was to deploy their fifth generation of ICBMs. The modernisation limits are meaningful only to the extent that they affect Soviet building programmes within the timeframe of the Treaty; the Politburo cannot simply call up the missile factory and say: 'Hey, Serge, make it four times larger, and I need it in six months.' The evidence is that the Soviets, having acquired megatonnage and throwweight advantages in the early 1970s, planned to work on accuracy and reliability anyway, precisely those things permitted under the Treaty. In other

words, the Soviets negotiated around their strategic building programme, they did not build around their negotiating programme as is more the American style in these matters.

Not only are the modernisation limits meaningless in practice (as are, by the way, the fractionation limits[9]), they are also impossible to verify, and this brings us to the second aspect of the 'loophole' currently under investigation—the encryption provision. Telemetry is the radio-signal that missiles can be made to emit in flight in order to allow those on the ground to monitor the test. Soviet missile telemetry is also a major source of US information on the characteristics (but not the number) of Soviet ICBMs. From an analysis of a series of telemetric data, we can learn about the accuracy, range, payload, fuel-type and reliability of Soviet ICBMs. The Soviets know this and so have developed techniques whereby they can encrypt, or encode, their telemetry so that we cannot interpret it. In SALT II, the Soviet Union agreed not to encrypt missile telemetry that would 'impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.' All other encryptions, presumably to keep secret aspects of ICBM characteristics not covered under SALT II, are permitted.

It does not take a great logician to see the Catch-22 implications of such an arrangement. During the 1979 Senate debate on the Treaty, a number of witnesses and Senators observed that the very information we would need to verify Treaty compliance could be the same information the Soviets would deny us; but we could not prove this because the necessary evidence would be the same that was denied us in the first place. In other words, any selective encryption provision is, in practice, a self-negating proposition.

The Carter Administration tried very hard to rebut this criticism and it did so in open session, shedding considerable light on the problem we face today. We know when encryption violates or does not violate the Treaty because we can match our data from new tests against that of many previous tests and see if any important information is missing. If it is, then there has been a violation, if not, then there is no violation. In other words, we judge by what we do not have, not by what we have. Administration witnesses admitted that in those situations where we have no prior data, or if a missile is tested in a totally new pattern, we could have real problems judging whether or not encrypted telemetry did or did not impede verification.[10] Obviously, this applies to totally new missiles about which we have no data, and modernised missiles tested in a new pattern. In other words, the problems apply to both aspects of Article IV, discussed above.

With respect to new missiles, it is logical that all telemetry that is encrypted be considered a violation of the Treaty. But this is not the Soviet view and, besides, the vagueness of the modernisation clauses makes distinguishing between a new and a modernised missile a complicated task.[11] With respect to modernised missiles, the Soviets can test in a new pattern, thus invalidating the usefulness of our prior data base. Since 1979, the Soviets have been encrypting nearly all their telemetry, and they have been testing old ICBMs in new patterns. Eventually, we

will have very little relevant data on Soviet ICBMs as new types gradually replace older types. This is why in reporting the February 8, 1983 test, the Administration was not even sure which provisions of SALT II the Soviets may have violated![13] We think that the Soviets violated Article IV and Article XV, but because they violated Article XV, we cannot prove they violated Article IV! Seen together, these two concessions lead to the twin conclusions that: (1) the encryption concession renders the qualitative restrictions on Soviet ICBM programmes totally meaningless; and (2) the vagueness of the modernisation clauses renders the distinction between legal and illegal encryption totally meaningless, as well.

Is there a way out of this dilemma? The beginning of wisdom would be for the Administration to respect its own campaign promises and the judgment of the Senate, which refused to ratify SALT II.[13] The Reagan Administration should stop pretending that the observance of SALT II as an executive agreement—which best describes the current understanding—serves US interests. The President's agreement to 'observe the terms of the Treaty as long as the Soviets do' was a patch of emperor's clothing from the start.[14] The Soviets may have been in violation of the aggregate ceilings on launchers since January 1, 1981. According to Article III, Paragraph 2, by that date both sides were to have reduced their total accumulation of launchers from 2,400 to 2,250. The United States was not affected by this provision since it never built up to the lower ceiling, but the Soviets were; but they have not come down to the lower number. Instead, they support a 'freeze' at current levels which would put them in permanent violation of not only the lower ceiling, but also the higher one.[15]

What the Soviets really violated on February 8, May 5 and 30 was not so much SALT II but our own wish-induced gullibility.

NOTES:

1. *The New York Times* reports the potential violations and the debate over it on April 21, pp. 1, 15, April 22, p. 6, April 23, p. 3, and May 13, p. B9.
2. The SALT II Treaty, Part 1, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 96th Congress, 1st Session, July 1979[4] and quoted in Robert Jastrow, 'Why Strategic Superiority Matters,' *Commentary*, March 1983, p. 30.
3. Senator Alan Cranston of California, among others, made this accusation. *New York Times*, April 22, p. 3.
4. The President was accused of doing this by selectively declassifying photo-intelligence data in his March 23 speech on national defense.
5. See *New York Times*, April 23, 1983. Specifically, the President said: 'If you can't get the kind of courtroom evidence you need, then you can't make the charge of violation.'
6. See, for example, the dribbling of Anne H. Cahn and James F. Leonard, 'Don't Accuse Moscow,' *New York Times*, April 26, 1983, p. A23 and Tom Wicker, 'Cheating on SALT,' *New York Times*, May 3, 1983, p. A27.
7. Hedrick Smith, 'U.S. Sees New Soviet Arms Violations,' *New York Times*, May 12, 1983, p. B9.
8. This is more or less what the United States did with Minuteman II to get the Minuteman III, a vastly more effective weapon by any measure.
9. The problem with the fractionation limits is that between 1979 and the Treaty's expiration in 1985, the Soviets would not have been *able* to go beyond 10 warheads per launcher without losing accuracy and payload to the point of making it counter-productive. The fractionation limit only becomes important after the

Treaty expires, and then it would have to be purchased anew with American concessions in the next round of negotiations.

10. See Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and Protocol Thereto (SALT II Treaty), Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st Session, Part 2, July 30, 1979, p. 475.
11. For details, see here Ambassador Nitze's formal statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in Military Implications of the Treaty..., Part 3, p. 884.
12. See *New York Times*, April 23, 1983, p. 3.
13. It is true that President Carter withdrew the Treaty from consideration before the Senate could vote on it, but this was not to punish the Soviet Union over the invasion of Afghanistan. Rather, the Carter Administration used the invasion to withdraw the Treaty because they knew they did not have the votes to pass it for ratification. In this way, they avoided embarrassment.
14. See my 'SALT and the MX: The U.S. Loses,' *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 11, 1982.
15. If Backfire bombers are counted in the Soviet total, as they ought to be, then the Soviets now have in excess of 2,400 launchers. If Backfire is not counted, then the Soviets have 2,383, still in excess of the currently binding ceiling.

[Dr. Adam M. Garfinkle is Co-ordinator for The Political Studies programme at The Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, USA.]

POLAND AND PAPAL POWER

by Martin McCauley

HAVE Polish Catholics and communists a common interest in ensuring that Moscow does not lose patience with the normalisation process and send in its troops? In other words, is the threat to Polish sovereignty so great that all Poles must bind together to reach a compromise so as to prevent such an eventuality? If the answer to these questions is yes then the Pope's recent visit to his homeland can be judged a success for both Church and State.

The rise of Solidarity in 1980-81 was the direct result of crass mismanagement of state and society by the ruling communist party, the Polish United Workers Party. Huge Western credits fuelled incompetence and corruption. The legitimacy of the communist party is based on the fact that it claims to be the avant garde of the working class, which in effect is the ruling class. The rejection by the workers of the communist party and the official trade unions introduced a new situation, not only in Poland but in Eastern Europe as well. Solidarity filled the gap and became the trade union of about 9.5 million work people. Nevertheless the communist regime did not collapse since, although its legitimacy was almost nil, it still possessed power. The latter is based on the instruments of coercion, the army and the police. They held the key to Poland's future. General Jaruzelski was able to convince the Kremlin that they were still loyal and could be relied upon to impose martial law. His judgement turned out to be correct. Had it been otherwise, a Warsaw Pact invasion would have been inevitable.

Under martial law the loyalty of the instruments of coercion to the communist party were tested to the limits, but they held firm. Jaruzelski knew that as long as this state of affairs continued the party, wearing its military uniform, could continue to rule. The Church was the natural spokesman for the banned Solidarity and would support and succour all those imprisoned and in camps.

The regime was caught between two vices, the Kremlin and the Church. It had to satisfy Moscow that normalisation was proceeding successfully since failure to do so could only mean military intervention. This was no idle threat since it is known that military intervention almost occurred on two occasions. The East Germans, especially, were keen on this option. Jaruzelski's problem was that he had power but no legitimacy. As long as the army and police stayed loyal he had room for manoeuvre. He could not speak directly to Solidarity but he had to come to some arrangement with the Church. The latter found itself in a situation where it had legitimacy in the eyes of the populace but no power.

Since in the last resort discussions with the Church meant discussions with the Pope, a lively exchange between Warsaw and Rome developed. Since the Church was in the stronger position morally it could negotiate

with some confidence. The Church could have taken a hard line and insisted on the lifting of martial law and the re-emergence of Solidarity and all it stood for. This would have put Jaruzelski in an impossible position since Moscow would not have tolerated such a move. The Church negotiated on the premise that its goal was to improve the lot of the faithful and this meant that it was willing to compromise with the State. Some hard bargaining went on before the Pope arrived in Warsaw on 16 June. He grasped the opportunity to support Solidarity and the right to form free trade unions. He met Lech Walesa and maintained that the right to organise and to civil liberties were natural rights and not conferred on the population by the communist party.

However, on closer inspection, he was, in fact, saying little that was novel. Practically everything the Pope said had previously been uttered by the former Polish Primate, Cardinal Wyszynski. Indeed, on closer inspection it may turn out that the Pope was quoting Wyszynski at length. The meeting with Walesa was scheduled to take place at the end of his tour. The Western Press made much of the indecision about when the Pope would meet Walesa but the time of the meeting had been arranged by the Vatican and Warsaw before the Pope left the Eternal City. Had the Pontiff met Walesa at the beginning or in the middle of his visit it could have sparked off scenes which would have embarrassed Church-State relations. It appears reasonable to assume that Warsaw and the Vatican have agreed that Solidarity cannot be resurrected and that its leadership will have to go back to civilian life. This means that there is no public future for Lech Walesa. What will replace Solidarity? Since the government has admitted that only 27 per cent of the working population now belong to the new official trade unions there is a great need for trade unions which are acceptable to the vast majority of workers. The more so since trade unions in communist countries administer social security payments and other welfare benefits which are the responsibility of government in Western Europe. Martial law would have to have been lifted by 22 July or shortly afterwards to allow such moves to have any chance of success.

Farmers in Poland are unwilling to trust the goodwill of the state and in the present economic climate there is little state money for investment in the countryside. Warsaw and the Vatican have been discussing a possible solution to this problem. If the Church becomes involved in the agrarian sector, private farmers would co-operate and boost output. According to Church sources a plan has been mooted to raise $2.5 billion in the West, mainly in West Germany and the United States. This money would be used to purchase mineral fertilisers and agricultural machinery for the private farmers. The sum seems reasonable given the fact that Western economists estimated that the Polish economy required about $5 billion of credits to put it on a sound basis just before martial law was imposed. If the Church becomes involved in such a deal it would require Western countries to suspend their economic sanctions which have been imposed on Poland since the declaration of martial law. It would be difficult for the West to retain sanctions if the Pope personally supported

their suspension.

What would the rural initiative involve? The Church would administer the credits together with the State and would exert considerable influence, since without its total support the flow of money from the West would dry up. In order to do so the Church would probably have to be recognised in law as a legal entity so that it could channel donations into this special rural fund. The Sejm (parliament) would need to pass the appropriate legislation. Another possibility would be for the Church to found its own bank. Involvement in agriculture could lead the Church into contact with industries connected with farming, such as food processing. The benefit to the Church is evident and would further enhance its role in the countryside where it is already very influential.

The smile on Jaruzelski's face after his second meeting with the Pope was evidence of his satisfaction with the visit and the negotiations with the Vatican. He evidently believes that thereby the regime will gain some legitimacy while the Church may have acquired just a little power. Why should the Church prop up a regime which visibly enjoys little support in the country? The main reason is that the alternative is direct Soviet intervention. Cardinal Glemp, the Polish Primate, has spoken on several occasions of the risk of Soviet military intervention if the Poles do not settle their differences. Left on its own the present regime cannot mobilise the population. The helping hand of the Church is absolutely essential.

The Pope's skills as a diplomat and politician are respected, but the decision to collaborate with an ailing communist regime may be typically Polish and comes from someone with long experience of the realities of power in an East European state. Others who have not shared this experience wonder why the Church should raise the legitimacy of a regime, the goal of which is to eliminate all Church influence. Divided counsel is evident in the Curia in Rome. The dismissal of the deputy editor, an expert in East European affairs, for stating in *L'Osservatore Romano,* the official Vatican newspaper, that Lech Walesa's career as a public figure in Poland was over reveals how split the hierarchy really is. It is inconceivable that the Pope did not have prior knowledge of the offending article before it went to the printers. The whole episode demonstrates that there is an influential minority in the Curia which doubts the wisdom of the Church's rapprochement with the Warsaw regime.

Has Jaruzelski been negotiating with the Vatican to find a Polish solution to a Polish problem so as to present it to the Kremlin for approval, or is his policy simply Moscow's policy? Given the economic and political burden that Poland has become to the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, it is evident that the Kremlin would like to find a solution to the Polish impasse. Just how far Moscow would be willing to go to reach a modus vivendi depends on the constellation of power in the ruling Politburo. Yuri Andropov has accumulated the late Leonid Brezhnev's three titles, those of Secretary General of the communist party, chairman of the Defence Council and President of the State very rapidly, but his power is more formal than real. His major opponent, Konstantin Chernenko, has

still to be defeated and the decision not to promote anyone at the June Central Committee plenum to full membership of the Politburo — which at eleven members is understaffed — was evidently a compromise between the Andropov and Chernenko factions. Since Andropov has launched a campaign against incompetent and corrupt government and party officials, Chernenko becomes the natural guardian of the threatened men. After all, when is an official incompetent and corrupt? When he can be identified as a Brezhnev man, many would say. Chernenko, of course, was a great Brezhnev man himself.

Andropov has powerful allies in Andrei Gromyko and Marshal Dimitri Ustinov. The military has been long known as advocates of a hard line solution to the Polish problem but it is not in the interests of the civilian politicians to allow the military to acquire too much influence over policy formation. Afghanistan serves as a timely reminder that a military solution to a political problem can be self-defeating. The most complex decision which the Kremlin has to make at present is what concessions to make to entice the Americans into an agreement, one which would prevent the placement of Pershing and Cruise missiles. Given the balance of power in the Politburo this will be a very difficult decision to take. Gromyko, one may assume, would like to see a solution to the Polish problem which led to the lifting of Western sanctions and allowed Poland back into the comity of nations. Soviet foreign policy would thereby benefit. A military solution for Poland would be a disaster for Soviet foreign policy and would end any hopes of agreement at Geneva and on Pershing and Cruise missiles. Hence it is reasonable to assume that Jaruzelski has some room for manoeuvre since both Moscow and Warsaw wish to reach a compromise with the Church.

The key question facing Western policy makers is: what is our objective in Poland? Is it to defuse the situation as quickly as possible, thereby promoting a rapprochement between Church and State, or is it to undermine the communist system? Should the West help to stabilise Poland, thereby strengthening the communist world? The West German government can be relied upon to choose the first option and to contribute to the stabilisation of Poland as quickly as possible. Their argument is that if one wishes to punish Moscow one should not do so at the expense of the Poles. Others may toy with the second option. If Moscow had to intervene militarily—and it would do so to sustain the communist regime in power irrespective of loss of face throughout the world since Poland touches on Soviet security—it would find itself enmeshed in a network of opposition and defiance which would impose a heavy economic burden on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Poland would become a millstone round their necks. Such an eventuality would be a severe set-back to the goals of Soviet foreign policy and concomitantly enhance Western, especially Americans, goals. The Soviet threat would have become even more real and would be a body-blow to the peace movement.

The key factor in these deliberations is the well-being of the Polish people. The population would gain most from the stabilisation of the country and would suffer grievously if the Warsaw Pact invaded.

The Conservative victory at the General Election has seen Mrs. Thatcher's defence policy vindicated. Unilateralism and the peace movement made little impact on the electorate. Hence the Prime Minister is under no pressure to revoke her decision to deploy Pershing and Cruise missiles before the end of the year. Anglo-Soviet relations were strained before the election and the mass of the electorate did not find this state of affairs abnormal or disturbing. Should Britain now keep up the pressure on the Soviet Union or enter into a dialogue with Moscow so as to improve the climate of relations? Such an improvement would include the promotion of a solution to the Polish problem.

The argument in favour of lifting economic sanctions and supporting the stabilisation of the country is that the regime cannot normalise the situation in Poland without the aid of the Church. If the Church were to play a more important role in promoting the economic and social well-being of the rural population it would be strengthened as an institution. Instead of confrontation between Church and State it is possible to conceive of them moving to the middle ground between their conflicting world views. Such an eventuality would improve life for all in Poland and would help to remove the danger of periodic explosions of anger and despair on the part of the population. Hope would again be injected into social relations. The alternative is bleak; drift, inertia, cynicism and nihilism. A viable, more self-confident Poland would be one in which Marxism-Leninism as an ideology was dead except as a facade for the power of the communist party. The Church's power would be exercised behind the scenes. Without the Church the party cannot mobilise the population to work for a better Poland. The Church and the Vatican would be justified in taking a few risks at present.

[Martin McCauley is Lecturer in Russian and Soviet institutions at The School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London. Publications include *The Soviet Union after Brezhnev* (Heinemann 1983.]

REFORMATION AND EXCOMMUNICATION

by Francis Edwards, S.J.

ALTHOUGH standard works by such distinguished professors as A. G. Dickens and G. R. Elton on the English Reformation end early in Elizabeth's reign, it was only at the beginning of this reign that the Reformation that has endured to this day really began. The acts of supremacy and uniformity, which became law on May 8, 1559, formed the basis of a church settlement which, though shaken for a time during the Interregnum of Oliver Cromwell, has never really fallen or failed. The religious aspect of the Reformation has been the subject of innumerable studies. The political aspect has not received nearly so much direct attention or been sufficiently distinguished from the religious. Certainly, the political reformation embodied principles which have been taken a little too easily for granted by English historians generally over the past few centuries.

The medieval church destroyed for heresy, committing the offender to the secular arm. But was it not, if anything, a grosser violation of human liberty to identify from then on spiritual orthodoxy with temporal loyalty so that anyone who could not swear to the royal supremacy was not only a heretic but a traitor? It is true that by the original act of supremacy.[1] It was only after a third refusal of the act that the culprit or victim experienced the dire effects of high treason. But by a further act of 5 Elizabeth Cap. 1,[2] the pains and penalties of treason were inflicted after a second refusal. It is true that the act did not intend to corrupt in blood or disinherit, and by policy of Archbishop Matthew Parker and the Queen, the oath was not to be tendered a second time before the matter was referred to the archbishop. Nevertheless, the principle of making a man's metaphysics a matter of political loyalty was clearly a retrograde step, and involved a kind of scandal which has not been sufficiently noticed by historians. The fact has been for too long too close to their noses.

It is sometimes objected that Elizabeth as a bastard could not have been recognised by the papacy while a better claimant lived, namely Mary, Queen of Scots. This is by no means true. The force of those important nine points of the law have always been recognised by the papacy, and there was no doubting the completeness of Elizabeth's possession from the very beginning of her reign. Although her orthodoxy was known in Rome as doubtful almost from the first, the popes, even the fiery Caraffa, Paul IV, behaved towards the queen with remarkable forbearance. Pius IV wrote her a letter dated from Rome, May 15, 1560, intended to be presented to her by Vincent Parpaglia on a hoped-for visit to England in 1560.[3] It was addressed 'to our most dear daughter in Christ' and expresses the papal concern for her honour and the well-being of her kingdom. She was exhorted to put aside 'bad counsellors' who did not love her 'but themselves' and served only 'their own selfish desires'. The pope assured her that he would do all in his power to ensure

'the establishment and consolidation of [her] royal dignity'. She was urged to return to the bosom of the Church. Indeed, it was hoped that she would send representatives to the Council of Trent which resumed operations on July 16, 1562, with a view to 'getting rid of heresies'. In spite of the queen's penchant for heresy, no further significant step was taken against her until the excommunication of 1570.

Meanwhile, what of the great rival? Mary, Queen of Scots' attitude, as revealed in her authentic correspondence—and authentic needs underlining—was quite straightforward. She wanted to be restored to her kingdom of Scotland. She also wanted to be recognised by Elizabeth and the English parliament as the English queen's successor in the absence of heirs of her own body. Mary consistently repudiated the idea to the day of her death that she countenanced or participated in plots to overthrow Elizabeth during her lifetime. Certainly, careful examination of the evidence—and the accent is on careful—more than suggests she was telling the truth. Appearances to the contrary seem to have been contrived by those crafty operators, Sir William Cecil and Sir Francis Walsingham. Doubtless, her last letter dated February 8, 1587, told the truth when she declared, 'The Catholic faith and the assertion of my God-given right to the English crown are the two issues on which I am condemned.'[4] The early Cecils worked always to establish not merely a régime but a revolution; to determine the course of historiography as well as the course of history.

And what of the excommunication of 1570? The subject is timely in view of its recent anniversary. Undoubtedly, it was produced in Rome in the pontificate of St Pius V and the original still bears his bulla—or did so the last time I saw it in the Vatican archives. Unfortunately, these small lead seals are sometimes cut off by unscrupulous researchers. The promulgation of the bull presents a problem. None of the princes of Europe advocated it, and the bull was smuggled into England, according to his own account, by Roberto Ridolfi, a Florentine banker, secret agent of the pope, and from November, 1569, almost certainly an agent of Sir Francis Walsingham—a double-agent in contemporary phrase. This would certainly explain why the bull was posted up on the eve of Corpus Christi, 1570, by John Felton, seemingly a bona-fide if rather misguided papist who could not have known all that he was doing. The bull came months too late to help the northern rising, although attempts were made to show that this was its main purpose. In fact, it burst upon the unsuspecting world at a time when, according to de la Mothe-Fenelon, the French ambassador, there was a crisis in the Privy Council. One day Elizabeth made it clear that she wanted a settlement that would send Mary back to Scotland—she had been a prisoner in England since 1568—and indicated her growing impatience with the policies of Cecil and his friends. The publication of the bull changed the situation for Cecil almost overnight. Incidentally, there is no reason to suppose that Elizabeth was aware of the shabbier or shadier shifts of Cecil and Walsingham to get rid of the Scottish queen, or for that matter of Thomas Howard, fourth Duke of Norfolk, a long-standing rival of Sir William,

successfully manoeuvred to his execution on June 2, 1572. With the recent publication of John Martin Robinson's *The Dukes of Norfolk*, this, too, is becoming more widely accepted as the greater historical probability.[5]

Whatever Elizabeth's government wanted contemporaries and posterity to believe, Catholics were not bound by the bull to withdraw their allegiance from the queen; although some, like the second Earl of Southampton, felt troubled in conscience, and some it seems, went abroad for conscience's sake. John Leslie, bishop-designate of Ross and Mary, Queen of Scots' ambassador, reassured the earl that 'no subject of this land should hazard himself and his estate for that cause. For it appertains to the great princes of Christendom to set forward the reformation or alteration of religion, and was sufficient to the subjects that they were constrained to obey, as the people of Israel, being in Babylon captives, and compelled to forbear the service of God. . .'[6] Robert Persons, the Jesuit, in his treatise explaining why Catholics could not take the oath of allegiance of 1606, fully upheld the papal right and indeed duty at times of excommunicating princes. But he was careful to add a proviso disposing of the common Protestant notion that if the pope deposed a monarch, his catholic subjects who remained Catholic must be ipso facto traitors. 'In case the subjects of the king would remain loyal unto him, without prejudice of their religion and conscience, and should promise or swear the same . . . there is no cause why the king should persecute his own because of the pope's deposition, neither can such deposition be any just cause of that persecution'.[7]

If King James I's oath had merely insisted that 'notwithstanding any declaration or sentence of excommunication or deprivation', the subject should promise allegiance, any Catholic could have taken it with a good conscience. This fact would not have escaped James I and his ecclesiastical advisers who, in theological matters, did not lack sophistication. The aim was, of course, to eradicate Catholicism, not to accommodate Catholics. Hence the implications of the oath which struck at the theory and principle of the papal prerogative not merely at errors presumed or real in its exercise. It is only fair to add that it was almost certainly an apostate priest and Jesuit, Sir Christopher Perkins, dismissed from the ranks of the Order on October 14, 1581, who was mainly responsible for drawing up an oath to trap the consciences of his former co-religionists; an oath 'so phrased as to give the appearance of orthodoxy'.

Like Dr. Edward Norman of Peterhouse, as it seems, a man who writes wisely on ecumenical matters, the present writer does not foresee any swift or sudden reunion of the Christian communions, not even of the Anglican and Roman Catholic. However, in the present climate of thought, which has abandoned older attitudes of entrenchment and confrontation across no man's land, progress is undoubtedly being made in revising aspects of our Reformation history. Historians are more conservative and cautious than most. This is not surprising. Their trade is, or should be, truth not expediency; and as E. L. Woodward observed nearly fifty years ago, 'you reach more quickly in history than in any

of the studies which can rightly claim the name of science the limit of demonstration'.[8] The plain fact is that the historian does not know what he is talking about—only what other people once talked, or rather wrote, about. Using one's judgment in the matter of assessing other people's truthfulness is infinitely more difficult than applying one's senses to the data of the laboratory. Small wonder progress is slow, not always certain, and with a good deal of periodical back-pedalling.

NOTES:
1. G. W. Prothero, *Select statutes . . .*, Oxford 1913, pp.1-13.
2. Ibid. pp.39-41.
3. E. Cardwell, *Documentary Annals of the Reformed C. of E. . . .*, Oxford 1844, vol. I, pp.285-7, Latin.
4. National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, 1977.
5. Oxford, 1982, See chapter 5.
6. See F. Edwards, *The Dangerous Queen*, London 1964, pp.178-9.
7. R. Persons, 'A discourse against taking the oath in England: 1606'. Stonyhurst MSS, C. Grene, Collectanea P., ff.161-174, copy or summary.
8. From 'Bias in the teaching of history at public schools', *History*, vol. 19, (1934-35), p.234.

[Fr. Edwards has been archivist to the English Province of the S.J. and one of their historians since 1959. Apart from articles in learned and less learned journals, he has published *The Dangerous Queen* (1964); and *The Marvellous Chance* (1968), standard works on the Ridolfi plot; *Guy Fawkes: the Real story of the Gunpowder Plot?* (1969); *The Gunpowder Plot: The Greenway Narrative* (1973); *The Elizabethan Jesuits* (1981). Currently he is working on a life of Fr. Robert Persons, the Elizabethan Jesuit, and hopes to have in the press shortly a history of the English Province S.J. and a revised edition of the first book on the Gunpowder Plot.]

IBSEN AND THE LOST BOHEMIA

by John Elsom

YOU have to look hard nowadays to find bohemia in Oslo. It is such a restrained city. On April 30, however, something stirred in the stone and concrete undergrowth. The maid at the Hotel Nobel warned me to keep indoors that night and my windows closed. On May the first, of course, there were going to be demonstrations and marches and union bands in the main square, but on the previous night, at midnight, as April 30 turned into May 1, the real action would happen.

The beggars were coming to town, the dissidents, the rebels, the punk rockers. In previous years, there had been riots, broken up by the police with tear gas and riot shields. The students would get drunk, and demonstration would clash with counter-demonstration, as they did in the good old days. My room at the Hotel Nobel overlooked the main square, with the parliament buildings to the left, the National Theatre to the right and beyond, along a broad avenue, the palace. I had a ringside seat for whatever might happen at midnight.

At about 11.30 police cars took up positions in the side-streets. Already knots of students and demonstrators were gathering, the outdoor cafe had prematurely refused orders, a firework may have been set off or perhaps a car back-fired. The roads were deserted and for once you could hear clearly the different *carillons* of bells chiming out the half-hour, the quarter-hour and then midnight. The student groups grew a little larger, some shouting. There were scuffles, among the demonstrators, not with the police. One band looked larger and more threatening than the others, about a dozen in number, pumping their fists up and down. They swaggered across the square as if they meant business—but when they came to a pedestrian crossing they pressed the button on the traffic lights—and waited for the lights to change.

At that point, I went to bed. A riot which stops at the traffic lights when there's no traffic around is not, by my reckoning, one of your more nerve-tingling demonstrations of revolt, not Grosvenor Square but Grosvenor Gardens. It was not exactly disappointing, for rioting cities are more commonplace these days than decent, secure, well-brought-up places like Oslo. And yet I had somehow expected to find a vein of anarchy running through Norway much as, in the imagination, the Sahara desert is filled with date palms and camels. Where were the bohemian cafes, of Munch's drawings, where anarchists and whores slump over bottles of aquavit? I had been warned against a night-club near the hotel, the Leopard, whose eyes blinked in the dusk of the street-lamps. Dangerous? Not very, an expensive disco, with a few sailors.

A hundred years ago, however, bohemia was alive in Christiania, the old name for Oslo and, if not exactly well, for bohemians by definition are never well, radiated a vital sickliness. It was a nation within a nation, a small café enclave, which exerted an influence beyond its numbers. It

issued its manifestos, its oaths of allegiance, even its Nine Commandments, printed in the last issue of *The Impressionist*, which began 'Thou Shalt Write Thine Autobiography' and 'Thou Shalt sever thy family ties' and ended with 'Thou Shalt Take Thine Own Life.' It suffered persecution and censorship, retorted by shocking the not-so-silent majority into cries of outrage, went to prison, escaped, set up communes elsewhere, read the Paris papers and finally, when its energy gave way, slid, bright eyes still shining, into any premature graves which could be found.

Ibsen knew all about the bohemia in Christiania. His Eilert Løvborg in *Hedda Gabler* would have lived there in the mad, young days, escaping from time to time to tell Hedda what it was like to have vine leaves in your hair. When the pace grew too much for him, Løvborg ran away into the remote northern districts of Norway, setting up as a tutor in the family of a circuit judge, which was where he met, for better or worse, his Solveig, Mrs. Elvsted. When that little spell of reformism petered out, he returned for one last spree to bohemia, and killed himself against the rules, not by design but accident.

Løvborg was a prophet at a time when all good bohemians were prophets. They were heady with science and rebellion, with art and demolition. To reach the heights, they had to plumb the depths: it was *de rigueur*. If you didn't experience that switchback between two extremes, you had sold out to bourgeois contentment. Marriage was one of their deadly sins. 'Love descends,' as Hans Jaeger pointed out, rather often, in *From the Christiana Boheme* (1885), 'descends like a bird of prey'; and before tearing out your vitals, it lifted you up into the high mountains and the soaring regions of the upper air. But the one thing which you shouldn't do with a pitiless eagle is to marry it.

Løvborg wasn't the only bohemian to shoot himself accidentally on purpose. The painter, Edvard Munch, did so in an argument with his mistress, who appears, tall, poised and sinister, in so many of his early drawings and paintings. She was his model for Hedda Gabler; and in his series of paintings, variously depicting *The Woman in Three Stages* (1894) —the stages being the Virgin, the Wanton and the Woman in Black—she appears as the last stage, next to a tree behind which stands the Artist, eyes staring with the anguish of it all, one hand bleeding.

In the magnificent Munch Gallery and Museum in Oslo, there are paintings and drawings from all the periods of Munch's life, which spanned eighty-one years. He died in 1944. From that majestic collection, whose range and assurance can only be compared among the moderns to Picasso's, only the work of his bohemian phase is widely known in Britain. When we think of Munch, we think of bohemian anguish, of loneliness and despair, of *The Howl* and *Vampire*, of the artist bleeding on his truckle bed. His more lyrical paintings are forgotten, together with those vast murals depicting the sun rising or setting over mountains, which are not simply mountains, but panoramas of life itself.

This popular concentration on ten, perhaps fifteen years, of Munch's long creative life illustrates the fascination which Christiania's bohemia

held for the rest of Europe. Munch's paintings shocked the German establishment in the early 1890s and led to a formal break in the *Artists' Association* between the traditionalists and the later secessionists. The traditionalists, who believed that all art should be morally uplifting and technically 'correct,' refused to believe that Munch was an artist at all. He was simply a decadent masquerading as an artist. But the secessionists, who eventually formed their own 'Free Association of Berlin Artists,' were equally vigorous in Munch's defence. The painter, Walter Leistikow, writing in the *Freie Bühne* in 1892, described as one 'who can tell, paint, sing such things, has a poet's disposition, who looks at the world, which he loves, with a poet's eyes. But great poets and painters are seldom understood at first, seldom honoured. They can be glad if they are not shown the door and politely thrown out, like Mr. Munch.'

The unlikeliness of this impact can be appreciated if we remember that, in 1891, Christiania was a small provincial city, on the outer fringes of Europe, with a population of about 150,000. Norway itself was not a fully independent country, but linked with Sweden in a loose federation under the Swedish crown. Although Christiania was the capital of Norway and contained its only university, as well as its parliament or *Storthing*, it was, numerically speaking, about half the size of Belfast in those days, a tenth of the size of Berlin, a twentieth of Paris and a fortieth of London.

It is extraordinary that the influence of this small town, with an obscure native language—or languages, should have spread around Europe and that its theatre should control, through Ibsen, the European *avant-garde*. The Scandinavian approach dominated much discussion about political and social issues of the day. Its painters, like Munch, were prized, its poets and philosophers admired if left untranslated; and Scandinavia was in fashion. The source of that intellectual energy came from its despised bohemia.

This statement, however, needs to be qualified, for the man most responsible for that influence, Henrik Ibsen, was not a bohemian, had lived abroad for twenty-seven years until he returned to Christiania in 1891, whose name was glibly linked with causes (like feminism) which he did not wholly espouse and who, in any case, was not specifically associated with Christiania but with Scandinavia as a whole. Although Ibsen was a more profound writer than August Strindberg, his Swedish rival, their two names were indissolubly linked, in Oliver Lyttelton's phrase, with 'that gloomy Scandinavian penumbra.' Lyttelton, a member of Churchill's war cabinet and the first chairman of our National Theatre, had a fine disregard of the nuances of geography as well as literature: he added Chekhov's name to his Scandinavian list.

Nor was Christiania the only Scandinavian city to have its bohemia. Stockholm had one too, described in Strindberg's *The Red Room*, as did other self-respecting Lutheran towns. Bohemia in those days was not so much a country as a roving *zeitgeist*, far removed from the basin of the Elbe where it was marked on the maps as a kingdom in the Austro-Hungarian empire. Paris had its bohemian quarter, as did London; but of

all the bohemias which drifted from place to place, and grubbed up the price of a drink wherever it could, that of Christiania persists in the imagination—not just because Munch lived there and Ibsen wrote about it, but because with a Norwegian determination, it was also the most categoric and extreme. Paris for the most part tolerated its bohemians, London ignored them and looked the other way; but in Christiania, the contrast between Lutheran dourness and bohemian wildness was sharp, categoric and brooked no attempts at compromise.

Ibsen never wrote directly about bohemia. He was not like Christian Krohg, Munch's friend, a 'low-life writer.' But throughout Ibsen's criticism of small-town hypocrisies, of marriage and religious oppression, the themes of bohemia are continually expressed. Much has been made in theatre criticism of the way in which Ibsen anticipated Freud, of the two sides to his nature represented by the hedonist liar Peer Gynt and the severe pastor Brand, of the curious mystery to Hedda's character and of his knowledge of Norwegian history and legend. But the forgotten contrast is between bohemia and what was later to be called suburbia. When Hedda urges Eilert to kill himself nobly, she is echoing the ninth commandment in *The Impressionist*. When she listens to Eilert's dramatic stories as to what is happening on the darker side of the town, she is hearing tales from the red rooms, dominated in *Hedda Gabler* by the singer and temptress, Mam'zelle Diane.

In *Ghosts*, the verdict on the dead Captain Alving's character is decidedly ambiguous. For much of the play, Captain Alving is treated as a vicious degenerate, whose disease Oswald has inherited. But when, in Act Three, Mrs. Alving is called to give an explanation as to why the Captain behaved as he did, she does so in terms which seem decidedly generous—'What exuberant strength and vitality there was in him!', '. . . a child of joy, for he was a child at the time, he had to live here at home in a half-grown town, which had no joys to offer him, only dissipations' . . . 'Your poor father found no outlet for the overpowering joy of life that was in him. And I brought no brightness into his home . . . '

The central point, made consistently in Ibsen's middle-period, naturalistic plays and in his later plays as well, is that bourgeois family life offers no opportunity for the aspirations of men and women, both physical and spiritual, to express themselves. But repressing these aspirations leads to minor disasters and ultimately to tragedy. The condescending treatment handed out to Nora in *The Doll's House*, the boredom of Hedda, the degeneracy of Captain Alving and the hopeless loneliness of Mrs. Alving, the guilt of the Master Builder all stem from the attempts to preserve bourgeois domesticity, reinforced by religious injunction. This was also the main theme of the bohemians, with their commands to sever family ties, to be true to one's own character and nature, whatever the cost, and to plunge fully into the maelstrom of living.

The connection between Ibsen and the bohemians can be made in other ways. Ibsen's naturalism, for example, is not what it seems. He was a genius at persuading his audiences to believe that they were watching

slices from everyday life. The English actress, Elizabeth Robins, one of the first Ibsen interpreters in Britain, recorded her impressions of the first performance of *A Doll's House* in London: ' . . . the unstagey effect of the play made it to eyes that first saw it in '89, less like a play than a personal meeting . . . ' Desmond McCarthy, writing forty years later, praised Ibsen's plays in these terms. 'The greatest triumph of the modern dramatist is to achieve three things at once: to compose a story perfectly logic-tight and convincing about real people; to conduct it so that it will suggest general ideas of practical interest; and, lastly, leave us with the feeling that we, for a while, have shared with a mind greater than our own the privilege of thinking and feeling down into the very roots of life. That is why Ibsen's plays remain thrilling . . . '

But Ibsen's naturalism nowadays seems decidedly un-naturalistic, his logic far from watertight and although his emotional power remains undiminished, there is an extremity about the feelings expressed which continually verges on melodrama. This is partly because Ibsen's dramatic technique, so perfectly organised, so *intentional*, was often at odds with what he was trying to say. He was a master at finding back-door methods of getting his non-naturalistic points across. He used the imagery of everyday objects as a symbolic language, so that, for example, Hedda's father fixation is expressed by General Gabler's portrait in her inner room, her coldness by the dim, milk-coloured globes which light that room, her hatred of being a woman and longing to be a man by the pistols which she waves around, and so on, to the more extreme expressions of underlying feelings, such as the stove into whose furnace she plunges Eilert Løvborg and Mrs. Elvsted's 'baby,' the manuscript of *The History of the Future*.

Just as Munch takes everyday images and heightens them into nightmarish expressions of neurotic emotions, so Ibsen, a minor painter himself, draws discreet and sometimes not so discreet attention to the dream-like quality of domestic life, seeking a bohemian interpretation of objects which, under normal circumstances, would seem not to be bohemian at all, but the essence of bourgeois stability. Ibsen, like Munch, was drawn towards symbolism, impressionism and that underlying anarchy which the bohemians expressed so well and took as their way of life.

But how can modern Oslo, where rioters stop at traffic lights, accommodate its bohemian past? And are bohemias anachronistic in such a welfare state? In Norway, they still have censorship, directed now towards snuff videos; and although Norwegians for the most part accept censorship and believe that it does no harm, a Swedish critic delighted in telling me that they had banned *The Life of Brian*, the Monty Python film. Has suburbia conquered? The video films offered in my hotel in Bergen were, unlike any in-hotel videos throughout Britain or the States, morally impeccable—three concerned with coping with sickness (cancer, mainly) and the fourth with old age and death. In Norway, as to a lesser extent in Sweden, you cannot avoid expressions of social concern about everything: the banners in the May Day parade espoused every good cause going—from 'Hands Off Nicaragua' to 'crèches for Laplanders.' But in winter, when

the sun shines over the snowclad mountains, or in the spring, when the snows melt and you can start to feel the warmth of the summer sun, the Norwegians take to the hills and the depths of the countryside, avid skiers, determined joggers, ardent for every means to shed the squalor of urban custom. That is the way, I suspect, in which the new bohemians seek to plunge into life and conquer the unknown, through an excess of exercise.

Well, that was Baden-Powell's remedy, too, and very good as far as it goes; but I was rather relieved on my last night in Oslo, to discover a basement café where they served drinks after midnight, and actually sat and talked, and embraced one another, and made love in discreet corners, and blew up Washington and Brussels in their imaginations, and laughed Brecht to scorn, and cried into their beers. I will not say where it was. It would be like revealing the nests of the last peregrine falcons.

The October issue of *Contemporary Review* includes: *Spain at the Threshold of Europe*, by E. Moxon-Browne; *India and Britain: More than a Marriage of Convenience*, by Sir John Lawrence; *What After Kreisky?*, by Hari Stajner (held over from the September issue); and *The View from Stirling Bridge*, by Tom Lannon.

MRS. THATCHER'S NORTH BRITONS

by R. D. Kernohan

NO one knows how much trouble Scotland is going to give Mrs. Thatcher in her second term. In 1983, as in 1979, Scotland voted against the Conservatives. It opted out of Mrs. Thatcher's landslide as it had opted out of her first victory—and, for that matter, as it had failed to welcome Edward Heath in 1970 and even to agree heartily in Harold Macmillan's golden age that the country had never had it so good.

The only Conservative Premier since the war to win a majority of Scottish votes and seats was (improbably enough) Sir Anthony Eden in 1955. But that was when traditional heavy industries still flourished, both Liberalism and Nationalism were at a low ebb, and the Labour Party was moving placidly from the Attlee era to the Gaitskell one. But the surprising thing so far in Mrs. Thatcher's reign is not how much trouble Scotland has caused her, but how little. Scots may choose their words according to their political inclinations and describe the mood around them as one of realism, resignation, defeatism or despair. They generally agree, however, that neither the left nor the nationalists have been able to take the opportunities which they thought would be offered to them after 1979.

The car works at Linwood (and other symbols of the Macmillan era of 'regional policy') disappeared with scarcely a fight. Mr. Michael McGahey has found it hard to get his miners to parade on Mr. Scargill's orders, though rapid pit closures now could change the mood. Shipbuilding, much threatened as well as much diminished, has so far failed to muster anything approaching the spirit and drive of the Upper Clyde protests of the early 1970s. No Scottish local authority under Labour control has seriously challenged the Government, least of all on the council rents issue that local Socialists fought so hard back in Macmillan's time. So far, CND has not exploited the Trident argument in Scotland in the way that the Greenham women have used the Cruise one. The unemployment campaigns like 'the People's March for Jobs' have seemed to win goodwill rather than stir the heart. Even the fishermen, who once seemed likely to blockade ports and vote Nationalist, have settled down for the time being to keep a suspicious watch on the development of the Common Fishing Policy.

In the House of Commons, where her Scottish MPs were and are heavily outnumbered by Labour, Mrs. Thatcher's Scottish team has had a fairly easy passage. George Younger, retained as Secretary of State, has not stirred up the personal unpopularity which used to go with his office, in Labour as well as Tory Governments. The Scottish Office has even found itself exporting promising junior Ministers to other Departments. All this could change. Some of Mrs. Thatcher's placid passage in Scottish affairs is certainly due to the weakness and confusion of the Labour Party, which thinks of itself as the 'natural majority party' in Scotland. A few Labour stalwarts departed for the SDP, notably the re-elected Robert MacLennan and the narrowly defeated Dick Mabon. Rather more right-wingers stayed

on, both in the parliamentary party and in local government. The party establishment shuffled left, with some of the old left discovering that politics was rather dull as a team game and others as isolated under the new dispensation as in the old one. But the overall effect of Labour's wider troubles was to make the party's Scottish strength more apparent than real.

If—and it is clearly a very big 'if'—Labour eventually emerges from its General Election disaster rejuvenated, revived, and more self-disciplined, one of the early results might be to make life thoroughly unpleasant for the Government in Scotland. But there are two even bigger 'ifs' that Scottish politicians must now take into account. The situation in Scotland would be entirely different if Labour could successfully play a nationalist card, without finding itself trumped. And it would change profoundly if the Alliance parties were to maintain the progress which they made during the election campaign.

Scottish nationalism, however, is an unpredictable factor and a dangerous ideological ally for Labour. Labour went into the election campaign committed (despite the hostility of some of its MPs on both right and left wings) to a Scottish Assembly, but it made little of it during the campaign. As has frequently happened—from Gladstone's day onward—the majority of Scots seemed inclined to the idea of limited home rule, but to give it a very low priority in politics. This was the mood of the Labour campaign in 1983, though it is arguable whether the tepidity the campaigning about the Assembly reflected Labour's self-doubt or simply a conviction that the election was lost before the campaign started.

But with the bitter sting of defeat, and the frustration of winning again in Scotland but losing so badly elsewhere, the first thoughts of some Scottish Socialists were to fly the red tartan flag. Perhaps they were provoked by the effrontery of a Scottish Nationalist suggestion that the SNP (with two seats) would share in a popular front against the Tories or lead a 'national convention.' Some use—rhetorical rather than seriously political—began to be made of the statistic that 71 per cent of Scottish voters 'rejected Mrs. Thatcher,' though not so much with the uncomfortable statistic that Labour got nearly 60 per cent of Scottish seats for 35 per cent of the votes.

There was, for example, a revealing moment on BBC TV on election night when two tired interviewers, one a former Scottish Nationalist MP, the other a well-known enthusiast for devolution, found a left-wing anti-devolutionist, Robin Cook, apparently talking out of sheer frustration about the need to reconsider federalism for Britain. Their spirits rose visibly and their questions perked up. But it was, as Robin Cook reminded them, 3 a.m. Perhaps it will seem different when everyone has slept on it.

Labour's difficulty is partly that it might want to use nationalism in its milder forms, but dare not let it get out of control. The Tories got themselves in trouble in the late 1960s when Edward Heath flirted with devolution and much of his party took fright, just as some voters were getting seriously interested. But in the last resort, if they were unprincipled enough, English Tories could sell out to Scottish nationalism. Labour has to be a centralist party (though devolution is consistent with good central govern-

ment) if the Scots and Welsh are ever to put in another Labour Government at Westminster. The left-wing Nationalists (including ex-Labour men like Jim Sillars) want to let the English have independence too.

But there is a deeper problem. The course and moods of Scottish nationalism cannot be controlled or predicted. It rises unpredictably and falters just when it seems to have consolidated itself. Between 1945 and 1949, in the late 1960s and in the mid-1970s, nationalist sentiments seemed to be powerful enough to reshape Scottish politics. But in 1983, the SNP's parliamentary representation in 72 Scottish seats is Gordon Wilson in Dundee (perhaps by virtue of tactical voting) and Donald Stewart in the Western Isles. In only seven of the other seats did it come second. And it lost 53 deposits.

There is, of course, an 'all-party' Campaign for a Scottish Assembly that also thinks its time has come. The quotation marks are desirable since, while it doubtless has some Tories on its books, there is no appreciable support from the Tories who backed Heath's Assembly plan or even the smaller number who took the 'yes' line in the 1979 referendum. Labour MPs have also decided that their devolution campaign is to be a party affair.

Next winter, and Scottish by-elections if and when they come, will show whether the immediate post-election impetus to campaigns (or, at least, cries) for a Scottish Assembly can be sustained. It is too soon to say whether a really new campaign has begun, led by such Labour enthusiasts as George Foulkes in Jim Sillars's old seat, or whether too many politicians simply found it impossible to stop talking when the polls closed and turned to devolution as a snap reaction to Mrs. Thatcher's triumph in England. It is arguable, however, that the key to devolution, home rule, federalism, or any kind of Assembly now lies with the Alliance or whatever relationship of Liberals and Social Democrats evolves from it. Devolution could be extended from administration to legislation by the simplest and most desirable means: the return at some future election of a British Government wholeheartedly committed to it.

Before the election, few Scottish voters took too seriously the arguments about which of two Scottish MPs, Roy Jenkins and David Steel, would make a better Prime Minister. Scotland showed only too well what the Alliance was up against: the consolidation of Labour strength in industrial areas which made it likely (as was, indeed, the case) that even a Labour disaster would leave its Scottish parliamentary strength little changed. But the Alliance did well enough in Scotland (just under a quarter of the votes) to open up new options for the future. It polled more than twice as well as the Nationalists, took eight seats out of 72, and came second in 28 seats. Its victories were mainly in strong Liberal territory. (Even the SDP gain in Ross and Cromarty was Liberal country in the 1960s, with Skye added from Russell Johnston's seat.) But Roy Jenkins in Hillhead and a sprinkling of good second places showed the Alliance making headway in industrial and suburban Scotland. Perhaps the Liberals would have done as well on their own, except in the special case of Hillhead; but the fact is that at previous elections they didn't.

Did the Alliance merely muster a protest vote in Scotland? It certainly seems to have won over voters from all three other parties, not least from the section of the SNP support which voted Nationalist without seeming to be committed to independence. Perhaps that process was helped by the much publicised in-fighting of the SNP, especially over pressure groups which tried to blend militant nationalism with the left-wing Socialism of Mr. Sillars, who now plans to work in Saudi Arabia and leave Scotland to its own devices. However, it could also be argued that a fair number of Scots who did not want a Conservative Government, or did not like this particular one, found the Alliance as credible an alternative Government as Labour and a more desirable one.

The Alliance was clearly the only political force in Scotland to improve its position at the election, and to be able itself to see clearly where it could make fresh progress. It can now hope to challenge in the rural seats where the SNP invaded Tory territory in the 1970s. It can argue that it might penetrate the hard core of Tory city and suburban seats that Labour did not win even in its best days. A close call in West Edinburgh gave the Tories a bad fright. And if Labour fails to revive, or stays far to the left, the Liberals and Social Democrats will be the main opposition in the Labour heartland, where the old tradition of the Tory working-class vote continues to fade away in Scotland, whatever may be happening in England. This may be a case where nothing succeeds like even partial success.

Certainly, neither of the bigger parties got much satisfaction from the Scottish results. The Tories would have been seen to suffer a sharp set-back but for three seats gained through long-delayed boundary changes. The SNP slipped badly back at a time when a Tory Government was unpopular in Scotland and there were many doubts about Labour. And Labour itself fell to 35 per cent of the Scottish vote, with only a few Glasgow results showing the kind of revival which the party claimed to have found in its grass-roots campaign.

Labour's strength was concentrated enough not only to get a disproportionate reward in seats, but to provoke a good deal of talk about 'the two Scotlands,' meaning the Labour-dominated industrial areas and the rest.

In the days of the almost all-embracing two-party system, the Conservatives, even when their troubles began in 1959, dominated the 'other Scotland.' Perhaps after the 1983 election something may stir in their memory about the way in which, in what now seems their golden age, that domination was won. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Scottish Conservatism became Unionism, sustained by the substantial Liberal secession over Irish home rule. In the 1930s, the Simonites or National Liberals were a substantial part of support in Scotland for Baldwin and Chamberlain. Even as late as the decade after 1945, half a dozen Scots Tory seats were, strictly speaking, held by Liberal-Unionists. In each case, the Conservative party had drawn reinforcements from people who had entered politics through the Liberal tradition. Labour's Scottish strength seemed to demand anti-socialist unity. Perhaps there is a certain historical justice as well as irony now if the Liberals, whose life-blood in Scotland seemed all but

drained away outside some of the more remote constituencies, should benefit from a transfusion of Labour supporters and new voters whose parents voted Labour.

Scotland was a major force in the restructuring of British politics after the First World War. The eight Alliance MPs are not yet the equivalent of the Red Clydesiders who made their mark then, but it is now conceivable that Scotland could have an equally dramatic part in an equally fundamental change.

It is still far-fetched to think so, and perhaps rash to write in these terms. A tour of Glasgow's housing estates, or of what once were steel or mining areas, is an exploration of political apathy and frustration rather than an encounter with expectation that everything will change when one or other of the Davids gets in. A Labour Party with convincing leaders and policies would hold most of its supporters. Labour loyalty still runs deep. And Scottish Tories will generally stay Tory, because of Mrs. Thatcher, or in spite of her. But there is, at least, the gentlest breeze of change in Scotland, and a probability that Scotland will reflect any dramatic changes that come over British politics during the second Thatcher term. Scotland is also beginning to show some of the social changes (such as growth of house ownership) to which Labour has been slow to adjust. And, inevitably, the heavy industries—steel, coal, and shipbuilding—seem likely to decline further. Even the steel plant at Ravenscraig in Lanarkshire looks far less secure than when George Younger thought he had 'saved' it in Cabinet.

All this is far short of ensuring a Scottish landslide for the Liberals or some kind of Alliance at the next election. The SDP badly needs some new secessions from Labour to regain momentum and bargain with the Liberals on anything like equal terms. It also has problems ahead if the home rule or devolution issue comes to the forefront of Scottish politics again, for some of those who warm to the SDP are cool about devolution. They may be even cooler about the kind of federalism which Liberals supported in the years when their policy commitments were only of academic interest.

But with all the qualifications, ifs and buts that follow the 1983 election, it can be seen as a break in the ice of Scottish politics. New currents are flowing. Labour ought to have been able to mobilise Scotland for a change of Government and failed. The SNP remains a minor party and not a revolutionary force. The Tories have seen, even more emphatically than before, how far out of step Scotland is with the rest of Britain. The Alliance parties have many problems and limitations, with only the shadow of an organisation in large parts of the country and a weak base in local government. But for the first time since Asquith lost at Paisley in 1924 it is possible—only just possible—to think of a major Liberal comeback in Scotland.

[R. D. Kernohan is Editor of *Life and Work: The Record of the Church of Scotland.*]



CARE FOR HANDICAPPED CHILDREN

by Peter Niecke

HEIKE Kramer from Rostock gave her parents cause for concern when she, in contrast to her twin sister, lay apathetically in her pram, showing no reaction to her environment. She was referred to an eye clinic by the Infant Care Centre and doctors there found that her sight was impaired to a considerable degree. The child was included in a system of early remedial treatment and, until the age of three, was taken care of at home by a specialist teacher, assisted by her mother, and later at a special kindergarten for blind and partially sighted children.

Thus prepared for learning, at the age of six the child attended a school for children with defective sight, where she remained until her sixteenth year. Her performance compared well with that of other, healthy children of her age group. This enabled her to train for the vocation of computer programmer. She turned out to be a talented mathematician and is at present studying at a technical college, together with girls of normal sight who are friendly and helpful.

This is one of many examples of the rehabilitation of handicapped children and adolescents in the German Democratic Republic. Of every 10,000 children and young people up to the age of ten, 938 are handicapped because of organic or orthopaedic defects, or impaired sight or hearing. Of these, over 930 can be trained and rehabilitated and, as a result, are being fully integrated into normal life.

Prophylactic treatment of all children begins before birth and after birth is intensively continued with special tests to recognise at an early stage genetically determined and other infant diseases. The system of special care for children and young people also comprises compulsory vaccinations against contagious diseases as well as regular check-ups. The parents have to pay nothing for these or for the additional measures taken by the state to ensure the health of children and young people.

There is also a wide range of legal provisions in the GDR aimed at preventing damage to health, recognising at a very early stage diseases which cannot be prevented, and giving special treatment as soon as possible. Thus, all children suffering from probable existing physical defects, as well as mental handicaps, are subject to registration with the health authorities.

The aim of educational and remedial rehabilitation is to develop the mental and physical abilities of handicapped children. A network of special kindergartens and schools provides the basis for this. There are eight different types of special schools—for children who are blind or whose sight is impaired; for those who are deaf or have speech defects; the physically handicapped and sufferers from behavioral or mental disturbances.

In accordance with the GDR's education law, all children attend ten-year secondary schools. Also, the special schools—with the exception

of those for deaf and mentally disturbed children—give lessons along curricula obligatory for all schools in the country. The targets set in these curricula are reached by most of the handicapped. For them there are extended secondary schools which—corresponding to national education in general—end after the 12th grade with the university entrance examination, called *Abitur*. The special schools for children who are either deaf or mentally retarded impart a limited but fundamental polytechnical education. At present there are some 75,000 children studying at the country's 556 special schools.

Children and young people with psychic defects, who are unfit to go to school yet deserve educational opportunities, are cared for in institutions administered by the medical and welfare system—208 day-care centres, 56 homes at which the children stay during the week or all the time, and 32 hospitals, with a total capacity of 12,500 places. They are educated along a special rehabilitation programme which has close co-operation with parents as one of its basic principles.

The success of the medical and educational care is becoming apparent. Most of the handicapped young people are trained for suitable jobs and, whenever vocational training at vocational schools is impossible because of the nature of the defect or other circumstances, the task is undertaken by the rehabilitation centres which work within the integrated medical and welfare system. At present there are twelve such centres, which train skilled workers in over forty basic vocations. These include five in electrical engineering and electronics, several trades in the metal-working industry, and a number of trades which are in great demand by the apprentices, such as orthopaedic shoemaking, ladies' and gentlemen's bespoke tailoring, and draughtsmanship for building and mechanical engineering.

The right to work in the GDR is not a privilege for the healthy. The 'basic right to work' for everybody has been explicitly stated in the Labour code. It also includes the right to equal pay for equal work. Thus, people with limited ability are protected and supported in finding and fulfilling the requirements of a job and feel themselves safe and supported.

NEW HORIZONS FOR LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL

by Urs Schoettli

RECENT events surrounding the Free Democrats in the Federal Republic of Germany have given rise yet again to the old question of whether the Liberal slant is to the right or to the left. In the last few years, international Liberalism has had to consider this question, particularly in debates regarding such problems as the welfare state, East-West relations and the Third World. The parties constituting the Liberal International cover a broad political spectrum. Furthermore, the increase of contacts with Liberal parties in the Third World has made an answer still more elusive. Yet the increased presence of international Socialism, as well as new international initiatives from the Conservative and Christian Democrat camps, are challenging international Liberalism to define its position.

The past year does indeed seem to point to the fact that those people who place the future of Liberalism to the right of centre are correct. After an economically successful era in Europe, left-wing Liberalism seems to have lost considerable ground. This impression is confirmed in the latest election results. Whilst the Swedish Liberals had to swallow a painful defeat in the parliamentary elections last September due to their lack of distinction from the Social Democrats, Dutch Liberals, who consider themselves a middle-class party to the right of centre, enjoyed increased success both in regional elections as well as in the general election of Autumn 1982.

An examination of the parties involved in the Liberal International reveals that those Liberals who claim to be middle-class parties in their manifestos have a secure electorate. Generally, between 15% and 25% of the electorate vote for the Swiss Liberals, the Dutch VVD, the Belgian Liberals, the Democratic Party of Luxembourg and the Danish Venstre.

On the other hand, left of centre Liberal parties clearly find difficulty in consistantly obtaining over 10% of the votes. After a swift increase in popularity, the Dutch left-wing Liberal Party D'66 is unlikely to recover from the serious loss of votes at the last election. Apart from Denmark, Scandinavian Liberalism has suffered defeats in favour of non-Socialist parties, (and particularly the Conservatives). In Norway and Finland, the genuine Liberal parties now belong to splinter groups who cannot rely upon their electorate's votes. Even in Sweden the Liberal People's Party, which had formerly been a strong party, has now fallen a long way behind the two other middle-class parties. Similarly, in France, the Radicaux de Gauche, the left-wing Liberals, (with the exception of regional centres such as Corsica), are unable to acquire a credible electorate.

Naturally, this analysis would be incomplete without an examination of individual national characteristics. This is evident in the case of Great Britain or the Federal Republic of Germany. Historically, the con-

tinental left or right wing bias does not apply to English Liberalism. There remains a radical tradition of Liberalism particularly in Wales, the West country, Scotland and the North of England, which takes an anti-Conservative stance where the State and Society are concerned.

After the First World War, and following the continental pattern, the foundations of Liberalism in a Progressive People's Party in England were destroyed by the rise of the Labour Party, founded by the Trade Unions. Moreover, during the long period in which the Liberal strength diminished, the British first-past-the-post voting system led to a specific type of Liberal supporter. Until recently the offside position maintained by the Liberals could be explained by the idea that left-wing Liberals felt at home with the Labour Party and the right-wing Liberals felt at home with the Tories. This was enhanced by the tendency of both Labour and Conservative parties to see themselves as Centre parties with a mass appeal. It is thus interesting to note that the debate concerning a right or left-wing Liberal slant has been rekindled.

Since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany the Free Democrats have only been out of the Bonn Government for a few years. This has had both positive and negative repercussions on German Liberalism. One good result of the Liberal participation in the Government has been the extended Liberal influence in German domestic, foreign and economic policies, which their share of the votes would not otherwise justify. On the other hand, the FDP has had to face the dilemna of answering the key question regarding a coalition prior to each election. This explains why Germany, unlike her foreign neighbours, has given such historical importance to each change of coalition. Needless to say, every new decision taken by the coalition partners produces greater tensions within the smaller party. The two main problems facing the FDP are firstly, that in the coalition the FDP joins forces with those powers whose ideological interests and policies favour the existing coalition, and then finds itself in a position where it is difficult to represent true Liberalism within the Government; and secondly, the FDP suffers from the fact that it has only a very small, firm electoral following, and that for tactical reasons the majority of its voters give the Liberals their second vote.

Finally, Liberalism in the Federal Republic is still suffering from the Adenauer era. As Party Leader of the Christian Democrats, the first Federal Chancellor succeeded where the Swiss—since the foundation of their Federal State—have failed. Thanks to his towering personality and political foresight, Adenauer managed to unite two denominational parties in one. Whilst in Switzerland non-Socialist Catholics vote mainly for the Christian Democrats and non-Socialist Protestants generally vote for the Free Democrats, religious denominations carry no weight, as far as the CDU electorate is concerned, and as a result the Christian Democrats are firmly established in the north as well as in the south of the Federal Republic.

Occasionally it seems as if Liberals are tempted to interpret history in a Marxist, one-dimensional fashion. This is illustrated in the mistaken

belief that nowadays Liberal politics concern only very minor parties. The battle for firm support in mass appeal is left to the Social Democrats on the left and the Conservatives and Christian Democrats on the right. Liberals have withdrawn into political exclusiveness. The difficulties which Liberals face in asserting themselves in the competitive, democratic struggle against the popular parties originate as much from the modern conception of the State as from the Liberal system of political values. We find particularly in the United States, as well as in Western European democracies, that all important parties have strong Liberal wings. Indeed, it is impossible in industrialised democracies today for a majority of votes to be won by an extremist party. This is demonstrated by the development of Socialism in Spain. Felipe Gonzalez's PSOE had no chance of victory until he had considerably moderated his position. This illustrates the narrow scope of today's Governments in important fields such as domestic, foreign and economic policies.

The fact that *Realpolitik* compels problems to be solved from a central position leads to a revaluation of the term 'Liberal'. In this context, continental European Liberals, like their English counterparts, are confronted by the challenge of convincing the electorate that Liberal interests are not so well represented in other parties. The fundamental differences between Liberal tendencies within various parties and organised Liberalism must be made clear to the public, and in this respect the dwindling importance of the party press and the *cliché* slogans promoted by the mass media are a great hindrance.

Where can the Liberal answer be found? First of all, the public must be reminded that the benefits of the rule of law and a free market economy are achievements of Liberalism. There is no Christian Democratic, Socialist, or Conservative democracy, but only a liberal democracy. With the undeniable success of the modern market economy, Liberalism in Western democratic countries can claim to have been successful in turning Bentham's maxim—'The greatest happiness of the greatest number'—into political reality.

The political and economic success of Liberalism has caused other democratic parties to lay claim to substantial areas of Liberal policy. Tolerance and Pragmatism, two basic values of Liberalism, naturally elude party-ideological claims to sole rights. But even if other democratic parties agree with the Liberals in concrete politics, basic differences arise in the way these policies are implemented.

Years of continuous economic growth have pushed these differences into the background. However, now that the State can no longer afford to spend freely, as the restraints laid by economic conditions force it to choose its priorities, the nature of Liberalism must again be clarified. Not only are there a large number of fair weather Liberals in the populist parties, but it is becoming increasingly obvious that when actually making decisions popular parties tend to discard liberal values. Faced with a situation of conflict neither the Conservatives nor the Social Democrats are likely to give priority to liberal values.

Clearly, the courage to stand unflinchingly for what is objectively right

can be seen in international trade policies. Without heeding the lessons of history, Governments repeatedly turn to protectionism in times of recession. The Socialists argue that jobs must be preserved, and that the Conservatives should uphold national 'sovereignty'. Both parties sweep the tragic consequences of a global trade war under the carpet and seek refuge in blocking their own markets. The Liberal conviction that free world trade promotes man's peace and well-being must be defended consistantly. At the same time, it must be emphasised that free trade is not a static condition, nor a statement of existing ties, but a process of continuous development following the dictates of the market. In the Liberals' opinion, the necessary shifts of emphasis, particularly regarding trade between the industrial nations and the developing countries, should be achieved through the mechanisms of the market and not by dirigism.

What has been proved in a national framework is equally true for the world economy. State-controlled demand results in a waste of valuable resources. The fact that the international market reacts more quickly and efficiently to challenges than its critics would have us believe, is proved by the flexible adjustment of industrial and private demands for energy, as a result of both oil-price shocks. The Liberal principle of protection, for those who through no fault of their own are weak and uncompetitive, applies without a doubt to world trade, as for example, to the developing countries who possess no energy sources of their own.

Liberal International opened its doors to the liberal and democratic forces of the Third World with its 1981 Rome Congress Manifesto. If this expansion is to be taken seriously it is important that the Liberal values developed in Western industrialised countries are examined in relation to their political significance in and for the Third World. The important debate on political, social and economic challenges of the developing countries is in need of a re-definition and re-evaluation of the main principles pertaining to international Liberalism.

In party political terms, Latin America has proved to be the most successful continent in the Third World for international democrats. Although the Christian Democrat International and the Socialist International have been firmly established in Latin America for a number of years, the Liberal International has now reinforced its contacts with this continent. Since the 1979 Congress in Ottawa various parties from Central and South America appear regularly as observers at Liberal International meetings.

At last year's Congress in The Hague, for the first time two Latin American parties were accepted as full members of the LI. It may prove vital for the future work of international Liberalism in Latin America that the two different aspects of Liberalism are embodied in these two new members. Whilst the Partido Liberal in Panama predominantly represents the middle classes, and as the ruling party has played a decisive role in the development of the Republic of Panama for many years, the Independent Liberals who left the official Liberal Party in Nicaragua in the forties were mercilessly persecuted under the rule of Somoza. It was not until after his fall that the Partido Liberal Independiente was

legalised. This party is presently in Government and supports the revolutionary process provided that the principles of pluralism, non-alignment and a mixed economy are respected.

In the debate on the political aims of Liberalism in Latin America the 1981 manifesto provided new guidelines on the position of Liberal International with regard to economic policies and the fight against dictators in particular. In the developing countries, economic structures must be adapted to the prevailing conditions. In many respects, most Latin American countries are only now at the point reached by the European industrial nations in the second half of the nineteenth century. Therefore, the state's role in infrastructure, economic planning and investment is more important than in the industrialised nations of the West today.

Liberals in Latin America view themselves as an alternative to Marxist Totalitarianism and military dictatorships. Both Castro and Pinochet are prepared to sacrifice human and civil rights in favour of hoped for economic development. Liberals, on the other hand, fight against setting priorities and advocate the simultaneous promotion of political and economic development. Thus, international Liberalism must clearly distance itself from those powers who speak of 'liberal' systems when market-economy structures already exist, and who do not take into account the political and social conditions.

In Europe, Liberal thinking has clearly contributed to the development of the concept of justice and the duty to resist tyranny. Whenever the Liberals are faced with passing judgement on liberal movements and armed rebellions in the Third World, they must remember this legacy. Where it is impossible to overthrow an unjust regime democratically, citizens should have the right to violent resistance. The vast majority of European Liberals would not be prepared to accept the social, political and economic injustices imposed by military dictators in Guatemala, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay without resistance. United, Liberals must democratically make their contribution so that liberation movements in the Third World can be released from their unilateral dependence on the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement.

In other parts of the Third World, Liberalism cannot be achieved through party organisations. In Africa, every democratic movement is confronted with the problem of tribal bonds. As post-colonial history shows, party-political pluralism in many African countries is not feasible. There are very few examples of parties being able to maintain a national perspective.

In Asia, parliamentary democracies are as rare as in Africa. In individual countries, however, the traditional liberality of culture and religion offers more favourable possibilities. Of particular interest for international Liberalism at present are India, Sri Lanka and the ASEAN states and in this context Liberal partners in the Philippines can be found amongst the democratic opposition to the Marcos regime.

Clearly, it will be important over the next few years to improve relations with the Arab world. In a number of states in the Middle East

regular contacts with the well-informed intelligentsia, liberal middle-classes and internationally orientated leaders in the economic sphere already exist. With regard to the numerous misunderstandings which persist in the West concerning Islam, Liberalism could serve as a valuable basis for the long-overdue cultural dialogue between East and West. In this respect, the Liberal postulate is equally applicable to the North-South dialogue, where the cultural challenges should be considered quite separately from any economic co-operation.

Finally, it could be instructive to consider the present political situation in Britain in view of the debate about the Alliance between the Liberal Party and the Social Democrats. The result of the recent general election has once again shown that in Britain the whole party political spectrum is distorted by an electoral system which cannot cope with the basic requirements of a complex society. The fact that in times of economic crisis Great Britain is the only European democracy which has re-elected a single party Conservative government is ample proof of that.

[Dr. Urs Schoettli was Secretary of the Liberal Party of Basle 1972–1976 and Economic and Political Consultant in Bombay 1976–1978. He is at present correspondent of the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung* (Switzerland) for the Indian Sub-Continent.]



POEMS

PARADISE MAN

All one are a poet's days
and his words like shadows gliding
in a forest that has no bounds

this is what I've always sensed
since first I stood on English shores
and summer broke about my head.

Now in a pizza house of Charlotte St.
or the Barbican's dry sink
where all is built beneath a teetering sky

or even in remembered Troys
sooted-up with ageless griefs
agonies that time has turned to myth

I look on Eden's secret sidewalk
say my rosary of words again
and pluck the flower out of love.

MOMENT OF FREEDOM

A salmon-chested chaffinch sang
on a bare branch as we cycled along
its beak like a yellow clip transmitting

joy to high clouds, near buds and us.
A joy unaware of misery and loss—
the joy of a life that only knows how to bless.

Immovable in its melody, self-entranced:
we joined it briefly who had chanced
upon it, shared its moment of irreducible innocence.

To concentrate is to begin to be free
and listening to that pure sound for you and me
was to forget, momentarily, our inhumanity

all that mood and desire that makes proudly unwell.
For to see a bird and hear it sing is to un-hell
a whole blighted world and recover its soul.

WILIAM OXLEY

THE STRANGEST WELL IN BRITAIN

by David Gunston

ALTHOUGH Lourdes is rightly regarded as the greatest place of Christian healing pilgrimage in the modern world, there is a similar shrine in Britain which has attracted pilgrims for something like 1,300 years, with a record of alleged cures equally long, compared with the century or so that Lourdes has been operating.

This is Holywell in Clywd, in North Wales, where the miraculous well of St. Winefride, the most famous place of pilgrimage in all Christendom in the Middle Ages, is still functioning as a Roman Catholic faith cure centre.

The compact little town of Holywell, which owes its origin, fame and name to this well—one of the strangest in existence—sits high above the wide sandy estuary of the River Dee, north of Halkyn Mountain, a limestone ridge riddle with disused lead mine workings.

Turn north off the town's centre, and almost at the bottom of the steep Well Street, hidden from view from the road by the medieval building erected over it, lies the well that once drew kings and paupers alike from all over Europe. Many thousands of believers still turn up here every year to drink or bathe in the water in the hope of a cure for their ills.

The Holy Well is said to be based on an ancient legend, which like many legends probably contains a kernel of truth embedded in the fantasy. Winefride (in Welsh, Gwenfrewi) was a young girl of the neighbourhood who lived in the seventh century. Educated by her uncle, St. Bueno, a famous name in Welsh religious history, she early decided to devote her life to the service of the church. But Prince Caradoc, of Hawarden, a local chieftain's son, had other ideas and wanted her to marry him. Naturally, she refused, and one day he tried to carry her off. She fled in terror to the nearby church but was overtaken by the thwarted young prince. In a fit of mad pique he seized his sword and cut off her head, which rolled down the hillside, through the open church door, right up to the alter where St. Bueno was officiating.

Where the severed head came to rest a huge spring of water suddenly burst forth from the ground. St. Bueno took up the head, and at his prayer it was re-united to the girl's body and she was restored to life. At the same time the ground conveniently opened up to engulf the wicked Caradoc. Winefride, later canonized, lived on to take the veil and eventually become the Abbess of the Convent of Gwytherin, not far from Llanrwst. At her second death, about A.D. 650, she was buried at the convent, but was later re-buried in Shrewsbury Abbey in 1138.

Doubtless such a woman did exist at that time, and although unlike Lourdes there has never been any suggestion of any visions of the Virgin Mary, there is an interesting parallel with the French shrine in that the spring under the Grotto did not appear until the time of the apparitions. Certainly, this whole area is steeped in religious associations: there were Cistercian monks at nearby Basingwerk Abbey, who were undoubtedly

attracted to the district by the fame of the Well. Their now ruined abbey was built for them in 1131, but they had settled in Wales much earlier. Also, these hillsides are full of natural springs and wells.

You enter the shrine today through a neat small garden dominated by the inevitable statue of the Saint, to find a medium-sized swimming pool set in a medieval courtyard and fed from the spring itself, completely encased under cover by the square stonework of the late fifteen century Chapel. In fact, the crypt of the Chapel has been built over the rising well-head, confining it within four stone walls.

The water gushes forth in a great geyser-like dome, completely filling the basin and the outdoor pool, from whence it runs downhill in a stream to be used by the thriving woollen mill next door. Neither heavy rain nor prolonged drought affects the copious rising flow of clear pure water which never freezes in winter, remaining always at a constant temperature of 50°F. The chalybeate spring was once reputed to be the largest in Britain, but mining operations in modern times are said to have greatly reduced the flow. Nevertheless, the water still rises out of the ground with impressive power.

The old legend of St. Winefride is reinforced by the strange appearance on the sides and steps of the well of the delicate, moss-like liverwort known as St. Winifred's Hair *(Jungermannia asplenoides)* and the reddish lichen called St. Winifred's Blood *(Byssus iolithus)*, which to simple pilgrims of an earlier age must really have looked like patches of the Saint's blood.

The pilgrims have come to this strange spot for thirteen centuries, impelled largely by the desire to find a cure in the water from St. Winefride's hands. Several Kings of England also made pilgrimages: Richard I in 1189, Edward IV in 1439, Henry V in 1416 and James II and his queen to ask the Saint that they might be blessed with a son in 1687.

Many cures are claimed and some miracles alleged. Earlier visitors have inscribed the details on the stone walls and pillars surrounding the well. Welsh bards sang the Well's praises. A special display adjoining the pool outside interprets some of these inscriptions and marks. Many nationalities, dates, home areas and faiths are recorded: one, surprisingly, is Jewish. There is also a photograph of the great pathetic stack of crutches, walking-sticks, leg-irons and other aids that until recently lined the walls of the crypt, left behind by happily cured visitors.

Up until the last century there were daily services at the well, and there are still many pilgrims and curious visitors, as well as official processions culminating in open-air mass in the garden on such dates as June 22, St. Winefride's principal feast day, which commemorates her martyrdom, and a number of others.

The Chapel built over the well can best be seen from further up the steep road. It is an exceptionally fine example of Perpendicular architecture, and replaces the earlier well chapel which fell into disrepair. It was built about 1490 by Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of Richmond and Derby, and mother of Henry VII, and her arms and emblems are carved

on the ceiling of the well crypt and on the corbels of the Chapel above. If the crypt, with its miraculous spring is still alive and thriving, the main upper Chapel, locked and empty, is sadly neglected.

There are incongruities at St. Winefride's Well, too: a turnstile to enter the place, although the charge of 2p. is modest enough. Votive candles flicker in the crypt—but Irish pilgrims seeking small change to pay for their offering are apt to offer Eire silver coins to the unsuspecting. A notice requests reverence in the shrine: one hopes it is directed at unbelievers. Another bars everyone from entering the water except at the appointed early morning hours when the sexes are segregated. And the inevitable Catholic display of tawdry religious souvenirs, augmented by plastic bottles of the spring water, where young school-girls take the money in the shop at the foot of the garden, seems to the non-Catholic or the sceptical out of harmony with the very real faith that has led people to seek health here down the centuries. Ironically among the numerous medallions and rosaries and sealed prayers on sale are many carved statuettes of Bernadette and the Virgin at Lourdes.

No account of St. Winefride's Well would be complete without mention of one of its less welcome visitors of more modern times: that oddly warped yet gifted character, Frederick William Rolfe, self-styled Baron Corvo, author of *Hadrian VII* and subject of A. J. A. Symons' classic biography *The Quest for Corvo.*

One day in 1895, calling himself Frederick Austin and posing as a penniless artist, Rolfe descended on the unsuspecting town of Holywell, attracted by the prosperity of the shrine and the Catholic Church of St. Winefride, one of the finest in Wales. He was befriended by one of the honoured Rectors of that church, Rev. Charles Sidney de Vere Beauclerk, S.J., commissioned to paint some banners for the shrine, given free lodgings and found a studio in which to work.

All went well for a time. Rolfe painted his colourful banners, which are still preserved (though beginning to show their age) by the kindly Monsignor at the church, and bathed in the basin below the well, needing another's direction when he removed his powerful glasses. Then his persecution mania took over. Although he had lived there free for over two years, he demanded £1,000 for his paintings, went to law to get it, persecuted his benefactor and soon had the whole of Holywell in uproar. Then he settled out of court for £10, his point (so he thought) having been made.

This one notable exception apart, the Shrine of St. Winefride has always welcomed visitors and pilgrims, and the alleged cures continue to this day. What is their explanation? Simple faith, health-giving constituents in the water, self-delusion continuing for many centuries, or some sort of a miracle? Or maybe a strange combination of all these? The answer, whatever one's belief or lack of it, is not clear and remains mystifying to a degree. Meanwhile the Well gushes forth unabated, its clear water a living challenge to modern scepticism.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE FORGOTTEN BUILDER

Dear Madam,

I must be among many in my profession who had never heard of Geoffrey Whitworth, evidently one of the many unsung heroes of English Theatre, until I read John Elsom's article in *Contemporary Review* (No. 1406, Vol. 242) and an article by Irving Wardle in *The Times* (24th March 1983). I had not realised how much was owed to him.

Both writers share a depression that the Whitworth dream has gone wrong. Mr. Elsom uses the Policy Studies Institute survey by Robert Hutcheson, *A Hard Fact To Swallow*, which demonstrates the imbalance of subsidy per head between London and the Regions to show that theatre freed from commercial pressures which Whitworth so desired could still go wrong, whilst Irving Wardle finishes his article with the haunting line:

> He saw it all coming, and when it came it broke his heart.

I have worked in the regions all my life and can bear witness to the bare statistics of the Hutcheson survey. The regions have become in so many cases the unsung heroes of this country's cultural life, consolidating, expanding and encouraging Geoffrey Whitworth's 'Community Theatre writ large.'

But unsung they remain both financially and in lack of coverage. The finance side, Hutcheson has well chronicled; but lack of recognition is a source of continual annoyance to regional companies of every size and type, bedevilled by a London based press. This is felt even more strongly by smaller companies who suddenly find their pitch occupied by occasional invasion by the big national companies on tour, whose one-off visits with attendant publicity rupture the carefully laid plans of the smaller company. The latter have done all the spade work, for their bread and butter; the former come in using the small change of their grants.

There is nothing more galling to read than a report in the *Sunday Times* of 8 May 1983 by Leslie Geddes-Brown, that the National Theatre is touring a bare boards production of Macbeth to Britain's schools which the press will cover as the National doing its bit for the community, while it will blithely ignore the hard, unsung, continuous work already being done in this field by the other smaller companies.

This I would see as another example of subsidy going awry, a big company coming in on the backs of many smaller ones and stealing a source of potential income. Not quite what Geoffrey Whitworth would have hoped for!

Yours faithfully,
EDWARD GRIST

Washington,
Tyne and Wear.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

A REVIEW OF POST-WAR EUROPE TO THE TREATY OF ROME

Post-War: The Dawn of Today's Europe. Richard Mayne. Thames and Hudson. £10.50.

For 25 years, Richard Mayne has had a ringside seat at the centre of European developments, as at one time personal assistant to Jean Monnet, Mr. Europe himself, (and as translator of Monnet's *Memoirs*), and for a spell in the 70s as head of the U.K. Office for Europe in Kensington. Though he is now a writer and broadcaster and in a measure detached, it is doubtful if any other Englishman has his knowledge of the European Community, and he uses it here to give an insider's view of the men at the centre and of the post-war problems that led them all, in all their personal diversities, along the road to Rome.

The strength of the book lies, indeed, not only in the sharpness of the etchings of people but also in the feeling for place. Whether it is Paris and the almost-tangible 'feel' of life on the Left Bank; whether it is Nuremberg as a site for the war-crimes trial, and with all its Nazi overtones; whether it is Port Said in all its appealing seediness in a post-Imperial age, as British troops dropped in on it from the skies in 1956; whether it is the view of Florence from the idyllic setting of the Piazzale Michelangiolo above the Arno—in all of them and many more the scene-sets are authentic and acute. And Dr. Mayne has a similar sharpness in his description of Jan Masaryk's death in Prague in March 1948, even though he has inevitably here to draw on inference—though he makes a compelling case that Masaryk was, in fact, murdered.

This is more, however, than a study in recent diplomatic history. The most moving and perceptive chapters, indeed, are 'Easy Street' and 'Strangers in our Midst', portrayals of the European culture of the young in the first post-war decade, the world of Godot and Lucky Jim, of Edith Piaf and Callas, of *Christ Stopped at Eboli* and Danilo Dolci, of Sartre and Auden, of Philby and Maclean—and of cars and television and 'You never had it so good.' These two chapters are superb evocations of that post-war mood that, whatever might be the scars or unfilled craters in the visible world, still could think of *la vie en rose*. But the book is equally sure, and reasonably optimistic, in its account of the conceiving of the Marshall Plan, of Truman's incisiveness, Marshall's and Acheson's skill, and Ernest Bevin's speed and grasp in seizing this great, imaginative and splendid American initiative.

Unfortunately, Dr. Mayne stops with the signing of the Treaty. There is a place for a follow-up, if he can reveal how 'the idea of Europe' was given bureaucratic form, and of the clashes of these same personalities as the harsh world of compromise and contra-deal took over. It will be a less happy story, one suspects, than this, and not easy for an Englishman to tell, since for 16 years we were to be absent. But this volume, thoroughly researched and well-written, is a splendid piece of imaginative recall of the days when in spirit we were all young, and passports did not seem to matter. The idea of Europe, born as it was of the Resistance, was, as it still is, a great and noble vision.

ESMOND WRIGHT

RICE IN MALAYSIA

Rice Processing in Peninsular Malaysia. An Economic and Technical Analysis. L. J. Fredericks and R. J. G. Wells. Oxford University Press. M$25.

This book by L. J. Fredericks and R. J. G. Wells is a much-needed text, for it provides an 'up to date,' comprehensive work on a major agricultural sector (rice) of Malaysia, using much sound economic and technical analysis.

Rice is Malaysia's most important food crop, while rice processing is a significant industry within the Malaysian economy. The rice growing industry offers a variety of economic benefits at the earlier stages of industrialisation, such as a staple diet, a rural-based spatially dispersed industry and so on. Moreover, it is a good seed-bed for entrepreneurial talent and a high employment sector.

Malaysia, which now produces around 85% of its own rice requirements, has, over the last thirty years, undergone a rapid expansion in rice processing to such an extent that, although it has the smallest area under paddy in ASEAN, it has the highest yield of paddy per hectare. Part of the explanation for the growth in rice production is a result of better drainage and irrigation schemes, which, with government help, have permitted double cropping, but other reasons such as the improvement of rice strains, storage facilities and milling techniques have also proved to be important.

The rice milling process itself can be carried out by a number of systems—the mill-stone method, the under-runner method, the disc-type sheller approach or the rubber-roller method, these all turn out a different quantity of milled rice for a given quantity of paddy. The authors state, however, 'that it is difficult to generalise about recovery ratios, though there is wide recognition that some milling technologies are generally technically more efficient than others."

The historical growth of mill type is reviewed in this chapter, too, both for the commercial and private sector, with the implication that it is the public sector that has brought forth the most significant technological change in rice processing.

The chapter on rice storage emphasises the oft-seen problem that rice harvesting occurs once or twice a year, yet demand is often continuous throughout the year. The ability to store the excess supply is important, as too is government involvement in the rice market supporting the price of rice through a buffer-stock system. The authors discuss the advantages and disadvantages of different storage methods as well as the importance of socio-cultural and biological factors on storage losses. Present and future storage facilities are also evaluated and the authors present evidence that large storage facilities, often found in Malaysia and other developing countries, may remain idle for long periods of time, indicating a lack of good planning and a mis-allocation of resources.

Once the paddy is harvested, it needs to be milled and dried. Rice is dried by two ways, mechanical methods and by the use of the sun. A difficulty with harvesting in the rainy season is that natural drying is not able to deal with all the grain drying requirements. The chapter on drying compares these different drying methods in terms of costs, capacities of the drying systems and the modernisation of plants.

It is well known that in the long-run the factors of production (land, labour and capital) can be used in different proportions to produce the same output. Some countries have an abundance of cheap labour, that is particularly true of many South East Asian countries, while the west, which has found labour

expensive and less productive, has tended to use more capital intensive methods of production. It is the export of capital intensive rice production methods to countries which have an abundance of cheap labour which lies behind the chapter entitled "choice of techniques." The authors look at the choice of techniques of rice production for Malaysia in relation both to the issue of employment and to the reasons for the use of capital intensive techniques.

The final chapter concerns Government Rice Policy. The available figures indicate that Malaysia has never been self-sufficient in rice requirements, moreover, the movement towards self-sufficiency has been set within a number of policy objectives for the rice industry, such as poverty reduction (increasing farmers' incomes) and ensuring that consumers can obtain quality rice at reasonable prices and at a minimum cost to the government.

The policy of self-sufficiency is economically and strategically important. Successive policies towards this goal, in areas such as irrigation techniques, improved rice strains and subsidies have appeared in many of Malaysia's Plans. The topic of poverty reduction, too, has received considerable support since the Third Malaysia Plan with the help of the rice support scheme (the buffer-stock system) and the like.

Some people might argue—'Is there not a trade-off in these objectives?'. We could expect so, but the authors suggest that the trade-off has not been crucial and that the government has been able to expand both income and stabilise prices with a degree of success. The concluding pages look at policy implications for the rice processing industry. Firstly, the government must overcome excess milling and storage capacity within the industry, secondly, there is the problem of choice of technology—the authors feel, for example, that a mix of imported technology and specific domestic technology should be looked at in more depth and that a horizontal storage system may be more appropriate than a vertical one. Finally, there are a number of important ideological issues. Here the authors suggest the fostering into commercial sectors of a greater proportion of Malays and other indigenous peoples.

In conclusion, therefore, there can be no doubt as to the value of this small book. The text is very readable and anyone who has an interest in agriculture has something to gain from reading it. Of course, the book is most suitable for agricultural engineers and economists, but generally I feel interest should be widened to people outside this sector. One must also mention, at this stage, the plethora of useful and valuable references that back up many aspects of the work.

MARK COOK

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE ALLIANCE

Inside the Alliance. Jeremy Joseph. John Martin. £3.50.

Inside the Alliance, written by David Steel's assistant, Jeremy Joseph, with only three years' high level political experience, is refreshing if precocious. The preface by Dick Taverne has little relevance to the narrative. This book is yet another view of the most recent political phenomenon. It is, however, not merely a Liberal view, but a very personal one. It might more appropriately be termed 'One Side of the Alliance.' It entirely misses out the protracted battle over Europe in the seventies which acted as a catalyst to Labour's Social Democrats. Similarly, it is unfamiliar with the Wilson-Callaghan era.

By contrast, the author has his finger firmly on the pulse of the Liberal rank

and file. He seems to regard the Alliance as the seduction of the Liberal Party by the SDP, but in saying 'perhaps' he is clearly meaning 'yes,' albeit not with the fervour of his Party's leader. More seriously, he omits the impact of the SDP in drawing into the political orbit many thousands of people not previously involved in Party politics and so widening the base of the Alliance. Many may be political virgins, but their enthusiasm and the political experience of former Labour (and some Conservative) activists has had a qualitative as well as quantitative effect (if I may use the Marxist dialectic).

The author clearly reflects the often justified suspicion about traditional right wing Labour representatives who see the SDP as a lifeboat rather than a new plane. He pays scant regard to the courage of many who threw away established political careers to plunge into the unknown, and does not attempt to understand the forces at grass roots' level which gave the SDP a base before it was formed at national level.

The emphasis is upon David Steel and his relationship with Roy Jenkins and other members of the 'gang.' Equally, it reflects the tensions in the Liberal Party and the Alliance before and after the honeymoon which culminated at Crosby. It does not get under the skin of the Alliance in the wards and constituencies, although it acknowledges how, having thrown away labels, many Social Democrats and Liberals found an identity of views that surprised them both.

I find his research suspect and, not least, on reading of myself described as the 'candidate for Wealden.' Neither a candidate nor ever hearing of a place called Wealden, I have to question the accuracy of other descriptions. However, when it comes to describing the pressures on Bill Pitt at Croydon, his personal knowledge is invaluable. The writing is fast, witty, sometimes very perceptive, but essentially superficial and without historical perspective.

At the same time, it is well presented and contains contemporary cartoons. It actually entertains and will irritate those who, like me, have contributed in some small way to the Alliance after jettisoning our past—and future prospects. It is a chronicle and a story and it is well told.

PAUL ROSE

THINGS AS THEY ARE

Fairfield Porter. Realist Painter in an Age of Abstraction. Essays by John Ashbery and Kenworth Moffat. Boston Museum of Fine Arts/New York. Graphic Society Books. $35.00.

'You can only buck generalities by attention to fact,' wrote Fairfield Porter, 'so aesthetics is what connects one to matters of fact. It is anti-ideal, it is materialistic. It implies no approval, but respect for things as they are.' In the age of what he defined as art as sociology 'the artist who treats art as though it was raw material for a factory called understanding,' Porter, both as painter and critic, seemed committed to play the role of the little boy in the Emperor's new clothes. As John Ashbery puts it in his extremely intuitive analysis: 'It was his forte to play the role of a Moliere gadfly, an Alceste or a Clitandre in a society of stentorian *précieuses ridicules*.' Born in 1907, educated at Harvard, he mixed an intellectualism based on complete honesty of mind with a passion for paint and colour which evolved from enthusiasm for the natural fulfilment of Impressionism and in particular the late work of Vuillard. Although of the same generation which had developed Abstraer Expressionism in America he pursued himself a very individual and yet very straightforward approach to painting, defined by Kenworth Moffett in the sentence 'Porter's

approach is really an extension nineteenth-century naturalism: nature and its given order are exploited for the sake of art!

This volume of Porter's pictures, together with the two introductory essays referred to, a lengthy interview with the painter by Paul Cummings of the Whitney Museum, made in 1968, and a useful chronology of his career was published to mark the holding of an important retrospective, which opened at Boston this spring and will be seen at Pittsburgh and New York (at the Whitney) next year. Although it suffers in format from being too closely identified with this particular exhibition rather than serving as a definitive catalogue raisonné it is a valuable introduction particularly on this side of the Atlantic where his work, unlike some other of the American realists, is still little known, to this attractive and blazingly honest artist.

Even at the time of his death in 1975 the revival of interest in the present-day manifestation of American realism had not made the impact which it has now. Today this continuation of a tradition which dates back to Eakins a century earlier is a very important feature of contemporary art in the United States and has implications of an international type as well. Rightly, John Ashbery identifies Porter's place in this with a continuing flaring of American genius 'from Emerson and Thoreau to Whitman and Dickinson down to Wallace Stevens and Marianne Moore! In many ways it is one of the most moving and original developments of art in the United States and can be equated with the equally explicit music of Samuel Barber and Aaron Copland which I believe will come to be valued as one of the major cultural achievements of our century.

Fairfield Porter was a late developer, who only really found his feet in the paintings which he produced mostly in a New England setting in the period after the war. Because of his honesty and his individuality he could sometimes be an awkard, almost a deliberately self-controlled painter; as Ashbery suggests: 'He had to contend with an over-active intellect and an over-active conscience . . . somewhere Porter seems to have felt that painting was too selfish an occupation and that entering into it in a wholehearted way was somehow self-indulgent.' In his later work, however, he seems to have reconciled 'the need to justify the artist's profession to himself and to others' and though gaining in freedom, richness and flexibility in his pictures to have achieved a self-reliance which allowed him to place on record his very deep feelings for the world in which he lived. The result is often extraordinarily beautiful. although he does not make the demands on the observer which his friend William de Kooning often makes, Porter's work is not always immediately easy to identify with. Emotionally he seems frequently to be holding the viewer at arm's length, but a study of his painting is, in the result, correspondingly rewarding. The Royal Academy might do well to consider extending their current interst in contemporary American and by mounting an exhibition of his pictures in London as soon as these are available to be seen here. There is a lot to learn from them of America at its best.

ERNLE MONEY

A NEW PORTRAIT OF M. R. JAMES

M. R. James: An Informal Portrait. Michael Cox. Oxford University Press. £14.50.

Full forty-four years Montague Rhodes James had lain in his grave in the small town cemetery of Windsor before, in 1980, Professor Richard William-

Pfaff, of the University of North Carolina, set up his monumental tombstone biography of him. Outwith the courts of Cambridge, the School Yard of Eton, and the antique corridors of academic power and palaeography, James was remembered only as the author of *Ghost Stories of an Antiquary*, and sundry associated dreads and drolls. And now comes a second biography, by Michael Cox. Can the frail figure of the long-dead scholar—even though he was provost of both King's and Eton—support this sudden binate celebration? What can Mr. Cox, in his 268 pages, possibly say that Professor Pfaff, in his 461 pages, left unsaid? Frankly, not much. 'When I began this book,' writes Mr. Cox, prefatorially, 'a biography of M. R. James was long overdue. The principal source of information . . . was S. G. Lubbock's brief 1939 *Memoir*. . . . . Having by then examined the unpublished and not altogether successful attempt at a biographical study of James by Sir Shane Leslie, I began on some serious research into this quintessentially English life, unaware that the Revd. Dr. R. W. Pfaff . . . had already spent some time working on the material. His (book) appeared in 1980, by which time my book was in draft.' Mr. Cox recognises that Pfaff purposed a comprehensive description and assessment of James' scholarship 'within a carefully researched biographical framework.' Mr. Cox's own, more limited, aim has been 'to produce an informal biographical portrait of M. R. James for the general reader.' And this modest objective has been well achieved. Whereas Pfaff constructed a great labyrinth of a book, through which one had to pursue with some diligence the hazy figure of Monty James the man, as opposed to the omnipresent and distinctly formidable bulk of Dr. James the scholar—that is, the palaeographer, the biblical exegetist, the medievalist, iconographer, hagiographer, bibliographer, antiquarian and sovereign expert on stained glass windows—Mr. Cox essays a more personal account of Monty's 'life of quiet distinction.' Treatment of the ghost stories bulks larger here than in Pfaff's volume. No detailed critical analysis is attempted, but there are some interesting notes on their provenance. It is satisfying to learn that the fifth story in *More Ghost Stories of an Antiquary*, 'The Stalls of Barchester Cathedral,' first appeared in *Contemporary Review* in 1910. Considering how widely M.R.J. travelled—by tandem tricycle and bicycle—through France, it seems curious that he never became aware of that strangest of all places, Rennes-le-Château, perched on a steep mountain-top in the eastern foothills of the Pyrenees. Or did he? *vide:* 'The Treasure of Abbot Thomas.'

As Conan Doyle dismissed Holmes, similarly M.R.J. dismissed those supernatural apocryphal stories of his, regarding his work on apocryphal literature as far more likely for significant survival. Sadly, his most widely-read work of scholarship, *The Apocryphal New Testament* (1924), has been largely superseded for biblical and patristic specialists by Wilhelm Schneemelcher's 1959 edition of Edgar Hennecke's *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen*. The ghost stories, however, remain unsuperseded, although they have set a fashion, R. H. Malden and A. N. L. Munby springing to mind as subsequent and successful practitioners in the Jamesian genre.

The particular strength of Mr. Cox's book is its occasional evocation of atmosphere—Christmas at Cambridge, port and pipe-smoke and misogyny in the Senior Combination Room—and odd revelatory flash . . . 'At a . . . dinner in May 1907 he (M.R.J.) sat next to Benson and told him with relish that there were moves in King's to cut down two pine trees in the Fellows' Garden, "one because it spoilt the other, and then the other because it looked so odd alone".' What a lot that tells one of the academic life! And what of Monty himself?

How does he emerge from Mr. Cox's pages? A rather cold, insubstantial presence—ghostlike, you could say. Whistle as you may, he will not come to you.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

BACKGROUND TO BRITISH ELECTORAL POLITICS

The Almanac of British Politics. Richard Waller. Croom Helm, paperback £12.95.

It is safe to say that on election nights many viewers and speculators would have had this book at their hand. It is more valuable than all the comments and analyses of all the pundits put together. The result in the General Election 1983 was determined not just by the voters' choice, but by his or her choice in 650 constituencies, no less than 90% of which were new. The boundary revision has been one of the most thorough in British electoral history—perhaps the most thorough since 1832—and it makes most of the references to parallels with the result in 1979 or earlier largely irrelevant. To this add, of course, MPs or ex-MPs who lost their struggles for readoption, and a series of personal tensions. More than this, this book is valuable for its attempt, in all its brevity, to indicate the ethnic, economic or social character of each 'patch' and not least the extent of its council housing. For this and other social characteristics Robert Waller uses the 1981 census statistics. He has, of course, a splendid American model, in Barone's and Ujifusa's *Almanac of American Politics* which, after every Congressional and Presidential election, offers similar surveys of each of America's constituencies,, and state-by-state assessments too. For Britain, this is a totally unique and most valuable election guide. Each reader will be able to judge it by his or her own constituency; to this reader it was accurate, vivid and very revealing. If there is an interim conclusion, it is of the North/South division of the country, which the election result of 1983 re-confirmed and the increasing polarisation of opinion as a legacy of the growth of suburbanisation and social mobility. This, already evident in 1979, is likely to become a more important—and very disturbing—feature of all future British elections. For them Mr. Waller's book—and, no doubt, its many later editions—will become an indispensable and very welcome guide.

ESMOND WRIGHT

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Politics of Penal Reform (Longman; Paperback, £3.95). This addition to the *Politics Today* series is a stimulating and very controversial contribution by the well known criminologist Mick Ryan to the never ending problem of sentencing criminal offenders. He provides a short post war analysis, in which he argues that there has been a trend away from the 'myth' of rehabilitation to that of punitive 'justice'. He refers to the public's 'punitive obsession'. He also regards some offences such as 'mugging' to have been exaggerated in their incidence

and effect by the press. Like most people, however, he is in favour of cutting down the number of imprisonable offences, for example in cases of petty offenders, including the mentally ill, habitual drunkards, maintenance defaulters, and those on remand. He argues against long prison sentences as self-defeating. He would like to see the abolition of the parole system and have it replaced by remission of sentences. He regards the abolition of prison as 'the final goal'. For the present, he concedes 'for some offenders at least, perhaps under 10%, some time spent in custody seems inevitable'. He has sympathy with the victims of crimes, and financial compensation. 'In cash terms, an immediate start could be made by cutting the police force substantially and using the money saved to establish a property compensation fund.' Reducing the police would hardly be consistent today with Sir Samuel Romilly's basic principle, generally accepted and by the author, that the most effective deterrent is the certainty of conviction.

Leave the Letters Till We're Dead: The Letters of Virginia Woolf 1936-1941. (Chatto & Windus. £5.95). Welcome paperback reprint of the 1980 collection edited by Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann, being the last of the six splendid volumes. The letters are not so profound as the diaries, less considered, in the nature of things, because usually written after the day's creative work, dashed off when Virginia Woolf was tired and nearly (but not quite) off-guard, sometimes elated but rarely betraying depression. The main bulk is the continuous, intimate, teasing correspondence, which she fed upon, with her sister, Vanessa Bell, and with Vita Sackville-West and Ethel Smyth, the members of whose special friendships with her still glowed. The evocation of a life and of a period would be difficult to surpass. The spirited and reasoned defence of Bloomsbury in a carefully drafted letter to Benedict Nicolson is recommended reading. The suicide is scarcely foreshadowed, and although of course known, comes as a shock and a pity.

M. T.

Everyman Fiction. This is a new development in the Everyman Library which has won a great reputation over more than three quarters of a century in the cheap publication of classics to a high standard of presentation. Now the Library is extended under the series title of *Everyman Fiction* to cover in paperback established works of fiction published during this twentieth century. The object is to issue twelve volumes during a year. The first six titles now published are: J. G. Ballard's *The Drowned World* (£2.50) first published in 1963; *Wild Thing* (£2.95) containing ten rock tales by Philip Norman which first appeared 1972-79; the highly entertaining campus novel *Unholy Loves* (£3.50) by the American writer, Joyce Carol Oates; Hugh Fleetwood's *The Order of Death* (£2.50) set in Manhattan, which first appeared in Great Britain in 1976; *Mrs. Caliban and Others* (£2.95) containing three short novels by Rachel Ingalls, they are *Mrs. Caliban, St. George and the Nightclub,* and *The Man Who Was Left Behind.* Finally we have that great classic, Dylan Thomas's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Dog* (£2.25).

Szymon Szechter

A STOLEN BIOGRAPHY

Translated from Polish by Frances Carroll and Nina Karsov

Social satire on a Communist country with a generous dose of fable and fairytale added. . . . An original and unusual novel, the work of a wise and gentle man.
George Mikes in *The Times Literary Supplement*

Brilliant social satire.
Stephen Spenderly

A light-hearted though revealing account of the conflicting influences which can beset the sensitive human being. These influences are deployed as three separate beings.
Rosalind Wade in *Contemporary Review*

Oh, how naive grown-ups are, particularly if they are writers. Always wanting to amaze their readers with something, and so always searching for something new. They take great pains over not so much what they write as how they write it, to make it as original and as odd in form as possible.
Szymon Szechter in *A Stolen Biography*

Hardback £6

Available from bookshops, W. H. Smith and by post from the publishers Nina Karsov, 28 Lanacre Avenue, London NW9 5FN, telephone 01-200 6125

THE REFERENDUM NEWS AND COUNTER BRAINWASHING GAZETTE; ITS THE ONLY MAGAZINE OF ITS KIND IN THE WORLD; ITS THE MAGAZINE THAT TELLS YA WHO IS BRAIN-WASHING WHOM AND WHY.

Harold William Briggs Publications,
106 Wellington Road North, Hounslow,
Middlesex TW4 7AA.

PRICE 50 pence plus 30 pence postage.

PETAL AND THORN: Selected Poems

by Peter Yates

"Mr. Yates is an imaginative poet, and all he writes here has an extreme poetic quality." *The Spectator.*

ISBN 0 9508794 0 1 91pp. Cloth £5.95

Available direct from the Publisher:
PETER WARD, 21 Lennox Gardens, Dollis Hill, London, N.W.10.

BRITISH POETS, 1914-1945

CONTAINS ILLUSTRATED ESSAYS ON

40 POETS OF THE PERIOD

British poetry between 1914 and 1945 is marked by its growing Anglo-American character. During the 1930s and 1940s, many British poets became involved with the social and political problems of the day. Among the socially and politically active poets covered in this volume are W. H. Auden, Stephen Spender, Louis MacNeice, C. Day Lewis, and Edgell Rickword. Also included are the 'war poets' of the 1914-1915 period, Wilfrid Owen, Siegfried Sassoon, Robert Graves, and Isaac Rosenberg.

The bio-critical essays in *British Poets, 1914-1945* begin with a list of the subject's major works. The subject's life is discussed chronologically, while consideration is given to the critical reception and subsequent evaluation of the poet's works. All the essays are illustrated with author portraits, scenes from the poet's life, and photographs of first editions, manuscript, printed pages, and similar items.

BRITISH POETS, 1914-1945 is edited by Donald E. Stanford, Louisiana State University. xii + 431 pages. Illustrations; Bibliographies; Cumulative Index. A Bruccoli Clark Book. Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, 1983. CIP: L.C. Card No. 83-5718. ISBN 0-8103-1702-8. $76.00.

Life Before Birth

By Peter and Mary Harrison — Futura Paperback £2.95

Reincarnation — True or False?

Through the testimony of children comes evidence which establishes the existence of life before birth.

Please send your psychic experiences to ASSAGE, 251 Regent Street, London, W.1. for the Harrisons' new book.

NEW IN CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

THE BATTLE FOR BADGER'S WOOD, by Frederick Covins
"One of the most beautiful children's books for many years".
£2.50

FLY, BIRD! FLY! an odyssey; by Frederick Covins
"Devastating".
£2.50

The first two titles of a new imprint already widely acclaimed in the U.K., with foreign rights being negotiated in at least nine different countries, including the U.S.A.

Available from most bookshops or direct from the publishers:

PIPE ELM PUBLICATIONS

Leigh Sinton, Malvern, Worcestershire WR13 5EA.

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG. Tel. 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

052.008

OCTOBER 1983

SPAIN AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
E. Moxon-Browne

EAST AND WEST AFRICA: POLES OF ATTRACTION
Guy Arnold

INDIA AND BRITAIN: MORE THAN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE
Sir John Lawrence, O.B.E.

COLERIDGE'S BOOKS
Sheila Huftel

and other articles together with a twelve-page Literary Supplement

98p

Contemporary Review

incorporating The Fortnightly

October 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1413 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

Spain at the Threshold of the European Community	E. Moxon-Browne	169
East and West Africa: Poles of Attraction	Guy Arnold	173
India and Britain: More than a Marriage of Convenience	Sir John Lawrence, OBE	179
What After Kreisky?	Hari Stajner	186
The Perils of Post-Industrialism	S. G. Shanker	189
The Liberal and Latin America	Marvin Goldwert	196
Political Power and the Future of Man	Sir Peter Smithers	198
Poem: In the Barn	Bryn Gunnell	205
Coleridge's Books	Sheila Huftel	206
The Spirit of Stirling Bridge	Tom Lannon	209
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		213
Quarterly Fiction Review	Rosalind Wade	213
Non-Fiction Reviews		217
Lord Longford, Richard Whittington-Egan, Rosalind Wade, Betty Abel		
SHORTER REVIEWS		223

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd, 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex U S Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y 10022 Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (Including postage). U K £14 50, U.S A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application Copies can be sent by airmail outside U S and Canada; extra costs given on request U S Postmaster. please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd, 527 Madison Avenue, New York N Y 10022 (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

October 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1413

SPAIN AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

by E. Moxon-Browne

THE result of the 1982 general election in Spain was a convincing endorsement of constitutional monarchy in that country. It was the first time in the country's history that a single party had received an overall majority in the Cortes; and it was also the first time that a Spanish monarch had sworn in a left wing Prime Minister. The oscillation of power from a right-of-centre administration (the Union of the Democratic Centre) to a left-of-centre government led by the Socialists (PSOE) is an early sign that Spain's youthful democracy is fast reaching maturity. The new Government is, in fact, more 'centrist' than its party label might suggest: factors persuading the new Prime Minister, Sr Gonzales, to pursue moderate policies include fear of an Army putsch, and the need to rely on the private sector for a regeneration of the economy.

The Socialist vote was not only a large vote, it was also heterogeneous: hence the need to satisfy not only the groups into which the PSOE made inroads (e.g. bank employees, small businessmen, doctors and voters under 30) but also its traditional support base among trade unionists and the rural poor. Economic policy is the Government's central concern at the moment. Unemployment is 17% and inflation is still in double figures. The Government's electoral promise to create 800,000 jobs in the next four years, and expand welfare and educational services at the same time, looks unlikely to be fulfilled even at the cost of higher and more efficiently collected taxation.

In external affairs, the new Government is pledged to win 'respect' for Spain in its dealings with other countries. This involves re-negotiating, on a more equitable footing, the agreement whereby the United States maintains military bases in Spain. It also means a special formula for Spain's membership of NATO along the lines of the French position (i.e. no commitment of troops but participation in planning and exercises). It will also involve pursuing the Spanish claim to Gibraltar and, somewhat paradoxically, resisting any claim by Morocco to the Spanish-controlled enclaves at Ceuta and Melilla.

The central plank of Spain's foreign policy is the continuation of negotiations to enter the European Community (EC). This goal commands widespread support within the principal political parties and among the electorate. The issue is almost unique in that it also unites the Army, the

Church, the business community and the trade unions. Spain formally applied for EC membership in 1976 and the dilatory progress of the negotiations since has slightly soured the strong Europeanism evident today.

Ever since the EC was established in 1957, it has been the conventional wisdom in the member countries that enlargement of the Community was not only a reflection of its vitality but also a wise investment in the future prosperity of the applicant countries. Enlargement has always had two dimensions: a political dimension in the enhancement of the Community's authority in global negotiations, and an economic dimension in the benefits of an extended 'domestic' market for industry and agriculture in Western Europe. It was also understood, tacitly at least, that the inclusion of Mediterranean countries in the Community would be the best guarantee of their political stability by virtue of anchoring their nascent democracies in the bedrock of rising economic prosperity.

From the viewpoint of the so-called 'applicant' countries, EC membership has been considered politically desirable as a means of exploiting access to 'European' decision-making councils, and economically desirable on account of the extended export markets and eligibility for regional aid that EC membership provides.

The prolonged recession in Western Europe has changed the whole atmosphere for Spain's entry negotiations. Among the present members of the Community there is an air of caution, not to say trepidation, at the prospect of adding Spain's economic problems to those of the Ten. The experience of the Community's newest member—Greece—has not been especially encouraging as its trade deficit with the rest of the Community has widened and, as a result, Athens has requested special aid to tide it over the present crisis. The mood of the EC is now less generous that it was even a year or two ago: the negotiations with Spain now look like being more protracted.

In Spain itself, the economic environment has deteriorated over the past year. The country shares with its European neighbours, only to a worse degree, excessive inflation and rising unemployment. Since the 1970 trade agreement between Spain and the EC, the former has had the benefit of low tariff barriers for its exports to the Community while being able to maintain protective tariffs on its own industries. Eventually, Spain will need to dismantle these tariffs and the only question is how quickly she can be persuaded to do so. The steel industry is symptomatic of the industrial sector generally. Domestic demand has declined and the familiar problems of over-capacity are now being seriously tackled by the Government. Although exports account for nearly half of all steel production (as compared to only one-tenth a decade ago) huge losses are being made ($350 million in 1982). Mr. Solchaga, Spain's industry minister, announced a plan at the end of June involving a shake-out of about 8,000 jobs in steel; a further 10,000 in shipbuilding and 40,000 in textiles. Even these measures, necessary as they are if Spain is to have any hope of regaining West European levels of competitiveness, have provoked strong opposition

among Spanish trade unionists.

There are also problems in the agricultural sector. Olive oil is a major item here and its annual production of 463,000 tonnes is about 60% of that of the Ten. However, Spain's entry to the EEC will not in itself create an olive oil surplus. What will create the surplus is the entry of cheapter vegetable oils into the EEC, virtually tariff-free, and this is something that Spain will have to accept as part of the *acquis communautaire*. There will, therefore, be a surplus of about 200,000 tonnes in the EC and strong pressure on Spain to cut back production. This will not be easy for the Spanish Government, since olive oil is the backbone of the economy in some of the more backward regions of the country (e.g. Andalucia). A greater problem of surplus could arise from Spain's over-production of citrus fruits (self-sufficiency = 235%) and even from other fruit and vegetables where Spain is almost 100% self-sufficient. After entry to the EC, higher support prices under the Common Agricultural Policy could mobilise the potential that exists for even greater production as extended irrigation schemes become financially viable. The fishing industry is another problem area. Under the principles of the Common Fisheries Policy, Spain would be in an advantageous position accounting, as it would, for a quarter of all fishermen in a Community of Twelve, and a quarter of the enlarged Community catch in terms of quantity.

Before the entry negotiations are concluded, it is impossible to estimate accurately what burden Spain will impose on the Community budget. What seems likely is that Spain will benefit from the budget to the tune of about £800 million per annum; and this prospect is bound to act as a catalyst for a serious reappraisal of the Community's financing by the present members.

The economic problems posed by Spanish entry to the EC are sufficient to arouse strong opposition to the idea in countries like France and Italy where farmers, in particular, see a threat to their livelihood. But there are also some political problems. Some kind of *modus vivendi* will have to be achieved between Britain and Spain over Gibraltar. Spain's membership of NATO could provide a useful umbrella under which the issue might lose some of its urgency. As a NATO base, Gibraltar might see the Spanish flag flying alongside other NATO flags, thus satisfying at one level Spanish *amour propre*. More tangibly, however, Gibraltar's strategic position at the entrance to the Mediterranean, and its vulnerability to air attack, make it sensible for its defence to be integrated with that of Spanish airspace in the region.

Another political issue is the Basque problem. Spain resents the ease with which terrorist suspects have been able to lie low in S.W. France. The French Government has been unwilling, for the most part, to extradite suspects to Spain for trial for fear of stirring up trouble in its own Basque region. While this policy could be defended in Franco's time on the grounds that ETA suspects might not get a fair trial, this is no longer a plausible argument and grates harshly on Spain's new democracy, a democracy that is rightly proud of its credentials and has, in any case,

conceded considerable autonomy to the Basques.

The consensus that exists between the main parties in Spain on the question of EC entry is supported by widespread interest in, and enthusiasm for, European integration among the Spanish public. Opinion surveys, carried out at regular intervals by the EC Commission, enable us to chart the 'European mood' in Spain over the last two years. At the end of last year 38% of Spaniards said they were 'very much for' efforts being made to unify Western Europe—a higher level of support than in many current member countries of the EC. This generally favourable attitude is reflected in the 48% of Spaniards who feel that accession of their country to the EC would be a 'good thing'—a level of approval lower, however, than three years ago possibly due to the entry negotiations becoming protracted. As in other West European countries, support for EC membership is stronger among the younger age groups but, overall, enthusiasm for the EC has waned as negotiations have run into obstacles. Those claiming to be 'very much interested' in the EC fell from 32% to 24% between 1980 and 1982 while those 'not at all interested' rose from 26% to 32% in the same period. There is clearly a lot of uncertainty in Spain about exactly what the EC will involve: about 70% of Spaniards claim that they are not 'sufficiently informed' about the Community.

Despite the problems, it seems inevitable that Spain (and Portugal) will be members of the EC by about 1986. Politically, it is very much in the interests of the Ten that the new democracies of the Iberian peninsula should be reinforced by closer contacts with Western Europe. Already, opinion in Spain has turned towards the EC: the psychological barrier of the Pyrenees is being broken down just as new motorways between Spain and France have pierced the physical barrier. The entry of Spain will undoubtedly present the Community with new challenges, especially on the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the removal of tariffs between Spain and the rest of the EC. The institutions of the EC will be faced by a new language, new participants, and new interests to be accommodated. Instead of continuing to muddle through on the basis of patched up compromises as at present, the Community should face up to the various long-standing problems that Spain's accession will bring to a head.

[Edward Moxon-Browne is a Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the Queen's University of Belfast. He is the author of *Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland* (Gower, 1983) and a contributor to J. Lodge (ed.) *Terrorism: A Challenge to the State* (Martin Robertson, 1981). He has also published a number of articles on European integration.]

EAST AND WEST AFRICA: POLES OF ATTRACTION

by Guy Arnold

NO African countries, apart from South Africa and Zimbabwe, receive as much press coverage in Britain as do Nigeria and Kenya. Developments in each country since independence have been instructive. Each has experienced a number of political changes as well as substantial alterations in economic fortunes. Each set off at independence in high hopes accompanied at that time by suitable gestures of approbation by Britain. Each has recently been to the polls for a crucial general election.

Much of the news which comes out of Africa these days is distorted or just depressing: drought, wars, rebellions, refugees, coups, economic collapse. Too often progress is not reported.

Robert Gardiner (now retired) was for many years the ECA's Executive Secretary. He was also one of the most respected international civil servants Africa has produced and at the end of the 1960s he was responsible for pushing the idea of a Trans-African Highway to traverse the continent from east to west. The Highway would begin (or end) in Mombasa at one extremity and Lagos at the other. These two cities represented the poles of attraction: each was a major port servicing one of Africa's more thriving economies. Between Kenya and Nigeria the Highway had to pass through Uganda, Zaire, the Central African Republic and Cameroon and while at either end traffic flows were then in excess of 2,000 vehicles per twenty-four hours (along the Kenya stretch) and higher still in the Nigeria stretch, the flows dwindled to as little as 12 vehicles in 24 hours through most of Zaire and the Central African Republic and did not do much better in Cameroon. Those figures illustrate one of Africa's geographic-economic problems.

The highway has not come into being, partly for political but mainly for economic-cost reasons; but in development terms the two 'end' countries remain among the most important on the continent.

Today Nigeria is the focus of attention in West Africa and, indeed, in Black Africa as a whole. It is one of the world's top oil producers and exporters; it has huge development plans and, for example, provides Britain with her largest export market outside OECD countries. The Nigerian population is now over 80 million and it is the only black African country that in any real sense can be regarded as a power outside the continent.

Furthermore, Nigeria has been through a full political circle since independence: inherited 'Westminster' pattern of government; breakdown leading to military takeover; civil war and the Biafra secession attempt; further change of military government by coup; a return to civilian rule. In general terms the country is firmly capitalist and western oriented.

Unlike Nigeria with its relatively peaceful transition to independence Kenya first had to survive the traumas of Mau Mau which overshadowed the 1950s. With virtually no natural resources Kenya concentrated upon

the land and cash crops for export to become one of the few agricultural success stories on the continent. From independence to 1978 the country's political life was dominated by the powerful personality of Jomo Kenyatta and though there were political hiccups and crises it was a period of general progress. When the peaceful transition from Kenyatta to Moi occurred in 1978 Kenya was regarded as one of the most stable countries on a far from settled continent.

Both countries were buffeted by the effects of world recession as they entered the 1980s; each is now in the throes of economic readjustment. Both remain on the right of Africa's political spectrum.

In 1975, following the OPEC oil price rises of 1973-74, Nigeria was able to launch her first massive development plan, based almost entirely upon expected oil revenues. A second and even larger plan was launched at the beginning of the present decade but almost at once and frequently thereafter this has had to be adjusted downwards. The adjustments are the result of world recession and a drastic fall in demand for oil.

Apart from her oil and certain major industrial developments funded by it—steel and the new petrochemical industry—the Nigerian economy is simply not sufficiently wide-based to weather the oil depression. Moreover, too much has come to depend upon oil revenues while the boom of the 1970s has accustomed the country to patterns of spending which it must now unlearn. Agriculture has been neglected so that today the annual food import bill is in the region of N1,500m—a figure the economy cannot easily meet and one which in any case ought to be made unnecessary by home production.

Now the important question for Nigeria is whether the current (1983) depression and cutbacks represent only a temporary phenomenon or a more lasting state of affairs. It is not enough to wait—as politicians too easily are tempted to do—until the recession ends and oil revenues pick up once more; it is more a question of developing alternative aspects of the economy to oil—and particularly agriculture—so that the degree of dependence upon oil may be permanently lessened. There are not many signs that this is being adequately contemplated, let alone attempted.

It was Daniel arap Moi's misfortune that his coming to power should coincide with the ending of the boom conditions of the mid-1970s, the further increase in oil prices and the growing world recession each of which affected what up to that time had been regarded as the Kenya economic miracle. The country, it is true, had done remarkably well at agriculture and its very success perhaps had led the government to take performance for granted—a dangerous but easy enough trap into which to fall—so that at the end of the decade insufficient attention was paid to the problem of incentives for farmers.

The difficulties the country faced led to discontents which certainly fuelled the attempted coup by the Air Force Regiment on August 1, 1982. The coup itself was bungled and, indeed, provided an almost textbook example of how not to mount a coup. But in its wake came a year of troubled political self-examination that hopefully will be put to rest after

the September elections. Meanwhile, Charles Njonjo, the 'kingmaker', who supported Moi for the presidency, resigned as Member of Parliament after having been relieved of his cabinet post as Minister of Constitutional Affairs pending the results of the official inquiry into the allegations that he was being groomed by an outside power to replace Moi as President. He, of course, denies the allegations but the fact that they have been made and the seriousness with which they have been taken are at least as important as will be any possible future revelations.

1983 is the second election year under the new Nigerian constitution which went into effect in 1979 when the military handed back power to the civilians. Nigeria is one of the world's largest multi-party democracies —only India, the USA and Japan have bigger populations going to the polls—and the vibrancy of its politics mean that the elections will be an event of major importance to Africa.

It is not difficult to find faults with the political process in Nigeria: it can be violent and high-handed while the public auction of promises can easily enough induce cynicism. At the same time it is, arguably, the most open system in Africa and it is important it should remain so. On a continent where too often the military have been tempted to seize and then keep power or alternatively where the power-hungry have managed easily enough to institutionalise one-party dictatorships it is encouraging that the largest black state should allow maximum political choice. There will have been plenty of shouting and accusations—those form part of the rumbustious political scene; but at the same time August witnessed not one but a series of five elections: for President, for Senate, for House of Representatives, for state governors and state parliaments. With the election over, Nigeria's new rulers face formidable economic and development problems for the remainder of the decade.

In an obvious desire to clear the political air and, hopefully, put an end to the rumours and speculation which have formed too prominent a part of Kenyan life for the last year President Moi called the general election for September 1983, a year in advance of the scheduled date. Kenya now is formally a *de jure* one party state but she, too, has experienced a number of political changes and upheavals since independence. The country became a *de facto* one party state at the end of 1964 when Ronald Ngala and Daniel arap Moi disbanded KADU to cross the floor of the house and join KANU. For the next two years parliament had some of the most lively debates in its history as backbenchers virtually took on the role of unofficial opposition. When Oginga Odinga broke with Kenyatta in 1966, however, he formed his KPU and for the next three years there was once more a formal opposition party. The crisis which followed Tom Mboya's death by assassination in 1969 led to the banning of the KPU and for all practical purposes Kenya has been a *de facto* one party state since then, finally becoming a *de jure* one party state in 1982. Yet this emphatically has not meant the end of democratic practices as is too easily supposed in Britain. Every election under the single party system has seen a substantial turnover of seats with both ministers and backbenchers falling victim to party opponents depending

upon their earlier performances.

Kenyan sensitivity to outside criticism erupted more than once during 1983. There was anger at a somewhat patronising leader in the *Times* as well as over speculations about the suggestion that Britain was the power behind a Kenyan politician supposedly being groomed to step into Moi's shoes. And then this June when the British Minister for Overseas Development, Mr. Timothy Raison, visited Kenya to look at aid projects President Moi referred to the presence in London of Kenyan dissidents and the attacks they launched upon their country from Britain. The President made the point that democracy in Africa is younger than in Britain and went on to say: 'You should restrain these dissidents from Africa who choose to attack their home governments from your soil.' President Moi is wrong in this: it is not Britain's business to control what dissidents from Africa (or anywhere else for that matter) say in Britain always provided they do not break the law. He is wrong for asking Britain to do so; but still more is he wrong to worry and that perhaps is a point Kenya might learn from Nigeria. Democracy thrives on dissidence: restraint is too easy. It may, temporarily, make for an easier governmental life but it almost never solves longterm problems.

In the case of both Nigeria and Kenya it is worth asking how much failure to achieve economic breakthroughs since independence has been due to internal failings and how much to external factors wholly or at any rate mainly beyond their control. Neither country has much influence on the world economic situation though as a major oil supplier Nigeria can play a marginal role while the size of her population makes her an attractive market. But both countries have a substantial part to play in regional economic terms—at least in theory—although so far the regional picture has not been encouraging.

One of the last formal achievements of General Gowon before the coup which ousted him from power was to bring the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) into being at the end of May 1975. Since then this regional economic grouping has achieved very little. The theory behind ECOWAS is fine. The practice depends upon changing economic patterns which were established in the colonial age. Less than 6 per cent of total African trade is intra-continental and this pattern also applies to West Africa. If ECOWAS is to thrive, therefore, it must account for a much larger percentage of regional trade than at present and there appears little obvious prospect of it doing so in the near future. There is a further problem: as the giant of the region Nigeria is looked upon with a certain apprehension by her smaller neighbours who fear economic or political domination—or both. The delicate relationship of Nigeria to the rest of West Africa was brought out earlier this year at the time of the Nigerian expulsion of approximately one million illegal aliens, mainly Ghanaians, from her territory. Despite considerable adverse criticism and press comment more from outside than inside the continent the expulsions went surprisingly smoothly and caused a minimum of ill-feeling in the region. This, in part, was because the other countries of the region wished to keep their

own options open in relation to immigrant groups within their borders. There was little African criticism of the Nigerian move which was undoubtedly popular at home.

Yet if to date the history of ECOWAS has been one of slow progress so that cynics can argue that it has survived only because it has not really tried to alter anything that has not been the case in East Africa.

It is the conventional wisdom that the East African Community broke down because the economy of Kenya was too strong in relation to those of its two partners—Tanzania and Uganda—and that Kenya attracted a disproportionate share of investment from outside. There was a good deal of truth in that and efforts were made, most notably in 1967, to compensate the other two partners although in the end to no avail. The community ceased to function in the 1970s after Amin had come to power in Uganda and Nyerere refused to deal with him: in consequence the High Authority which consisted of the three heads of state stopped meeting and no decisions could be taken.

What has been an inexcusable failure of African diplomacy, however, is the fact that for six years now the border between Tanzania and Kenya has remained closed. It is easy enough to cast blame but that is not the point. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania has made an effort commensurate with the need to overcome their differences and open the border again. This inability or unwillingness on the part of two of the continent's most sophisticated states to resolve their disagreements is one of the Africa's more glaring failures of recent years.

What lessons do these two have for the continent and indeed for Africa watchers from outside? The West is only too ready to read Africa lessons or see disaster looming (and not least it may be added when the disasters are a result of earlier western policies). Can we in reverse read lessons from the developments and problems these countries have experienced over the last twenty years?

If there is any lesson to read from politics it is simply that politics never solve anything. Politicians, no doubt, will react with horror to such a statement yet it is as true for left-wing or right-wing, democratic or dictatorial regimes. Government at most, and best, is usually little more than a holding operation, a caretaker to make the processes of national living and survival go somewhat more smoothly. It is interesting that since independence in both Nigeria and Kenya there have been no promises of future utopias. At most, governments have made extravagant promises—at elections or in relation to particular problems to be solved. More usually they have had the sense to argue that the policies they pursue will do something to alter the current situation for the better—but no more. Both countries have had realistic governments. Progress is never final. And what may appear to be a substantial breakthrough one year is seen in a quite different light a year or so later.

It is always easy to criticise. Both countries have some glaring faults—for example, the over-eager acquisitiveness of those with power at the upper levels: the much discussed African elites. Such behaviour is conspicuous and easily attracts adverse comment.

But the record of the last twenty years bears witness to some remarkable advances: in the availability of education and the growth of literacy; in health and other services; in infrastructure; and, however difficult to believe against the current poor economic figures, in levels of prosperity. Despite the many economic failures, more people enjoy more amenities and a greater (even if only marginal) share of national wealth than formerly. And, a fact that British readers may find hard to accept, these countries are actually freer than they were before independence. Colonialism, however enlightened, was not democratic. This year Nigeria and Kenya will have elected new governments and, despite the imperfections of their two political systems, the people will decide what direction they are to take over the next few years.

At the beginning of June—the twentieth anniversary of internal self-government in his country—President Moi announced an amnesty for 8,463 prisoners. Of course it was a political gesture and with an election coming up the point was not lost on the part of the President's opponents. Yet freedom is always relative. In a continent where two often outsiders suggest that it is denied altogether these two countries remain remarkably open societies where oppressions are the exception.

What is rarely understood in the West is the extent to which they are subjected to extra pressures. A recent example makes the point. Earlier this year Nigeria sought a loan of $2bn from European bankers and when eventually, after lengthy haggling, the bankers provided her with a loan for $1.6bn it was at 1¼% above LIBOR (London interbank rate) with an additional ¼% front end charge. At approximately the same time France obtained a loan for a comparable amount—$1.8bn (the bankers had pressed more upon France than she had requested)—and she was only obliged to pay ⅛% over LIBOR. Now, taking into account all the arguments abour credit worthiness and the difference between the standing of the two economies, the fact is that Nigeria has never defaulted on a debt and, to use a bankers' phrase, is under-borrowed. Moreover Nigeria represents one of Europe's best trading partners. But, as always, the West argues that such a 'developing' country represents a risk; therefore, instead of lessening the risk by granting easier terms, the bankers enhance the risk for the future by 'screwing' out of Nigeria as much as they think she can stand. Such an attitude is not untypical of that which all developing countries face.

Kenya and Nigeria are vastly different in size, style, politics and people; they nonetheless merit comparison since both attract a good deal of attention. Both have approached development in broadly capitalist terms and despite many problems both have managed to 'notch' up a good many more credits than debits in the process of their development since independence. It has not been a bad record in either case, often against fierce odds. Now, with the elections over and with Shehu Shagari re-elected as President of Nigeria and Daniel arap Moi unopposed as President of Kenya, the two countries must again turn their full attention to the urgent and continuing problems of development.

INDIA AND BRITAIN: MORE THAN A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE

by Sir John Lawrence, O.B.E.

IF any date is to be set for the moment when the British became paramount in India, it is 4th May, 1799 when shortly before two o'clock in the afternoon the breach was taken at Seringapatam. From then on it could no longer be doubted who would be master throughout the subcontinent.

It was the day before Lieutenant Alexander Lawrence's first wedding anniversary. He celebrated it by leading the Forlorn Hope into the breach, where he was left for dead, while the army went on to take the city, kill Tipoo Sultan and destroy his army. When the conquerors came back after several hours fighting one of the men found that Lawrence was still alive, put him on his back and carried him to camp. He recovered, and ever since then his family have been bound up with India in ways that are indeed part of the historical record but which also carry overtones that are not easily caught in historical writing.

The relation between Britain and India has already lasted nearly four hundred years and has rightly been compared by Philip Mason to the relation of two people who have been married for a very long time. The meeting between Europe and India, as I see it, is a process of creative discovery which began five centuries ago with Vasco da Gama and will continue far into an unknowable future. A glance at the map of the Eurasian land mass may remind us how much the world owes to the two sub-continents, the European and the Indian.

In what follows I use 'India' in its historical connotation to include the whole of the sub-continent and at certain times even Burma and Sri Lanka. The coming together of Europe and India is one of the great formative elements in world history, one of those things which determine the way the world is growing. And it is a fact that Britain was the chosen vessel through which this meeting took place, and that fact gives it much of its special character. The French, or some other nation, might have played the British role in India and might have played it better or worse.

Anglo-Indian history is extraordinarily interesting in itself but it must also be seen in a wider perspective. I do not believe that human history is a meaningless sequence of chance events—'what is life but one damned thing after another', as the young man says in the Bernard Shaw play—nor do I believe that history goes round and round in cycles. I believe that there is a direction in events, a purpose, one that is greater than the people who take part in them, as some of the greatest actors in the Anglo-Indian story fully realised. However, the actors often mistake the purposes of providence. The Marquess of Dalhousie was a great man in his way and a devout Christian, with a belief in the purpose of life, but I cannot share his too simple and insensitive view of the merits of European rule over Indians. And, though I share the Christian faith of Herbert

Edwardes, it sems to me that he applied it too simply to the problems of his own age and place. The purposes of history may not be easy to discern, but purposes there are.

European and Indian qualities are complementary, and humanity will not grow to its full stature until the interaction of these two races and cultures has worked itself out to the full. This process is a part of the growth of the human race to the fullness of the stature of Christ. I say this as a Christian but similar thoughts can be expressed in secular terms or in the language of another religion. It may seem fanciful to speak of historical events in terms of purpose, but fashions change, and in a few years what now seems to be fanciful may well carry conviction. Purpose in history cannot be proved or disproved. Academically, therefore, the question remains open.

Be that as it may, the crucial importance for all humanity of this meeting of Europe and the Indian sub-continent cannot be denied. For the first 150 years Europe received more from Mogul India than she gave. Then, for the nearly two hundred years of the British Raj, Britain probably gave more than she received.

The British Raj was the consequence of fighting. In the eighteenth century all the European nations had a military superiority over Indian armies, as they then were. First, the two chief European contenders fought each other, and the British beat the French. The Mogul Empire was at that time in utter dissolution, and many of the successor states fought the British one by one. Every time, the British won. They imposed peace, and maintained it for several generations. The Raj began with force and force was always in the background. But all things considered, it took surprisingly little force to secure peace in India.

It is misleading to consider the relation of Britain and India purely, or even mainly, in terms of aggression worked out in a colonial situation. There were other factors, some of them were economic; all of them need to be seen in perspective. And, however the military, economic and social factors are evaluated, the result was that two very different races met in a close relation generation after generation.

They interacted in ways that are perennially interesting, and much of the interest lies in intangibles which may easily escape the nets spread by historians and journalists. True, we have family quarrels; and we know each other's weaknesses well enough; but the meeting of British and Indians produces a remarkable psycho-chemical transformation. British people who have spent any length of time anywhere in the sub-continent always retain a very warm feeling for those they have known there; and when they return to the familiar places they receive a heart-warming welcome. Is it too much to say that on both sides, when there has been resentment, it has often been the resentment of the rejected lover? At any rate the feeling is a warm one, and it can retain its warmth for generation after generation in the same family. Anyone who frequents gatherings of British people who have been connected with India must have noticed this. Before independence it would have been plausible to

explain these feelings in terms of self interest, pride in belonging to a ruling group, and the prospect of an interesting and well paid career in the sub-continent. If this were all, this special feeling for India would have died away after independence. But, manifestly, this has not happened. It seems rather that a sub-continental germ is implanted in childhood, and that it is the *dharma* of certain British families to be bound up with the sub-continent that it becomes part of their fulfilment to serve the peoples of that sub-continent.

Of course, there were barriers on both sides. The English upper-class have always been too aloof, both towards other classes in their own country and still more so towards foreigners. On the other side there were the barriers of caste among Hindus, with purdah and other social barriers among the Moslems. Unfortunately, the British accommodated themselves all too easily to the caste system in ways that are interesting to analyse but cannot be excused. After making a good start socially during the period of Clive and Warren Hastings, the British set themselves apart in a way that made intimate friendships between equals thoroughly difficult so long as the Raj lasted. Hence the germ of truth, and I think it is only a germ, contained in E. M. Forster's *A Passage to India*. Perhaps it is more important that there were always those who regretted these barriers and tried to overcome them.

The relation between pupil and teacher has always been very close in the sub-continent; and the European teachers in schools and colleges—many of them missionaries—were able to build on this foundation in a way that sometimes combined the best of Europe with the best of India. Not infrequently, in the army, too, the relations between the races were close in a different but equally fruitful way. It would be interesting to write a history of the Indian Army as a civilising influence from Clive down to the present. No one is likely to idealise the relations of the two races, but at their frequent best there has been much that was, and is, creative in them.

Alas, as it grew older the Raj became increasingly set in its patterns. And this happened just at the time when these patterns were ripe for change. But it is good to remember that the wisest of that creative generation of Anglo-Indian statesmen who flourished at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries foresaw the end of the Raj almost at its beginning. It will be enough to mention Sir Thomas Munroe, Sir John Malcolm and Mountstuart Elphinstone. They never ceased to marvel at the extraordinary series of events which had given the lordship of Southern Asia to a tiny group of Europeans. In the next generation Henry Lawrence was of the same mind, and he was not alone in this, but by his time there were already too many of those who thought that the British were born to rule and to rule for ever.

Henry Lawrence used to contrast British 'arrogance and insolence in ordinary times' with the 'dastard fear' shown by many when the news was bad. More than anyone he was aware of the precarious nature of British rule but he did not conclude that it should or could be strengthened

by harshness, though he did believe that rulers should be firm. Obviously the time had not come for the British to withdraw, but he looked ahead. His essay on the *Military Defence of Our Indian Empire*, written a hundred and forty years ago, concluded as follows:

> We cannot expect to hold India for ever. Let us so conduct ourselves in our civil and military relations so that, when the connection ceases, it may do so, not with convulsions but with mutual esteem and affection; and that England may then have India a noble ally, enlightened and brought into the scale of nations under her guidance and fostering care. (*Essays Military and Political p.59-60*)

That was the ideal, although it was not always realised. There were convulsions; and the sub-continent is now divided between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. But do not these countries constitute, using Henry Lawrence's words, 'just such noble allies' as he longed to see?

In the year 1848 the Punjab was still an independent kingdom. And Henry Lawrence, as Resident at the court of Lahore, was, by the terms of the treaty of Byrowal, in effect the uncrowned King of the Punjab, holding the Kingdom in trust for the infant Dalip Singh, though with powers 'extending over every department and to any extent'. The outlines of the story are familiar but some of the relevant documents have not been previously published.

Lawrence's instructions were to work through the existing machinery of government, which indeed was what he wished to do. It must, however, be remembered that in general Indian public life had fallen to a very low level during the break up of the Moghul empire. And in the Punjab during the anarchy after the death of Ranjit Singh there had been an almost complete collapse of public morality. Office was sought purely for the money that could be made by bribery and oppression and the public administration of justice hardly existed. There were no judges as such. The tax farmers dealt with crimes if they had a mind to; but in general things just took their course without police or courts. The 'cry of oppression was very loud'—that was George Lawrence's phrase. But Henry Lawrence was reluctant to interfere. In reporting to the central government, he wrote:

> I have called the attention of the Durbar to their provincial agents, whom they are ready enough to eject. But this I am far from thinking is the surest remedy. A few signal examples are useful, but I tell the Durbar that it is better to hold out inducements to good than to be making constant changes; for assuredly the shorter the tenure of office the greater will be the plunder and oppression.

Henry Lawrence often had to restrain the zeal of his European subordinates, discouraging 'all direct interference and indeed all interference that could be avoided'. And after a shaky start the best of the Sikh sirdars began to give their sincere co-operation. The case of Dewan Dina Nath is interesting. Earlier, in his *Adventures of an Officer*, Henry Lawrence had characterised him as the 'accountant and Auditor General of the Sikh Kingdom, passing nothing without vouchers': a plausible way to teach crooked dealing, 'for who that will cheat will not fabricate?'

But now he praised Dina Nath for his 'clear head, cold heart and business-like habits', adding that he 'generally visits me at my house every two or three days', when 'he speaks out like a European'. Henry Lawrence

always emphasised that those rulers who were corrupt and oppressive had been brought up in a very bad school. Given a chance, they might improve, like Dina Nath.

But there were failures. Rungore Singh who was appointed chief judge, was one of them. Henry Lawrence described him as 'a rather ill-tempered person of loose habits' who wanted to appoint only his own corrupt followers as subordinate judges. But no one better could be found.

> I therefore made much of the Sirdar, tried to win him to propriety and to make him see that his interest lay in honesty,

promising him a good *jaghir* if he behaved well. But all was to no avail. Rungore behaved with bad faith, rudeness and dishonesty throughout. Finally, he was caught seditiously concealing some cannon on his land and when taxed with it said he had been dishonoured and would resign. So Henry suggested to the Durbar that they should take him at his word. They agreed with alacrity and in five minutes flat appointed a certain General Khan Singh Man in his place. Lawrence agreed, as he could think of no one better, and it turned out that this was quite a satisfactory appointment.

My final illustration of the methods of Henry Lawrence at this key period of his career is the case of Sirdar Lena Singh, who was made judge of the Sikh homeland, the Manjha. After two or three conversations with Henry Lawrence he set out instructions for his own subordinates. Though prepared under the orders of the Durbar these appeared to be entirely Lena Singa's 'own concoction' and as Henry Lawrence said, 'very creditable to his good sense'. In reporting this to his friend the Governor General, Lord Hardinge, Lawrence adds:

> Thus it is that I wish as far as possible to allow the Durbar not only to work with their own tools but to prepare their own instructions.

These events occurred at a time when the fortunes of India were at a low ebb and Britain was riding high. Times have changed since then, and this particular experiment was cut short by the tragedy of the Second Sikh War, for which much blame must be laid on British mismanagement. Many other opportunities have been missed over two hundred years. Warren Hastings wanted to have Indians in high posts with only a few Europeans as their colleagues; he was frustrated not by Indian corruption but by British nepotism. Powerful British politicians wanted jobs for their friends and Hastings was in no position to oppose them. But he kept this ideal to the end of his life. In 1812 when he was an old man, long retired from India, he wrote to his namesake, the Marquess of Hastings, who had just been appointed Governor General:

> Among the natives of India there are men of as strong intellect, as sound integrity, and as honourable feelings as any of this kingdom. I regret that they are not sufficiently noticed, employed nor respected as much as they deserve to be. Be it your Lordship's care (forgive my good Lord, this imperative style) to lessen this distance: be their especial patron, friend or protector, and by your example make it the fashion among our countrymen to treat them with courtesy and as participators in the same equal rights of society with themselves.

In his own generation Henry Lawrence was conspicuous among those who maintained that there must be 'a career open to talent' for the natives of the sub-continent. If France and Russia had Moslem generals, he asked, why could not Britain have Moslems and Hindus in high office,



both in the army and in the administration? This necessary reform was delayed far too long and the delay cost both Britain and India dear but, when it came, fellow officers in the army and colleagues in the Indian Civil Service co-operated in almost perfect harmony. In reading the reminiscences of members of the Indian Civil Service who served in the last thirty years of the Raj, there is nothing but the author's name to show whether the author is a British or Indian member of the service.

The continuity of administrative personnel has been perhaps the most important factor in preserving contact between the British Raj and the successor states which emerged in 1947 and afterwards, but there were, of course, other factors as, for example, the English language and the law courts. This last surprises as much as it delights. In the first half of the last century it was widely held that traditional village justice brought out the best, whereas the alien law courts brought out the worst in Indian life. In particular, British rules of evidence often led to a travesty of justice. Yet in the end the graft was entirely successful, as may be seen from the careers of Mahatma Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, to mention no others. So the spirit of English law lives on, as do some externals. A barrister in a *mofussil* town in India tucks his brief under his arm at exactly the same angle as a barrister at the law courts in Great Britain. The manners and customs of British law were evolved as a part of the *gravitas* which should go with the administration of justice. And Indians share with the British a strong feeling for ceremonial.

Educational links have been of rather a different kind. The traditional educational systems of the sub-continent are about as different from European education as they could be. Should more of the indigenous tradition have been preserved? Was it right to graft a purely European education onto an oriental stock? A different system would surely have produced different, and possibly better, results. However, the European inspired schools and colleges, especially the English medium schools, have brought forth far more than their share of the leadership in the sub-continent over many years. Most of these schools and colleges have been Christian foundations. In the Indian sub-continent the example of one good man can do more good than anywhere else in the world, and for this reason one of the keys to progress lies in giving increased support to those schools and colleges where the leaders of the next generation are being trained.

There have always been influences both ways, but in the past these have seldom reached their full growth by reason of the lack of equality in the imperial relation. The British were always the masters, just because they were British. When the Lawrences passed through Egypt in 1849, Honoria Lawrence observed 'It was new and pleasant for me to feel among Orientals just on an equality'. Thank God that equality can now be taken for granted. This makes it possible for mutual influences to develop for the first time to their full potentiality.

Before 1947 the influence of Indian religions on the European consciousness was already great but even in that field the European influence on

India was strong. Present day Hinduism has developed a long way since the Abbé Dubois wrote his classic account of it at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries. A part of the change is due to material influences, some of them emanating from Europe, but another, important, part is due to the Christian presence in the sub-continent. To take only two examples of this, Duncan Forrester has shown recently how the Protestant missions seem to have played a vital part in changing attitudes to caste. And the revaluation of the Bhagavad Gita over the last two hundred years owes something to European influences. Such changes have helped to prepare the way for a new and deeper encounter in certain places between Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism, even if the same cannot yet be said of Islam. No one can see the end of this joint exploration, and we cannot assume in advance that we are all on the same road, but, speaking as a Christian, I am convinced that our understanding of our own faith will be greatly changed and enlarged when we have spent, say, fifty years listening to what the other religions are saying to us.

Descending from these theological heights to the high street of any British city, the effect that shopkeepers from the sub-continent are now having on retail trade in this country is immediately apparent. Not only are they providing valuable services: they are restoring the Victorian virtues of thrift, enterprise and hard work. And that is an important contribution at this stage of our national evolution.

In conclusion I shall be happy if we can agree that the long association between Britain and India imposes an obligation to build on the foundations which are already there. And this is what the recently re-named South Asia Educational Fellowship proposes to go on doing on an expanding scale.

SAEF was founded in 1880 as the Indian Church Aid Association. Its foundation reflected the continued commitment to India of those who had spent their working lives there. The partition of the sub-continent and the establishment of United Churches necessitated a change of name to one which reflects the work more accurately. Throughout the hundred and three years of the Fellowship's existence, the work of fostering leadership through education has been emphasised. The field of operation has mainly been the old Indian Empire and Ceylon, the area of the previous Anglican Province of the Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon. Now, the establishment of united churches has changed SAEF from an Anglican society to an ecumenical one, free to serve the whole of South Asia, through all the main line churches. This is acknowledged as one of the most important areas of co-operation, yet there are many others. Everyone will think of different examples of interaction. Sport, for instance, from polo and cricket to shooting, leading on by a natural, if unexpected, twist to ecology and the conservation of nature; or the arts, painting, literature and dancing, so strongly emphasised in the 1982 *Festival of India*. Wherever one looks with a seeing eye the co-operation is likely to have a creative quality which is not often found in the relations between peoples.

WHAT AFTER KREISKY?

by Hari Stajner

THE recent parliamentary elections in Austria resulted in a paradoxical situation. Although the Socialist Party remained definitely the strongest political force in the country; having 48 per cent of all the votes, and only two seats short of an absolute majority in parliament, people insisted that the party had been defeated.

The explanation of this should be sought in the watchword of the Socialists' election campaign. Their leader, and at that time Chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky sought an absolute majority vote which would have enabled him alone, without the aid of any other party, to govern the country. When the election results showed that this goal had not been attained, he retired from this post of Chancellor. Soon, he intends also to relinquish his position as President of the Socialist Party. This is why people in Austria and elsewhere talk about the end of an era which bears the hallmark of Bruno Kreisky's powerful personality and policy.

Even those politicians in Austria in direct opposition to the Socialists now speak of the former Chancellor in the highest terms. Austrian information media are extolling the man who left the political stage so suddenly and unexpectedly, but with the greatest dignity. No one doubts any longer that Bruno Kreisky put his seal on the Second Republic, unlike any other post-war politician in Austria, during his long political career in the capacity of Secretary of State, Foreign Minister, leader of the opposition and finally as Chancellor, a function he carried for the last thirteen years.

Thirteen years of absolute power for a party is a record not only for Austria, but for all countries ruled by parliamentary democracy. From 1970 to April 25, 1983 Kreisky simply had no worthy opponent.

Outside his own country, Kreisky was certainly less known as the invincible leader of the Socialists or even as Chancellor of Austria. His name was associated with his active, often successful personal efforts to settle numerous international problems. Even before 1970 when the Socialists came into power, Bruno Kreisky, as Minister for Foreign Affairs put his mark on Austria's active neutral policy. In a certain way Kreisky contributed to the rapprochement between Bonn and Moscow and to the entire process and period which has come to be known as the 'Eastern Policy' of the Federal German Republic. He was one of the statesmen and politicians who were prepared to tackle numerous taboos—from recognition of the German Democratic Republic to talks with the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

One can include among Kreisky's comprehensive international activities the construction of the UN centre in Vienna and the establishment of numerous agencies and services of the world organisation in the Austrian capital. Let us recall that on two occasions Vienna was the venue of meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States

of America—in 1961 Khrushchev met President Kennedy and in 1979 Brezhnev met President Carter.

Without questioning his authority and success as a world statesman, today many people in Austria and other parts of the world wonder whether Kreisky's long and successful activities in Austria and abroad made for continuity in that country's neutral policy even after he has left the political stage. The question is whether the success of this policy was only the result of a powerful personality and distinctive charisma.

However, these are questions which almost always emerge when such an outstanding politician as Bruno Kreisky leaves the political arena.

It would appear that Fred Sinovatz, vice-chancellor for the last two years, during which time he was gradually preparing for his present role, is continuing along the road so successfully traversed for the past thirteen years by Kreisky and his Socialist Party.

This may be concluded from the new Chancellor's plans to form a government of 'strong men'. He has chosen as his ministers the two most prominent figures of the Socialist Party—Heinz Fischer and Karl Blech—hoping this will make it easier for him to carry on his predecessor's policy and to govern the country.

One should not forget, however, that after many years Sinovatz had to form a coalition government, allying themselves with the Liberals. Although the Liberals lost some votes compared with the preceding elections (but thanks to the complicated electoral system acquired one deputy more), with their twelve deputies they have become an inevitable ally of the Socialists. Naturally they have made the best possible use of this position. And so, apart from the post of vice-chancellor, they hold two more ministerial and the three state secretarial posts.

The first post-war participation of the Liberals in the government will certainly have its effect on the latter's future policy, for they are only now striving to become true liberals, modelling themselves on Genscher's party in West Germany. However, it seems that this influence will be less than hoped for by the Liberals and less than feared by some of the Socialists who even suggested that the party should retire to the opposition and leave the stage to the civic parties.

Kreisky firmly opposed any such idea, and reminded the Socialist Party that, though it had lost its absolute majority, it was still the strongest party in the country. 'It would be treachery, a betrayal of 48% of the Austrians who voted for us, if we went into opposition and left power to the civic block,' said Kreisky addressing the Socialist Party's special Congress.

Already, during the discussions between Socialists and Liberals on forming a coalition government and ultimate agreement, it became clear that there would be certain changes only in internal policy, first of all in economic policy. This will probably be most evident in that the position of small and medium enterprises will be made easier and the resources of the state budget used more sparingly. However, in spite of all the economic difficulties the policy of full employment will probably remain the credo of the Socialists, and one which they refuse to relinquish.

No major changes should be expected in Austria's foreign policy. The active neutral policy of Bruno Kreisky has won for Austria a position which the country must try to preserve. This means that the new government will continue striving for detente in Europe and the world, and that it will promote efforts to achieve nuclear and conventional disarmament. This policy will equally be an occasion for the new Foreign Minister, Ervin Lantz, formerly Minister of the Interior and one of the Socialist Party's strong men, to assert himself.

Viewed from the long-range aspect, the new Austrian chancellor, Fred Sinovatz, is facing three tasks. First, he will have to prevail upon the public, especially the Socialists, to resign themselves as soon as possible to the knowledge that there is no longer an absolute Socialist majority in the country and that Bruno Kreisky is gradually fading from the political scene. Second, he will have to make sure that the Socialists, albeit sharing power with the Liberals, do not lose their image. Third, he will have to prove that he and his government of 'strong men' are able successfully to carry on the policy which Kreisky and the Socialists pursued during the past thirteen years, and which brought prosperity and social peace to Austria at home, and a high reputation in the world.

Many people believe that the modest yet persistent Fred Sinovatz will deal successfully with these by no means easy tasks.

[Hari Stajner is Editor of the magazine *Nin*.]

The November issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *The Conflict in Central America* by George Philip, *Reform in South Korea* by Richard Sim, *Can Labour Come in from the Cold?* by Austin Mitchell, M.P. and *Oxford Now and Then* by A. L. Rowse.

THE PERILS OF POST-INDUSTRIALISM

by S. G. Shanker

IT is disquieting to observe the awesome resurgence of conservative evangelism in intellectual circles. Sentiments that would have received scant attention as little as a decade ago have suddenly acquired a new esteem which must surprise even their authors. Wherever one looks conservative apologists are resolutely attacking the intellectual barricades of liberalism, paving the way for what are perceived as the incomparable virtues of social Darwinism. Clearly this is a matter for the philosopher to address, and hopefully, redress. Not, I would hasten to add, by descending into the forum of ideological dogmatism, but rather, by clarifying the sources of the confusion on which this spirited revivalism rests.

The greatest danger confronting the political philosopher is the temptation to employ the vocabulary of philosophy in the service of party polemics. Philosophy certainly has an active role to play in political dialogue, but it is as a guardian of conceptual clarity, not as an arbiter of policy judgments. Philosophy is neither an explanatory nor a normative discipline, a fact which explains why so many putative 'philosophical' theories have proved to be at best chimerical, and at worst subversive.

Countless hypotheses have been proffered to explain what type of political creature man or society is, and countless manifestos have been proclaimed ordaining what type of society men should strive to create. Most have sought for some empirical basis for their theories, some 'scientific' explanation for the behaviour they are postulating. This was the most conspicuous feature of the pillars of nineteenth-century political theory: utilitarianism (based, as it was, on the notion of the 'felicific calculus'), and scientific positivism (a sociological application of economic determinism). But the identical fallacy—the supposition that political philosophy can explain the innate character of 'pre' or 'post'-social man—lies at the heart of classical socialist and conservative thought as well. The very assumption that philosophy is concerned with man's condition in a 'state of nature' is proof of the extent to which philosophers have been seduced by the attractions of armchair psychology and naïve social-anthropology. Noble savages, ruthless brutes, and rational power-brokers are all figments of the political philosopher's fertile imagination.

Philosophy is purely a descriptive activity; in the words of Wittgenstein, the philosopher 'may not advance any kind of theory'. This does not mean, however, that the philosopher is prohibited from engaging *qua* philosopher in political analysis. Admittedly, policy-discussions purport to qualify—despite the pervasive hint of mysticism that suffuses them—as empirical investigations *par excellence*. Nevertheless, such disputes continually rest on assumptions and confusions which do indeed generate problems that are specifically philosophical, not empirical.

Thus the philosopher has a special role to play in political dialogue, but it is a role which has been consistently undermined by political

philosophers themselves; by their implacable desire to augment their contribution by presenting themselves in the guise of the political scientist *manqué* or the manichean prophet (i.e. politician). The philosopher's responsibility is to clarify what we do think, not what we should think; not to tell us what we should become, but rather to clarify what we are becoming. Because philosophers have for so long now sought to aggrandise their position as a critic of political ideas under the pretence of contributing to policy formulation, the real nature of political philosophy has repeatedly been misconstrued, and its essential contribution to political discussion frequently overlooked.

If he is to perform his duties rigorously, the philosopher must studiously avoid the hazard of slipping unknowingly into political commentary. His aim must be, not to contest the merits of a political manifesto, but rather, to expose the inconsistencies underlying the public expressions of a political programme, or the ideological consequences which may be far from perspicuous. Today there is an acute need for such philosophical clarification, for the simple reason that the political forum is now littered with an abundance of contorted opinions based on contradictory or misunderstood objectives, a result of the clash between inherited ideologies and radically new societal trends. Concepts are continually changing, adapting to the evolution of new institutions and customs. In a time of such technological and economic ferment as the present, some of the most basic notions in our political lexicon may bear only a superficial resemblance to their etymological forebears of a generation ago. Thus, the primary task of the philosopher who hopes to contribute to the political enlightenment of his society must be to try to clarify the conceptual framework of contemporary thought.

Democratic society, as we currently understand the term, is based on two fundamental principles: the quest for individual responsibility and participation in the civic process, and the egalitarian pursuit, as far as this is possible, of harmony and prosperity. Obviously these two themes must continually come into conflict with one another, for what is efficient is rarely pluralist, thereby generating a tension which is the source of both the glory and the misery of modern democratic civilisation. Confronted with two significantly different conceptions of the nature of society, modern Democracy settled for the most prudent option open to it and decided to incorporate both: a Romantic vision of subjective fulfilment, and a Puritan insistence on reward commensurate with effort. The result is a society which has fused socialist and conservative values under the banner of liberal principles into a mosaic blend which renders a social reality far more complex than the simplistic pictures championed by party proselytisers. To deny the presence of this intricate synthesis is worse than reactionary: it is disingenuous.

It is a matter of prodigious humanist importance that, as soon as the industrial revolution began to create a phalanx of individuals who had neither to toil nor to govern (or fawn) for their subsistence, liberalism immediately began to flourish. The ascendancy of liberal concepts marks

one of the great spiritual foundations of modern democratic society. The freedoms that for millenia were confined to a privileged elite were now enshrined as 'rights' that should be enjoyed by every member of the society. Philosophers have struggled in vain, however, to identify the 'source' of these rights.

This failure does not represent the precariousness of the conceptual foundations of our society; rather, it reflects the fact that such concepts stand in no need of empirical justification. For what is at issue here is not some *a posteriori* truth established by the early liberal thinkers, which they then substantiated by their crude myths of primaeval society. What they had accomplished was the definition of a new point-of-view from which to interpret society. They did not discover, but rather they created natural rights: they decided that they would govern their society according to the principle that every individual should be blessed with such rights.

Every political theory is characterised thus by the presence of a 'guiding principle': a heuristic, rather than an empirical principle. The animus underlying liberalism can be characterised by John Stuart Mill's eloquent axiom that:

> The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection.

The reason why this principle has been the source of considerable confusion in political theory is largely because philosophers have misconstrued the logical status of such a statement. John Stuart Mill ties himself in knots in *On Liberty* in his futile attempt to discover the basis for this principle because he—and virtually every critic of liberalism following him—interpreted this as an empirical proposition, and consequently standing in need of factual ratification. But the key word in all of this is that Mill's principle was introduced as an axiom. An axiom is not a high-level empirical generalisation: it is a definition or a rule. One does not falsify a rule, because rules are neither true nor false. One simply conforms with a rule, or constructs a new rule in its place.

The axiom which lies at the heart of liberalism is thus a convention with which we conform because we choose to construct the type of society that results when such a rule is elevated into a governing principle. All attempts to refute this axiom, therefore, are misguided; at most, critics of liberalism can only hope to persuade us to introduce a new heuristic maxim to guide the development of our society: that is, to construct a new type of society. Socialist and conservative extremists alike who are eager to undermine our commitment to liberal principles are simply hoping to persuade us to reorient the manner in which we define our political reality. But liberal society's greatest strength lies in the fact that, because power has been diffused to such a remarkable extent, no one can easily force it to abandon the values whereby it governs itself; and if we were to choose to transform ourselves into a new type of society, it would not be without careful scrutiny of the principles we were rejecting and the new values we were adopting.

Having said that, however, it must be admitted that liberalism, as a political factor, faded to a significant extent after the war, only to be

replaced by two political ideologies which, despite the bellicosity of their adversarial rhetoric, share a remarkably similar general conception of the relation of the individual to the State. Each has been careful to garb their utterances in the mantle of liberalism, and yet the policies of each are disconcertingly opposed to the dictates of personal freedom. The fundamental premise underlying the policies of both Socialist and Conservative political parties is that the future of society will only be guaranteed by the preservation of a strong central authority.

To be sure, they differ markedly in their definition of what should constitute this authority. For Socialists, it is a matter of building up a strong public administration: small unions must be brought under the auspicies of centralised organisations; localised community decisions must be brought under the control of monolithic government departments; equality of public services must be overseen by national war-lords. If there has been a sharp reaction against socialist governments throughout the western world in the past decade, it is largely because of the rapid decline of individual freedom together with the increasing *embourgeoisement* of the 'working' classes. Perhaps it is simply the case that the liberal democratic ideal remains far too vivid a memory to permit the wholesale bureaucratisation of private activities. Or perhaps it is the fact that the stifling advance of centralism poses as much of a threat to trade unionism as it does to free enterprise. Whatever the cause, there clearly remains a general indisposition to embrace the destiny of east European despotism.

Conservatives preach a very different sermon: government must be decentralised and bureaucracies must be slashed in order to create the room for an individual to exercise his choices. And yet, despite his flair with liberal concepts, the conservative remains at heart no less an authoritarian creature than the socialist. What he principally objects to in socialist policies are the power centres that have been created. The well-publicised efforts to reduce the size of government and the civil service, to strip the TUC of its political powers (and the unions of their immunity from the legal process), to denationalise the incubuses of public industry, are certainly not an attempt to eliminate the influence of centralised authority as such. What conservatives really propose is a drastic curtailment of the size (and uncontrolled growth) of socialist-conceived leviathans; power is henceforward to be concentrated in the hands of as small an elite as possible.

Political rhetoric in the post-industrial world has thus increasingly centred on a debate about means rather than ends, and the Labour Party has conspicuously failed in their attempt to thwart this development. Indeed, in the past two elections the Conservative Party's domestic platform has ostentatiously refused to question the premise of the inviolability of the social goals originally championed by the Left; the argument has entirely been one of efficacy and political credibility. Mrs. Thatcher's far from casual remarks on the desirability of a return to Victorian values (a euphemism, perhaps, for American values) marks a deep-seated desire to return to an oligarchic structure governed, not by the 'markets', but by

the governors of the markets. And yet, what is really involved here is a conceptual, not a moral revolution; it is not our social values that need to be changed, it is our understanding of the social benefits that have been unleashed by Post Industrialism.

Under Industrialism there were a myriad of social goals which, because of the economies of scale involved, could only be properly financed by government. But it is now becoming technically feasible and indeed desirable to transfer many of these activities into the private sector, where they can be far more efficiently administered. Such privatisation and rationalisation does not *ipso facto* signify a reactionary attack on welfare policies, but it is not at all clear that this point has been clearly grasped by conservative dogmatists.

Conservatism has always harboured an extremely equivocal attitude towards 'social goals', which traditionally were peremptorily dismissed on the grounds that society is far too fragile an organism to permit indiscriminate interference, and the maintenance of order far outweighs the risks involved in any serious social planning. But the influence of socialist ideas in the twentieth century ultimately rendered such an attitude politically suicidal. Hence conservative parties were forced to enter the debate on an entirely different plane: what was at issue was no longer the question of the legitimacy of social planning, but rather, the question of rationalisation: viz. what would be the most effective way to realise those social goals upon which everyone now agreed. The last two elections have witnessed the ubiquitous presence of social idealists, all intent on preserving the social progress for which everyone has so volubly clamoured.

We can now begin to discern, however, the glimmer of a fundamental(ist) change, a return to the exaggerated battle-lines which one was beginning to hope had been permanently superseded. The glimpses offered of the last government's 'Family Policy Group' suggests a cautious attempt to test the political atmosphere for a direct assault on welfare values. Perhaps it is not too difficult to account for this significant change in the political climate. For, although the Conservative Party was elected in 1979 on a platform of progressive economic rationalisation, the party preserved a strong element of conservative ideologues. Given the present collapse of the opposition party the bastion of orthodox opinion has made bold to reassert their spiritual command over the party, and thence the nation.

There is a distinct danger that the next government might fall victim to those very factors which are forging its current electoral strength. The same forces which drove the Conservative Party to replace a liberal autocrat with a 'resolute' autocrat are now baying for a thorough cleansing of the Augean stables of socialist values. Thus the management reformers are warily finding themselves transformed into moral reformers. The emphasis on the government's constancy may be reassuring to the financial markets, but in the area of moral debate such dogmatism more often than not reveals a steadfast disdain for the free flow of information. A populist who is genuinely convinced of the merit of his objectives is only too willing to debate any number of opponents. But the politician

who resorts to pedagoguery rather than dialogue is one who is forced to employ bombast in order to convince others—and most likely himself as well—that the benefits of secrecy far outweigh any harm which democratic principles might consequently suffer.

Nevertheless, it would seem that herein lies one of the secrets of the government's remarkable electoral success: the country's hidden impulse to return to what might be described as a state of moral and political homeostasis. Two prominent developments over the past few decades have together contributed to the Conservative Party's current ideological strength. The first is the accelerating slide of socialism into a state which many perceive as dangerously close to anarchy. Established moral principles are rejected with abandon: far too quickly for any genuine alternative moral code to develop. Socialists have always found themselves hopelessly unable to reconcile theoretically the pursuit of personal liberty with the obvious demands of social coercion and State paternalism, and despite their bravado today's socialists are no more happy with the decline of public morality than was William Morris over a hundred years ago. The government was obviously quite right in their expectation that the call to Victorian morality would fall on an ever greater number of sympathetic ears which, after two generations of Labour and Conservative hyperbole, have grown innured to the subtleties of moral debate and the implications of moral legislation.

The second crucial element in the Conservative Party's present strength lies in the crude fact that a majority of the electorate are fully aware that they enjoy a standard of living which will be best preserved by dismantling the more cumbersome of the burdens imposed on the country by recent Labour administrations. The Labour Party's current turmoil (if not demise) is the ultimate proof of the extent to which this mood has spread. The so-called 'ascendancy of the Left' within the party is merely another way of describing the mass exodus of the centre and right. The Left clearly has a somewhat myopic view of the tangible success of their idealistic machinations; it is unfortunate that their exuberance has still not been tempered by the awareness that a successful putsch only occurs in the presence of a power vacuum. (What would be even more worrying is if they were denied all access to the political forum to air their grievances and plead their causes.)

It is not at all surprising that a country which has been suffering a steady decline in its share of manufacturing output, together with the collapse of its colonial market structure, should have developed a sharply polarised political system, with violent alternatives offered to recover the manufacturing pre-eminence inexorably slipping away. Furthermore, it is an inescapable fact that such polarisation becomes self-perpetuating, each side striving to undo what they perceive as the damage inflicted by the previous government. Perhaps there is some cybernetic mechanism at work in British politics, which is presently demanding a stringent regime of retrenchment in order to restore the political balance which grew so precarious during the 1970s. Or perhaps the adversarial pressures which

were built into the system have finally erupted into a struggle which has become genuinely and dangerously polarised.

Unfortunately, these violent swings only serve in the long run to destabilise an already fragile market confidence, further consolidating the polarisation which lies at the heart of the country's misfortune. Part of the problem is that each side views its policies as a minimum-risk approach, and that of the opposition's as high-risk ventures; and problematically, there is an element of truth to each of these perceptions. The Conservatives are horrified by the number of exorbitant capital-projects that have either crashed or lingered to place an intolerable strain on the government's resources; Labour is horrified by an economic policy whose refusal to engage in any serious form of planning threatens to introduce long-term social destabilisation. But for decades this polarisation was more rhetorical than it was practical, as successive administrations conformed to the pattern of Butskellist reforms. The fact that both parties abandoned this pattern as they entered the 1980s is proof of the strain which post-industrial changes are placing on the conceptual framework of post-war politics.

The election of the Thatcher government marked not only the first radical break with this political tradition, but equally significantly, with conservative economic policy as well. After all, if the fundamental principle of conservative political theory is to maintain the *status quo* in order to conserve whatever order society enjoys, then it would seem that the Conservatives should have been committed to a policy of at best modest deflation and rationalisation. For the prospect of a large contingent of unemployed youth, whatever its moral dimensions, surely a dangerous source of future social instability, and the furious attack on labour-intensive policies ended up bearing more affinity to socialist than to conservative political principles. On the ideological front, however, the government has moved increasingly boldly into the mainstream of conservative dogma. The prospect of a Conservative de-industrial revolution was worrying enough, but even more disturbing is the fact that, far from tiring after their exertions of the past four years, the present government's energy has grown so robust that it now proposes to crown its efforts with a social revolution which aspires to dethrone Mill and elevate Hobbes as the ruler of future political consciousness. Alas, the omens for their success are all too auspicious.

[*The Perils of Post-Industrialism* is the first in a series of articles by S. G. Shanker. He will explore the problem of unemployment in a post-service economy; the role of government in financing reinvestment; the growing danger to privacy and liberty; the need for political education in the realities of post-industrial society; and the importance of Britain's cultural and political heritage. Stuart Shanker, who was awarded the Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship and the University of British Columbia Mackenzie King Scholarship, is at present completing a D.Phil thesis on Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics. A four-volume collection of Wittgenstein criticism to be published in 1985 by Croom Helm Ltd.]

THE LIBERAL AND LATIN AMERICA

by Marvin Goldwert

AS one who has studied and written on Latin America for more than twenty years, I find myself today battling with the temptations of cynicism. I embarked upon Latin American studies because I was fascinated by one problem: the gulf between democratic aspirations and authoritarian realities. My first published work was on militarism in Argentina, a nation which, in spite of rich land, abundant food, high literacy, a large middle class and a democratic tradition has, since 1930, sunk into the morass of Peronism and militarism. Today I read the grim news from Argentina, especially with regard to the 'disappearances,' and shudder at the loss of innocence.

Indeed, the true cynic might argue that despite the course of social revolution sweeping across Central America today, the ineluctable terminus will be one-man or state despotism. For witness what has happened to other social revolutions in Latin America. I can remember my years as a graduate student in Latin American history at The University of Texas, when the study of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) held out such high hopes. In the late 1950s and 1960s scholars, like Frank Tannenbaum and Howard Cline, were arguing that the Mexican Revolution would show the way to the rest of Latin America—the path of a truly nationalist, indigenous, non-Marxist, pragmatic and democratic revolution. Yet, today, Mexico, despite its oil wealth, is mired in rigid one-party presidential dictatorship which seems unable to cope with the dire poverty and economic problems which beset the nation. What, indeed, has happened to the great promise of the Mexican Revolution?

Then, in 1952, came the Bolivian Revolution, in which miners and Indian peasants rose up against the elitist order. In the process, the army was disbanded only to rise again as a pretorian force imposing itself upon the Bolivian people. As the memory of that revolution fades, it becomes clear that another social movement has gone awry.

The Cuban Revolution of the late 1950s also raised liberal hopes of the creation of a pluralist and democratic revolutionary society. What, then, has become of it? Today, it represents one-man despotism in which the native *caudillo* tradition is wedded to Marxist-Leninism in the person of Fidel Castro. Another social revolution went awry!

Recently, ominous signs are emerging from the fourth social revolution—Sandinist Nicaragua. Although it is too early to predict the fate of that movement, recent moves by Daniel Ortega and the Sandinist *junta* towards press censorship, curbs on civil rights and political imprisonment are not promising. Are these the beginnings of one-party state dictatorship or are they temporary measures of emergency by a regime beset by domestic and foreign problems? Are liberals who study Latin American history and root for the well-being and stable democracy of our Latin neighbours again to be denied? If victory comes to the revolutionary

forces in El Salvador and Guatemala will they, too, fall victim to the inevitable swing of the Latin American pendulum from anarchy to despotism?

As an historian, I can recite the litany of factors which explain the drift toward despotism in these societies. Three hundred years of Spanish colonial domination imbued permanent authoritarian habits which did not dissipate with a sudden adoption of republican-democratic institutions in the wake of independence (1808-1826). Lack of preparation for democracy, mass illiteracy, the absence of a stable middle class, the privileges of the traditional ruling trinity—landowners, military and church—all dictated that, in spite of democratic constitutions and aspirations, Latin America would veer between anarchy and despotism. Politics became more complex in the period after World War I as a new middle class began to develop in Latin America. However, this new middle sector spawned not only democrats, but also a new authoritarian military-technocratic alliance which has since dominated Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Dictatorship in Uruguay is another source of liberal cynicism, for in the late 1950s Latin American history students were all taught that that nation was 'the Switzerland of South America.'

In the light of these developments, the cynic, if one succumbs to that mood, might develop a variation of the Freudian formula that 'anatomy determines destiny.' He could declare that 'historical habit determines political destiny.' But, as an anti-Marxist liberal, I refuse to succumb to such cynicism. My hopes for Latin America revolve around the potential mediating role of the Catholic Church and the few sparks of democracy still kindling in the region. In my *Sunday New York Times* I read:

> Plans are afoot for Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and the Dominican Republic to meet in Santo Domingo with the Central American governments of El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica to try to reduce tensions. The United States has not been invited to the meeting but Mr. Reagan says: 'We wish it well'.

Will this bloc of Latin American nations, in which a medicum of civilian democracy survives, spur the 'dialogue' in Central America called for recently by the Pope? Is United States insistence on a military solution going to drive the revolutionary forces of Central America into the self-fulfilling prophecy of entrance into the Cuban-Soviet camp? Does not United States policy militarize the situation, thereby strengthening the power of Marxist guerrillas in relation to democratic middle class members of the civilian fronts? These are burning questions for the liberal Latin American specialist, while warding off the temptation of cynicism.

[Dr. Marvin Goldwert is Professor of History at the New York Institute of Technology.]

POLITICAL POWER AND THE FUTURE OF MAN

by Sir Peter Smithers

THE Prime Minister made it clear in her public statements at the outset of the General Election, that she needed three terms of office to complete the work which she hoped to do. What did she have in mind? Was she saying that Britain had slipped so far downhill that it would be the work of three Parliaments to get the country back upon a sound basis, socially as well as economically? Or had she also done the unthinkable, looked unblinkingly at the future of man and the nature of his problem, and judged her duty against that wider background? It is difficult to imagine that anybody charged with the major responsibility for the conduct of a government could avoid reflecting upon the wider issues. Today the view from Olympus must be daunting indeed, but the Prime Minister is not notable for dodging an issue.

It is of the nature of all politics, whether democratic or otherwise, that the very people who by reason of their office are able to take the olympian view, and to reflect upon what they see from that vantage point, are just those upon whom the short-term problems of the world weigh most heavily. If crisis threatens tomorrow, even minor crisis, how is one to think of the problems of two or three decades hence? And if one is largely responsible for the fate of a particular nation in difficult times, how much thought can be spared for the future of mankind as a whole? The questions suggest the answers. Yet in a world which is now palpably a single system, the future of mankind is the ultimate problem, with which the fate of the nation is inextricably interwined.

Is anybody really thinking about this on a systematic basis—anybody that is to whom the world will listen? For the world of politics does not listen to academics, whatever illustions the latter may cherish, and for the matter of that academics who have not lived politics and held responsibility for the consequences of decisions see little of the reality. The world listens to those who have power, and they, alas, are busy.

Nevertheless there is a race of beings who have the privilege of an olympian view and who, if the truth were confessed, find little of real importance to do. These are the Secretaries General of Intergovernmental Organisations. Having myself been a member of this small and quite unusual group I can say from observation that from the United Nations downwards, they need not be so overburdened that reflection on long-term issues becomes impossible. Yet it is the exception rather than the rule for this happy state of affairs to be achieved.

If the world is now a single system urgently in need of a corresponding system of management, or at the very least of a mechanism capable of analysing its problems, one's thoughts should naturally turn to the United Nations for a rational global approach. Possibly some such idea lurked at the back of the mind of its founders, but if it did, at the time of the

Dumbarton Oaks Conference I do not recall hearing anything about it. Now, after decades of decline, to mention the United Nations in such a context is to be labelled a woolly idealist, and rightly so. How has this come about?

The answer to this question lies mainly in the fact that successive Secretaries General have misconceived the nature of the Organisation and, consequently, the character and best conduct of their office. Behind this misconception lies the undefined thought that the United Nations is in some vague way a potential super-state, with legitimate interests of its own, and that the Secretary General is its President. Neither in theory nor in practice has this ever been the case. But there has been no Thomas Hobbes to analyse the nature of intergovernmental bodies, to describe their actions and to predict their behaviour. Lacking such an analysis, from the outside it is almost impossible to understand the labyrinthine complexities of an intergovernmental mechanism and the flow of forces within it. On assuming office, most Secretaries General have thought of themselves, quite correctly, as presiding over an organisation mainly concerned with the solution of multilateral problems and with the operation of multilateral structures. They have then gone on, unwisely, to set themselves personal political objectives and, still more unwisely, to state them. No intergovernmental body can be operated successfully by this direct approach.

I must at once confess that when I assumed the modest office of Secretary General of the Council of Europe, I shared all of these misconceptions, and it was not until I had presided over the Intergovernmental work of the Council for two or three years that I began to perceive the nature of such a body. The Council is generally thought of by the public in terms of its Parliamentary Assembly, a useful body thrown in as an afterthought by the late Anthony Eden at the founding of the organisation. I was a sop to the supranationalists whom he so much despised. But over ninety per cent of the work of the Council came to be conducted in sixty intergovernmental expert committees, each comprising eighteen government representatives. Of this work the Parliamentarians and the public usually saw and knew nothing.

Like the United Nations, this rather complex organism was not 'run' by the Secretary General, and could not be run by a committee of eighteen Ambassadors. It ran itself, or rather, each committee ran itself. Items were added to committee agendas more or less at the whim of individual members. There were no overall objectives at which the organisation as a whole was supposed to aim, other than the general aspirations of the treaty documents which set it up. These meant nothing to committees of experts, each of which planned its work independently of every other committee, and with little regard for what was done in other international bodies. There was no work programme of the organisation which could be held in the hand for reference, and thus no means by which a government, or a member of the public, could see, still less understand, what was being done or, more important still, what was not

being done. This could be ascertained by the Secretary General himself, but only at the cost of interrogating one by one a series of departmental directors. I realised that I had but a vague idea of what the organisation was doing, and none at all of what it could or ought to be doing. In other words, like the United Nations, it was controlled neither by governments nor by the Secretary General. It was, like the United Nations, out of control. It was a long struggle to persuade my governments to permit me to draw up a structured work programme. It finally succeeded, mainly because of the support of the French Government, which was offended by the disorder prevailing in the work of the Council. Under the new arrangements each committee was required, often over loud protests, to submit an annual work programme to me for incorporation in an overall programme for the whole of the intergovernmental work. This would be discussed with them and modified in the light of overall objectives and budgetary considerations, and then the whole would be submitted to the Committee of Ministers annually for debate, modification and approval.

There is no doubt that the work of the organisation became much more purposeful, the budget was better employed, and the more ludicrous projects were eliminated. Most interestingly, the existence of a documented intergovernmental work programme made it possible for the first time to secure parliamentary scrutiny of the intergovernmental work by submitting it annually to the Parliamentary Assembly for debate and for the formulation of an opinion for presentation to the Committee of Ministers. In fact it was possible to go one step further, and circulate the Work Programme annually to other Intergovernmental Organisations, so that they might take our work into account in planning their own activities. This was a substantial step towards integrating the work of the organisation, and a modest step towards its integration in the global 'system' of multilateral organisations.

It will not have escaped attention that I have been speaking not of an effort to make an intergovernmental organisation bring itself under control, which would be a contradiction in terms, but of an attempt to impose control upon it. It is here that some difficult and at first sight repugnant conclusions must be faced. An intergovernmental organisation such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe, can have no 'interest' in its own right. To speak of defending the interests of the organisation is meaningless. It has no substance of its own, no constituents other than governments. (The European Community is not, of course, an intergovernmental body). It is no disrespect to international secretariats, which are generally speaking composed of persons of above average integrity, to say that when they talk of the interests of the organisation they mean the very substantial interests of the Secretariat in promoting the work and jurisdiction of their employer. This is quite another matter. The only legitimate 'interest' of which one may speak in an intergovernmental body is that of the group of governments which has set it up, and which are its sole constituents. This group can only act effectively through the agency of the Secretary General, using the instrument of his

Secretariat.

However, a Secretary General who permits himself to be a passive tool of governments misconceives his duty and betrays his trust. The organisation will flounder ineffectively, tossed about by every minor political current. His first task, therefore, should be to analyse the sources of his powers and their limitations. Whatever the Treaty Documents setting up his organisation may say, the real power of a Secretary General resides in his control of the Secretariat. This should be his absolute prerogative, and he should resist with all his might the attempts invariably made by governments to diminish it. All experience makes it plain that a committee of governments cannot administer anything effectively by direct action, whereas a Secretariat well run and under proper control, can be an efficient administrative machine and hence a formidable political instrument.

The Secretary General of the United Nations, if interested in the ultimate problem of the destiny of man, would be well advised to abandon pronouncements upon current political problems, and to attempt to bring his Secretariat more directly under his personal control. He might then respond more effectively to the needs of the collectivity of governments whose servant he is and thus of the peoples whom they represent. Fortified in this way he might even turn his attention to the still more herculean task of trying to discipline the United Nations Agencies, so that they formed part of a coherent whole, 'the United Nations'. Only thus could a system be devised which might in some measure confront the global problem of the future of mankind as a whole. When this mechanism was in place, it would be time enough to consider what to do with it. I am not under the illusion that any such attempt is likely to be made.

It is late in the day to consider what might have been done with the United Nations. Its name has become a byword for unrealistic and often oppressive politicking. Yet when I first attended the General Assembly as a delegate I was at once impressed by the immense potential of the organisation as a political instrument for those with the skill and determination to use it. Expressing this opinion at 'morning prayers', the daily meeting of the United Kingdom delegation presided over by its current head, I was promptly told by him that this view was 'much exaggerated'. Anybody inclined to share his reaction might like to reflect upon the astonishing performance of Sir Anthony Parsons in New York during the Falklands affair, without which the outcome might well have been entirely different, and far less favourable. It is a pity that the one body which might have enabled us to contemplate our own destiny as a first step to bringing it under control, has fallen into discredit upon the right through its identification with irresponsible elements on the left. The time is now ripe for a fundamental reappraisal of the United Nations; alas, perhaps it is over-ripe. But the future of man cannot now be left to piecemeal solutions, and those who scoff at all attempts to confront world problems on a global basis are in effect throwing in the towel on the future of the race. I am not yet prepared to admit that this is necessary.

The more I reflected upon the relationship of the work of my organisation, the Council of Europe, to that of the United Nations, a subject which I discussed extensively with U Thant, the more I came to feel that our system of dealing with problems by beginning at the bottom with what can be achieved in a modest way, and working up to greater things, is inadequate for the conditions of today. On the contrary, one had first of all to envisage what the Club of Rome later publicised as 'the *problematique*' the world-wide system of mankind in which every problem is now related, however distantly, to every other. If one could envisage the local and minor problem in terms of the general problems of mankind everywhere, then one's expert committee might be able to suggest solutions without creating thereby a host of new difficulties arising from conflict with other elements in the world system. Indeed their work might actually make a contribution to that system. This was, I thought, what intergovernmental organisations were supposed to do! My Work Programme would be a small beginning.

At this point in drafting the Work Programme, certain alarming facts began to appear.

It needed little observation to see, though I could not prove it mathematically, that in a technological society the rate of problem creation much exceeded the rate of problem solution. There were a mass of unsolved problems remaining from the industrial revolution and still not dealt with, let alone those created with increasing speed and frequency in the present century. This seemed to me the single most important fact about the modern world. It still does so.

In this respect the performance of the authoritation states, with theoretically total overall planning, is no better, and perhaps somewhat worse, than that of the 'free' societies. If this trend, for such it is, cannot be reversed, then collapse through the overwhelming number of interrelated and unsolved problems, rather than through some particular catastrophe, seems to be the ultimate fate of mankind. Could the intellect of man, which has landed him in this pickle, devise ways of reversing the ratio? How to attempt to do this was the supreme problem, which should be but was not the preoccupation of all holders of power.

The second alarming element, now well understood but no nearer to any practical response, was the long-term nature of the problems of society, confronted by the short-term nature of its political institutions. The frightening problems of the environment and of the *problematique* of which they are a part, now manifesting themselves, were then already appearing over the horizon for those who cared to see them. But the measures needed to meet them, even if they were politically feasible, would only be effective if taken twenty years ahead of a crisis, and within a universal framework. This was politically unthinkable. It remains so today.

The third discovery was equally alarming. It was already clear that much could be done to make the process of governmental and, therefore,

of intergovernmental decision-making more transparent. An extensive use of common data sources and data processing machinery would at least help to eliminate those many difficulties which I noted arose from the fact that each government approached a given problem from a different starting point and with a different selection of data. With this in mind, and in collaboration with the Batelle Institute and a group of fellow Secretaries General, I proposed to governments the establishment of an experimental data source, designed and operated by Batelle, under the auspices of the OECD, to which all governments and intergovernmental organisations would be invited to contribute and to which all would have access. Sixteen governments favoured a pilot scheme, for a total cost of $100,000. The French Government of those days, not enamoured of intergovernmental bodies in any form, was nevertheless convinced by the logic and agreed to go along. The British Government, predictably, gave an effective veto to the plan, without any credible reasons being stated, and it died forthwith. But the more one thought about how much could be achieved to make clear to decision-makers the consequences of their proposed policies, the more it appeared that this might in certain circumstances accentuate rather than diminish political conflict. If at the very minimum it had to be admitted that a clearer light upon proposed courses of action might eliminate those differences which arose from misapprehensions, it could do nothing to remove political differences arising from conflicts of interest. It was at this point that all attempts to envisage an analytical 'system' to respond to the world-wide 'system', as a step towards grasping control of our own destiny appeared doomed to break down.

None of this has changed today, and all that one then feared might happen is coming to pass. Man is no 'wiser' than he was in Aristotle's day, if wisdom is defined in the modest terms of an ability to sacrifice local and short-term interests in order to secure the medium-term survival of humanity. Man is endowed with instincts which preserve him from destruction in a primitive society: he will not willingly fall over a cliff, or see his children destroyed. But his instincts of self-preservation evidently do not extend to the conditions of a technological society. The present imbalance between a static 'wisdom' and a rapidly developing command over the physical world lies within the nature of man himself. It is an imbalance in his character between intellect and 'wisdom' or, if you prefer, an unwillingness to pursue the logic of the intellect to its ultimate and inescapable conclusions.

Are we then contemplating the end of our race induced by our inability to use wisely the powerful technology which we have created by our intellect? Some years ago I read a book written by one of our most respected scientists, which ended with the stated conclusion that all problems could be solved if science was given the chance to attack them. This had always been so and would be so in the future. As no supporting logic was advanced for this comforting perspective, I wrote to ask him the first of the above questions: could he envisage a possibility of our rate of problem creation being brought at least into balance with our rate of

POEM

IN THE BARN

Hidden in black shade,
turtle-doves tug the air.
Out there, where aspens hiss
in the wind-draw by water,
an oriole's liquid call
lets yellow light down
in twists and twirls
through leagues of leaves.

Across the hot blue sky
tall clouds drift silently.

Here, in the barn, a smell of chaff and coolness.
A bee lurches into the doorway,
turns on itself and mumblingly flies on.
Overhead, on a sag-bellied beam,
six huffs of smoky blue stir, hump,
subside, are still.
The barn door grates, touched by the itching finger
of the wind:
the huffs heave higher, jack up a bunch of doddling heads,
all turned towards the changeful light,
and listening.
A slash of shadow, a slight rustle:
the swallow swings in a pure arc up,
and snips a greeting.
Bolt upright, the bird with blood-red face
clings to the scaly cup,
rams food into a primrose gape or two
with soldierly precision,
drops and is gone.
The heads quaver down.
A contented chirp, calando.
Silence.

BRYN GUNNELL

COLERIDGE'S BOOKS

by Sheila Huftel

'IT is but Davyism', confessed Coleridge to Humphry Davy, the scientist who later invented the safety lamp. Since their meeting in 1799 soon after Coleridge returned from Germany, he was eager to become a scientist. Quick to kindle at each enthusiasm Coleridge admitted that 'it is but Davyism: that is, I fear that I am more delighted at your having discovered facts than at the facts having been discovered.' And so it was the morning I discovered that I could read Coleridge's books. I was more delighted, at first, that he had made the notes than in the notes themselves. Reading Coleridge's books is simplicity itself. Go to the Reading Room of the British Museum and ask for them.

Some of Coleridge's books belong to the British Library as well as others, not always his, in which he has made notes. A fine edition, for instance, of Theobald's Shakespeare, 1773, belonged to John Morgan with whom Coleridge stayed after the quarrel with Wordsworth in 1810. Coleridge's notes are in pen or pencil, whichever came to hand. Often commenting on a line of verse that displeases him, or correcting the logic, amending a play or a character in Jonson; and in Theobald, arguing with Warburton. Warburton's note; '*Laertes* is a *good* character; but is here in rebellion.' (Coleridge underlined 'good.') 'Mercy on Warburton's notions of goodness, see p. 219, especially after the king's description of Hamlet. He being himself, most generous and free from all contriving!!'

The following is a selection of some of Coleridge's books: *The Vision: or Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise of Dante Alighieri* (1819), translated by The Rev. Henry Francis Cary: *Remorse*; a set of Scott; Shakespeare. He was proud of his copy of *The Dramatic Works of Ben Jonson and Beaumont and Fletcher* (1811). It is a handsome folio set of four volumes. The books have been rebacked and leather cornered, but the boards are the original grey marbling. On the flyleaf of each volume Coleridge has written: S. T. Coleridge. 29 March, 1815. Calne, Wilts., and the price of the set is £4.10. A note in Beaumont and Fletcher's *The Coronation*, Vol. IV:

> *Pshaw!* Sit is either a misprint for set, or the old still provincial word for 'set' as the participle passive of seat or set... I have heard an old Somersetshire Gardener say—'Look, Sir! I set these plants here; those yonder I *sit* yesterday.

The pages of *Volpone* and *The Alchemist* with the notes would tempt an illiterate to struggle to read as Caliban struggled for speech. *The Alchemist* especially, with the neat, orderly writing running uncrowded alongside the text. The ink is still black. After a shrewd analysis, a note sums up Jonson:

> He no less than Shakespear stands on the Summit of a Hill & looks round him like a Master: though his be Lattrig & Shakespear's Skiddaw.

Coleridge's Shakespeare is in two vast volumes rebound in sturdy brown

leather. It was published by J. Stockdale in 1807 and specially bound with blank pages for notes. A note at the beginning of the book by R. Garnett, Keeper of Printed Books, on the 20 April 1897 gives the book's history. 'It belonged to Coleridge and the ms. notes are in his handwriting. Upon his death the book came into the possession of James Gillman, Esq., of Highgate. At the sale of the effects of Mr. Gillman's son, the Rev. James Gillman, it was bought by his daughter, Mrs. Howard, and presented to Dr. S. B. Watson, editor of Coleridge's *Theory of Life*, who bequeathed it to the British Museum.'

Coleridge's notes cover many of the blank pages.

> But O how truly Shakespearean is the opening of Macbeth's character given in the *unpossessedness* of Banquo's mind, wholly present to the present Object—an unsullied, unscarified Mirror... But Macbeth, lost in thought, raises himself to speech only by their being about to depart—*Stay*, you imperfect speakers—& all that follows is reasoning on a problem already discussed in his mind—on a hope which he welcomes, & the doubts concerning its attainment he wishes to have cleared up—His eagerness—the eager eye with which he had pursued their evanition, compared with the easily satisfied mind of self-uninterested Banquo.

Coleridge's informing mind and natural touch can be seen between the lines. Banquo's questions have a 'natural curiosity—such as a girl would make after she had heard a gypsy tell her school-fellow's fortune.' Coleridge even mentions the cold weather.

The notes are so much more real, more immediate in his writing. Perhaps best of all is the opening of *Hamlet*. 'Compare the easy language of common life in which this Drama opens, with the wild, wayward Lyric of the opening of *Macbeth*.' That is good criticism because it takes the reader and sets him on the Heath. Reading Coleridge's *Hamlet* notes, one sees the ghost—'... then this 'thing' becomes at once an *Apparition*, and that too an intelligent Spirit that is to be *spoken* to.—' A note evidently for a lecture is beside:

> Her obsequies have been as far enlarg'd
> As we have warranty

'Shall I tell the story of the fierce Methodist & my answer?'

A copy of *The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker* (1682), is magnificent, with notes crowding the margins. In direct contrast is a small book, *The Works in Natural History of the late Gilbert White* (1802), covered in a blue and fawn floral print. A librarian's note suggests that 'this book was probably bound for Southey by Mrs. Wordsworth—and is very likely a piece of one of her gowns.'

My attention was caught by a most handsomely bound copy of *The Watchman*, Coleridge's short-lived paper of 1796. There were only ten issues. The binding is lavish: marbled boards and end papers, brown leather corners and spine, the spine has a self-embossed design and gold lettering and tooling. It is kept in a scarlet leather box, gold lettered and tooled, that is lined with olive green watered taffeta, with a scarlet ribbon to lift out the book. I thought of Coleridge's; 'I love books, but I do not care what *binding* the Books have, whether they are dusty or clean...' He

would have been astonished that someone had made such a jewel of *The Watchman*. This copy belonged to Thomas Wise. 'He had', said a tactful librarian, 'improved his copy.' The pages with the Coleridge notes have been added. The end of the article on 'Shakespear Mss', the Samuel Ireland 'discoveries' (No. III, March 17, 1796), reads:

> If this rapidity and opulence of imagination should be found to characterize the Vortigern and Rowena, we certainly should vote in favor of its authenticity: unless there should be any reason to suspect *Edmund Burke* of having been an accomplice in the Forgery.

The paper is high-spirited. Its tone is caught in a Coleridge article 'On The Slave Trade' (No. IV, March 25, 1796).

> That the Slaves are more humanely treated and live more happily in the Plantations than in their native Country.—If any incredulous person should entertain a doubt of this, the slave-merchants, slave-holders, and slave-drivers together with the manufacturers of neck-collars and thumb-screws, are ready and willing to take their bible oaths of it! !

One of the most remarkable of the books is *Poems on Various Subjects*; the proof pages of some his early poems published in 1796 by Joseph Cottle, his Bristol publisher. The Advertisement is in Coleridge's writing: 'I have excepted the following Poems from those, which I had determined to omit. Some intelligent friends particularly requested it, observing that what most delighted me, when I was "young in *writing* poetry, would probably best please those, who are young in *reading* poetry . . .".' The book is enhanced by his corrections and notes in sepia ink, crossings out as thick as a line of paint. The printing of the Notes of 'Religious Musings' was faulty and three times down the page Coleridge has written: 'Good heavens! What a gap!' He was both hurt and disappointed over 'Ode on the Departing Year.' 'The Motto—! where is the Motto—? I would not have lost the *Motto* for a kingdom 'twas the best part of the Ode.' He goes on more in sorrow than in anger. 'O that Printers were wise! O that they would read Bishop Lowth!' On another page: 'I suspect, almost suspect, that the word "dark", was *intentionally* substituted for "lark"—if so, twas the most *tasteless* thing thou ever didst, dear Joseph!—'

Lamb should have the last word; 'I counsel thee, shut not thy heart, nor thy library, against S.T.C.'

[Sheila Huftel is working on a book on Coleridge. Her first book was *Arthur Miller: the Burning Glass*, and her writing has been about the theatre. On *Shaw's Actors: a Packet of Letters*, an anthology of theatre letters, Garrick-Olivier: *Playgoing with Leigh Hunt*, a collection of Leigh Hunt's dramatic criticism: *Portrait and the Player*.]

THE SPIRIT OF STIRLING BRIDGE

by Tom Lannon

PERCHED boldly on top of the Abbey Craig, about a mile north of Stirling, the Wallace Monument is no shy landmark. Stark and compelling, it never fails to capture the attention and grip the imagination of visitors to the area. For someone like myself, though, born and brought up in its very shadow, the Monument can often be relegated to the banal status of yet another mundane feature of the local landscape —so much an everyday piece of mental furniture that the inevitable contempt for the all-too-familiar soon takes root and settles in, sometimes even verging on outright scorn for the flimsy sentiment and blatant commercial tourist rhetoric which often surrounds what appears to be a mere cliché on the skyline.

But to cynically dismiss the Monument as only a tourist cliché would, of course, be a grave injustice—an injustice to which, until very recently, I myself could only plead guilty. The influence of a permanent phenomenon such as the Wallace Monument upon local people is deceptively ambiguous, because the 'taken for granted' effect tends to cloud and conceal a latent panache and invigoration. It all depends on the way you look at it. In my case, it took time and experience to discover the extra special charisma of the place, and to bring that latent exhilaration to the surface.

As a young boy in the village of Causewayhead during the early 1940s, I was attracted more by the close-by thickly-wooded Abbey Craig than by the Monument itself. Oblivious to the existence, let alone the significance, of the Monument, I was nevertheless insidiously taken prisoner by the unique spell of the Craig's wooded slopes.

Like most woods, mine had a superlatively magical quality. Their secret and creepy places made me come alive with the wonder of folk-lore, legend, and myth. The little forest was a place of child-like delight—a place for the mysterious and the unexpected—adjacent to everyday life yet so deliciously separate from it—a kind of sanctuary and adventure playground. There was always more to the woods than met the eye. The dark and menacingly stagnant Witches Pond, strewn with dark green foliage and frog-spawn, lay deep in the half-lit heart of the trees, and I used to dare myself to go there alone, stumbling happily in eager anticipation like a brand-new ball-bearing on a spinning roulette-wheel, to stare at the Pond and the cryptic little ramshackle timber hut nearby. The music and the mystery of the place were always given added resonance by the soft moaning and the loud rustling of the trees doing everlasting battle with the breeze, exploding into sporadic thunderclaps whenever the wind was strong and gusty.

Subtle but powerful, these impressions filled out my emotional territory, like a tap that wouldn't stop dripping its drops into a fathomless mental reservoir. Far below, to the south, the sleepy silver serpent of the River

Forth lay scattered in front of Stirling Castle, while just beyond, in the middle-distance of the other direction, there was the domineering cathedral-like dome of the Ochil Hills.

Many a day I'd wander deep into these woods, gather some twigs and light a fire, watching the miniature cliffs of red-hot wood crumble into the flames, and smell the smoke and the aromatic tang of the crackling jungle. Spellbound by the evocative sounds and smells and colours all around, a visit to the woods always carried more than a passing resemblance to a spiritual experience, and over the years I became a regular congregation of one.

But there was a jarring discrepancy niggling away. These childhood and early adult years were spent oblivious of the raison d'être of the Monument. It was simply there as if for no reason at all except as a neglected and extravagant antique vase brooding on an out-of-reach high shelf. The small plateau on the summit of the Craig which served as a natural plinth for the Monument was far too exposed for my liking anyway and I much preferred the warm intimacy of the woods to the alarming nakedness of the higher reaches.

So maybe for me it was the sheer all-embracing magic of the wooded slopes that forestalled enquiry about the Monument itself. Despite, or perhaps because of, repeated efforts of exasperated schoolteachers to describe to me the Battle of Stirling Bridge, it simply went in one ear and out the other and failed abysmally to penetrate my semi-conscious half-awareness. They would tell, as a ritualistic anecdote, how in 1297 William Wallace gathered his small army around the Abbey Craig, watching the advancing legions of English invaders led by the arrogant Earl of Surrey. On approaching from the south and reaching the river, the English bottlenecked at the old wooden bridge, attempting to cross. However, the bridge's timbers had been sabotaged in advance by the Scots, so that the English cavalry were thrown into complete disarray as the bridge collapsed and the waiting Scots pounced out of the woodwork to score a resounding victory against all the odds. Thanks to the guile and determination of Wallace, this was, of course, one of the major clashes in the Wars of Scottish Independence in which English domination was throttled and for which Wallace was later to pay with his life, being executed by the English for treason.

What the schoolteachers didn't explain, however, were the origins and meaning of the Monument. The story of the Battle of Stirling Bridge by itself was all very well as a rattling good yarn, but was so remote and recurrent as to be almost meaningless in practical terms. The message, if any, was subject to a law of diminishing utility, so that each successive telling of it only further undermined its credibility, and the credibility-gap soon accordingly opened up into a wide canyon. What we needed was a bridge to make the past more accessible, spanning the gap to link up the interlocking circles of time and space and to consummate the wholeness of the Abbey Craig, while I needed something to settle my own identity,

as if I were looking for a medium in a kind of seance with myself.

It took thirty years for the spectacularly chaotic imagery of those boyhood woods to distill into a fresh vision which is still today so crystal-clear, and the answer, as well as the problem, was to be found on my own doorstep.

It was in the 1970s, during and after a decade of extreme personal crisis, that the history really came home to me, and the fuzzy vagueness of the distant past was thrown into sharp focus. After being forced to leave my trade as a motor engineer because of worsening visual, hearing, and mobility impairments and becoming a widower and lone parent almost at one fell swoop in 1974, I took up a love-affair with learning by studying modern history at the University of Stirling which lies, ironically, not a slingshot away from the Abbey Craig. Among other things, it was revealed at the campus how, arguably, every age is governed by a certain spirit, and the middle-class Scottish Victorians were profoundly swayed by the idea of Scottish independence—the very independence which had been fought for by Wallace at Stirling Bridge, only to be hopelessly lost at the Treaty of Union in 1707 and the subsequent Anglicisation of the Scots. Alarmed at the drift of Scottish talent to England and a general neglect and contempt by London for the Celtic fringe, the Scots Victorians matched their passion for political independence with a fierce determination to resurrect the memory of the medieval Scottish Warrior-Kings.

During the 1850s, under the inspiration of fanatical campaigners such as Dr. Charles Rogers, the contagion flared round the country like a prairie fire until, after an uphill struggle financially as well as physically, appeared the Wallace Monument, majestic and replete with Scottish medieval memorabilia, on the hitherto bald summit of the Abbey Craig.

On the day the Foundation Stone for the Monument was laid in 1861, almost 100,000 people congregated around the Abbey Craig in a flamboyant rally and ceremony, and in 1869 the 220-foot high configuration of the finished work was firmly installed. Not only in outward appearance but inwardly, too, the Monument is saturated in quasi-ecclesiastical charisma created by the church-like layout, the colourful stained-glass windows bearing Scottish icons such as the St. Andrews Cross and the Arms of the Wallace family, plus the massive longsword of William Wallace as the dramatic centrepiece.

At that period, a renaissance in Scottish history was in full swing, and as part of the patriotic groundswell, a huge statue of Robert Bruce was built on the Esplanade of Stirling Castle in 1877, and ten years later the Borestone at Bannockburn was rehabilitated and marked with a huge steel mast.

As a pacifistic and non-party-political creature, the nationalistic and military fervour embodied in these events is for me only of incidental importance. The real meaning lies in the vindication of individual fighting spirit whatever its race and creed. As my own favourite variant of Bruce-

and-the-spider, the Wallace example has clear affinities with, say, that of David and Goliath, or with the Samouri tradition according to which he who surrenders in battle forfeits all honour, dignity, and respect—he who gives up and runs away is worthless. At the northern apex of the Bannockburn-Castle-Abbey Craig triangle, the Monument is for me a metaphor for resistance in the face of would-be personal adversity. Besides helping to make sense of the modern metrocomplex of motorways, computers, and plastic vegetation, it maps out and makes tangible my own sense of time and place in the universe in a way that didn't exist before. It orchestrates the pipes and drums which are always ready to reverberate in full cry between my ears if and when things get rough; like a Lannon Rampant always ready to unfurl and call on me to grit the teeth, grasp the nettle, and slug it out to the end if necessary.

For Wallace, survival was an art-form calling for the creative application of guile and mend-and-make-do dedication to practical problems. Black and bitter as today might seem, overflowing with buckets of blood, sweat and tears, for the likes of Wallace there is always a tomorrow and, thanks to the Wallace Monument, his legacy radiates something of his own infection into me, like a barb stuck elegantly into its victim. The Abbey Craig now puts me in touch, albeit tenuously, with a mind like that of Wallace, and reminds me that salvation to a large extent lies in a belief in one's own ability to make better things happen.

The woods are no longer ominous and menacing. The Monument is no longer a musty old curiosity-piece. Together, they are part of dynamic reality. For me, the edifying spirit of Stirling Bridge is as natural and enigmatic as the needle of a compass pointing upwards and onwards from a definite, complete, and harmonious centre of gravity.

[Tom Lannon is a freelance writer specialising in contemporary social history and media sociology. Publications include *Stirling's Road to Mass Culture* and *The Making of Modern Stirling* (Forth Naturalist and Historian, University of Stirling.) His two plays, *The Year of the Cabbage* and *Children of the Dead End* have been performed by Edinburgh Theatre Workshop and the former is obtainable in paperback from The Scottish Society of Playwrights, 37 Otago Street, Glasgow G12 8JJ, Scotland.]

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEW

by Rosalind Wade

The World is Made of Glass. Morris West. Hodder & Stoughton. £8.75. *The Big March.* Alan Prior. Hamish Hamilton. £8.95. *Bornholm Night Ferry.* Aidan Higgins. Allison & Busby. £7.95. *The Ice House.* Nina Bawden. Macmillan. £7.95. *The Search.* Iain Crighton-Smith. Gollancz. £9.95.

It sometimes seems that the season's fiction follows a closely related pattern, with no strand of originality anywhere to be found. Happily, the later summer novels take a totally different direction, pursuing a wide range of themes, some of them startling. Foremost among these must be *The World is Made of Glass* by Morris West. He is an author who explores serious subjects and has the ability to combine an authentic background with an absorbing story. The idea for *The World is Made of Glass* came to him in a surprisingly casual manner. He noted a few sentences in Dr. Karl Gustav Jung's *Memories, Dreams and Desires* which refer briefly to a visit by an unnamed woman who requested only one day-long consultation with the famous psychiatrist. In the course of it she confessed to having committed murder. The year was 1913 and dates confirm that at the time Jung himself was in a condition of considerable stress. To discover the basis in each case of what could only be termed psychiatric disorders provided Morris West with a welcome challenge. The time-span of the novel is contained within a dozen or so hours of the interview, bodied out with numerous flashbacks and thought sequences.

We are first shown the woman, here named as Magda Kardoss von Gamsfeld, in a particularly ugly situation. Her psychological derangement has developed into a need to inflict physical suffering in order to obtain her own sexual satisfaction. In the brothels of Berlin there was no shortage of candidates ready to endure her particular brand of sadism, yet on this particular occasion she has gone too far and inflicted near-fatal wounds on her elderly victim. To avoid scandal, she is obliged to flee to Paris, and it is after this squalid incident that she comes face to face with the renowned mental healer. What follows is audacious, and often shocking; for the woman, Magda, herself a qualified doctor, is equipped to excite Jung to a point where he is scarcely a psychiatrist but rather someone in urgent need of sexual gratification.

In a pleasant villa on the idyllic Swiss lakeside, with Mrs. Jung, pregnant for the fifth time, a nanny, children, and Jung's mistress, Toni Wolff, all very much in evidence, the depths of depravity are plumbed by doctor and patient. Magda may seem utterly evil, yet it proves to be a stimulating kind of badness, fostered by an incestuous relationship with her adoring father, the attentions of a lesbian governess, and early promiscuous love affairs. Because the one man she really loved, an Hungarian, Johann von Gamsfeld, was already engaged to marry her best friend, Magda's latent ruthlessness surfaced to contrive the untimely death of her feather-brained rival. The results were catas-

trophic. True, Magda and Johann marry, but their union is clouded by his early death and it is scarcely surprising if, after this calamity, the run down to sheer iniquity is rapid. Suicide offers the only escape. That Magda does not, in fact, kill herself is due more to her own Paris doctor than to Jung, with his somewhat brutish method of psycho-analysis. The eventual decision to put Magda to work with a rehabilitation scheme for prostitutes strikes the only false note. In any case, her ill-starred life is terminated by a random assassin just before the events of 1914 drew a curtain across the kind of existence pursued by such people as Magda's family and the von Gamsfelds. So much ill-will and sheer absence of worthwhile motivation might have made *The World is Made of Glass* depressing, even repellent. Instead, it is stimulating and thought-provoking, opening locked doors along unfamiliar corridors.

Alan Prior's new novel, *The Big March*, is, in its way, equally astonishing. In the world of television programmes and their presenters, self-interest is the dominating factor. The chief character, Alison Bowers, is a dedicated 'peace campaigner,' as well as an experienced TV reporter. It is in this capacity that she first meets Danny Watson, an American 'chat-show' presenter of the most second-rate kind, commanding top rating on the USA network. Predictably, Alison makes short work of Danny during an abysmally unsuccessful television interview. Danny, smarting from the break-up of his marriage, reacts more favourably and finds the anti-nuclear woman different, and therefore attractive.

Alison, also, is on the 'rebound.' Her well-nourished sexual appetite has led her into murky byways, yet her sophistication is no protection against getting hurt. When ditched by the indescribably awful TV producer Vance Seeling, she suffers as deeply as any jilted Victorian damself. Interwoven with interminable technical descriptions of filming and interviewing, Alison, Danny and Vance attempt to work out the problems of their own relationships. They do so against the backcloth of the 'Big March,' planned as the greatest-ever anti-nuclear demonstration. The event serves as a dragnet for drop-outs, professional agitators, Labour peers, trades unionists and, of course, the TV teams who see the event either as a tedious routine or as an opportunity to promote their individual egos. Alison is presented as a shining example of sincerity; Danny as one for whom opportunism usually triumphs over integrity. The blow-by-blow account of the March delays the coming together of these two in what must be seen as an unconvincing compromise on their original viewpoints. *The Big March* is presented at a jabbing, nervy pace which admirably conveys the tension and hazards of investigative TV reporting. If it were not for the fact that the author, Alan Prior, is himself an experienced television writer, it might all be dismissed as incredible. As it is, the wonder remains that such shoddy, acquisitive men and women should be in charge of our domestic entertainment.

There have been many novels written in the form of letters and so the passionate, erratic exchanges between the writer, Finn Fitzgerald, and a young Danish poet, Elin Marstrander, follow a well-tried narrative device. What gives *Bornholm Night Ferry* its more original flavour is the unusual nature of the correspondents themselves. Finn is a young married man, with a wife understandably jealous of the phantom in her husband's love-life, and two young sons. Domestic and literary demands weigh heavily on him, and it seems doubtful that an author so beset by personal problems could, in any case, write anything worthwhile. But in his letters, Finn is articulate and perceptive, dis-

playing a sober judgement on the coil into which Fate has trapped him. Elin is in a different situation, with a life in Copenhagen more limited in scope. Her jobs, her friends and her affectionate little daughter, Marijke, are seen in bold, splashing colours.

Elin writes fluently though ungrammatically, which makes her seem naïve, yet she is stronger and more resilient than Finn. It is remarkable how much information, background and even humour Aidan Higgins has conveyed through these scrappy epistles, rocketing their way between Spain, London and the Danish island of Bornholm: yet the final impression is one of tragedy. There is no future for the lovers, burning themselves out with longing and loneliness, or for their respective families, denied a rightful share of attention and concern. And the last few disjointed sequences, having the quality of a dream or, rather, a nightmare, remain long in the memory.

Nina Bawden is a writer who springs her surprises by stealth. Like the novelist Stanley Middleton, she has a genius for revealing hidden tensions and currents beneath apparently calm and even humdrum exteriors. The most sensational part of her latest novel, *The Ice House*, concerns the derelict relic of pre-refrigerator days in the uncultivated part of the Perkins' extensive garden. The deep pit, in which ice stored in winter would keep food cool throughout the summer, might have been expected to attract children in imaginative play. Instead, it is put to more sinister uses by Mr. Brown, once interned in a POW Japanese prison camp, who uses it as a punishment area. Soured by his World War II experiences, he is addicted to thrashings and punch-ups with a defenceless wife and daughter. The robust extrovert, Daisy Brown, witnesses a cruel and totally unjustified assault on her school friend, Ruth Perkin, and the shared shame and shock cement a friendship between the two so different fifteen-year-olds. It is destined to last into their married years when, despite mutual affection, the threads of their lives become tangled. Ruth, surprisingly, is the happy one, blissfully married—or so she supposes—to Joe Aberdare, a tolerably successful businessman, though beginning to feel the strains of middle-age. Sadly, Ruth realises that his ardour is cooling and intuition leads her to the conclusion that he unfaithful. He admits it, and in his anxiety to conceal the true identity of his mistress invents a faceless stereotype who, for a while, dominates Ruth's waking and sleeping thoughts. Only after Ruth has almost succeeded in coming to terms with her jealousy does she discover the truth—that her rival is none other than her friend, the now widowed Daisy. Daisy is described as a 'rogue elephant,' and this is a fair description of the abrasive personality the once likeable schoolgirl has become. Released from the strait-jacket of a disappointing marriage, she seems set to cause widespread disruption. However, with the shift of scene from London to Egypt at the time of Sadat's assassination, the two women sort out their differences against a backcloth of mob-demonstration and near-riot, for the curious, yet understandable reason that Ruth feels herself less threatened by the intrusion of a friend than of a stranger. An unusual tale, and one which could have been handled in a number of different ways. Nina Bawden has chosen to make of it a subtle commentary on marriage and adultery from which emerge no clear guidelines. Nina Bawden pulls no punches; makes no concessions to sentimentality, and the result is a lingering flavour of bitter chocolate. One of the frankest and most fearless writers of our times, she delivers on almost every page disconcertingly accurate comments on people, their surroundings and the conduct of their lives.

The Search, by comparison, is simple, too much so, perhaps, for the promising basic theme of a young University lecturer's search for a missing brother seems to be spun out and over-burdened with repetition. The sadly hostile situation between the two English lads, Trevor and Norman, is due to insensitive treatment on the part of parents who should have read the danger signals. Moreover, the searcher, Trevor, is presented as a colourless academic who, although gaining a high pass at University, seems to be consistently tedious and uncultured. It would have been a tame enough account of family dissension but for some novel features, and outstanding among these is the locale, Australia; for it was soon after he arrived in Canberra to take up a temporary lectureship that Trevor was approached by a stranger offering news of the missing Norman who had, it appears, emigrated to Australia some eighteen years earlier. To discover Norman's whereabouts becomes something of an obsessional challenge to Trevor and in pursuit of it he explores a strata of the Australian scene unfamiliar to most people. The land of golden opportunity is seen to have problems of unemployment, alcoholism and destitution equal to those of any of the Western States. It would not be fair to divulge the climax of Trevor's search, although the reader may have anticipated it. The impression is that *The Search* would have made a better film than a novel, in which case the poverty of characterisation might not have been so glaringly apparent.

Also received:

Collected Stories. Dylan Thomas. Dent. £8.50. Dylan Thomas, whose reputation is usually associated with such masterpieces as his verse play, *Under Milk Wood*, may have been underestimated as a short story writer. Yet it is his stories, more than forty of them, which serve as the surest guide to the development and inspiration of one of the most remarkable writers of the present century. Many favourites are in *Collected Stories*, as well as unfamiliar pieces. The presentation is excellent and the Foreword by the Welsh poet and short story writer, Lealie Norris, provides further revelation and information.

Fire Falcon. Duff Hart-Davis. Cape. £7.95. Continuing his series of unusual tension-ridden novels, Duff Hart-Davis is at his highest form in *Fire Falcon*. This story of a murder investigation in the Highlands of Scotland has many unusual features and touches on some quite important problems, as, for instance, the over-forestation of many of our beauty spots.

Telling Tales. Sara Maitland. Journeyman Press. £8.95. Described as 'feminist' stories, readers of *Telling Tales* will not be surprised by a predominance of women characters. This is not to suggest that Sara Maitland is exclusively concerned with propagandist views. She is an extremely original and compelling writer, winner of one of the annual Somerset Maugham Awards.

The results of the *Women of the Eighties Award*, organised by Hodder and Stoughton jointly with the June Hall Literary Agency, have recently been announced. The winner is Ruth Adler, for her novel set in a post-World War II setting, *Beginning Again*.

NON-FICTION REVIEWS

LORD HOME AND CYRIL CONNOLLY

Letters to a Grandson. Lord Home. William Collins. £6.95.
Cyril Connolly. Journal and Memoir. David Pryce-Jones. William Collins. £12.50.

Alec Home and Cyril Connolly were exact contemporaries at Eton. They were arguably the most remarkable boys of their time, though as writers George Orwell and Anthony Powell might contest the palm with Cyril Connolly. They provide a nice antithesis. Home, the Prime Minister, who was ready to serve under his supplanting successor and survived to become the most respected man in the country; Connolly, the literary genius manqué, as he never tired of telling us, with a good deal of reason. I was slightly younger than them at Eton, though I went there the same 'half' as Connolly. I would never have ventured to speak to Home, captain of everything that mattered in his last year. Of Connolly's existence I was not much aware until he amazed everybody by being elected to the highly élitist 'Pop'. Up to that time, he was the only completely unathletic boy to attain that distinction. He had just previously won a scholarship to Balliol, but that kind of thing was expected of 'Tugs' (collegers).

Both these books are thoroughly interesting. The simplicity of Alec Home's style should not lead us to underestimate the precision of his thought. David Pryce-Jones can be relied on for a number of unexpected angles, some of them painful. One hopes that it will be many years before Alec Home's official biography is called for. Pryce-Jones' fairly short memoir, coupled with Connolly's Diary for the years 1928-1937, leaves the way wide open for a much fuller treatment.

Lord Home writes with special authority on how to deal with the Russians. He retains a profound suspicion of their intentions, but manages to offer a measure of hope to his grandson. He quotes with approval the saying of Jowitt, Master of Balliol, who advised a young man 'Not to expect too much and not to attempt too little.' 'The struggle,' he writes to his grandson, 'to induce the Russians to co-operate in peaceful co-existence has been a marathon. I hope you will persevere and see it through. The recipe is to combine prudence (not expecting too much) with initiatives (not attempting too little) and my forecast is that you and yours will survive.'

His brief sketches of Churchill and Chamberlain, whose P.P.S. he was at the time of Munich, are written with an insider's confidence. Churchill has been severe about Home's old master and he himself is not let off lightly here. Home does not fail to remind us that Churchill, when Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1924 and 1929, 'cut the finances of his beloved services to the bone.' He was widely distrusted for Gallipoli, for his 'romantic support of the White Russian military campaign' for his returning us to the gold standard and for his implacable opposition to Indian independence. Home is not blind to Chamberlain's failings, but he remains loyal and affectionate to the man. 'I must not give you the impression that Neville Chamberlain was an unattractive personality. He was a good naturalist—a really knowledgeable observer of birds, butterflies and animals. He liked his fishing and shooting, and was skilled at them. He was fond of music.' But, Home continues, 'none of this was seen by the public. His talents and attractions were kept for only a few intimate friends.' And, no doubt, for the close-knit world of his relations.

Home gives a fascinating account of how Chamberlain came to use the fatal phrase 'Peace with Honour' from an upper room at Downing Street when he returned from Munich. Somebody in the jostling of the crowd on the stairs suggested to Chamberlain that he should repeat the historic words. His response was short, even curt. 'No, I do not do that kind of thing.' Nevertheless, within a few minutes, he did speak those very words. And then 'From the moment they left his lips,' says Home, 'he knew that he had made a great mistake and given a hostage to fortune that could break him and his political career.' I would hardly have believed this latter fact if Lord Home did not tell us so.

With Cyril Connolly, we turn from morals to aesthetics, from the life of duty to that of the sensations, aesthetic and otherwise. I thought that I knew a good deal about homosexualism at Eton. All the same, I was astonished to read here of the width and depth of the passions raging among the Collegers of my time. The goings-on went merrily forward at Oxford, if this account is to be believed, and I am in no position to challenge it.

Suddenly, when Connolly was twenty-three, came what Pryce-Jones calls the 'long-delayed discovery of the opposite sex.' In 1927, Connolly wrote in a journal: 'It is both difficult and curious to find oneself suddenly estranged from the male sex and plunged into joy and bewilderment by all encounters with the other; obviously, there comes a time when this has to be, especially if one's lot is cast further and further from the academic groove.' From then on, he made up for lost time in his relations with women. A complete biography will, I hope, do justice to the happiness of his last marriage and of the family life resulting.

Connolly's persistent self-denigration leaves a more unpleasant impression than is fair to his memory. He was by any standards an egotist, but he could not have made such a remarkable success of *Horizon* if he had not possessed a devouring interest in other writers. On the only occasion when I contributed to *Horizon*, I found him a sympathetic and constructive Editor. As a literary critic he was second to none over a long period. His views could never be taken for granted. Pornography Report of 1972 was slated by most of the literary establishment. Cyril reviewed it judiciously and generously in the *Sunday Times*.

Lord Clark, in his autobiography, described him as 'without doubt, the most gifted man of his generation,' when he was young. By the end of his life, his output in terms of books was small. But *Enemies of Promise* and *The Unquiet Grave* will surely be regarded as classics by all who come across them. He never wrote a paragraph which lacked a peculiar distinction.

An old tag comes back to me: 'Etonam nacti exornaerunt.' They took possession of Eton and adorned her. Beyond all question, that was true of Alec Home and it can be claimed without absurdity for Cyril Connolly.

FRANK LONGFORD

EDMUND WILSON IN HIS FORTIES

The Forties. Edmund Wilson. Edited with an introduction by Leon Edel. Macmillan. £14.95.

Not yet the Sage of Talcottville, Edmund Wilson has here but lately scaled Hill Forty, and is warily treading the unaccustomed plateau of middle age. All unknown, he has still thirty-two years to his credit in the hidden ledger of his life balance, but it is nonetheless a time for reflection and the reappraisal of

profits and losses. Behind lie years of hard drink, hard work and hard loving; the drifting twenties, the Marxist thirties. The forties bring death awareness, the shock of recognition—through the deaths of *other* people, especially such of his cohort as F. Scott Fitzgerald—and a compensatory self-preening on his, thus far, superior resistance to the Ultimate Marksman. But in the figurative notebooks of night are scrawled consciousnesses of pages that whisper of his own mortality. Symbolic the anchor thrust into the long-manured New England earth of Cape Cod. The well-found Wellfleet homestead. Axel's castle! Symbolic, too? Divorce from the frenetically ambitious competitiveness of his third wife, Mary McCarthy, and the last, lasting, safe marriage to Elena Mumm Thornton, gracious European, custodian and cosseter of his gradual winding down. Decade of domestication it may have been, but the notebooks and diaries put together, pieced together, with unobtrusive but invaluable commentary by the conscientious, Jamesianly obsessional (and thank God for it!) Leon Edel, are not lack-lustre. They gleam also with glosses. And it was a time of creativity—1940 saw the publication of *To the Finland Station*, and in the next nine years six further books and more than a hundred essays and articles followed. Most important critically was *The Wound and the Bow*, a study of the literature of trauma. Unfortunately the journals are tight-lipped about it. They are more discursive concerning his three travelogues of the decade—*Europe Without Baedeker* (England, Italy, Greece and Crete) and the visits to Zuni, New Mexico, and Haiti, which appear in *Red, Black, Blond and Olive*.

Most importantly, from a motive of fame and fiscal standpoint, was the publication, in 1946, of *Memoirs of Hecate County*, widely banned for its copulatory enthusiasms and a consequent bestseller, and his taking, three years earlier, of a steady job as book critic of the *New Yorker*.

This record of the forties is markedly slimmer than those previously published of the twenties and thirties, and there is an inescapable aura of *déjà-vu* for readers of *Europe Without Baedeker* and *Red, Black, Blond and Olive* hovering over these pages, but equally inescapable is the aura of Edmund Wilson, which means that this is an essential book for all who care for literature, American or universal.

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

HUGH GAITSKELL'S DIARY

The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell 1945–1956. Edited by Philip M. Williams. Jonathan Cape. £25 net.

The price of this weighty volume (£25) does not suggest that a large sale is expected. Philip Williams had access to these diaries when writing the authoritative biographies of Hugh Gaitskell. Sensational revelations are hardly to be expected. Nevertheless, for students old and young and for present and future admirers of Hugh Gaitskell there is much to be learnt here about the man himself and the events with which he struggled so high-mindedly. It is difficult for me to write dispassionately. Hugh and I shared digs at Oxford together in our last year and obtained satisfactory degrees in P.P.E. at the same time. He introduced my wife to me, as recalled here, after a New College Commem Dance at 3.00 a.m.

In 1950, after a meeting in Oxford, he was writing about myself and my wife: 'They were very sweet and flattering about my speech and one could not help feeling what a pleasure it was to have such friends in the middle of all this political struggle. So far, at least, there does not seem to be any sign of any strain in our relationship. I shall continue to watch this carefully. It would

be nice to think that I had disproved the Thomas Morley saying, "There are no friends at the top".' I am only surprised that someone with such an instinctive talent for friendship should have felt it necessary to study his relationships in this way.

I doubt whether he would have written so enthusiastically about me (though he never faltered in his opinion about Elizabeth) at the time of his heroic and ultimately successful decision to 'fight, fight and fight again' to save the Labour Party he loved. I supported him weakly, fearing that he would divide the party so sharply that his own leadership would be imperilled. In the event, he was right and I was wrong. By the end of his life, so tragically premature, he was once again referring to me as 'his oldest friend'.

I am not sure how well he knew himself, in spite of a habit of self-scrutiny that was his humanistic substitute for a religious examination of conscience. In the days before I knew him, when he was already very intimate with Elizabeth, he once said to her: 'Don't let's dramatise the situation.' The time would come when Aneurin Bevan would refer to him by implication as a 'desiccated calculating machine.' But, in fact, under his Wykehamist exterior, emotions always burned strongly. They helped to equip him for the mass oratory in which he came to excel. The 'fight, fight and fight again' speech is probably his most famous effort. But he spoke with immense passion at the time of Suez, infuriating the Tories, incidentally, and his speech in effect rejecting the Common Market at his last Labour Party Conference held the close attention of his audience for a good eighty minutes. By that time, he had acquired rhetorical skills (references, for example, to Vimy Ridge and A Thousand Years of British History) which, in earlier years, I would never have expected of him.

When we were young men together, I felt sure that he would render valuable service in teaching, for example. But he was essentially unobtrusive, except in the sense that he was popular with all who knew him. It never occurred to me that he would go on to greatness. Yet he would surely have achieved it if he had not been cut off. The part played by his wife, the present Lady Gaitskell, in helping him to acquire the confidence needed for leadership has never been properly understood.

His sister said of him when he died: 'He was a true Christian.' Ethically, no doubt, that was so, though he would not, I imagine, have claimed that label. When he became leader of the Labour Party, I wrote to him and expressed the hope that he would not mind my praying for him. He replied, 'Of course I don't mind; I expect we are closer together than you think.' But few of us approached this in the strength of his passion for justice.

FRANK LONGFORD

GEORGE HENRY LEWES

Mr. George Eliot. David Williams. Hodder & Stoughton. £12.95.

For many years, there has been a need for a full-length biography of George Henry Lewes. Gordon S. Haight had promised a companion volume to his *George Eliot: A Biography*, but this has so far failed to materialise. Now, David Williams has attempted to fill the gap. Rightly, he sees George Henry Lewes as a jaunty, ebullient character and adopts a style of writing which he presumably believes to be in keeping with his subject. On first impact, this is likely to make the reader wince, if not give up altogether.

However, when one is attuned to the 'jokey' language, much that is valuable

in the book becomes apparent: particularly the detailed account of George Henry Lewes' early life as doctor, journalist and actor. Descriptions of the important people who were his mentors, together with discussion of long-forgotten articles and plays, do much to underline the remarkable achievement of the youthful Lewes, despite inadequate education and a difficult home background. The climax of this period was, of course, his marriage to the beautiful Agnes Jervis, daughter of the M.P., Swynfen Jervis, who apparently welcomed the impecunious author into his home and family without reservation.

What happened to the marriage is, of course, well-known. The limitations of the nineteenth-century divorce laws precluded a clear-cut break, even if, as seems uncertain, Lewes had wished for it. Instead, he assumed without question the heavy burden of financial responsibility for Agnes and his three sons, together with the four younger children fathered by Thornton Hunt. No doubt that George Henry Lewes was deeply frustrated and disappointed, and so the circumstances were propitious for his extra-marital union with the journalist and translator, Mary Ann Evans, deputy editor of the *Westminster Review*.

The extraordinary transformation of this diffident though gifted woman remains a literary conundrum, and it is not surprising that David Williams makes the explanation a major plank of the biography. It is, of course, on record that Lewes prompted Mary Ann Evans to embark upon the stories which appeared anonymously as *Scenes from Clerical Life*. David Williams takes this a step further and suggests that the George Eliot novels were actually a collaboration and that much of *Adam Bede*, for example, bears the hallmark of a racy naturalistic style of dialogue readily identifiable with Lewes's own early attempts at fiction. He offers no firm evidence, yet the curious choice of the pseudonym and George Eliot's almost pathological resistance to critical reviews invite serious consideration of the hypothesis. What seems more probable is that, after the initial consultations and discussions, George Eliot's hitherto submerged talents reasserted themselves and she developed under her own steam into the learned, prestigious novelist destined to dominate the literary scene throughout the late eighteen-hundreds.

The shift in relative fame and spending power could have been responsible for the marked decline in George Henry Lewes's own career as a journalist and general author. Certainly, apart from important appointments such as Editor of the *Fortnightly* and Advisory Editor of the *Cornhill*, his role became increasingly one of business manager and impresario.

It is reassuring to realise that some of his books, such as the works on Goethe and the *Biographical History of Philosophy*, are still in demand today, while there are theatre critics who declare that Lewes's dramatic criticism has never been bettered. Sadly, David Williams died before the publication of *Mr. George Eliot*, and so it would be inappropriate to dwell too much on errors and repetitions and the absence of acknowledgements and sources. There is much of value in *Mr. George Eliot* which could be enhanced by a re-reading of Professor Haight's *George Eliot: A Biography*.

ROSALIND WADE

NIKOLAI TOLSTOY AND FAMILY

The Tolstoys; Twenty-four Generations of Russian History 1353–1983. Nikolai Tolstoy. Hamish Hamilton. £12.50.

To say that Nikolai Tolstoy, heir to the senior line of the Tolstoys, has a remarkable story to tell of his ancestors would be a ludicrous understatement. For 600 years their unbroken line has contained some of the most extraordin-

ary geniuses, madmen and mere eccentrics it would be possible to meet or imagine. Indeed, were it not for the author's impeccable documentation and the abundant extrinsic evidence to the contrary, the whole enterprise might well be thought of as an extravagant novel. Massacres, shipwrecks and duels abound: so, too, do Statesmen, diplomatists and loyal officers of the Russian Imperial Crown. The service of these men to successive Tsars makes the adventures of the Tolstoy-Miloslavsky family synonymous with the history of Russia itself.

The story is that of one family, but it contains the tales of many individual members of it. Amongst the twenty-four generations so graphically described there was, for example, the brilliant diplomat at the court of Peter the Great who, bringing back the Tsar's son from self-inflicted exile, saw him reunited with his father and immediately afterwards killed at the latter's behest. There was the General, instrumental in the defeat of Napoleon at Borodino, whose pets on active service were three large bears and a white eagle, each of which accompanied their master into an aristocratic if alarming household on his retirement. There the bears, in uniform with medals, stood as footmen behind the chairs of guests at the dinner table. Then there was the celebrated duellist of the nineteenth century, Feodor Ivanovich Tolstoy, whose constant companion on even more unorthodox travels was an orang-utan. This man fascinated the novelist, Leo Tolstoy, in two of whose stories Feodor appears,—as the indecisive officer in *The Two Hussars* and as Dolokhov in *War and Peace*. Both beloved and notorious, called by his novelist cousin 'criminal and attractive,' the life of this member of the family almost beggars description (but is vividly portrayed by the author in one of the most entertaining parts of his book).

It seems that this strangely gifted writer, poet and fighter was, by mistake, in 1819, sent as one of the Tsar's emissaries on the expedition of the Russian-American Company to the settlements on the Pacific coast of Alaska. He was 'the wrong Tolstoy' but, unabashed, carried out some extremely doubtful exploits in the name of his government. Being marooned intentionally by an exasperated superior officer, he proceeded to establish his own kingdom on the island of Nuku-Hiva, off Alaska, where he found the reigning king to be unaccountably his willing slave. The duties allocated to the king were to follow the Russian on all fours and "Fetch" sticks from the sea when so commanded. This task the monarch uncomplainingly performed. With the pet ape and several obliging ladies, Feodor lived for more than a year, being eventually returned to and welcomed in St. Petersburg society where he showed his ubiquitous tattoos to interested younger members of the family, especially at large parties.

Seldom is a writer able to turn the story of his forbears and his country alike to such good account. The fortunate conjunction of ancestry and impressive literary and historical gifts allows Nikolai Tolstoy to do honour to both.

BETTY ABEL

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Fontana Biographical Companion to Modern Thought (Collins, hardback £15.95; Fontana Original, paperback £6.95). Dr. Alan Bullock was editor with Oliver Stallybrass of the *Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*. Dr. Bullock, with R. B. Woodings, have now prepared 'a further volume, self-contained but complementary to the Dictionary and following the same design, which would provide the biographical information, often difficult to obtain, which anyone may need in exploring the world of modern thought.' The volume contains nearly 2,000 entries by 300 contributors who are identifiable. By modern is meant those dying in the nineteenth century, with some inevitable exceptions, such as Karl Marx. This is basically a companion volume which presumably explains the absence of names one would expect to be included. For example, if Lord Denning is entered, why not other great common law judges such as Lord Atkin? Among historians, Sir Herbert Butterfield seems a glaring omission. Nonetheless, the volume will no doubt be very useful in most cases when required for reference.

Alexander Pipe. Collected Poems (Dent. £2.95 paperback). This edition was first published in Everyman's Library in 1924. It is now republished with a new Introduction by Clive T. Probyn. He discusses Pope's work in the literary and social context of his time, whose 'public message is a secular one, however much his moral programme was based on religious convictions'. He refers to 'a crucial and remarkable strength in Pope's poetry, i.e. its tensile strength, its wholeness of vision, and its organic social commitment'. The Collection is edited by Bonamy Dobree, and the notes have been revised where necessary in the light of greater knowledge since 1924.

Ghosts in Country Villages (William Kimber. £6.50). Pluckley, in Kent, with its twelve or so attached ghosts, is reputedly the most haunted village in Britain, but the authors in Mr. Denys Val Baker's latest anthology of short stories of the supernatural range far and wide with, as we would expect from this editor, a bias towards magical Cornwall. This is an exceptionally strong collection, containing M. R. James' Anglo-Saxon crown story, Hugh Walpole's 'The Tarn' and a strange new vignettte by A. L. Rowse, 'The Wise Old Serpent of King's Wood'. In all, of the fourteen stories,, there are six that have not been previously published: of these, Rosalind Wade, always at home in the Cornish landscape, Derek Stanford, master of sensuous atmosphere, and J. C. Trewin make notable contributions. Mary Butts' opening story is strikingly well written. As before, the volume may be read enjoyably at a sitting.

M. T.

P. G. Wodehouse, Four Plays (Methuen paperback. £2.95). P. G. Wodehouse is more commonly associated with novels than with plays. Yet he wrote 18 plays and 33 musical comedy libretti. In his useful and informative Introduction, Mr. David A. Jason points out that 'Plum' 'worked with every major theatrical composer of his time and was associated with all of the major producers.' Of his plays, 'with one exception, all of his plays were adaptations, either of his own material or by some foreign playwright.' The exception is *Come On, Jeeves*, included in this volume. This was written in the summer of 1952 with his collaborator, Guy Bolton. Production was delayed and Wodehouse meanwhile turned it into the novel, *Ring For Jeeves*, published in April 1953, as his sixth Jeeves novel. The play toured the English provinces in 1954, but did not reach the West End. *Come On, Jeeves* is the only play to star Jeeves. The three other plays in this volume are *The Play's The Thing* (1926), *Good Morning, Bill* (1927) and *Leave It To Psmith* (1930). Mr. Jason has added a chronology of Wodehouse's life.

The World Atlas of Revolutions (Hamish Hamilton. Hardback £12.95; paperback £7.95). This is a valuable publication which should help in portraying graphically the course of revolutionary movements. The author, Andrew Wheatcroft, starts with the American Revolution and continues to the present day. He might very usefully have begun with the English Civil War, at the heart of our liberties. The maps have associated texts. He points out that the book 'has been designed so that it is possible to use the maps without having read the text. . . . Nor have I sought to present that most tedious of literary exercises, the concise, balanced, and judicious résumé.' This is an unfortunate approach, but the maps largely speak for themselves.

The Great Writers Library consists in its entirety of fourteen volumes, ranging from *The Beginnings to 1558* (Volume I) to the twentieth century and *Commonwealth Literature* (Volume XIV). This seventh volume, *The Victorian Period Excluding the Novel* Introduction by Arthur Pollard (Macmillan Press. £15 hardcover, £7.50 paperback) contains entries covering some seventy writers. Arranged alphabetically, each consists of a brief biography, a complete list of published works, a selected list of published bibliographies and critical studies, and a signed critical essay on the writer's work. Professor Pollard's Introduction sets the scene as adequately as possible within the short compass of twenty-one pages. The forty-nine contributors who divide up the seventy-odd entries between them, contrive authoritative, useful, although not perhaps as full as one might wish, notes. It seems odd that the ubiquitous nineties figure, Richard Le Gallienne, was excluded. The absence of reference to Arthur Symons' long biographical essay on Ernest Dowson from the Dowson 'Reading List' by Mr. John Heath-Stubbs is both lamentable and remarkable. Crackanthorpe is another absentee, but, happily, the normally neglected Stephen Phillips is not only present, but most accurately and satisfactorily accounted for by Mr. William M. Tydeman, who even gets the almost universally incorrectly reported birth date right. Warts and all, an indispensable work of specialised reference.

(R.W-E)

PRE-REQUIEM FOR A CLOWN

Rupert Strong's Seventh Book of Poems

However keenly responsive to tragedy, he is always remarkably conscious that comedy is just around the corner.

£3.00 paperback **£4.50 hardback**

RUNA PRESS, MONKSTOWN, DUBLIN

Distributed in the U.S. by Dufour Editions Inc.

BRITISH NOVELISTS SINCE 1960

Edited by Jay L. Halio, University of Delaware.

(Dictionary of Literary Biography, Volume 14.)

834 pages in 2 parts. Illustrations; Bibliographies; Cumulative Index.

A Bruccoli Clark Book.

Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, USA, 1983.
CIP: L.C. Card No. 82-2977. ISBN 0-8103-0927-0. $148.00/set.

AFRICAN VIOLETS

MAIL ORDER CATALOGUE 25p

Visitors welcome—50,000 plants in growth.

Open Monday–Friday 9.00–4.00. Sundays 2.30–5.00.
Saturdays (May–September only) 2.30–5.00.

Tony Clements Nurseries

Station Road, Terrington St. Clement, King's Lynn, Norfolk PE34 4PL.
Telephone: (0553) 828374.

ORDER FORM

To: **The Subscription Manager,**

Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG

I enclose herewith my cheque for ...., for a year's subscription
[For rates, see inside front cover]

Name . .. .

Address . .. .

.. ..

11 JAN 1984

The Hopeful Journey (2)

HOTEL AND HOLIDAY SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

by

Rosalind Wade

Copies obtainable from:
Rosalind Wade, 4 Dollis Drive, Farnham, Surrey.
(£2 including postage)

THE TRADITION OF POLISH IDEALS

Essays in History and Literature

Edited by W. J. Stankiewicz, Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia

This topical collection of studies, by distinguished American, Canadian and European scholars, originated as a series of lectures given at the University of British Columbia.

CONTENTS: Introduction—*W. J. Stankiewicz.* The Polish Identity—*Peter Brock.* Tolerance in Poland: Political Choice and Tradition—*Françoise Le Moal.* The Polish Nobility in Pre-revolutionary Europe—*Hans Roos.* Jadwiga, Poland's Great Queen and Her World—*O. Halecki.* Copernicus: Science versus Theology—*John Norris.* Frederic Chopin and the Polish Ideal—*Carol Wootton.* Sienkiewicz Revisited—*Roy Danielis.* The Warsaw Uprising—*Jan Karski.* Slawomir Mrozek: The Moulding of a Polish Playwright—*Marketa Goetz-Stankiewicz.* Post-War Polish Poets—*Bogdan Czaykowski.*

288pp £6.90

ORBIS BOOKS (LONDON) LTD.
66 Kenway Road, London SW5 0RD

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG Tel 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

NOVEMBER 1983

CENTENNIAL 1984: A SECOND SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA?

Anthony Kirk-Greene

CAN LABOUR COME IN FROM THE COLD?

Austin Mitchell, M.P.

OXFORD—THEN AND NOW

A. L. Rowse

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

David Shipman

and other articles together with an eight-page Literary Supplement

98p

Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

November 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1414 Founded 1866

Contents *Page*

The Conflicts in Central America	George Philip	225
Centennial 1984: a Second Scramble for Africa?	Anthony Kirk-Greene	232
Can Labour Come in from the Cold?	Austin Mitchell, M.P.	240
Teaching the History of Conflict	Paul Wilkinson	246
Abortion in Greece	Stephanie Ginger	253
To Merge or not to Merge . . .	John Elsom	256
Oxford—Then and Now	A. L. Rowse	261
Poems: Far West	Frederic Vanson	266
Ash Wednesday	J. H. B. Peel	
Cinema: a Quarterly Review	David Shipman	267
Correspondence: The Nuclear Weapons Debate	John Barnie	271
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		273
Lord Longford, Clare Colvin, Kenneth Lindsay, Esmond Wright, Richard Whittington-Egan		
SHORTER REVIEWS		279

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St, Southend-on-Sea, Essex U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N Y 10022 Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47 50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd, 527 Madison Avenue, New York N Y. 10022 (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 Incorporating The Fortnightly

November 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1414

THE CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA

by George Philip

WHILE it still remains true that the internal dimensions of the Central American conflicts are not always sufficiently analysed,[1] recent developments have irrevocably moved the area into the arena of great power involvement. This has brought about a qualitative shift in the nature of the problem and it also makes it increasingly important to look closely at the international issues involved.

Seen in international terms, Central America is above all a crisis for the Reagan Administration. Yet it would hardly be a crisis at all, given the vast disproportion of power between the United States and Central America, if US policy were not subject to serious constraints. One of these is the Cold War itself. The main adversary of the US in Central America is the government of Nicaragua. As a sovereign government it can enjoy rights that mere rebel movements cannot. It can buy arms, contract alliances and—as a last resort—bring in foreign troops when threatened from outside. While the Nicaraguan authorities are at pains to stress their difference from Cuba, there can be little doubt that there are close relationships between the two countries—relationships which then tie in with the close Cuban/Soviet alliance. Moreover, it now appears that, despite some grumbling in places, the Sandinistas have succeeded in winning the acceptance of most Nicaraguans and are also quietly strengthening their own security apparatus. Under these circumstances, the Reagan Administration is faced with some difficult choices. The idea that the Sandinistas can be overthrown by an internal revolt is clearly fantasy. They can be defeated only with very heavy US involvement (whether semi-covert or quite open) which would, under the international circumstances, be very dangerous. Yet if they are not to be overthrown, the US position within Central America will continue to be predominately defensive, and fearful that the Nicaraguans will encourage rebel movements elsewhere.

This is not to say, however, that the present US position is very easy to defend. If the state of Congressional or public opinion in the US were different, it is just possible to believe that Washington could commit troops directly to El Salvador. This would be sufficient to defeat the Left-wing rebels in that country decisively enough to make a public example of them. The US government might then be sufficiently in control to organise elections which a moderate reformist candidate could win, again with an exemplary effect in other Central American

countries. The US would certainly then be open in its imperialism, but at least its intervention would have some possibility of decisively resolving the situation which had led to it. At present, however, it must operate by proxy—and this adds to its problems.

It is now likely that the US government will suffer the costs of intervention while enjoying few of the benefits. US objectives in the area, as defined in public, are three-fold. The aim is, first and foremost, to contain 'Communism' and to inflict at least a psychological defeat on Left-wing rebel groups throughout Central America and upon the Nicaraguan government. Secondly, it aims to promote democratisation and the institutionalisation of politics throughout Central America. This is not just for reasons of propaganda (although these undoubtedly play a part) but also because, in the absence of a political settlement, Central American countries will continue to be vulnerable to Revolution. Third, the US hopes Central American governments will promote a limited degree of social reform (although not so much as to transform the economic system fundamentally), again in order to pre-empt possible rebellion. Yet to state these objectives is not to say that they are achievable easily, or indeed at all.

The spread of Revolution from Nicaragua to Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala probably can be contained by local security forces as long as US aid and advice are freely provided as they have been in the past—particularly in the first two cases. However, while outright government defeat can thus be avoided, it will not be so easy to break the messy stalemate now developing in El Salvador nor to undermine the long-term potential for Revolution that now exists in the region as a whole. The government of El Salvador at least now depends on an open-ended and indefinite US commitment, and other governments may be in a similar position before much longer. Moreover this commitment, however much Washington may regret the fact, cannot be extended only to respectable conservatives or moderate reformers. It must also take in the activities of thugs and fanatics whose notion of a political settlement consists in the physical elimination of all actual or potential opponents. Much the same can be said of the CIA-supported *Contras* now attempting to destabilise the government of Nicaragua.

For this reason the introduction of effective democratic reformism into Central America remains a dream (or, as some would see it, a grotesque parody). Democratic political institutions cannot easily be imposed on countries from abroad at any time, still less so in the middle of a crisis, and the longer-term requirements of democratisation and reform will run counter to more immediate US objectives of the containment and defeat of 'Communism'. In sum, the Reagan Administration has committed itself to a strategy which is necessarily defensive and long-term, cannot count on decisive victory, and is likely to involve more naked and highly publicised brutality, far less social reform and far more reliance on political expediency than it would like. Whether such a strategy is for long palatable to US public opinion or to the Congressional opposi-

tion remains to be seen.

The United States is, of course, not the only foreign power involved in Central America. The Cubans and, behind them, the Soviet Union also play a role. Both Moscow and Havana are careful to play down their commitment to Nicaragua (just as the Nicaraguan authorities are careful to play down their support for the insurgents in El Salvador) but public statements are not necessarily a good guide to private objectives. It probably is true that the Soviet Union has little direct interest in Central America but Cuba was undoubtedly delighted at the Sandinista victory which gave Havana an ally in the region and so reduced Cuban isolation in Latin America. Nor could Cuba seriously doubt that a Revolution of this kind would be followed by major conflict with the US in which sufficient military defence would prove essential if the Sandinistas were to survive. The low key Soviet/Cuban response is no doubt partly intended as an alibi in case Nicaragua does in the end 'fall' to Washington, but it can also be seen as part of a strategy to avoid frightening public opinion within the USA, in the hope that this will ultimately frustrate Reagan's designs in the area (the Soviet Union and Cuba, of course, do not face similar problems with their own public opinion). As an effort to isolate the Reagan Administration, it is a tactic which has brought some success.

Some mention should also be made of the Contadora group (Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela and Panama) and, in this context, of Mexico particularly. Mexican President de la Madrid's overt criticism of US policy in the area should not be taken as being a simple emotional anti-American reaction; such emotion did perhaps play a part in former President Lopez Portillo's forthright declarations on Central America. De la Madrid, however, took office far more favourably disposed to Washington than did his predecessor and his alarm was genuine enough. Other Latin American countries may also become increasingly concerned about the US role in Central America, particularly after changes of government which are scheduled within the next few months in Argentina and Venezuela and are possible also in the case of Chile. Mexico may soon be able to put itself at the head of a large group of Spanish-American countries publicly opposed to US policy in the area. It is difficult to see how much practical effect this would have but it would undoubtedly do little for US prestige.

The real prospect for Central America is tragic. It is of an iron curtain pulled down across the region without the compensating stability which the Cold War helped produce in Europe. The CIA-assisted harassment of the Sandinista regime is most unlikely to bring it down, but it may well lead to a hardening of its line against domestic opponents; the economic costs inflicted on Nicaragua will also be considerable although the political consequences of this may be less than US policymakers (accustomed, no less than their opponents, to think in economistic terms) believe. It is, however, hard to see how any of these pressures could induce the Sandinistas to share power with the Somocistas currently exiled in Honduras. To the extent that they succeed in co-opting other actual

or potential opponents, they become more, not less, of a threat to Washington.

In the countries to the north of Nicaragua—Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala—the outlook is for continuing conflict. It is hard to see how the armed Left can be decisively defeated (although it will undoubtedly suffer severe setbacks from time to time) when social conditions are working in its favour, when Nicaragua can continue to offer aid and comfort to rebel movements and when the security forces of the region remain brutal rather than efficient. A degree of social reform and political institutionalisation might alter this picture but these are unlikely to occur precisely because of the continuing conflict; the most effective enemies of Nicaragua are also the worst institution builders.

Under these circumstances, the poor majority in these countries will enjoy the benefits neither of social reform nor of economic progress nor yet again of the (admittedly only relative) physical protection offered while the oligarchic ascendancy remained unchallenged. The United States will suffer different kinds of damage, less extreme but no less real. Continuing turbulence in the region will imply a further commitment of US resources and Washington will still be unable to feel secure; Washington's moral credibility will also suffer from its inevitable identification with the hard men of the far Right. Such a loss of credibility may be particularly damaging to a country with an open political system and a claim to world leadership. Cuba will also largely have failed in its attempt to break out of its former isolation within Central America; this failure will accentuate further its dependence on the Soviet Union although there may be some compensating gain in influence if the United States does succeed in alienating decisively the sympathies of such 'middle of the road' Latin American states as Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela. For the USSR itself, however, such an outcome would be near-perfect. For a minimum commitment on its own part, it will have achieved the maximum isolation of the Reagan Administration—from many Latin American republics and perhaps also from domestic public opinion—while also putting into more favourable perspective its own foreign adventure in Afghanistan. These gains must far outweigh any disadvantage to the Soviet Union in losing the possibility of having to support (or refuse support to) a mendicant revolutionary government in distant El Salvador.

It is worth emphasising that there is nothing inherent in the Central American situation which has brought great power conflict into the area. Nicaragua in particular and Central America in general have become problems because Washington has chosen to define them in this way. The countries which might have most to fear if the domino theory really were correct (notably Venezuela, Panama, Colombia and, above all, Mexico) take a strikingly different view of politics in the region. It is also at least possible that a different US administration would have found Cuba and Nicaragua amenable to negotiation. The United States still has many things to offer these countries and a softer US approach may also have softened, in turn, the pro-Soviet line of the Cuban government.

The United States, Cuba and Nicaragua all have some interest in ensuring that the worst hostilities of the Cold War were not brought into Central America—yet this is precisely what they are in imminent danger of bringing about.

Why has the United States got itself into so unrewarding a position? Inevitably, in so politically complex a country, the reasons are themselves complex but some of them are sufficiently general to raise disturbing questions about the quality of judgement with which US foreign policy is made. Undoubtedly the constraints are important too. Public opinion is certainly important, especially after the US was devided and damaged by its Vietnam experience. Yet it is still worth pointing out, to those who take the Central America/Vietnam analogy too literally, that US combat troops have not been and probably will not be sent to Central America. If they ever were sent, there can be little doubt that they would, in a purely military sense, win. The US armed forces could almost certainly defeat some 10,000 modestly armed rebels in El Salvador without the need for a 'draft' and without the massive commitment of resources which the US applied to Vietnam. The Reagan Administration must feel constrained by the fact that the direct (and probably quick) method of defeating the Salvadorian insurgency is not available for reasons which have little relation to the actual problems confronted in the area. Washington is therefore committed to methods which are more indirect, less effective and which rely more heavily on incompetent and/or brutal local clients who have their own objectives. It is certainly not the intention here to advocate that the US send troops to El Salvador (such a step would have global repercussions which might far outweigh any purely local advantage) but only to point out that the Reagan Administration has been hindered in its own chosen policies by domestically-imposed constraints. It has thus had to settle for a policy of indirection tempered by bluff. If it were not for the political climate within the USA, the Central American crisis would certainly not have developed in the form in which it has.

A second factor relates to the difficulty of handling the US foreign policy-making machine. There are undoubtedly conflicting pressures in the various parts of the US bureaucracy which can give an air of incoherence even to a clearly defined set of policies. It has, however, not helped that Reagan seems to rely most for advice on those officials who are furthest removed from the day-to-day reality of the area. Two Ambassadors to El Salvador have been removed since Reagan took office and it appears that Reagan's concern with global power relations (or perhaps with domestic public opinion) counts for more than any deep understanding of Central America itself. This set of priorities is expressed institutionally by the dominance of the National Security Council over the State Department.

At a more fundamental level, the ideas informing US policy in the area are unsatisfactory. There is here a partial conflict between two dominant, but by no means compatible, sets of ideas. The first set can be described

as an American version of the Brezhnev doctrine. According to this, Central America lies within the US sphere of influence; it is its 'front yard', closer to Texas than is New York. Many key US policy-makers and many Republicans are straightforward US imperialists in the sense that they see Central America as a legitimate sphere of US influence where involvement does not require particular justification (it should not be forgotten that Reagan was one of the strongest opponents of Carter's Panama Canal treaty in 1977). Yet this imperialist line cannot be admitted too openly, for the US government also wishes to rail effectively at the imperialism of others ('Let Poland be Poland' etc.); a Brezhnev doctrine, in other words, is acceptable in Central America but not in Eastern Europe. Inconsistency, as such, need not matter (and few world powers are free of it) but it is not clear why, in a thermonuclear age, mere proximity should count for so much. Finally, even if we accept the doubtful hypothesis that Central America really matters to global balance, it remains true that the US has, since 1961, been able to cope with the undisguised hostility of one Caribbean State (Cuba) whose Marxist leadership has been able to survive numerous US attempts to destabilise it. A confrontational US position may help to consolidate the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua just as it helped consolidate Castro's rule in Cuba. A more conciliatory line from the US might reduce Cold War tensions in the area and thus avoid a polarisation which itself highlights the limits of US influence in its own 'front yard'.

A second set of ideas which informs US policy is that of a kind of universalism and rests on the assumption that the US will indeed 'go anywhere, bear any burden, pay any price', if not exactly to protect liberty then at least to combat Communism. Seen in this light, there are not one but two profoundly ideological protagenists involved in the Central American conflicts. Of the two sides, the Cuban/Soviet is the more cautious, the more willing to bide its time and wait. Marxists believe that time is on their side and in Central America this belief may indeed have justification, while the US must intervene rapidly and on an increasing scale if it is to protect its embattled clients in the region. The Cuban/Soviet side and the USA in universalist mood may both be perfectly sincere in proclaiming a desire for peace and security but the meanings differ. Indeed, peace and security for the one must be defined in terms which deny totally the same benefits for the other. Yet it is clear that a universalism of this kind does not rest on a clear view of US national interest, nor is it easy to see how it can be maintained without an indefinite commitment of resources or an infinite willingness to bear risks. Yet it is plain that the US public is patently not willing to commit resources indefinitely or bear risks infinitely and that any policy with any chance of public acceptance within the US must be made to rest on carefully selected priorities and ends carefully tailored to means. To paraphrase Macaulay, there are few sights so ridiculous as a US government in one of its periodic fits of universal morality.

All of this presents a depressing prospect. The United States has got

itself into a position where it cannot easily 'win' in Central America (even an apparently clear-cut victory may turn out to be Phyrric in the long run, as in Guatemala in 1954) but where it can suffer considerably during a prolonged and indecisive period of crisis.The inhabitants of the area may be rightly fearful of a future which threatens Cold War politics in a climate of Central American violence. It is only to be hoped that one day some lessons will be drawn about the difficulties attached to great power intervention in small, backward and politically unstable countries.

---

1. An important exception here is Victor Bulmer Thomas' forthcoming chapter on Central America in the Royal Institute of International Affairs' forthcoming *Latin America in the World Recession.*

[George Philip is Lecturer in Politics at The London School of Economics and Political Science.]

The December issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Reform in South Korea* by Richard Sim (held over from the November issue), *Antarctica's Indian Summer* by Peter J. Beck, *Wilberforce: Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary* by Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P. and *Vladimir Bukovsky's Castle* by Michael Futrell.

CENTENNIAL 1984: A SECOND SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA?

by Anthony Kirk-Greene

THE potentially magic date of 1984 projects a different significance to different audiences. In the United States, it commemorates the two hundredth anniversary of Congress's ratification of the Paris peace treaty confirming America's independence from Britain. In England, it marks the bicentenary of the publication of what four years later was renamed *The Times*, initially the *Daily Universal Register*, and in Scotland it marks two hundred years of the *Glasgow Herald*. It also commemorates, again, the centenary of the despatch of Gordon's ill-fated expedition to Khartoum. For some unrecorded British naval family, too, it is a memorial anniversary, for in 1784, the historians tell us, 'in a salute by one of our ships in China a gun was inadvertently fired, which killed a native. The government demanded the gunner and he was soon strangled'. In 1984 it will be five hundred years since the Wars of the Roses came to an end, nine hundred years since Rome fell to Henry IV; and in 1184 BC Troy was taken and the Trojan Wars were at last over. Again, to those in Bavaria who have never forgotten God's mercy in delivering them from the Black Death, 1984 will mark the 350th anniversary of the Oberammergau Passion Play.

To many people in the English-speaking Western world the relevance of 1984 lies in the Orwellian context of 'Big Brother Is Watching You' and the Party's triple slogan translated into the official language of Newspeak, 'WAR IS PEACE, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY'. Here stands the warning of George Orwell in his grim vision of what the world of creeping totalitarianism, with its Ministry of Love (responsible for law and order), Thought Police, and daily Two Minute Hates, could be like in that then far-off year, thirty-five years ahead, of 1984. Already the chilling term 'Orwellian' has become part of the standard vocabulary of the English-speaking world, describing a state or society which is intent on dehumanising the individual and annihilating ('vapourising' in the idiom of *1984*) those who dare to rebel: in short, the blueprint of the already realised Gulag Archipelago. To most people in Africa, or at least to those cognizant of the passage of their continent's modern history, 1984 should recall to them the moment, a hundred years earlier, when, at the Conference of Berlin, the political reshaping of Africa was conditioned and confirmed.

In 1884, of course, in the heyday of European arrogance and imperial expansion, there was little cause for surprise and none for protest that such consequential decisions for Africa should have been made in Bismarck's remote Berlin Chancery, by statesmen who might only with hesitation have been able to distinguish Zambesia from Zanzibar or a Zande from a Zulu. To quote Hilaire Belloc's satirical lines on the puzzle-

ment of Europe's turn-of-century politicians over Africa:

> Great Island! Made to be the bane
> Of Mr. Joseph Chamberlain.
> Peninsula! Whose smouldering fights
> Keep Salisbury awake at nights,
> And furnished for a year or so
> Such sport to M. Hanotaux.

The affront was further aggravated by the fact that, again unexceptionable in 1884, not a single African view was sought or voice heard in this sealing of the partition of their continent into the hinterland diplomacy of 'effective occupation' and 'spheres of influence'. By 1984, on the other hand, not only Africa's plight will have become a matter of every individual's conscience and every nation's concern, but the greed of the Scramble and the wilfulness of the Partition have engraved themselves on the heart of independent Africa as a scary reminder of what might happen again and what must therefore never be allowed to come to pass. Hence, according to the conventional wisdom of African political rhetoric, the respect necessarily paid to the watchword of African unity as the safest insurance against balkanisation and the continent's consequent vulnerability to re-partition and re-occupation by non-African powers.

Yet more surprising perhaps, given the hindsight of 1984, is another contradiction. Despite angry protests by frustrated nationalists during the latter day colonial period that, come independence, they would at once effect reunification with their kith and kin across those artificial and arbitrary boundaries roughed out by ignorant statesmen in Berlin, those self same boundaries have been publicly accepted by the independent states of Africa as the legal basis of the new nations. More than this, they have now been elevated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to an entrenched status of near-sanctity. Temerarious indeed the African leader who, in 1984, dares to seek to rationalise the topsy-turvy legacy of his national boundaries and reverse Europe's scatter-gun decisions of 1884. 'Until we were colonised', as Julius Nyerere shrewly explained of modern Tanzania 'this nation did not exist... Colonial rule put the flesh of emotional unity on the bones of legal unity'. So it is that, paradoxically, the modern nation-state of Africa rests physically and politically on the foundations laid by the colonial powers a century ago.

The year 1884 was to mark simultaneously the beginning of the two most influential and international themes of twentieth century Africa, its colonialisation and its decolonisation. True, the Berlin Conference retrospectively confirmed the Partition rather than initiated the Scramble. Such exact chronology, however, can in no way undermine the basic premise of this article, namely that if the colonisation of Africa marked the most important aspect of Africa's position in the international system during the first half of the twentieth century, its decolonisation has been the most influential contribution to the world scene in the second half. The question is posed of how serious are the signs that, as the year 1984 nears its centennial fulfilment, the trauma of 1884 may be repeated and

Africa once again yield its sovereignty to non-African powers and lapse into the passive status of the pawn of superpowers. Nineteen eighty-four may usher in a new Scramble for Africa: a new partition and new participants, yet with many of the old purposes and ploys still persisting. If the differences of the second Scramble superficially outweigh the features of the first, the objectives and the outcome could be startlingly similar. In such an event, Africa would seem to rival the Middle East as the focus of ceaseless local turbulence and continuous international intervention. That is not a role to be envied.

Where do such sombre speculations leave Africa as the centenary of interventionist 1884 approaches? If the frequency and ferocity of the continental conflict which has characterised Africa of the 1960s and 1970s continues to escalate at a similar rate into the 1980s and 1990s, what kinds of intervention can be expected? Leaving to one side the kind of gauche propaganda attempt by the United States to influence world opinion on Poland by its television spectacular 'Let Poland Be Poland' screened on Solidarity Day in 1981 (a chimera worthy of George Orwell's own Ministry of Truth), a number of post-'1984' possibilities emerge from this analysis of international intervention in independent Africa.

First, internal conflict is likely to accompany, as cause or as effect, the chronic capacity for instability revealed by many of Africa's independent states. This is so whether they were colonial possessions (Uganda, Chad, Benin) or, like Ethiopia and Liberia, were not. To blame such repetitive instability on the colonial past alone is a naïve argument, one heard less and less as, like the experience of India and the Second Republic of Nigeria, new nations acquire more and more maturity. As J. K. Galbraith has observed of what he sees as the existing 'state of permanent crisis' in Africa, the worst aspect of colonialism has been the pathetic alibi mentality it seems to have left behind. Such internal conflicts may have a spill-over effect, penetrating just over national boundaries; or they may invoke the kind of once-removed intervention which in the case of the Nigerian civil war we have identified as internationalisation.

The second scenario accepts that there are likely to be more inter-state wars in Africa. Those who saw conflicts like the Congo, Sudan and Nigerian crises of the 1960s as merely teething-troubles have had their optimism shattered by the latter-day Somali-Ethiopian war, the Uganda-Tanzania war and the war in Chad, the last-named escalating to its climax on the eve of the Organisation of African Unity's twentieth birthday. Unlike Africa's civil wars, intra-state wars have to date been relatively few in Africa. They may occur with or without a third-party, non-African presence, that is to say on either the Somali-Ethiopian or the Ugandan-Tanzanian model. While Africa itself is at least aware of its own capacity for intra-state combustion and all the external consequences that may flow from such explosions, the sweeping concept of a Pan-African High Command to police Africa's own wars as well as to resist external aggression, or the creation of an African 'fire-fighting force' to cool down such inflammatory outbursts as Shaba, have not proceeded far beyond the

rhetoric. The ignominy of the OAU's first attempt at undertaking a peace-keeping role and the understandable resentment of Nigeria over how it was left holding the Chad baby have done little to inspire those who advocate the establishment of Africa's own 'international police' force. Even the encouraging ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) protocol on defence, still not signed by all sixteen member-states, could give rise to some diplomatically embarrassing situations if, for instance, the aggressor turns out to be a member state, or else a non-member African state, and not the 'foreign' aggressor principally envisaged.

Thirdly, within the continental framework, there has been agreement since the mid-1970s on what constitute the two most inflammable flashpoints, though there are today those who might want to add a vulnerable third. Some see the Horn of Africa as the womb from which World War III will spring, as fully armed as Venus was unclothed in the moment of instant birth. Its motivation could just as well be local antagonisms as superpower seizure; or, even more likely, the exploitation of the first by the second. Others give priority of Armageddon to Southern Africa, with its crisis of encirclement as the Black states recall Nkrumah's view of the real meaning of Ghana's independence, 'our task is not done and our own safety is not assured until the last vestiges of colonialism have been swept from Africa', and the Republic of South Africa carries out grim warning raids against Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and any others who dare to harbour their enemies. The scenario of a Pan-African assault on South Africa as the last bastion of white supremacy on the continent can neither be ruled out in theory or envisaged in immediate practice. Despite the burden of Professor Nolutshungu's new book on the inadequacy of political détente within the Republic, the generation of change in South Africa in the post-1984 period is likely to be more clearly attributable to internal policies than to external pressures.

Nor will South Africa have let pass unnoticed the success of Israel's destabilising strike against the PLO in the summer of 1982 as a new way of taking out threatening or troublesome neighbours. As for Chad, the possible third claimant for the unwelcome accolade of Africa's hottest flashpoint in the post-1984 decade, there are those who already ascribe to the miserable failure that was 'Tripoli 1982' the end of the cardboard-and-paste unity of the OAU. Others do not predict such a collapse until Azania is here and there is no longer any Pan-African cause to hold fifty disparate nation-states in common accord. Others again see the Tripoli *débacle* as a crisis, yes, but not a collapse: the death, through illness or murder, of the OAU is the one thing Africa's more responsible statesmen will not countenance. Whatever view is taken, the OAU never can be the same again after Gaddafi's double mismangement at Tripoli, and Chad is likely to remain both a milestone and menace in the history of international relations in independent Africa. As one experienced African diplomat put it, 'Chad is a word and 1982 a year the OAU would dearly like to forget'.

Fourthly, there is the scenario dominated by external powers. Com-

monly called superpowers, this is a definition whose lack of realism is open to serious challenge. In the context of Africa today, there is no reason why Nigeria or South Africa (earlier, Professor Ali Mazrui in his Reith Lectures added Zaire to complete the triumvirate of potential nuclear powers in Africa) should not earn such recognition. For the moment, however, let us stick to the common African equation of 'external' with 'super' powers. Stripping their image of its wolf's clothing and allowing for a certain measure of mischievous dirty-tricks inseparable from the contemporary international scene, whether it be from the CIA or BOSS, from the PLO or Mossad, of the *Ugly American* or *Our Man in Havana* style, superpower activity in Africa is for the moment more likely to remain covert than to manifest itself in an explicit presence. None of the superpowers yet seems poised to do what the Soviet Union has done in Hungary and Afghanistan or Cuba in Angola, namely to 'send in the cavalry'. The Falklands syndrome of a classical imperialist task force is not likely to become the model for ex-colonial action in Africa in the 1980s: the days of 'suffering a great national humiliation' are long gone for Europe in Africa, and where the possibility of such injury exists (a commercial rather than a colonial one) it is more likely to be met with sulks or a stiff upper lip than a punitive gunboat (e.g., France's reaction to Guinea's 'insolence' in 1958, Britain's response to BP's nationalisation by Nigeria in 1979). Despite the strategic sensitivity of the Horn, the superpowers still show respect for at least the superficial sovereignty of independent governments, and despite the mineral indispensability of, say, Angola or Namibia to the West, not even the internationally aggrieved USA went so far as to blockade 'the Pirates of Teheran' so as to safeguard 'their' oil supplies. In general, there is likely to be more superpower 'influence', less superpower 'intervention', to use the distinction drawn earlier. Where we may see further physical intervention is of 'Stanleyville 1964', the 'Entebbe 1976', the 'Shaba 1978' or the 'Teheran 1980' type, derived from the promise of the legal protection of one's own citizens when the local administration no longer appears competent to fulfil this fundamental responsibility of international law.

Lastly, we are left with one necessary but neglected modification of the notion of international intervention. For practical purposes in the African context, the argument generally assumes such supra-national action to be by a non-African power, 'super' or not. Yet there is nothing in the post-'1984' era to rule out the possibility of African exemplars of international intervention in the affairs of another African state. To his chagrin, many members of the OAU cast President Nyerere in this aggressor's role when he appeared before the heads of state summit in 1979. Anticipating the plaudits of his peers for having rid Uganda of the tyrant they had called 'the shame of Africa', he received instead condemnation and the cold shoulder. In the eyes of many African leaders, Gaddafi's Libya has all the traits—and already some of the record—of becoming independent Africa's first African imperialist, with fingers in a number of juicy pies from suspectedly the Gambia and Ghana across to provenly Uganda and Sudan

and now very positively in Chad. To some African leaders, even the composition—and the brief—of the OAU peace-keeping force sent to Chad in 1982 was vulnerable to suspicions of international (Pan-African) interference and assault on national sovereignty. And who is to say that, should some small African state discover oil or some other mineral deemed indispensable by the turn of the century, some other, larger African country might not order its troops across the border, always in the name of the aggressor's time-honoured cause of 'protection' or 'liberation'? 'Uganda Seizes Part of Tanzania', 'Zaire Occupies Zambian Villages', 'South Africa Invades Lesotho' are all recent back-page headlines in the world press, indicative of a tendency which could some day erupt into front-page news. Given Africa's ethnic hot-potch of 'nations' and the inflammability of its arbitrary boundaries, such an eventuality as African aggression should not be ignored. In Africa today, the commonplace correlation of 'international' and 'foreign' with 'non-African' intervention is no longer an adequate tool of analysis.

As the anniversary of 1884 comes round, a certain grim image increasingly assumes the shape of a haunting nightmare. This is something deeper than the undemanding prophecy of Africa continuing to be, literally as well as metaphorically, in the firing-line for the rest of the century. The flashpoints of South Africa and the Horn make this inevitable, even without Africa's tendency to sudden eruption onto the international scene from the least likely and least significant areas, for instance Chad. Those with a penchant for finding historical precedents will surely discern an irony in the fact that it should be Chad which has emerged as the focal point of Africa's conflict and international concern, in the 1980s just as it did a century ago. In 1984, as in 1884, the periphery may still act as the trigger to action from the centre, the lesser states still agitate and arouse the bigger nations—save that this time the latter could be African, too.

How great then, one may reflect, is the risk to Africa of being repartitioned, in '1984' as it was in 1884? And, with appalling irony, of once again losing its sovereignty, this time so recently regained? As the *Umtali Post* rhetorically asked a year ago, turning its gaze on the Chinese and Russians, the Cubans and East Germans, the Americans and the Swedes, who clutter Africa's soil, 'Is this the freedom that Africa seeks?' Such a scenario, however unwelcome, must at least rank among the options facing the international relations student who is at the same time a realist.

If 1984 does usher in the age of another Partition, of a second Scramble, the chances are that this time round the new imperialists will not necessarily be yesterday's colonialists. If they are still the superpowers, then the superpowers probably will not be Britain or France, Belgium, Portugal or Germany, but perhaps the Soviet Union (was not Brezhnev called 'the architect of expansionism'?), or the United States (why should Reagan's 'constructive engagement' have limits?) or the untested China (who first described Africa as 'ripe for revolution'?). Somehow, like Pooh Bear with his inability to resist hopefully sticking his finger into the honeypot, Europe (and now the USA) seems eternally fascinated by the

African beehive—even though they do not forget they may be stung once more.

Again, in any '1984' replay of 1884 and all that, it is less likely to be the insensitive imposition of Europe's will on an unwilling Africa, as happened in the nineteenth century. Rather could it be superpower intervention by invitation, as one African country after another turns to one superpower after another in a cumulative catastrophe of countervailing 'advisers', alliances and arms supplies.

Or, if it *is* a case of superpower interference, it may be a matter of repartition at one remove, as it were, not of physical intervention but of politico-economic influence. Today nations no longer, as in 1884, have to expand territorially in order to acquire wealth. Prior possession of wealth enables and encourages expansion of a less physical but equally influential kind—a lesson well learned by the USA in the 1950s and by the OPEC countries in the 1970s. Yet even if the Third World, no longer overawed by Western dominance, has quickly learned to manipulate and change the rules of the international game, it often seems no nearer to being able to win it in 1984 than it was in 1884.

Of course, as we have seen above, the new imperialists need not be limited to the superpowers. They could be from Cuba (far bigger than the snide stereotype of Moscow's errand-boy), or from Israel, itself the progeny of colonialism and today an international force with the power to make itself felt far beyond its borders—and not afraid to do so, either. Not for nothing do Israelis themselves call South Africa and Taiwan the other two members of the club of 'parish states'. Or, should Gaddafi's dream of empire be realised, we could have a home-grown African colonialist. The day may be nearer than one thought in 1960, 'Africa's year of independence', when we see Africa's first *African* colony.

How far any second Scramble might out-distance the first, a century ago, in crudeness and callous consequences would have to remain for assessment by posterity. Yet even today, the appalling plight of Africa's five million refugees (Mazrui's 'mobile referendum on the march', voting with their feet on their countries' habitability-index), the victims of war, tyranny, drought and famine, affords a horrifying preview of the African condition if the nightmare of '1984' should be realised. It is no longer non-African intellectuals alone who dare describe what more and more Africans see as the betrayal of their New Jerusalem by the hand of its very architects. From East Africa, Kenya's leading social novelist and dramatist, Ngugi wa Thion'go, has harrowingly expressed his people's perception of unchanged human misery in the no-change switch from colonial to independent rule:

> When we fought for freedom
> I'd thought that we the poor would milk grade cows.
> In the past I used to eat wild spinach;
> Today I am eating the same.

From West Africa, the lament is echoed by Buchi Emecheta in her latest novel:

> When the Europeans ruled us, few people died; now we rule ourselves, we butcher each other like meat-sellers slaughtering cows.

Just how apocryphal, one is forced to wonder, is the story of the peasant from Central Africa who sighingly asked 'When will this thing called independence end?' and did not live for an answer?

Finally, the imperialism of '1984' may differ from that of 1884 simply by its absence of Empire. What we may see in the Africa of tomorrow is colonialism without the colonial state. Eastern Europe proves that there are more forms of colonialism and satellite status than that of formal empire, with its structure of plumed proconsuls and a corps of colonial administrators. Imperialism can no longer be defined by the willingness to send a gunboat or extract a treaty. It can be just neatly effected by aid or arms, both the giving and withholding thereof. In '1984' we may once again hear, as we did in 1884, of 'spheres of influence' rather than precise boundaries, and find ideologies, communist or capitalist or any other -ist, replacing the merchants, missionaries and military as the principal agents of post-colonial imperialism. For it could be that the chief element distinguishing the imperialism of '1984' from that of 1884 is the ideological input. Here could lie the new dimension to the new domination.

Yet whatever the tactics (trade or aid or arms or cultural co-operation) and whoever the leading *dramatis personae*, it remains likely that the rest of the cast will be the same—the Africans. It will be the same stage and the same plot, in figurative 1984 as in historic 1884: Africa as the scene of alien hegemony, always with the capacity to interfere or intervene, over the destiny of Africa's ineluctably subordinate peoples. As Julius Nyerere prophetically observed, exactly twenty years ago, of Africa's second Scramble:

> [It] will be conducted in a different manner from the first, but its purpose will be the same—to get control of our continent. This time we will not be subject to military invasions from countries outside our continent. Foreign powers have no intention of fighting each other in this Second Scramble . . . The imperialists, old and new, will exploit the differences within African nations and between African nations . . . They will incite African to fight African, but always in their own interests. The success or otherwise of this Second Scramble depends on us.

The only qualification to such casting is that, in the '1884' revival, there can be no guarantee that Africans may not themselves play the lead roles this time. In '1984', the novel nightmare of African imperialism within Africa can no longer be dismissed as an Orwellian chimera.

[Anthony Kirk-Greene is Lecturer in the Modern History of Africa at Oxford University and a Fellow of St. Antony's College. He will contribute a second article on international intervention in Africa in the December issue. Publications include *Crisis and Conflict in Nigeria 1966-1970* (OUP 1971).]

CAN LABOUR COME IN FROM THE COLD?

by Austin Mitchell, M.P.

IN the forty years since the war Labour has transformed itself from the strongest, most effective social democratic party in the advanced industrial world, with the proudest record in government, to the weakest, showing a greater fall in vote over both the post-war period and the seventies than any other. Much of this comes not as a result of long office but while in opposition to the most incompetent government in the west, and in an electoral system well calculated to strengthen the two incumbent parties. All Social Democratic parties have problems: the ineffectiveness of Keynesian economics in crisis, the reaction against big government as standards rise, the increasing pluralism of society. Yet these are common to all and most parties are riding them out. Only Labour has turned a common problem into personal disaster.

Labour's decline is supposed to be the product of social change, the erosion of working class values, lifestyle and allegiances. True, this is going on; yet it affects both parties and all advanced countries. Indeed, to the extent that Britain has grown more slowly and is now more depressed its impact should have been less here: it is a mark of success not failure. The real problem is that as allegiances erode, more electors are up for grabs, more people are influenced by perceptions of competance, ability to deliver, attractiveness, image and generally looking like a team people can put trust in. On all these counts we failed.

The nation wanted an alternative to the rigours of Thatcherism. Initially they turned to us: we had around half the vote in the 1980 polls, but then we chucked it all away and in despair people turned first to the Alliance, which soon had the same figure, and then during the Falklands crisis back to the government, leaving the other two parties scrabbling for the other half. The electorate was more volatile than ever. We were not only failing to attract them, we were positively putting them off. So in the 1983 election while we had prepared the way by doing everything wrong:—poor leader, poor policies, awful campaign, disunited party—the Conservatives merely had to use their opportunities to the maximum, timing the election to best advantage, expanding domestic credit and seizing the temporary stimulus of the falling pound to make people feel better even if they weren't. This was no more than normal opportunism; though a mite unworthy of Margaret. Yet it was enough to win with an opposition which had halved its support in two years. The voters were really saying that they didn't particularly like what the government had done but would give it the benefit of a lot of doubt because they liked our antics even less. They put their heads firmly in the sand and gave Mrs. Thatcher a mandate to do what will certainly be her worst.

Labour's failure was the consequence of Britain's decline. The Labour government of 1974-9 struggled to cushion the consequences of decline but did so only at the cost of straining the party, weakening the unions

who had so willingly co-operated with it and exhausting its own credit with party activists and electorate to neither of which had it delivered the (different) benefits of instant socialism or real growth both had come to expect. The internal reaction against this failure boosted the left. Because there was no trust and Labour is the party of the rule book the new settlement had to be written into the constitution by a series of changes designed to make the party a more disciplined instrument for socialism and one more dependent on its activists.

Thus every adverse trend in the politics of decline was wilfully compounded. The people were frightened. Labour multiplied fears because the triumphant left took the opportunity to cram in every policy they wanted with no thought to either priorities or the credibility of the right in selling the direct opposite of what it had peddled four year's before. The government had become more extreme, carrying through a counter revolution: instead of moving in to occupy the middle ground as the logic of a two-party system dictated, Labour moved left and vacated it. The people wanted the alternative which it is the job of a two-party system to generate: Labour split, and dissidents who could survive only by smashing Labour bent to that work with a will, presenting the electorate with a confused babble of recrimination and deadlocking the machinery of change, the two-party system, just as the rise of Labour and the fall of the Liberals had done through the twenties. Labour needed to adjust to new times and new moods: instead of listening to the people it turned inward, pre-occupied with itself. We needed to speak to the nation, tell them our truth, conciliate their fears: instead both sides in the party shouted at each other and the left prospered by telling unrepresentative activists what they wanted to hear. Labour needed to build up its membership using them as a means of communication with the people: yet membership shrank to just over a quarter of a million, an activist middle class clique talking to themselves and wholly unattractive to the population. Small wonder that the nation turned away in droves, relegating us to a situation where our best hope next time is not to win, a 12% swing is impossible, but merely to get back to being the inevitable alternative. We had made ourselves irrelevant. The electorate merely underlined that lesson.

A party which was dominated by the flabby opportunism of the right from 1974-79 and paid the consequences in collapse when that government had run out of steam, goodwill and ideas had then made the exact opposite mistake by abandoning itself to a left reaction which proved overwhelmingly negative. It now has to draw the balance between these two dangers to mobilise the energies of the left and the presentational abilities and attractiveness of the right for a common purpose which has become desperate. Yet dire, glaring, necessity has never been a sufficient reason for action in the Labour Party. So the great danger is that having begun to make ourselves irrelevant we will grow to love the ghetto. It can easily happen: fewer members mean they are more powerful. It's comforting to turn inward; the clamps are tightly fastened; the activists

too strong and too out of touch with the real world; our role as a protectionist party of the declining sectors of Britain's national life, dwindling unions, dying industry, disappearing working class, depressed areas may be too strong to allow us to escape and straddle the gap to the new. If we fail we will be relegated to sad dwindling decline, a ghettoisation such as that which afflicted the French Communist Party where the Socialist Party captured the new in a way we seem incapable of doing. That danger is real and oppressive. So anyone who sees saving Labour as Britain's first political priority can only point the direction, indicate the road without knowing whether a very obstinate party will be willing to travel it.

Our approach to policies in 1983 had more to do with masochism than salesmanship. There are those among us who would rather feel right, or rather self-righteous, as a voice crying in the wilderness than be in power. So the party hectored the people, the right muttered disloyally, the electorate shuffled away. That mistake must not be repeated. The left will be the new party establishment. Its measures may be more necessary in a declining Britain, though not necessarily that particular set. Yet unless it learns that real radicalism is what you achieve not what you declaim and that it must carry the people and not just the party, mobilising presentational skills, practical flair and involving the right with all its public standing and acceptability, then its obsession with 'the policies' reduces the whole party to futility. Unless both sides apply themselves to the paramount problem of policy it cannot be solved, An imposed policy dictated by fanatics and conference will not work. Instead, all sides must come together — as they can if they think about policy, not power struggles. The one is emotive and divisive, the other a finite process to which both sides have a contribution to make. Moreover, disagreements on policy are acceptable to a public repelled by the struggle for dominance but understanding of serious discussion of serious issues which worry the nation too.

There are no new policies, no sudden revelations. What there could be is a reshuffling of the policy pack and one which takes account of reality and its priorities and of the art of salesmanship to a doubting electorate. Internally both sides must share power and policy in a new *modus vivendi,* live and let live with no domination by either. If they don't get on they die separately. Neither can now prevail, still less succeed without the other. So the main question to which both must address themselves is that of responsibility. To whom is the Labour Party responsible? To the people? In which case how are their views, wishes and desires to be heard in a party obsessed with itself? Or to the members, the movement or the working class? In which case why are the members so few? Why can't the movement deliver? Why doesn't the working glass come forward? In the last few years we have been promised that radicalisation would bring new support from the working class, its consciousness raised, bringing it sweeping in like Blucher to the relief of the left's Wellington. That proved to be myth. We must therefore turn back to the people who showed us in June that we had drifted as far out of touch with them as

Churchill's Tories in 1945. We must now accept reality as the Conservatives did. Labour has become irrelevant to the needs of the people. To get back means listening, easing the shackles of the outside party and making what we aim at fit in with the aspirations of the people.

The premise on which the New Model approach was based was that Labour has to offer a real choice, to be radical, to re-enthuse the working class. We did not and cannot: depression generates fear and privatises misery and class bases are eroding. A 1981 MORI poll showed only 29% saying they belonged to any particular class. In 1964 half did. While we looked to old, fading, class allegiances, Margaret Thatcher built a new majority, recruiting support from skilled workers and the white collar brigade by the promise of tax cuts and by talking the populist language of the people. Labour, obsessed with unemployment, tied to the trade unions and defending jobs, council house dwellers and the poor, was being whittled away from the 'natural party of government' of the sixties, to a party of the new minority. When unemployment was used to break the bargaining power of labour and weaken the trade unions, a wedge was driven between those in work, whose living standards improved—up 3.5% in disposable income 1981-83—and the rest, on whom the sacrifices of decline were placed.

Not a nice society. Yet it created a selfish new majority with a stake in decline. It also worked electorally. Now it poses to Labour the problem of how to reintegrate its coalition, or more accurately how to drive a wedge into the new majority to get back those who should be Labour, and without whom we cannot attain power. In political terms it is not difficult. The interests of those who borrow or buy homes on mortgages are not served by Tory monetarism which puts money, its institutions and those who have it before people and production. Nor are the interests of wage and salary earners served by deflationary economics: expansion and growth give them their only real leverage as well as the only prospect of jobs for their children. Their instincts, though not socialist, are certainly altruistic; they are below the threshold at which it pays to provide for self and family through insurance and so they depend on the universal state provision and the tradition of civic improvement (as well as fun and betterment) through local government. They are also populist, instinctively against a British management they know to be incompetent. They are aware of middle class monopolies of lawyers and the professions which prey on them and serve them so badly and all the unregulated unfairnesses in the fields of insurance, pensions, house purchase, car purchase and accident compensation into which they are now venturing. If the universal state provision of the dole society is irksome to them, so is the nanny-state which middle class guilt has created. Yet they are still unable to stand fully on their own two feet, needing help rather than mollycoddling. Most of all they desire a party which gives an impression of managerial competence. That cannot be the Tories, with their prejudiced selfishness. It cannot come from the pious impracticalities of the Alliance marching idealism down a dead-end street. It can and must come



from a revitalised Labour party.

Labour's problem in regaining their allegiance is therefore intellectual and presentational: to devise policies which provide help for those who need it most, but at the same time to offer lures and baits to this new middle class. The intellectual basis must be egalitarian, for there is a widespread readiness for common sacrifice, such as incomes policy, which will play a part in the hard times to come if Labour pursues it by Rawlesian social approach, aiming not at an impossible goal of total equality but simply requiring every privilege, every inequality to justify itself.

These problems are solvable but not by the introverted sectarian body which emerged in the years of the ostrich. They need an outward looking, permeable party, broadening its appeal and reaching out to the people, not just activists and unions. An unrepresentative membership is unqualified to dictate policy to a broad national party whose purpose must be to bring together all the discontents generated by the present government and mobilise them against it. Conference must therefore be demoted. The only body competant and able to provide policy and leadership is a Parliamentary Labour Party restored to its traditional role as mediator between the party, its enthusiasts and the wider electorate outside. Policy formulation must be shifted from the national executive and its complex jungle of committees to the PLP, mobilising outside experts and interests, involving those who are required to sell the policy.

A limited yield strategic nuclear weapon on Walworth Road, the Labour party headquarters, would help! More humanely, head office should be transformed from a policy factory into a propaganda-presentation machine, thus the national executive could become not a power base from which to attack the leadership but a body responsible for an effecient professional organisation capable of carrying Labour to power.

Membership must be built up to the higher levels found in other socialist parties, not by bringing in more fanatics, for the frontier with the 'loony left' needs to be sealed, but by lowering subscriptions and demands of involvement and making far more use of direct democracy in the form of postal ballots and postal briefing. To demand the weakening of the trade union stranglehold on the party is a counsel of perfection: the unions are more than ever necessary now not only financially but as a force for sense and moderation. Yet their attention will drift away if Labour looks less and less like a viable instrument for achieving what they want. Ideally, we need state funding, the only way an independent, efficient, party of the less well off can function. Since the Conservatives are certain to deny us that justice we require modern professional fund-raising techniques. Finally and most clearly of all, we need leadership. Labour does not like strong leadership, yet needs it more than any other party, particularly now, to take it out of sectarian shallows and back to relevance. It needs the charisma Neil Kinnock brings.

Whether such a revival plan succeeds depends on time and circumstance. The Alliance and its junior partner, the SDP, are both a threat, having a big advantage in by-elections. The SDP will hover like a vulture, waiting for Labour's mistakes; but they, too, have problems; a plateau effect operates on their vote, making it impossible to reach up to the peaks. The SDP survivors, apart from David Owen, are ponderous rather than dynamic, and they have to resolve the dilemma of whether to stay separate and hope for further Labour desertions (which aid their purpose but compete with their own walking wounded) or close the door and be eaten alive by the Liberals.

The Conservatives' counter revolution could be stopped much earlier by a sensible deal or a working relationship between Labour, and one of the uneasy partners in the Alliance. A mutual withdrawal of candidates reuniting the divided opposition to Thatcherism would end the weakness and division which allowed this government back into power. Yet devoutly as such a consummation is to be desired, it cuts across all Labour's instincts and the Alliance's preference for Toytown politics. No great harm in that, provided Labour accepts that failure to use such a strategy makes the only alternative obligatory: we must drive to the centre ground and embrace into Labour's own coalition the middle class and new middle class groups we alienated in 1979 and 1983.

Margaret Thatcher's chickens have come home to roost since the election: higher interest rates, spending cuts and asset sales to pay for the electoral spree, emerging balance of payments and government spending problems. The recovery will vanish like the mirage it always was. No one can cure inflation by depression without inflicting tremendous harm on the economy, and an increasing burden of taxation pressing on a shrinking productive base is one which cannot permanently be borne.

When nemesis comes, can Labour be far behind? 'Yes' is the honest answer. But just how far is a question which Labour alone can resolve.

[Austin Mitchell has been Labour Member of Parliament for Grimsby since 1977.]

TEACHING THE HISTORY OF CONFLICT

by Paul Wilkinson

THE study of the history of conflicts is rightly at the core of international relations teaching and research in our universities and colleges. In an international system shot through with conflicts at all levels, it should be obvious that we need to try to improve our knowledge and understanding of their origins, development, outcomes and overall impacts. The close study of earlier conflicts is essential to an adequate understanding of earlier international systems which they helped to shape. And without a knowledge of previous international systems we have no hope of understanding the complexities of our own.

The achievement of excellence in the teaching of the history of conflict is, one must admit, hardly a glamorous or instantly popular manifesto. It is far easier to attract support for political 'solutions' to the problems of peace and justice. Yet, ironically, the *way* in which the history of conflict has been taught to different ethnic, religious, and ideological groups has been one of the most significant factors responsible for subverting progress towards greater peace and justice. One has only to look at current conflicts in the Middle East, Africa and Central America, or on the streets of our multi-racial cities in Western Europe, to see how new generations can be taught to hate and fear their neighbours, and the seeds of fresh conflicts are sown; or at the speeches of Menachem Begin or Charles de Gaulle to see how powerful political leaders can create and exploit their own historical myths to achieve their political ends.

Indeed, the great challenge for the teacher of international relations is the demythologising of the history of conflict. Even in the case of the most recent conflicts, where there are enormous numbers of living witnesses and documentary materials available to the historian, there is abundant evidence of attempts at deliberate distortions, lies, and attempts to rewrite history. The Soviet communist regime has been particularly culpable in this regard. One should not expect anything else from a ruthless self-serving dictatorship where the only history allowed by the regime is official history.[1] Even so, the sheer crudity of the lies and the effrontery of their campaigns of deception of their own citizens is staggering. To this day the official histories of the Bolshevik revolution omit any mention of major participants, such as Trotsky and the others who were later disgraced, purged or forced into exile by Stalin. The Soviet accounts of the Second World War continue to claim that the Western powers deliberately betrayed Russia by failing to honour their promise to open a second front. And it is still claimed that the wartime British government was secretly trying to make a deal with Hitler, and to pull out of the war. There is a similarly predictable mythology about Western responsibility for the Cold War, the Hungarian, and later the Czech and Polish 'counter-revolutionary movements' which the Soviet leaders claim were instigated by Western 'imperialist' forces and intelligence services. The Russian

people have never been told the full facts about the circumstances or scale of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. In the light of Soviet Communism's habitual and all-pervasive lying, it is not really surprising that they at first tried to deny responsibility for shooting down the Korean airliner KAL-007, until the sheer weight of technical and verifiable evidence from Japan and the United States made it impossible for them to brazen it out any longer. These are just a few examples of Soviet mythology.

There are many other dangerous mythologies of conflict emanating from neo-fascist historical revisionists dealing with the Second World War events.[2] Professor Robert Faurisson, in his writings and a bizarre 1981 legal case, has sought to prove that the Holocaust did not happen. The pseudo-academic Institute for Historical Review, based in California, spews out propaganda designed to persuade readers that the conventionally accepted historians' version of the Holocaust is nothing more than a hoax.

But these ideological extremist efforts at revisionism of the history of conflict are the easiest to identify, and hence the easiest to counter in the open educational systems of the West. Far more all-pervasive and difficult to counter is the mythologising of nationalist bias and prejudice. How does one deal with the steady barrage of polemical media coverage in the USA which insists on portraying the conflict in Northern Ireland in simple terms as a confrontation between a brutally repressive British colonialism and downtrodden Irish freedom-fighters? Why is there such a strong vein of anti-French propaganda in British commentary on Europe? And why so much anti-British prejudice in France? And why has the USA got such a poor image among West European youth when Western Europe ultimately depends on the United States for its security against a Soviet superpower armed to the teeth and threatening it with SS20 missiles to which it has as yet no counter?

To know the answers to any of these questions we would have to be at a far more advanced stage of knowledge of political psychology and the subtle processes of political socialisation and shifts in opinions, attitudes, and beliefs.

What we can do is to take some important preliminary steps to try to guard against the substitution or contamination of the teaching of the history of conflict by propaganda.

The first and most important basic precaution is to ensure the total political independence of the universities and the entire educational structure. Schools, colleges and universities, whether privately or publicly funded, should be left free of political interference to run their own curriculum, recruit their own teachers, conduct their own examinations, and maintain their own research and library facilities. Let us remind ourselves that the Nazis' penetration and takeover of the educational institutions was one of the major ways used to destroy the Weimar Republic. If political parties, of whatever political hue, interfere in the selection of teachers or seek to impose political tests on those who hold educational

posts, they at once threaten academic freedom and the cause of truth and scientific enquiry. Academic freedom is, sadly, already lost in many Third World countries as well as in the one-party states of the Soviet bloc. Let us ensure it is protected in the Western democracies. Grave recession and politicians' enthusiasm for cuts in public expenditure on education raise fresh dangers of political interference and pressures, of varying degrees of subtlety, on universities and colleges of all kinds.

In this climate of educational cutbacks and trends towards tighter centralised governmental financial control of higher education, studies of history and society are particularly at risk. Many of the influential 'New Right' politicians and industrialists favour the more utilitarian subjects with some immediate technological or vocational application—such as electronics, computers and accountancy. They tend to regard studies such as international relations and history dismissively, not only because they see no use for them in practical terms, but also because these subjects are seen as inherently or potentially 'subversive.' By its very nature, good scholarly work in international relations may provide the basis for powerful independent critiques of existing foreign and defence policies. It is naïve to think, for example, that hard-pressed governments will welcome greater freedom of information and an open-market in ideas on foreign affairs. Yet the assiduity with which they follow the work published by our leading academic specialists in aspects of international affairs and strategic studies reflects the fact that governments are really desperate for greater expertise in many areas. But it is no good international relations scholars hoping they will be loved, appreciated or cossetted by governments. If they are doing their job really well, the most they are likely to receive from official quarters is grudging respect and attention and some generally unacknowledged utilisation of their research. We should prize our academic freedom and independence above all else, and wear our unpopularity as a mark of pride.

It is a common mistake to equate historical objectivity with value neutrality. Commitment to the pursuit of historical truth is itself a value. There need be no incompatibility between an historian stating his opinions and moral judgements, provided these are made quite explicit, and yet adhering devotedly to the basic requirement of historical objectivity. This requirement is that the actual historical facts, so far as they can be ascertained, are presented to the reader uncoloured by the historian's own opinions and preferences. The professional historian of conflict must never suppress, distort or invent facts to fit the purposes of some ideology, theory or polemic.

A direct consequence of the historian fastidiously presenting the actual historical facts is that he is then in a position to criticise and evaluate other historians' interpretations and theories, and to develop his own interpretation of the same events.[3] It is the ability to construct original and *convincing* theories and fresh interpretations that distinguishes the truly creative from the minor historian. The historian who professes that he has reached no firm conclusions, that he is unable to make any moral

judgements, who believes one theory is as good as another, does not thereby qualify as more objective than his colleagues. He is simply abdicating from part of the historian's task. The test of a really expert historian of conflict is that one can use his comprehensive and accurate historical data and yet find oneself rejecting, in whole or part, the overall interpretation or theories the author presents.

To achieve high standards of objectivity, the teacher of the history of conflict must familiarise himself with the widest possible range of sources on the background and context of the conflict and the motives, perceptions and actions of *all* the parties to the conflict under investigation.

One of the reasons why the so-called 'revisionist' school of historians of the origins of the Cold War provide a dangerously inadequate basis for teachers and students of the period is that all their evidence is based on US documents and other sources. They virtually omit details of Soviet motives, perception and actions at each key phase of the deepening conflict between the US and the Soviets because quite simply they had no access whatever to the essential Soviet information. Yet on this totally one-sided scrutiny and scathing criticism of US foreign policy alone they confidently apportion the main blame for the Cold War on the United States!

Sometimes an objective history of a conflict is impossible because of the unavailability of key data. But in other cases the lack of comprehensiveness is the result of deliberate omission or bias. A good example of this is the way the East Coast media in the United States almost totally ignores the existence of the 1 million Protestants in Northern Ireland, when commentating on the conflict in Ulster. In other cases, the problem is that the facts about long-standing and deep-rooted conflicts are simply forgotten or conveniently glossed over. There is abundant and horrifying detailed historical evidence of the massacres suffered by the Armenians at the beginning of this century. After the war, the facts about what Professor Kuper has called 'the forgotten genocide of the 20th century' were 'lost down the UN's memory hole.'[4] The Armenians lacked a government, they lacked a political voice, and they had no leverage or political influence. Their powerlessness has resulted in their virtual disappearance from the international relations textbooks. Teachers and researchers must always be on their guard against the prejudice and selectivity exerted by governmental power. Studying the behaviour and attitudes of *all* the parties to conflict involves making the effort to investigate non-governmental actors just as thoroughly as governmental ones. It may be more difficult to obtain essential data about shadowy terrorist and revolutionary organisations, but it is no less vital to understanding the many 20th century conflicts in which groups of this kind are integrally involved.

Nor should the teacher despise or ignore the vast amount of printed and broadcast propaganda material produced by regimes and non-governmental groups. In this field, of course, a major limitation is lack of the people with necessary language skills to provide the teacher with the necessary resource material in translation. For example, among the

gravest deficiencies of our education systems in Britain and North America today is the acute shortage of Russian language-trained personnel with a grounding in international relations, politics and history, capable of monitoring Soviet materials thoroughly and analysing them in depth. We face an even graver deficiency of specialists trained in Chinese. Urgent attention should be given to encouraging more joint degree training in hard languages and international relations, and extending the availability of teachers qualified in these subjects to the non-university sector.

The recent neglect of the ideological causes and dimensions of conflict reflects the limitations of the theory of ideology in contemporary western social science and in neo-Marxist thought. Dominant schools of social psychology and sociology in the West have been so permeated with the deterministic behaviourism of the natural sciences that they have tended to discount or neglect the capacity of powerful doctrines and belief-systems to inspire and mould human conduct. Marxists have been obsessed with far too narrow a conception of ideology, which they see as false-consciousness and legitimation for a ruling class.[5]

The conscientious historian of conflict has no excuse for accepting either of these crassly oversimplified approaches. Historical materials on *every* kind of social conflict show clearly the importance of many other major social functions and consequences of ideologies. No social group seems immune from the need for some elemental belief system, however crude, to provide meaning and purpose to life, a doctrine of man and society and a rudimentary structure of values to guide individual conduct. De Tocqueville, writing long before Marx, was the first great social theorist and historian to see that the new secular ideology of the French Revolution functioned in many respects like a surrogate religion, a focus of hope and faith with the same dogmatic certainties and universalist pretentions. It was Sorel, Pareto, and Mosca writing early in this century who recognised the powerful function of political ideologies, or 'formulas,' as social myths to inspire and mobilise masses to action. And modern historians of revolution and of fascism have added immeasurably to our understanding of the irrational and mythic elements in masss political psychology.

As teachers of the history of conflict, we do our students a grave disservice if we fail to emphasise and explore fully with them the key roles and influences of ideologies which are inherently in constant conflict with each other. Ideologies are inherently and powerfully conducive to conflict because: each professes that its own ideas constitute a superior wisdom and truth which implicitly supersedes the claims of all other ideologies; they always claim to speak to and for a transcendent entity or collectivity larger than the corporate group of believers (i.e. they are inherently expansionist and propagandist); they engender conflicts in their constant efforts to transform the values of unconverted individuals and groups; they engage in struggles to promote and implement programmes of action on groups and societies, and codes of conduct on individuals. Above all, they are manipulative weapons of enormous power in the hands of skilful

leaders who can use them for almost any purpose—unification, centralisation, separatism, war, liquidation of opponents, scapegoating, and the inculcation of a climate of hysteria and terror.

For all these reasons I would argue for making the study of ideologies and the movements that are their bearers, a central focus of attention in the teaching of the history of conflict. We need to be able to guide students authoritatively and comprehensively concerning the nature of the ideas and doctrines involved, their origin and development, and their historical influence. And we need to go much further than this if we are to foster critical thinking, independence and originality among our students. We must constantly be encouraging critical appraisal of the content of political ideologies, their major concepts, degree of clarity and logical consistenecy, and theoretical and heuristic potential. What doctrines of man and society do they imply? What is the relationship between the basic principles and values enunciated and the planned forms of political, social and economic organisation and policy prescribed? How feasible are they of realisation? What implications do they have for the international system? If we are to study and more fully understand the causes and nature of conflict, these major problems cannot be baulked.

One major aspect of conflict almost totally neglected by teachers and researchers in Western countries is the resolution and termination of conflict in Third World areas. Considering that all the 145 major internal and international conflicts since 1945 have taken place in the Third World, our ethno-centric preoccupation with NATO and the superpowers has become intellectually and pedagogically indefensible.

There is an urgent need for greater research and teaching about alternative and potential peace and security arrangements for preventing, containing, and reducing conventional and unconventional conflicts in Third World areas.[6] This must encompass UN mediation and peacekeeping, non-UN peacekeeping, third party mediation, bilateral agreements and treaties, alliances, regional security organisations, arms control agreements and neutralisation. In the light of the current Lebanese crisis, the intensifying Gulf war, and continuing conflicts, for example, in Central America, the Western Sahara, and the Horn of Africa, the need to concentrate greater intellectual and scientific efforts on these aspects of conflict has become desperate.

We need to grapple with some fundamental questions, including: Why have certain security arrangements in the Third World failed and others succeeded? Under what conditions are international initiatives, for example, by the UN or by regional security organisations, most likely to be attempted, and to succeed? What useful lessons can be learned from comparative studies of conflict termination and resolution which could, if applied, help to reduce and, if possible, prevent, violent conflict among the Third World states which can so ill-afford to waste scarce economic resources on military expenditure?

If there can be said to be a real breakthrough in the teaching of the history of conflict, I believe it takes place at the level of changes in the

perceptions and attitudes of individuals who have had their minds opened up to fresh perspectives and insights. It comes when a student begins to recognise that people involved in both or all sides of a conflict may be sincere idealists who believe they are serving the interests of mankind. It comes when students begin to realise that there are no simple or permanent 'solutions' to deep-seated international and intra-national conflicts, and that the international community has no choice but to learn to cope successfully with the dangers of endemic conflict. We can and must try to improve the possibilities of preventing conflicts from escalating to the point where they threaten the survival of the system itself. The ultimate challenge to the community of teachers of the history of conflict is to help create a climate in which mechanisms for the prevention or containing of major conflict can have some chance of working. It is easy not to get excited about the prospects of success. When I see the skies darkening with the wings of war, I am haunted by the famous lines by W. B. Yeats:

> Turning and turning in the widening gyre
> The falcon cannot hear the falconer

The urgent task, the predominant vocation and obsession, of teachers and analysts of the history of conflict must surely be to try to provide the more objective and profound knowledge and understanding of the causes and nature of conflict, and of methods of restoring and preserving peace, which are now essential to humanity's survival. Or else:

> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Thankfully, however, there are some brilliant independent histories and memoirs which expose the lies of the official histories: see, for example, the works of Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Robert Conquest, and Nikolai Tolstoy.

[2] See the discussion by Ian R. Barnes, 'Other Neo-Fascist Strategies', Politics 1, No. 1, pp. 24-29, 1981.

[3] For interesting reviews of some of the problems involved, see E. H. Carr, *What is History?* (1961), G. R. Elton, *The Practice of History* (1967), and Hugh Stretton, *The Political Sciences* (1969).

[4] Leo Kuper, *Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 101-119.

[5] These problems were first rigorously analysed by Karl Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* (1936).

[6] There are a few distinguished exceptions, such as Evan Luard's *Conflict and Peace in the Modern International System* (1968) and Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss, *Controlling Small Wars* (1970), but most of the literature is now either very out of date, or concentrated exclusively on a single method of terminating or resolving conflict.

[Paul Wilkinson is Professor of International Relations, University of Aberdeen.]

ABORTION IN GREECE

by Stephanie Ginger

A YOUNG woman walked into a doctor's surgery in Greece and discovered after an examination that she was six weeks pregnant. During her interview with the doctor she was told that she could terminate her pregnancy should she wish to. She had the abortion a week later, performed by a respected obstetrician, at a private Maternity Hospital in Athens, at a cost of 15,000 drachmas (£120) and was in and out of hospital within three hours. Nothing strange in that, except that abortion is illegal in Greece, and she is one of an unofficially estimated 300,000 women per annum who pay qualified, practising obstetricians to terminate their pregnancies.

Greek law decrees that a woman who purposefully allows someone to destroy her embryo is punishable by imprisonment of up to three years; the person who destroys it receives at least six months imprisonment, and someone who performs abortions regularly can get anything up to ten years.

Yet this does not seem to have any effect on what has been termed by social studies groups in recent years as the 'epidemic nature of illegal abortions in Greece', and comparatively it could be judged as just that.

In England in 1969, two years after the 1967 Abortion Act was passed legalising abortion, 50,000 abortions were performed. Greece at that time was about level with 52,000 recorded in 1965. Sixteen years later, in 1981, 129,000 women had abortions in England and Wales, an area with a population of roughly 50 million, whereas the unofficial figure had escalated to 300,000 in Greece which has a population of 10 million. The proportion in Greece rose to more than double that of England in a country with a fifth of the population.

This 'epidemic' is causing growing concern from demographic experts who are convinced that the present fertility rates are too low and that Greece's net reproduction rate is below replacement level, and has been since 1965.

This concern is shared by the Greek Orthodox Church, which prohibits and condemns not only abortion, but avoidance of procreation (i.e. contraception). A special committee was created within the Holy Synod to examine the problem. An encyclical distributed among priests was decisive on the position taken by the Greek Orthodox Church. It stressed that 'the murderous trend of abortion is threatening the nucleus of the family unit and endangering the survival of our nation', and urged believers to 'realise that children in a family are a blessing not a curse'. This does not, of course, take into account pre-marital sexual relationships which in Greece, like everywhere else, are becoming more common. The Greek daily newspaper *Ethnos*, 20th May 1983 edition, reported that the 9th Panhellenic Medical Symposium had issued new figures which stated that one in four Greek girls had undergone between one and seven abortions before the age of 19.

But the Church is split in its opinions. More enlightened priests accept that as illegal abortions are as prolific as they are, they may have to be more realistic about contraception and advise that 'instead of ending with an abortion God gave you the mind to prevent conception'. This view, however, does not appear to be sufficiently widespread to make much difference.

Politically, the Church still maintains a foothold in Greek society, and although Andreas Papandreou's Socialist government, in power since October 1981, caused an uproar from religious leaders after introducing the civil marriage ceremony last year, most Greek governments are loath to antagonise the Church; something that would be unavoidable if abortion was legalised.

Greece, however, is aeons from that moment. Mrs. Margaritidou of the Greek Organisation for Family Planning said that the battle for diversified family planning education is an uphill struggle. 'Family Planning was only mentioned in Greek law three years ago for the first time', she explained. 'The Pill is available over the counter in most chemists, but it isn't advertised as a contraceptive, nor prescribed. One type of IUD can be fitted in Greece on request, but condoms and the rhythm method are more common.'

'Abortion has become a way of life here', she continued, 'and is virtually the only effective method of birth control. There is no birth control educational programme in Greece'. The Greek population is largely ignorant of preventive methods, and so those who are economically unable to finance large families fall back on abortion.

Most studies researched on the subject of abortion only take into account married women using abortion as a way of family planning. It is Mrs. Margaritidou's contention that 'even the most conservative estimate by members of the medical profession suggests that the minimum number of abortions in Greece annually is equal to that of births.' Double that for the unaccounted, unmarried women and 'the real figure is more likely to be two abortions to every one birth.'

Mr. Danezis, President of the Greek Eugenics and Genetics Society, said that 'in general, the risk of infertility in women after an induced abortion is 3 to 4 times more likely in comparison with women without an induced abortion.' Having healthy babies after as many as say, ten abortions, must be unlikely, therefore.

Mrs. Antonia Trichopoulou, Professor of Biochemistry at the Athens School of Hygiene, and author of a 1965 field survey believes that the main reason for abortion being used as the prime method of birth control lies with Greek women themselves. 'The main obstruction for contraception is because Greek women are not anxious or frightened of abortion,' she said. 'They are brought up with it, and hear stories from friends and relatives who have had four, five, even ten abortions and appear none the worse for it.'

It is true that Greek women appear to have an aversion to introducing man-made hormones or products into their systems in order to avoid pregnancy, and yet have no such aversion to, or fear of, abortion.

Another interesting factor which came to light in the 1965 survey was that a greater percentage of obstetricians than could be kept busy by attending live births, were finding some branch of their profession sufficiently rewarding financially to run private clinics.

Mrs. Trichopoulou said that public opinion did not rule out the possibility that obstetricians discouraged contraception not only because of the belief that pills and IUDs could be carcinogenic, but also because abortions provide a steady proportion of their income.

'Legalising abortion wouldn't make any difference to abortion figures' she said. 'It's the same as being legal now'. In spite of legal definitions, only about 20 or 30 cases are brought to court every year, and then only if a patient dies, or a disagreement arises between the persons involved.

In Britain, abortion is legal with the signatures of two doctors who certify that to have the child would be risking the life, mental or physical health of the woman or her existing children, or a substantial risk of the child being born abnormal.

Not so different from Greek law, in which it is possible to have a pregnancy legally terminated in cases of unavoidable threat to life, rape, incest or pregnancy of a minor.

In Greece, the law is ignored, no signatures are taken, standards cannot be controlled or clinics supervised and records are not kept. Thus, abortions in Greece continue to increase every year. The Church is not required to be seen to make major changes in its attitudes. Nor is the government, which does not relish the idea of getting embroiled in the moral, religious and political aspects of abortion. The Minister of Social Services had no comment to make on the subject.

Perhaps their view is that since induced abortion is performed at a relatively safe standard, on demand and within the finances of the general public, upsetting neither the Church nor the medical profession openly, it would be wisest to leave the situation severely alone.

[Stephanie Ginger is a journalist living and working in Greece.]

TO MERGE OR NOT TO MERGE...

by John Elsom

FRANKLY, the Alliance hasn't much choice. When the Liberals and SDP shared out constituencies before the 1983 election (or had their quotas foisted upon them, whichever you like), they temporarily gave up their rights to be considered as national parties. It was an extraordinary gesture which made sound tactical sense, but still has to prove itself strategically or philosophically.

The pact thus cobbled together for the purpose of breaking the mould isn't likely to last for another four years. In SDP constituencies, the Liberal organisations will start to wither away, while in Liberal areas, the SDP will have difficulty in getting off the ground. The temporary sacrifices made tactically for the last election will start to look permanent. In the meantime, Labour is unlikely to continue to tear itself apart. Its current revival, having bought the dream ticket, may not last, but the electorate will be deciding in its own mysterious way as to whether Labour or the Alliance will prove to be an effective alternative government. The rivalry between the opposition parties will be conducted on a 'more-unified-than-thou' basis. What both the Alliance and Labour most fear is an outbreak of internal feuding.

But unity cannot be always imposed from on high, however much Messrs. Steel and Owen may wish to do so. The external show of unity needs to be supported by internal methods of reaching agreement, which, practically speaking, will draw the two Alliance parties towards merger. Obviously, the policy panels will have to be in close and continual consultation, which has not been the case until now. Obviously, too, constituency parties, whether Liberal or SDP, will have to consider the views of both sides before choosing their candidates: the Liberals favour joint selection, the SDP currently do not, but whichever view prevails, there will have to be *de facto* joint selection if local bickering is to be avoided. And, for this nettle also has to be grasped, the Alliance will have to decide between the two leaders as to which will lead them into the election as a Prime-Minister-in-Waiting.

If the Alliance parties remain unmerged, they will be offering an indecent number of hostages to fortune; and the voters will be understandably puzzled as to why they should choose to do so. If the Liberals and the SDP are saying essentially the same things, then there is no logical reason why they should not merge—or at least until such time as proportional representation allows for the public expression of shades of opinion. If they are putting forward different policies, then the electorate are entitled to know whose views will prevail. Dr. Owen may not have been exactly talking through his hat when he said that the British public rather like the idea of two political parties co-operating together for the good of the country, but I'm afraid that his hat was too close to his lips for comfort. From my limited experience of canvassing at the last election, I found that voters were indeed confused by the idea that while Steel

was leading the campaign, Jenkins would head a potential Alliance government. 'Get yourself sorted out,' one said to me, a former Liberal voter, 'and then I'll consider voting for you.'

Merger, in short, is the politically obvious next step; and the obvious time to discuss such a merger was in September, 1983, at the time of the two party conferences. The atmosphere between the two parties was warm rather than merely cordial. Steel and Beith were well-received at the SDP's Assembly in Salford, of all places. Owen was cheered on the last day of the Liberal's Assembly at Harrogate, an appropriate place for a rejuvenated Liberal Party, a Victorian baroque town with a massive new conference hall, straddling nearly everything. Various motions were floated whose general direction drifted towards the discussion of the possibility of something which might be considered, without being absolutely definite, as a tentative half-merger. The Liberals could afford to be trenchant about Northern Ireland, the SDP could pass solid resolutions on the economy and the social services; but when they came to the possibility of a merger between the parties, well, the wisest course was to leave the options open. An effective stalemate was reached on joint selection of candidates. An idea that the Alliance leader should be elected from a poll of both parties was mooted—and shelved. The old Labour Party used to fudge and mudge: the new Alliance is in these matters a vast improvement. It merely dodges and shelves. Let grass-roots co-operation thrive! Then the leadership will come along to mow the lawn. Let policy consultations flourish! Then the joint campaign committee will decide on the manifesto.

The sad message left from both party assemblies was that the Alliance are not so determined to work for political power that they are prepared to take the necessary steps to set their joint houses in order. And I suspect that the reason behind this alarming reticence lies in a mixture of short and long-term considerations. Neither party is convinced that its future rests with each other. They have accepted the tactical arguments in favour of the Alliance: they have considerable doubts and differences of opinion about the strategy and the philosophy. The SDP and the Liberals share certain general aims; and it may be still true to say that the common ground between the two Alliance parties is greater than that which lies between the two wings of the Conservative and the Labour parties. But would they landscape the common ground differently? Have they the same aims, for example, in arguing for proportional representation and an incomes policy?

Let's start with the short-term considerations. The SDP has its image to maintain, that of a radical, young, dynamic party, composed of people who are bored with the entrenched attitudes of old political parties with their antediluvian vested interests. Does it really help their cause to be linked with a party like the Liberals, renowned since the First World War for losing elections nobly? The Liberals, on the other hand, as befits their age, regard the SDP's enthusiasm with something akin to paternal cynicism. The Liberals have been here before, after Orpington, after the

1974 (first) election, when only one more heave was necessary to break the system. The substance of the SPD's policy—including PR, incomes policy and the like—has been Liberal policy for years. Both parties want devolution; but the Liberals have seen so many campaigns for devolution founder on entrenched interests—which is not to suggest that the Liberals are any the less determined to achieve their goals than the SDP, only that they approach these matters with a caution bordering sometimes on weariness.

They may be weary, the Liberals, but they tend to be tough. Many years ago, during the 1960s, the Liberals decided that the way to break through lay in community politics, the slowest and rockiest road to power, but the one which they believed in the long run would lead to success. Furthermore, community politics was not just a matter of looking for cracked pavements and, as it were, de-cracking them. It was directly in the Liberal Party's philosophical tradition, whereby central government was to be considered as a 'service industry' The Victorian Liberals firmly believed that good government depended on a proper recognition of the worth of an individual. Society as a whole was a collection of many small communities; and the community in which an individual lived and worked had what can be called natural boundaries, those people whom the individual could actually come to know, trust, work with and love. Naturally, these communities were small, naturally they might conflict with other communities; and the Victorian Liberals distrusted those didactic politicians who wanted to transform the world, without necessarily helping their neighbours. The only true human values lay within the community, through which personal moralities could be expressed. The role of government was to reconcile the conflicting interests of different communities, to set the common laws by which the communities could individually live. The natural targets of the Victorian Liberals were monopolies of power, economic or political, tyrannies and their opposites, anarchies.

Their descendants, the modern Liberal Party, have inherited many of these instincts, without always sharing or even recognising the Victorian philosophy. Even Gladstone took a somewhat *laissez-faire* attitude towards national poverty, believing that governments could not exactly create wealth, only maintain those conditions in which wealth could be created and through the free market distributed. Socialism which believed that governments could create wealth and fairly distribute it, was the great nineteenth century Liberal heresy: it allotted to government potentially dictatorial powers. Keynes reconciled the *laissez-faire* traditions of the Victorian Liberals with the new political demands of the twentieth century—which expected a more forceful role from government, interventionist and within limits *dirigist*.

The SDP, on the other hand, are a party of management. They may reach the same conclusions as the Liberals, but they do so from an opposite direction. Whereas Liberals are reluctant to concede to central government more powers than it plainly needs, the SDP continue to talk

in *dirigist* terms, even when the subject is devolution of power. This difference of approach is noticeable in a comparison between the Liberals' arts policy and the as yet unpublished SDP version. Both parties have much in common in their general aims. Both believe, for example, in a Ministry of Culture, in a tax on video- and music cassette tapes, in encouraging local and community arts. In the methods of approach, there are, however, drastic differences. The Liberals believe that broadcasting and telecommunications should be included within the general mandate of the Ministry of Culture; but stress the importance of the arm's-length principle separating the Ministry from the proposed Central Broadcasting Authority which in turn is at arm's length from the broadcasting companies. The SDP want to keep broadcasting still within the aegis of the Home Office. The SDP believe that education is the key to a successful arts policy: the Liberals do not want to give the appearance of dictating to the education authorities that they should emphasise one area of training rather than another. Education is firmly left out of the Liberals' arts policy, firmly left into the SDP's version. And so on. The SDP talk of the new wealth created by the SDP's technology-led economic policy. The Liberals are much more cautious. At Margate, in 1980, the Liberals passed a resolution to the effect that economic growth as conventionally defined was neither attainable nor desirable. When Liberals talk about wealth, they often mean something vaguely ecological, like natural wealth or even the quality of life. When the SDP discuss wealth, they usually mean national income, expressed in money terms.

There are, therefore, considerable philosophical differences between the Alliance parties; and in this case, philosophy is not something which can be brushed aside as vague abstraction. It affects that somewhat muddy central section of party political life, half-way between the policies on which everybody is agreed and the local details on which everybody can afford to differ. The instincts of the Liberals are anti-authoritarian, usually politely so, sometimes rudely. Steel had to win his support from the party conference, which he did with a mixture of gentleness and toughness. Owen faced no such challenge; but I suspect that in future the SDP will have difficulty in coping with dissent within its ranks. The Liberals are a party which respects the dissenting tradition, which may be why they seem, from the outside, so untidy but retain through hard times a resilient coherence.

But can the tidy, market-minded SDP link arms for long with the cheerful, loyal but slightly anarchic Liberals? Can they do so, with or without a formal merger? With a merger, they may stand a chance. Without one, I fear that they do not. If there are no formal methods of resolving their natural differences, then the squabbles, now muted, will grow. And what will drive the Alliance parties apart are the strategical, rather than tactical or philosophical differences. If, for example, the Labour Party stages any kind of significant revival, it must do so at the expense of the SDP—if only because, in the original share-out of seats, the SDP were mainly allotted Labour seats to challenge. The Liberals,

under those circumstances, will see that the SDP has failed to maintain its challenge to Labour, and will wish to take over. From the Liberal view, the SDP failure at Darlington called the whole theory of the Alliance pact into question. It had been assumed that the SDP would do better than the Liberals in Labour constituencies. But the Liberals won Bermondsey and the SDP lost Darlington, and with it the bandwagon impetus which could have led to greater success at the general election.

Equally, the Liberals are fighting more Tory seats than the SDP; and it may well transpire that the young, radical image of the SDP is more successful than the Liberals at winning Tory votes. As one party in the Alliance shows signs of failing, the other will make a bid to take over; and if the strategical pattern stays consistent over a period of time, then inevitably the two parties will be drawn into conflict with one another, a conflict exploited by their opponents.

To forestall such an eventuality, the two parties must consider now ways of cementing the Alliance. Perhaps they should start by building upon the Joint Campaign for Fair Votes. If that campaign is successful, even to the extent of merely building up the pressures for proportional representation, it can lead to other joint campaigns; and gradually the SDP and the Liberals will become so accustomed to meeting each other on one barricade or another that the formal merger will come as a matter of course. In the meantime, those Liberals like me who have worked for more than twenty years to break the mould, with singular lack of success, watch with bated breath to discover whether the Alliance, having so nearly succeeded at the last election despite the disappointing result in terms of parliamentary seats, will build upon or throw away the chances which the SDP and the Liberals have created for themselves.

OXFORD—THEN AND NOW

by A. L. Rowse

OXFORD is a place of ghosts for me. My memories go back as far as to see the Marquis Curzon as Chancellor, preening and strutting like a peacock as he accompanied Queen Mary to the Sheldonian to receive an honorary degree. Or I see Robert Bridges, every inch a poet laureate, with leonine head loping with his long stride along the Broad. Or John Masefield, neat and ruddy *matelot,* slipping shyly into Blackwell's on his regular shopping visits into Oxford. Turning down New College Lane I observe the albino Warden Spooner, blinking like a bat on emerging into the light of day. One hears Gilbert Murray's too reasonable, silvery voice—whom the absurd S. G. Owen, with pineapple-shaped head, would recommend undergraduates at Christ Church to go and hear 'weeping over the *Medea*'.

There are more endearing memories. Maurice Bowra seemed to be almost perpetual Vice-Chancellor in the Forties and Fifties. From the steps of the Clarendon Building I watch that short Queen Victoria-like figure, bustling along from Wadham punctual to the minute to transact University business. Samuel Butler said that, as we have a Professor of Poetry, so we should have a Professor of Wit. We had one in Bowra. Of Queen Juliana: 'Every ounce a Queen'. I have only just come across his reminder: 'Few undergraduates realise, after their years at the University, how much they owe to Blackwell's'.

The front quad at All Souls throngs with ghosts: those eminent Appeasers: Halifax, of whom the University Member, Lord Hugh Cecil, putting it in theological terms as usual, said that 'Edward could not recognise Original Sin when he saw it'. Then Sir John Simon, whom Asquith—who should have been Chancellor—used to call 'the Impeccable': all too peccable, if I may coin a word, as Foreign Secretary. Or Somervell, who thought Munich 'a miracle of timing', and Geoffrey Dawson whose voice through *The Times* was more powerful and disastrous than any. How wrong-headed they were!—Christian gentlemen who had no idea of the malign Evil they were dealing with.

There are more intimate memories. Richard Pares, who should have been Regius Professor of Modern History, if not struck early by fatal disease. Bruce McFarlane of Magdalen, to whom the 15th Century was an open book—though he left it to his devoted pupils to open it. Dear elongated Charles Henderson, of 6ft. 6in, at Corpus, first of Cornish antiquarians. I see a figure almost as tall, Adam von Trott, moving from Mansfield to Balliol as Rhodes Scholar—handsomest head in the world, hanged by Hitler upon a butcher's hook in Plötzensee.

What an appalling epoch it has been our fate to live in—what a hideous society we have survived into, when you look around the world! The Oxford I came to, as a scholar in English Literature at Christ Church, was an elect society—and an elect society is the only one that is any good to elect persons. It is all a question of *Quality;* an historian friend re-

minds me that the first thing that goes, in a social revolution, is quality. See Soviet Russia. Oxford and Cambridge still stand for quality, for good intellectual standards, merit and achievement. This is why a recent blueprint, or salvo, from the Labour Party (my own old Party!) described them as 'the cancer' of the educational system. Easily recognisable as sheer envy, or the malignant hatred of the inferior for first-class standards, for quality.

The Oxford I came up to was smaller, more distinguished and discriminating, and better. Smaller is better, larger is worse; both Oxford and Cambridge are too large now, diminished in beauty and distinction.

Since architecture is the music—at any rate, the register—of history we might begin with the visual outside of things and progress to the inner spirit of the thing. There are far too many new buildings. It is a mistake to add a single new building in the historic old centre of Oxford, jamming the place up and adding to the traffic problems. The new Bodleian was a mistake made in the Thirties—third-rate architecturally, anyway: it should have been placed on the Holywell site, where we now have the big new Law Library, a better building.

A fundamental fault in the modern world is the tendency for everything to get out of the human scale. Those vast new halls at St. Catherine's and St. Edmund Hall are rarely full, only at occasional conferences. White elephants! A huge red elephant has been put up by Queen's down in St. Clement's; or, rather, it looks like an Atlantic liner stranded on the banks of the little Cherwell. These buildings, half glass, are unpractical too: rackety, noisy, no privacy, everybody exposed like animals in their cage in the Zoo.

Not that I am against the modern idiom in architecture. The best new buildings are all by Powell and Moya: Wolfson College, the new buildings at Christ Church and Brasenose, while Corpus and University College have done good jobs in Grove Street (Oriel an appalling 'butcher's shop' window there: no taste, without or within), and in Logic Lane. The enormous development of Science has deposited a huge heap in the Parks; —whoever was the architect,

> Lie heavy on him, earth, for he
> Laid many a heavy pile on thee.

The vast development of Science is the most significant change—and excruciatingly characteristic—of the modern world. All the same, I like to think that, where Cambridge took the lead in splitting the atom, Oxford did something to repair the damage, more constructively, by developing penicillin and the new universe of antibiotics. Along with this goes the grand new growth of the Medical School, which has made Oxford a most important centre of medical research. This is something to be proud of (I salute the names of those splendid Rhodes Scholars, Florey and Hugh Cairns, ablest of brain surgeons that he was), and we owe it to William Morris, Lord Nuffield, to offset the devastation of Cowley.

The old joke had it that Oxford was to become the Latin Quarter of Morris-Cowley; and true it was that the Railway Station—we actually

need a bigger one now—used to announce 'Oxford—the place where Morris cars are made'. As a parallel, a highbrow Fellow of All Souls heard two girls in the train discussing the amenities of Oxford. One trumped the other with, 'Oxford—there's a *smashing* Woolworth's there'. I rather think we owe that feature, and the demolition of the charming, much missed, Clarendon Hotel in the Cornmarket to the present Chancellor as Minister of Transport.

Much as we owe to Lord Nuffield, on both sides of the account, I cannot enthuse over the College under his name. He was out-manoeuvred by A. D. Lindsay as Vice-Chancellor over that one, who steered it into an institution for the study of Politics and Economics. I should have thought that those were practical subjects, and that one learned more about them by practising them. I see more point in the foundation of St. Antony's, with its yen for the study of the outer world, Europe and exotic places like Russia and China.

Apropos of that, All Souls took the right line in developing along a consistent plan its experiment in the thirties in bringing to us scholars from the outside world who want to research in Oxford. (This summer, among others, mostly American, we had one from Red China, another from Red Poland—a useful service to perform.) This was a proper service for All Souls to make—though other Colleges have followed suit; as against the younger generation incautiously led to opt for yet another annexe of graduate students, of whom we have enough already.

Repairs, repairs everywhere—historic buildings which were appropriately grey and ancient-looking when I came up, now resurrected white and new out of a bandbox. How Evelyn Waugh hated it!—with whom I see a good deal eye to eye about the horrors of contemporary society. Even I am reduced to wonder whether the Colleges are not victims, in part, of those dynasties of builders who live off our buildings, as depicted in Hardy's *Jude the Obscure*. I am sick and tired of every quad littered with builders' *débris* and junk. I'll bet the College Bursars could reduce unnecessary work and expenditure by at least 20 per cent. They could then spend more on books, the proper tools for a University.

Repairs, restoration, more Colleges—several nondescript Colleges have appeared on the horizon since the war alone. I do not altogether see the necessity. Neither Oxford nor Cambridge should sprout a single new College. I was not surprised that there was considerable, enlightened opposition to a Robinson College at Cambridge. Think of what £10 millions could have done for a far more valuable object, the National Trust, in preserving immeasurably more beautiful relics of this country's past! The past of this country is a great deal more interesting that its future is likely to be—a consoling thought for historians at least.

Women at Oxford, coming to the forefront—along with the growth of Science the most significant change in my time. I remember Stone-Age men who were opposed—they were certainly King Canutes thinking to hold up an irresistible tide. To what point? Equality between men and women—Victorians really believed in the inferiority of women, think of it!—is the one sense of equality worth recognising, and in keeping

with the most significant (and best in results) revolution in our time. Oxford, too, has the best of reasons to be proud of it—consider the fine achievements of Oxford women in literature and science. One does not need to labour the point, with two Somerville women as Prime Ministers of Britain and India.

The key institution in any University must be the Library. The Bodleian Library is the greatest single institution in Oxford. From the time of its founding it set a new model, the first public library in Britain, one of the first in Europe. Its historic and literary collections, books and manuscripts, are fabulous and constantly being added to. For all practical plus research purposes, I suspect that it is the finest library in the English-speaking world.

So, too, with Blackwell's across the way. I have no doubt that as a bookshop it is the best in the world. But it is not only that—it serves a multiplicity of purposes, publishing, printing, with subsidiaries around the country, one important one in North America. It is a unique institution, all due to the genius, public spirit, hard work—the imagination and generosity—of Sir Basil. Really, he should be made an Earl for his services to the nation.

No space to particularise them here. It so happens that a wonderful book has appeared to celebrate the Centenary: *Blackwell's, 1879–1979. The History of a Family Firm.* (Blackwells, £12.50). It is beautifully written, by a recent Vice-Chancellor, Sir Arthur Norrington—with his own experience of that splendid publishing concern, the University Press —with the help of Sir Basil. I know no history of a business so human and humorous, so informative and wholly delightful.

So long as that trinity stands—the Bodleian, the Clarendon Press and Blackwell's—Oxford will stand.

And the spirit of the thing?

Of course, Oxford is touched by the spirit of our demotic, deplorable time. A former Manciple—Chaucerian title for the head of the College servants (now 'staff', please)—deplores the untidiness of the streets, the litter left on the pavements by people lounging about. Then there is mugging—one hears of young toughs beating people up, one is warned not to walk the streets at night, and everything has to be kept locked. Unthinkable before the last war! We never 'sported our oaks', i.e. locked our outer doors (save perhaps for a good purpose). People knew their place. Now nothing is safe—a certain amount of vandalism, a good deal of burglary, like exerywhere else in the filthy demotic society we have lived into. A large margin of the mixed younger generation is out of hand: they *need* discipline but they won't get it in our slack society.

And the undergraduates (now, 'students', please)—I find them less interesting to look at, more monochrome, more equalised, I suppose. I miss the Oxford aesthetes of my youth, those variegated begonias, my contemporaries: Harold Acton and Bryan Howard at Christ Church— Auden, there, was apt to be slatternly: Tom Driberg out to shock one; Graham Greene, Peter Quennell, Anthony Powell, Cyril Connolly at Balliol, John Betjeman at Magdalen, Evelyn Waugh at Hertford— and

how he minded it! The Colleges have become more equalised since those days too.

In the Thirties, a considerable number, both dons and undergraduates, were on the Left—naturally enough, considering the state of affairs in Europe, the appalling record of the so-called 'National' Government, and their disastrous course of Appeasement. The upshot of that may be seen in the contribution of Oxonians to the Labour Party—Prime Ministers in Attlee and Harold Wilson, such Cabinet Ministers as Gaitskell, Crossman, Gordon Walker, Crosland, Jay, Foot and many others in office. We had few Communists: the best known, my friend Ralph Fox, had gone down to be sent by the Party to become a martyr in the Spanish Civil War, when—as I know—he did not want to go.

Today, I gather that there is a marked intellectual inflexion towards conservative values—again understandably enough, when one considers the recent record of the Labour Party and Trade Unions alike, and the widespread disillusionment with the breakdown and confusion of the new social order—more disorder than order, to say the least of it.

Still, the cleverest boys (and girls) in the country come to Oxford (or Cambridge). Though we are all supposed to be so boringly equal, some of us are still more interestingly equal than others.

[Dr. A. L. Rowse was awarded the Benson Medal by the Royal Society of Literature, for services to Literature, last autumn. His most recent book is *Eminent Elizabethans*—his parallel to Lytton Strachey's *Eminent Victorians*, for which he was awarded the Benson Medal.]

POEMS

FAR WEST

For all its softness of speech this is a hard people,
Resistant, ultimately, as feldspar,
Eyes washed to the bright blue of a summer sea.
Their faces bear the imprints of winter rages
And, granite-handsome, map the extremities of seasons.

These are small hard-muscled men
Whose gaze is level at the tide's doings,
Calculating the force and way of the waters,
Reading the weather's semaphores
In every cloud-tatter. Their God, hard-dying,
Broods on in grim rock-footed chapels where still
His anger haunts, a remnant not of love
But tireless will, hard as the headland is
Where fisher Christ has not yet stilled the storm.

FREDERIC VANSON.

ASH WEDNESDAY

The sun has set again behind the hill,
The west embalms another dying day,
The rooks are roosting raucously and shrill,
The children are returning from their play.

The first star rides at anchor on a stream,
The clock pronounces five impassive notes,
The owls alarm the coppice with a scream,
The rising fishes fall to dusky floats.

The trees are bare, the fields are flecked with snow,
The frost festoons the bracken in the brake;
And yet tonight at last I surely know
That spring remembers, and is half-awake.

J. H. B. PEEL.

CINEMA: A QUARTERLY REVIEW

by David Shipman

THE critic of New York magazine has been to see George Cukor's *A Star Is Born*, reconstituted after being cut during its initial engagements in 1954; six thousand people packed Radio City Music Hall for one showing, causing David Denby to reflect 'that if the studio heads could only see this—all these adults concentrating on a 30-year-old film that meant something to them emotionally—they might feel some distaste for the movies they have released this summer.' A hearty hear-hear to that, though I was depressed about this time last year, you may recall, about some of the movies on offer, and then a good crop came in. It is difficult to write enthusiastically about much of the stuff I've seen recently; certainly the best movie to open lately has been an old one.

Visconti's *The Leopard* won the Grand Prix at the Cannes Film Festival in 1963, but 20th Century-Fox, which had world distribution rights, thought it too long and too literary for American audiences. Expecting a flop, they cut it by forty minutes and reprocessed it in De Luxe colour and CinemaScope, a cheaper method than the original Technicolor and Technirama. The director himself wrote to *The Sunday Times*, probably in the hope—vain, as it happened—that Fox would let British audiences have an opportunity to see the original; the American version, he wrote, was 'in my view badly cut and dubbed with ill-chosen, unsuitable voices. . . . When I saw the film in New York I had difficulty following the plot. Moreover, the film had been processed as if it were a bright piece of Hollywoodiana. It is now a work for which I acknowledge no paternity at all.' The film failed completely both here and in the States, though the original had long runs in Milan, Rome and Paris: I saw it in Paris as it began its 18-month run, and always thought that Fox deserved to lose the money they had invested in the film; ironically, they neglected *The Leopard* because they were concentrating their efforts on *Cleopatra*, which was both a critical and a box-office flop. Now the Visconti version has opened in London, to great acclaim and queues outside the Gate, Notting Hill, every time I go past. And deservedly.

Seeing it again does make this summer's offerings look even more tawdry than they are. Giuseppe de Lampedusa's novel about an aristocratic Sicilian family at the time of the Risorgimento has been faithfully adapted and the film is visually impressive, both in the battle sequences and the more intimate moments. A breeze brushes the curtain as the family kneel in prayer; carriages wind through a dusty landscape; hunters stalk their prey amidst the high, yellow corn; and the family gives a ball—which takes up the last forty minutes of the film—which marks, we may feel, the end of one era and the start of another. Visconti was a careful director: he lacked Antonioni's vision and Fellini's flair; I doubt whether he felt as deeply about people as de Sica once did, but he had intelligence and taste, using the second to advance the first. He had wonderful powers

of evocation, and the first element one looks for in his work is verisimilitude: he never sacrificed authenticity for beauty, but strove for both. If the film, in the end, is superficial on the Risorgimento, it is marvellous on the moods of the time and the wit of the Prince—a portrait in depth, limited only by Burt Lancaster's too-often too-knowing smile.

In contrast, *Danton* is all hurry and scurry, and since I have a feeling that that was what it was like, for those involved in the French Revolution, we may find it one of the most successful movies on that historic event. It is, nevertheless, not one of action but of conversation pieces—or, rather, slanging matches. The director, Andrzej Wajda, has turned his one weakness to good use—that sense of incoherence, uncertainty, amazement (with inconsistent loyalties) which surely characterised the Reign of Terror. Wojciech Pszoniak's Robespierre, dubbed by a French actor, is a cold, grim, tormented man; in the title-role, Gérard Depardieu does his over-familiar Depardieu act, diminishing the man if not the film. The author of the play on which the screenplay is based—it was first performed in 1931 and Wajda himself directed a revival in Warsaw in 1975—was pro-Robespierre, so we may suspect a heavy adaptation. It is tempting and, in fact, impossible not to see the two protagonists as Lech Walesa and Jaruzelski, and, indeed, the movie might be subtitled How Governments Can Triumph Against the Wishes of the People, but all the attitudes in the movie are those held or expressed by Danton, Robespierre and their colleagues. They are expressed repeatedly in the movie, but since its 136 minutes' running time passes in a flash, it can hardly be called repetitious.

The Iron Curtain bloc send us some strange propaganda movies. *The Divine Emma* (shown to the press but not, so far, publicly) purports to be the life of the diva Emma Destinn, as directed by a fellow Czech, Jiri Krejcik. Indeed, it is reasonably accurate, though the final title, to make its point, ignores the fact that she was able to return to sing in New York after the 1914-18 War, during which she was imprisoned for suspected espionage activities. Both her fame in the US and her captivity—she was confined to her country estate—are romantically treated, but the piece is an allegory on the lack of choice in present-day Czechoslovakia—as underlined by the synopsis prepared by the British distributor: 'An artist forbidden to perform—her life run by the State.'

The Second World War is the background to a very good film, *Paths in the Night*, made by Wajda's contemporary, Krysztof Zanussi. It is again deeply romantic and perhaps too schematic and conventional, if an engaging atmospheric piece, with good, decent conversation. Since a German officer (Mathieu Carrière, who has become a very fine actor indeed) wants to be accepted by the (Polish) family on whom he is billetted, we may think of *Le Silence de la Mer*. It may be because that film exists that Zanussi chose to make this one for West German television. It was shown here on BBC 2, so it is ironic that it is incomparably better than another film on the same subject, the relationship between conqueror and conquered, which has been playing in cinemas. This is *Merry Christmas, Mr.*

Lawrence, an Anglo-Japanese production, directed by Nagisa Oshima. The source is a novel by Laurens van der Post, *The Seed And The Sower*, based on his own experiences in a Japanese POW camp during the War, and meant to explain that the atrocities committed by the Japanese went hand in hand with other qualities, noble, gentle, understanding. None of those qualities has found its way into the film, as written by Oshima and Paul Mayersberg. Oshima has not helped himself by casting two acting nonentities, pop stars in their respective countries, in the two leading roles, David Bowie and Ryuchi Sakamoto, as a brave, foolhardy prisoner and the camp commandant. In the elegant words of the script, the commandant has 'taken a shine' to the prisoner, but the movie is not about *that*, either. In fact, I failed to discover any discernible point, though it is better made than Oshima's other films, except for an absurd flashback meant to establish the 'guilt' of the Bowie character; it is not, however, less humourless than the other scripts written by Mayersberg.

The King of Comedy also has script trouble: indeed, it is so thinly written, by Paul D. Zimmerman, that it is no surprise to find that the screenplay has been hanging around Hollywood for at least five years, till Martin Scorsese elected to do it. It reunites him with that superlative actor, Robert de Niro, but though he gives the role a marvellous surface, the character does not exist. This is Rupert Pupkin, who aspires to national fame, via television, as known to a talk-show host, also very well played, by Jerry Lewis; so Pupkin kidnaps him to make his dream come true. Since de Niro, Lewis and Scorsese are famous, they might have found more to say on the subject than is here—and it has equally little to say about show business. Much of it, too, is based on impossibility: Pupkin simply walks into Lewis's country home, whereas the vast majority of the renowned and wealthy in the US are protected by security guards. I know several wealthy Americans who live on communal estates or in apartment blocks which are more difficult to get into than Fort Knox. I've also done quite a bit of television and radio in the States, and the same can be said of the buildings from which the programmes are beamed. And yet here is de Niro wandering in and out of the radio station where Lewis works. To add insult to injury, the movie finishes with a cheap 'ironic' finish in the manner of Scorsese's more celebrated *Taxi Driver*.

Scorsese is not the only leading American film-maker to fail this season. Coppola offered *The Outsiders*, a ludicrous attempt to offer today's youthful audiences a 'youth' film in the lurid manner of *Rebel Without a Cause*. So, these esteemed directors having offered nothing that I could recommend to the readers of *Contemporary Review*, I took myself off to *Educating Rita*, directed by Lewis Gilbert, whose films, I admit, I have never much cared for. However, this film has been enormously popular, and after *The Outsiders*, *The King of Comedy* and *Merry Christmas, Mr. Lawrence*, I thought that I deserved cheering up. *Educating Rita* didn't do it; on the contrary, I wondered how on earth the Royal Shakespeare Company commissioned the play from Willy Russell and how it managed



to run two years in the West End. Obviously, there is a public for dialogue like this: '*Howard's End*? Sounds dirty to me.' Or this, when a customer asks Rita (Julie Walters) what she is reading and is told, *Of Human Bondage*: 'My husband's got a lot of books like that.' 'Somerset Maugham?' 'No, bondage books.' Mr. Russell undoubtedly gets some deserved laughs from time to time, but only at the expense of Rita's character, which is wildly inconsistent above and beyond the defences he has built within it. She is supposed to go from outspokenness to being nice enough to be invited by the students to go to the South of France or explain Shaw to them. In fact, she is so artificial that I didn't take, as others have done, to Miss Walters but, as her drunken tutor, Michael Caine ignores the clichés he has been handed and tries to give a performance. The film was released in this country by Rank, who produced such past successes of the director's as *Reach for the Sky*. *Educating Rita* belongs to that era. All the advances made in movie entertainment since then have been in vain. It is not only an old-fashioned movie, but manipulative, though not sufficiently clever as to disguise the fact that it wants—in the academic world—to have its cake and eat it. The RSC and Rank, always a philistine among movie companies, looked like an unholy alliance; in practice, it turns out to be also very depressing.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEBATE

Dear Madam,

In the current debate on nuclear weapons in *Contemporary Review* and during the General Election it does not seem to have occurred to many people that the options offered by the opposing factions are in reality no options at all, for the arguments of one side partially cancel out those of the other, and *vice versa*. It is probably true, for instance, that a nuclear deterrent has been a factor in stabilising Europe since World War II. Yet this is only a short period of time and, given human nature, it is surely unwise to argue from this that nuclear weapons will provide a deterrent indefinitely. Yet this is what they must do, surviving internal and international crises, as well as the possibility of power, in Russia or America falling into the hands of a mentally unstable dictator such as Hitler. But politicians do not like to think in the long-term any more than the rest of us. If they can secure a short-term peace, future generations can shift for themselves.

Yet what of the opposing arguments? A gradual de-escalation on the part of the West, unilaterally or bilaterally with Russia, sounds eminently reasonable. In fact it would hardly change the *status quo* at all. Any partial nuclear disarmament would still leave both sides with more than enough weapons to destroy each other and the earth many times over. It may push back the probability slightly (by a total ban on tactical nuclear weapons, for instance), but the possibility of a nuclear war on a devastating scale remains.

Unilateral disarmament by one or more of the Western nations and the declaration of a nuclear free zone are further steps in the anti-nuclear argument. They are, I think, equally unrealistic, for they assume that in the event of war between the USSR and America, Russia would respect such neutrality. This is unlikely. A country like Britain would still have too many industrial and communications targets which could best be destroyed by nuclear weapons; and even assuming that nuclear free zones were respected, massive H-bomb attacks elsewhere in Europe would certainly cause fall-out in the neutral zones. In the nuclear age neutrality, and the idea of the nuclear free zone is based on the principle of neutrality, is no longer an option.

Unilateral disarmament by the West is unlikely to occur, but if it did the argument of those in favour of a nuclear deterrent (that without it, the USSR would extend its hegemony to the west of its present boundaries) seems most convincing. This might take several decades, but a disarmed West would be powerless in the face of Russian aggression, and western Europe would almost certainly take on more the appearance of client states of Russia.

Those in favour of unilateral disarmament seem divided on this point. Some favour a 'better red than dead' approach, arguing that life under

any circumstances is better than death in a nuclear war. Perhaps they are right, though this smacks of the slave mentality. Others assert that life under Russian domination would not be so bad, and that a *modus vivendi* would be established. Events in eastern Europe and Afghanistan make this unlikely.

The last argument, that of Christian pacifists, is more interesting and cannot be dismissed so easily. It is that even if disarmament did lead to the establishment of a Russian-dominated tyranny, it would be defeated in the end by the power of love. Behind this argument lies the one valid ethical stance in the debate. Unless I misunderstand the argument of Christian pacifists, they contend that when faced with the possibility of annihilating a whole people, even if that people is your 'enemy', the only moral course is to disarm and accept the consequences. These may involve tyranny, and the torture, imprisonment and deaths of many thousands as in Nazi-dominated Europe; nonetheless it is morally nobler to accept suffering oneself than to inflict it on others. In the end, such a policy of suffering accepted in the name of Christ (or humanity) would break down even the most ruthless tyranny.

This position is an admirable one so far as it goes. But it seems to involve a choice that can only be made on an individual basis. An individual may choose suffering and death in the name of a greater love which his tormentors hardly understand; but no one has the right to make that choice for others, and to opt for a policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament would in effect be to impose such a choice on the mass of the populace who would certainly not wish to make such a decision as individuals, and many of whom would probably collapse spiritually under its terrible consequences.

So while it seems to me almost the only ethically acceptable stance, it is not one that can be turned into political action unless, that is, the nation could be converted to Christian pacifism, an unlikely event. There seems, then, no viable policy open to us. To continue with a nuclear deterrent is almost certain to lead eventually to nuclear war. Yet equally if we disarm, we face almost certain tyranny and untold deaths. Each side presents its arguments as if they offered a genuine solution to the problem, and each is quick to point to the flaws in the opposition's argument. But in fact neither side offers a solution at all, and neither is being entirely honest. Perhaps this is because of a human need to believe in some hope for the future, and if neither side in the nuclear arms debate offers any real hope for peace, as I have suggested, then the future is truly bleak. It will be bleaker still if we continue to hide from the truth behind the false opposites of whether we are 'for' or 'against' nuclear arms.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN BARNIE

Abergavenny, Gwent.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

DUFF AND DIANA COOPER

A Durable Fire. Letters of Duff and Diana Cooper 1913-1950. (Edited by Artemis Cooper). Collins. £11.95.

I once met Lytton Strachey. It was at an election night party in Bloomsbury, in 1931. I ventured to ask the venerable man (actually he was 50 at the time), 'Who did you vote for in the election?' He replied in his famous high-pitched tones: 'I voted for Edgar Wallace', who had been a Liberal candidate. 'Did you', I persisted, 'vote for him because you admire him as a politician?' 'No', he replied, 'I don't think he is a successful politician. I think he is such a good writer.' Considerably adapted, that might be applied to Duff Cooper. Not that anyone could crudely describe him as an unsuccessful politician. He won an historic bye-election. He served in Chamberlain's cabinet, he resigned from it over Munich. He was also a very popular ambassador to France. All this is more than falls to the lot of the average member of parliament.

But as a departmental minister, he made no mark. As Minister of Information during the war he was a failure, as gently indicated here. One remembers him there for one saying only. 'If you hear any defeatist talk, put the question bluntly: "Are you a paid or unpaid agent of Hitler?" '. I would not think that he would ever have reached the top in politics, or exerted a lasting influence in that field. He was an eloquent, forceful if rather old-fashioned public speaker. He had courage in abundance, physical, as he proved during the First World War, moral, as everyone who knew him was well aware. But as his very talented granddaughter acknowledges: 'He was one of those people who by nature are uncomfortable with people not of their own class, and he was bad at small talk'. Not quite the qualifications for dealing with the electorate. Even when presumably more at home in the House of Lords, he showed no exaggerated deference to established customs. I had the privilege of following his maiden speech. There is a convention that one covers the speaker with fulsome praise, but there is also a convention that the maiden speaker makes some show of being non-controversial. Duff Cooper ignored the latter convention totally, in some passionate remarks about his old bêtes noirs, the Germans. He could not be expected to be concerned with the dilemma in which I found myself as Chairman of the Anglo-German Association, though he was always friendly to me. But I was not the only member of the House to be disconcerted.

So much for the politician, gifted, brave, but never altogether at home in that milieu. As a writer he was really excellent. I cannot think of any cabinet minister since Augustine Birrell who could have written a cultural masterpiece like *Talleyrand*. The style of his letters is maintained at an astonishingly high level. But those of his wife, already famous for her descriptive powers, do not suffer by comparison.

When one reads about these coteries, whether they originated at Oxford or Cambridge, in high society or the Bloomsbury world, one feels every now and then an irritation, to put it mildly. Was all this mutual admiration and display of affection quite genuine? Did they really believe all their hyperbolic sentiments? Duff Cooper, writing from the trenches in 1918, quotes a passage from Rupert Brooke: '... there is no man who has had such friends as I... so prone to laughter, so strong in affection... so stern with vices and so blind

to faults and folly, of such swiftness of mind and such strength of body, so apt to make jokes and to understand them.' Duff Cooper comments: 'What Rupert Brooke says about his friends might very well, with a few alterations, be applied to ours.'

But the detachment that makes him such a perceptive writer prevents him going overboard. 'We don't', he writes, 'make new friends easily. We had too many. I don't think I have made a friend since Oxford.' Probably no one else of his world would have written a sentence that follows: 'There are consolations for the deaths of the light-foot lads. Think of Julian (Grenfell) growing more like Lord Desborough (his father).' I came to know and to admire enormously Lord Desborough, a magnificent figure of a man in old age. But it was difficult to identify him with the author of *'Into Battle'*.

Diana Cooper went far beyond any possible line of duty in promoting her husband's career. Without her four years in *'The Miracle'* he could never have entered the House of Commons. Without her influence with Winston Churchill, he might never have attained the Paris Embassy, though he was ideally suited for it. Her appeal to Ernest Bevin may have assisted his maintenance in that post after the Labour government came to power. But Bevin respected Duff. 'I like Duff. He is so straight', he remarked on one occasion, after Duff Cooper had fallen asleep during a prolonged conference.

The lives of Duff and Diana Cooper are by now well documented, not least in the masterly biography of Diana Cooper by Philip Ziegler. Duff Cooper does not emerge there as a paragon of marital fidelity by certain standards. But no one who reads this fascinating and moving correspondence between the two glamorous partners can doubt the authenticity of the love.

FRANK LONGFORD

THE DIARIES OF PETER HALL

Peter Hall's Diaries. Edited by John Goodwin. Hamish Hamilton. £12.95.

Whether Peter Hall is aware of his courage in publishing these diaries or whether it was one of those pressurised decisions later regretted is a matter for argument. In allowing the sort of exposure that most people in public life would prefer to suppress until their executors decided for them, he has acted with considerable bravery. His detractors, of which he has a number, would probably use the word folly.

The diaries, which cover the years from 1972 to 1980, are required reading for those involved in the theatre. Sir Peter covers the time from his taking over as Director of the National Theatre and writes of the battle to get the building open, his disputes with associate directors and militant NATTKE members, his experience of a hostile press campaign, and the difficulty of remaining creative while managing an unwieldy administration. He admits to the criticisms made of him. Yes, he is paranoid; he is sensitive to newspaper comment; he does find it hard to delegate; he should not have taken on outside work while trying to open the National Theatre.

Despite these realisations, he continues along his self-lacerating path. Underneath the powerful, urbane ruler of the South Bank is a vulnerable being wracked with nerves. He wakes sweating from nightmares in which he has cut his own throat. He is haunted by the time he 'cracked up' in 1963 when he was Director of the Royal Shakespeare Company. His sinuses roar, his head aches, he is so tired he has to stay in bed all day. His marriage is in a shocking state, although he does not appear to analyse why. Perhaps that is in the five-sixths of the diaries that have not been published—they were edited down from the original million words by John Goodwin.

Nor does he analyse exactly why he caused such antagonism among some of his associate directors, such as Jonathan Miller and Michael Blakemore. On factual evidence, the behaviour of the conspirators seems to have been vindictive. Ringing up from a holiday in Biarritz to find out if the Evening Standard had yet published an article hurtful to Peter Hall, sounds a trifle obsessive on the part of Michael Blakemore. Olivier's behaviour, as outgoing Director, was unpredictable and mischievous. The only people with whom Peter Hall seemed to have consistently good relationships were the elder statesmen actors, John Gielgud and Ralph Richardson (he called them the Old Lions) and Peggy Ashcroft.

To a large extent he was a victim of the grandiose thinking of the sixties when large, heroic architecture was in favour and the myth existed that we were simply going to get richer and richer. By the time the South Bank theatre complex was nearing completion, people had learned to distrust the monolithic and the money was not available to service it. Thus, to the rest of the theatre world, he became the ogre that grabbed money from the needy for the insatiable demands of the new building. He was, in fact, more aware than members of the Government of the dangers of the N.T. draining both money and talent.

The sixties mood, that good living was a necessity, now sadly disproved, also had an effect on his personal finances. His admitted mistakes of fronting *Aquarius* and doing the Sandersons wallpaper advertisement were both the result of gloomy interviews with his accountant over the extra thousands needed for the Hall ménage. He does seem to have had a lot of relations to look after, but perhaps a bit of belt tightening, rather than whizzing off to Germany to act in a B movie for £5,000, would have been the answer. It certainly would have saved some sleepless nights. Once on the treadmill, he became addicted to overwork, and records with pleasure how the Concorde got him to the United States so that he reached the theatre just a quarter of an hour before curtain up.

Like other successful diarists, Peter Hall is a good gossip and spiller of beans. There was the disgraceful request, emanating from Lord Eccles, then Minister with responsibility for the Arts, that Trevor Nunn should 'do something' about the RSC's left wing actors, which included Corin Redgrave. 'Trevor said do you mean fire them? Hugh (Willatt) said he was merely passing on what he had been asked to pass on.' Then there was Trevor's own appalling suggestion that he and Peter should consult each other if they wanted an actor who was with the other company, rather than approach the actor concerned. 'I cannot see how we can carve up actors' lives between us, without reference to them,' wrote Hall. Quite right, too. An actor's career is precarious enough without Britain's two most powerful theatre directors secretly playing God.

The seventies were rough years for Peter Hall and he felt each sling and arrow acutely. Now happily married to the opera singer Maria Ewing and with the worst of the National Theatre strife behind him, will the diaries after the next ten years be more mellow? I have my doubts, for there seems to be a streak in him that distrusts a smooth run. The theatre world is a hothouse of highly charged temperaments, but somehow I think Sir Peter can stand the heat.

CLARE COLVIN

THE PRICE OF VICTORY

The Price of Victory. Michael Charlton. British Broadcasting Corporation. £10.75.

This is an important book for many reasons; unique for being the most distinguished contribution to the *'oral history'* of our times. Michael Charlton is a highly intelligent student of international affairs and is also blessed with a most pleasing radio voice. During 1980, he interviewed on Radio 3 some fifty leading statesmen, English, European and American, and their top civil servants and/or private secretaries, who were all closely involved in the formative discussions of the Common Market and some, incidentally, of the Marshall Plan and of Nato. The list includes Churchill, Bevin, Attlee, Eden, Macmillan, Heath, Butler and Thorneycroft; Eisenhower, Kennedy, Dulles, Acheson, Hoffman and Dillon from the United States; de Gaulle, Spaak, Schumann, Adenauer and de Gasperi from Europe; along with such Civil Servants as Monnet, Sir Con O'Neill, Baron Snoy, Lords Franks and Sherfield. It is not surprising, therefore, that the resultant book is of high quality. Although some of the evidence is necessarily given in hindsight, it is always responsibly and clearly stated, often with diaries open and with quotations from Cabinet discussions, where legally possible.

All in all, the experiment is successful and an enormous tribute to Michael Charlton and to the BBC. If this seems like super-praise, I can only add a personal comment. I lived actively through this period of history and met nearly all the chief actors, either in Parliament or at Strasbourg and European capitals or in Washington. I have also, in two books, described the European Parliaments. The chapter headings in *The Price of Victory* spark off, in my case, dramatic scenes at The Hague Congress (1948), at Strasbourg (1951) when Spaak and others resigned owing to Eden's backsliding; and later the general despair at our failure to join the Coal and Steel Community and later our continued absence at Messina and succeeding conferences.

Here are the chapter headings: Churchill's Morning Thoughts; Bevin at Victoria Station 1 and 2; The Schumann Plan—Losing the Initiative; A Sludgy Amalgam (Winston's phrase); Messina! Messina! ; The Parting of the Ways; A Last Step Sideways; The Channel Crossing; Epilogue.

It might be assumed that this volume is heavy reading. Not at all. Michael Charlton has wit and literary style, as evinced by the above chapter headings. In addition, the author has supplied a sufficient number of discerning photographs to illustrate the text, without breaking up the flow of the prose or the sequence of the arguments.

It may now be apparent that the book's title, *The Price of Victory*, in Monnet's words, was 'the illusion that you could maintain what you had without change.' It is left for a later head of the Foreign Office (1957-61) to say: 'There were several opportunities after the war and in all those post-war years. If we'd taken the initiative, we could really almost have written our own ticket' (Lord Inchyra). Among the British statesmen and civil servants, I single out Harold Macmillan who, together with Heath, Soames, Sandys and Sir Frank Lee at the Board of Trade, made a valiant attempt to reverse the policies pursued by Attlee, Bevin, Eden and their foreign policy advisers, particularly Lord Sherfield. But it was all too late. Only Peter Thorneycroft stood out from the compromisers Butler and Maudling and called our policy a 'diplomatic catastrophe.'

Of course, post-war statesmen had other priorities: Russia, the Middle East, rebuilding Britain, the Marshall Plan, India and the New Commonwealth,

which tended to blot out or blind them to the New Europe, foreseen by distinguished Europeans and also by Americans, witness Eisenhower's Guildhall speech (1951). With the exception of Churchill, succeeding British statesmen and their advisers were suspicious of Europeans and failed to understand the three intersecting circles, America, Commonwealth and Europe, in which Britain was involved. They feared American isolationism, they overplayed the Commonwealth factor and misread the deep passion for unification in Europe, labelling each initiative as Federalism. Labour was suspicious of joining with Conservative or Catholic governments in Europe.

Britain emerged from the war victorious, but quite unable to sustain the global role of acting as the centre of the three intersecting circles mentioned above. In retrospect, Rab Butler admitted that we failed to adjust ourselves to a new situation, 'namely, that we are now part of an economic unit, able, if it really got together, to stand up against Russia and the United States.' This was the Price of Victory.

KENNETH LINDSAY

THE ENGLISH LAKE DISTRICT

Land of the Lakes. Melvyn Bragg. Secker and Warburg. £9.95.

This book is written from the heart, a tribute to his homeland by one who still, in interludes from London, manages to live there. Melvyn Bragg was born in 1939 at Wigton, within a morning's cycling range of Skiddaw, which dominates the northern fells, and he lived there for his first twenty years. He confesses that he is still moved at local markets when 'that Nordic knocking of warm consonants clinches the deals', and he conveys his affection in every chapter. In what he calls his 'time-walk' through the first 500 million years of its geological existence, there are moments when one is reminded of James Michener's *Centennial,* with its similar sense of what time has done to the rocks and soil of the American Great Plains.

Bragg is equally good on his human history. This is no mere tourist guide, and is unashamedly personal. His range is wide: geology and history, language and poetry—he is warm, even lyrical, on Wordsworth, 'the supreme literary presence in the Lakes'—rock-climbing and sports; and sport in Cumbria is itself wide-ranging, from fox-hunting and rock-climbing to hound trailing and wrestling. His special strength, however, rests in his knowledge of, and feeling of identity with, the working lives and habits of the hill-farmers of the fells; from his base near Ireby he knows them and keeps in touch—as he has clearly shown in his *Speak for England.* So that alongside the many and splendid illustrations, the book is peopled with real folk; the land of the Brigantes who rode out the Roman invasions from their fortresses here, and the Norsemen of a thousand years ago, and of today's legions of caravanners and tourists is brought to life as a *pays* where real people work and play.

Each one of its readers will seek to discover whether Bragg has unearthed his or her own favourite spot, his or her own special place of magic and renewal. Bragg speaks of 'that deep fulfilment of the senses which comes unexpectedly in some lonely spot and seems to speak of a profound relationship with what is all around; with rocks and stones and trees, with the water and winds and the changing screens of light'. Although he writes with unusual affection for Barrow and with natural affection for Ulverston and Grange-over-Sands, he is clearly a man of the northern fells and perhaps not quite as

evocative on southern Lakeland. Cumbria is at once picturesque and awesome. This is a splendid description of it, and a tribute to a man's roots and origins. In its combination of prose and picture, all calls out for translation to the television screen. There are reports indeed that it is already being done. The sooner the better.

ESMOND WRIGHT

MURDER BY PRESCRIPTION

Where There's a Will. Rodney Hallworth and Mark Williams. The Capstan Press. Paperback. £2.45.

Although hardly of a piece, either as to style or proof reading, with the only other book on the Bodkin Adams Eastbourne Murder Case, Sybille Bedford's *The Best We Can Do* (1958), the value of this book is that it is the first to appear after Dr. John Bodkin Adams disappeared, at the age of eighty-four, on July 4th, 1983. Published just over ten weeks after the good doctor's demise, the speed which was obviously of the essence most likely accounts for the somewhat maculate state of the text.

The plump, cherubic doctor, rather like an amiable Gestapo officer on extended leave from Buchenwald in appearance, was the very personification of the 'Cheery Reaper', garnering in with his syringe/sickle a sizeable harvest from the scything down of wealthy old maids, widows and orphans. He was the beneficiary of 132 wills. His own, in overdue season, was proved at close on £403,000. The full tally of his patients' assisted passages is reliably stated to have been twenty-five.

I remember seeing this stalwart and dedicated medico in the dock of No. 1 Court in the Old Bailey in 1957—very bald, very pink, very fat, looking, behind the glass panel, like nothing so much as a big pink limax. I remember talking with Detective-Superintendent Hannam—The Count, they called him at the Yard in deference to his tasteful tailoring—in his home at Willesden, and the vehemence with which he assured me that the acquitted doctor was a cold-blooded mass murderer for gain.

It was J. B. Priestley who remarked that the most sinister words in the case were those used by the doctor after his acquittal: 'Now I must get back to work'. And one wonders why, since William Burke was accorded the honour of the verb 'to burke', Bodkin should be burked of the courtesy of a verb 'to adamise'.

This is essentially a working journalist's book, with all that that implies. It is written in entertaining journalese, not without its own feisty charm. Very concrete: less cerebral. But it must occupy a niche on the criminology shelf.

The doctor was, in life, of litigious bent. Only now, the full story can be, and here is, told. Dr. Adams was cremated at Eastbourne, after a dignified funeral at Holy Trinity Church, attended by about 150 elderly and distressed gentlefolk of the South Coast spa who had the good fortune to survive him!

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Transfer of Power 1942-47. Volume 12. The Mountbatten Viceroyalty Princes, Partition and Independence, 8 July–15 August, 1947. (H.M. Stationery Office £70). This volume completes the monumental task, under the General Editorship of Dr. Nicholas Mansergh, of selecting and preparing documents for publication, covering the period leading to transfer of British sovereignty to India and Pakistan from the time of the Cripps Mission in 1942 to the final hand-over on 15 August 1947. Most of the documents in this volume, as in the earlier ones, are drawn from the official archives of the India Office, to which the Editors have enjoyed unresticted access. In addition the Editors, in this volume Sir Penderel Moon assisted by David M. Blake and Dr. Stephen R. Ashton, have had access to Lord Mountbatten's Indian Papers; other sources include documents from the Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office, and papers consulted among Sir Walter Monckton's documents in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Nearly 500 documents are included, together with some seven documents which would have been included in earlier volumes if then available, maps showing partition boundaries, and an Appendix of Errata et Corrigenda in relation to the first ten volumes. Shortly before this new volume starts, the 3rd June Plan providing for Dominion Status and partition had been generally accepted. This selection is mainly concerned with the progress to independence upon this basis. In their Introduction, Dr. Mansergh and Sir Penderel Moon analyse and explain the documents in their context of events, with great clarity and appreciation of their importance. They reproduce the Indian Independence Act which received the Royal Assent on 18 July. This provided for indepedence on 15 August, and the Editors have concluded their work sharply with this date. Among the principal matters dealt with are law and order, mainly in the Punjab and the problems of demarcation. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who became the Chairman of the Boundary Commission, arrived in Delhi on 8 July, and his Commission were able to make their decisions just in time for independence. This volume is not concerned with the violence after the 15th August. Much of the volume is also concerned with the reluctance of some of the Princes, including Hyderabad, to accede to the new Dominions. In addition the volume reflects the daily work of administration and negotiations in bringing the peaceful transfer of power into operation. The working relations between the Secretary of State, Lord Listowel, and Lord Mountbatten are revealed in the documents with, on the whole, general agreement on the major issues. Occasionally the Viceroy had to press his views against some opposition. An example was 'the rigid time-table imposed by the Viceroy upon the Princes'; Lord Listowel gave way. The scholarship in these volumes is of the highest order and they are essential to any serious study of the transfer of power.

Henry Moore, Wood Sculpture (Sidgwick and Jackson. £12.95). This is a remarkable book. It contains for the first time a catalogue of Henry Moore's wood sculptures, and where they are kept, amounting, so far as

is known, to 45 works. In his Preface, David Mitchinson points out that 'there are thirty-nine wood carvings in the twenty pre-war years and only six in the period since.' This volume contains excellent photographs of most of all these by Gemma Levine, except a few, in which case archive photographs have been used. Henry Moore, himself, writes on being a sculptor. He has always insisted on direct carving without first modelling. 'To me, direct carving became a religion.' Furthermore, he has given up preliminary drawings. 'For the past twenty or thirty years, I have worked differently. I make up a maquette—the complete idea in small version . . . I know what I am making.' In this book, he is particularly concerned with carving in wood; he discusses the characteristics of different woods. The larger figures tend to be in elm. He also explains his technique and method of work. He comments on his wood sculptures, with the help of the photographs. One especially interesting series of illustrations is that of his Reclining Figure: Holes 1976-78, which depicts the progress of the work from the huge elm log to the completed sculpture. His wood sculptures are, of course, only a small part of his total output. He writes, 'the wood sculptures make up about a quarter of the number of my sculptures in metal and they number about one-fifth of those in stone."

A Short History of Socialism (Collins. £2.95). The late George Lictheim's well-known history of the major ideologies in the international socialist movement has been reissued in Flamingo Fontana paperbacks. When this book was first published in 1970, socialism was already in decline. In a new Foreword to this edition, David McLellan writes that 'the prospects for socialism seem, if anything, gloomier now.'

Saki, Short Stories 2 (Dent. £1.95, paperback). All those who admire Hector Hugh Munro will appreciate this new selection of his stories by Peter Haining. In 1978, Emlyn Williams chose his collection of fifty-five tales. Saki wrote nearly 150 short stories and novels, mostly the former, for which he is particularly well-known. Peter Haining has had ample scope to select another 52 tales in this Everyman Classic series. The anthology starts with Saki's first story published in 1890, *Dogged*, and continues to his wartime stories. It includes four previously uncollected pieces. Peter Haining has written a brief literary biography of the author in a penetrating Preface.

Katherine Mansfield, Short Stories (Dent. £2.50, paperback). This is another new addition to the Everyman Classic series. Katherine Mansfield died at the early age of 34 in 1923 and has acquired a reputation as one of the founders of the modern short story, brilliantly executed, with an awareness of contemporary life. In this collection, Claire Tomalin has selected twenty-one stories 'most likely to challenge the attention of readers a century after her birth.' In a long and intuitive Introduction, she concludes: 'Each of the stories in this collection is a fresh and memorable response to a world she found challenging, exasperating and ridiculous, and yet enjoyed with a passionate, unflagging zest.'

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

An intercultural and interdisciplinary enquiry into the works of **George Orwell,** his world and the validity of his views will be held on THURSDAY, FRIDAY, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 12, 13, 1984 at

Hofstra University,
Hempstead, New York 11550, USA

For further information: Courtney T. Wemyss, Conference Director
Natalie Datlof and Alexej Ugrinsky, Conference Co-ordinators

CONTEMPORARY LITERARY CRITICISM

Excerpts from Criticism of the Works of Today's Novelists, Poets, Playwrights, Short Story Writers, Filmmakers, Screenwriters, and Other Creative Writers.
Volume 23 in the series. Edited by Sharon R. Gunton and Jean C. Stine.
488 pp + indexes. Cumulative Indexes to Authors and Critics in Vols. 1-23. Appendix.

Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, USA, 1983. ISSN 0091-3421.
L.C. Card No. 76-38938. ISBN 0-8103-0113-X $74.00.

HOPE OF PEACE by Novin Afrouz

The first collection of poems by the celebrated Iranian-born concert pianist has been heralded as the most important poetry collection to be published this year.
ISBN 0 903610 04 3. **Price $3 (UK offer price £1.50).**

NEW HOPE INTERNATIONAL
23 Gambrel Bank Road, Ashton-under-Lyne OL6 8TW.

NEW HOPE INTERNATIONAL 1983/84 issue now out. Original poetry, reviews, articles, competition. :: £1 post free.

ORDER FORM

To: **The Subscription Manager,**
Contemporary Review Co. Ltd., 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG

I enclose herewith my cheque for ... ., for a year's subscription
[For rates, see inside front cover]

Name .....

Address .....

FORGING PASSION INTO POWER

JONATHAN HANAGHAN (£3)

THE WISDOM OF JONTY

Arranged by Richard Cameron (£1.50)

'Very occasionally in life, one meets people who make a great impact on one, people who stand out from the common run, extraordinary beings. For me, Jonty Hanaghan was one . . . '

Ludovic Kennedy

'One of the greatest figures in a century'
Arland Ussher (Past President of the Irish Academy of Letters)

RUNA PRESS MONKSTOWN DUBLIN
Distributed in the US by Dufour Editions Inc.

9 FEB 1992

COME TO LIFE IN THE COUNTRY

Farmhouse Holidays and Self-catering Cottages.
Over 250 throughout Britain.
Personally inspected and recommended.

FREE 72 PAGE ILLUSTRATED
COLOURFUL
BROCHURE

COUNTRY FARM HOLIDAYS
THE PLACE, HAM LANE, POWICK,
WORCESTER. TEL: (0905) 830899

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG. Tel. 01-242 3215. All business

CONTEMPORARY REVIEW

118th YEAR OF PUBLICATION

DECEMBER 1983

LABOUR'S FUTURE
John Hatch

REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA
Richard Sim

ANTARCTICA'S INDIAN SUMMER
Peter J. Beck

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW
David Fingleton

and other articles together with a seven-page Literary Supplement and Half-yearly Index



Contemporary Review

Incorporating The Fortnightly

December 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1415 Founded 1866

Contents

		Page
Conflict and Intervention in Post-Colonial Africa	Anthony Kirk-Greene	281
Reform in South Korea	Richard Sim	292
Antarctica's Indian Summer	Peter J. Beck	297
Wilberforce: Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary	Sir John Biggs-Davison, M.P	300
Labour's Future	John Hatch	304
Mercurial Melina's Marbles	Stephanie Ginger	311
The Challenge of Mass Unemployment	S. G. Shanker	314
Raphael Drawings at the British Museum	Muriel Julius	320
Quarterly Record Review	David Fingleton	324
Correspondence: The Importance of Voluntary Service	Angela Whitcher	328
LITERARY SUPPLEMENT		329
Lord Longford, Esmond Wright, Paul Rose, Betty Abel, Richard Whittington-Egan		
SHORTER REVIEWS		334
HALF-YEARLY INDEX, July-December 1983		336

Editor:
ROSALIND WADE

Associate Editor:
BETTY ABEL

Editorial Advisers:
PROFESSOR ESMOND WRIGHT
PROFESSOR PAUL WILKINSON

Fine Arts Correspondent:
ERNLE MONEY

Music Correspondent:
DAVID FINGLETON

Finance Director:
LEONARD SKIPP

© 1983 Published monthly by Contemporary Review Co. Ltd, 61 Carey Street, London WC2A 2JG England and printed in England by H. G. Leates Ltd., 45/47 Alexandra St., Southend-on-Sea, Essex U.S. Mailing Agent: Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York N.Y. 10022. Second-class postage paid at New York, NY. Annual subscription (including postage): U.K. £14.50, U.S.A. and Canada $47.50. Rates for all other countries on application. Copies can be sent by airmail outside U.S. and Canada; extra costs given on request. U.S. Postmaster: please send all address corrections to 'Contemporary Review', c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 527 Madison Avenue, New York N.Y. 10022. (ISSN/0010/7565)

Contemporary Review

Founded 1866 incorporating The Fortnightly

December 1983 Vol. 243 No. 1415

CONFLICT AND INTERVENTION IN POST-COLONIAL AFRICA

by Anthony Kirk-Greene

FOR all the respectable ancestry of their claim to a millennium and more so of diplomatic relations, as evidenced in Professor Kenneth Ingham's notable collection of essays, *Foreign Relations of African States* (1974), and of relatively unhindered commercial intercourse over and above the long-distance slave trade, as persuasively argued in Professor Mahdi Adamu's *The Hausa Factor in West African History* (1978), it has to be accepted that during the colonial period Africa had little say in the international system. In this context Ethiopia, Liberia and the Union of South Africa are temporarily excluded from the argument. Where foreign affairs were concerned, Africa was no more than part—and not a very important part, either—of the foreign affairs of the metropole. That this subordinate status persisted right up to the very eve of independence is emphasised by the fact that responsibility for external affairs was purposely retained in the colonial governor's own hands until the last constitutional moment and that the formation of the diplomatic corps of Black Africa came measurably later than the Africanisation of their civil service cadres.

In sum, it may be said that up to *circa* 1960 Africa in international relations essentially meant the 'Africa desk' in foreign affairs with London or Paris, Brussels or Lisbon and, in earlier years, Berlin. Liberian diplomats could hardly be labelled conspicuous along the corridors of power, and Abyssinia, even if it did not quite deserve the tatterdemalion reputation caricatured by Evelyn Waugh in his novel *Black Mischief*, was scarcely a country to be reckoned with in the wider world. The Union of South Africa, on the other hand, was becoming just this, as it advanced to catch up with Canada as the senior Dominion. To number royalty among its governors-general before World War II was the prerogative of the older Dominions, not yet of Australia, New Zealand or even imperial India.

For all the common *cordon sanitaire* of the colonial state, this is not to say that dependent Africa had no official contact with the outside world. The point being made is that, where it did, it did so essentially and exclusively through the metropolitan powers. However, in three major ways Africa was to play a tangible part in international affairs during the colonial interregnum.

The first point of impact was through its sizeable contribution to the armed forces of the metropolis in two World Wars. For instance, in World War I, the West African Frontier Force saw action in both the Togo and Cameroons campaigns, and then joined the King's African Rifles in the East African campaign—a war which, as both C. S. Forester and now William Boyd have shown, still offers first-rate copy for a first-class novel. In the Second World War, Britain's African armies were despatched outside Africa to reinforce the Commonwealth troops in Burma (such a grave decision is said to have required Cabinet approval). South African and Rhodesian troops fought their way spectacularly up from Ethiopia into the Western desert and on to Sicily and Italy. Francophone African regiments, on the other hand, had a long tradition of service outside their own country, and fought as far afield as Europe, Turkey and Indo-China. Nor should another aspect of such service abroad be forgotten. West and East African soldiers were not only used to help regain Britain's South-East Asian empire, they were also present in India to witness and to take back home memories of the vigour of the Congress Party's 'Quit India' movement. The French *tirailleur* and *spahi*, too, although already used to empire-wide active service, had encountered in the Second World War the trauma of surrender and virtual civil war in the so-called mother country and were witness to the agonising decision in the African territories of whether to support Pétain or de Gaulle's Free French. Many African soldiers, in East and West, in anglophone and francophone Africa, had their personal choice of loyalty to face, as they found themselves fighting their kith and kin before Mount Mora or the Pare Hills by Taveta, and later unperturbedly exchanged their German for British, French and Belgian officers. In wartime, then, the African soldier—and even more so, in terms of appalling casualties, the gallant carrier corps—very definitely projected Africa on to the international scene. None of these lessons was lost on the colonial *askari*.

The second African involvement in the international scene was predominantly but not exclusively an African affair. This was the decision of the victorious superpowers to deprive Germany of its colonies (most of which were in Africa, with a few in the Pacific) and, taking up an idea put forward by Jan Smuts, to convert them into Mandates. These were to be administered by the colonial powers on behalf of the League of Nations as, to cite the mandate document, 'a sacred trust . . . towards people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world.' Thus, albeit respectively under British, French, Belgian and South African tutelary care, Tanganyika, Togoland and the Cameroons, Rwanda and Burundi, and South West Africa all became very much part of the international system. Even though their administration continued to be under the supervision of colonial powers motivated by a mutual feeling of 'hands-off-ours' jealousy, their new found status in the international order ushered in by the Wilsonian euphoria of self-determination and the League of Nations made them now morally and legally different from the commonalty of colonies and protectorates. Later, after World War II, the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations

carried this limited colonial connection with the international world further than the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations had ever been able to do. Through its triennial Visiting Missions, it not only brought the UN to Africa (other than into Namibia) but also Africa to the UN and hence in more urgent contact with the international community.

A third indication of Africa's limited admission into the international system during the colonial period was often of less visible impact than the other two. This is because it was a diffused, economic link, not a direct, geo-political event. Colonial status in the twentieth century invariably meant incorporation not only into the economy of the metropole, in varying degrees, but also integration of Africa's primary products and minerals into the world markets. If copper or gold, sisal or groundnuts, rode high, Africa rode high, too. More often it was the other way round, and slumps in the demand for sugar, coffee or cocoa could be as disastrous for colonial Mauritius, Gold Coast and Kenya as the collapse of the mineral markets has been for latter-day Zambia, Zaire and, in the case of oil, Nigeria. More than one African administration has had cause to rue the volatile nature of this aspect of its entry into the international system during the colonial period.

And Africa on the international scene after independence? By almost any criterion one chooses, Black Africa's emergence onto the world scene has been spectacular. The creation of a fifty-plus member Organisation of African Unity; Africa's positive lead in the re-negotiation of the Lomé Convention and the establishment of its formal links with the European Economic Commission; its successful recognition as a sub-region of the United Nations through the creation of the Economic Commission for Africa in Addis Ababa; its conspicuous role in the non-aligned movement; and its active projection into the debates, committees and controversies of the United Nations and its capture of a large number of high offices in the UN and its numerous agencies (Africa alone has secured from UNESCO a fifteen year subvention for the writing of a regional history), all testify to the impressive advent of Africa on the international scene. Western and Eastern, capitalist and communist cities alike, teem with diplomatic missions from African countries. African capitals regularly host lavish international conferences (who, one wonders, was the wit in Freetown who coined the epithet 'IOU' for the 'OAU' conference hosted by impoverished Sierra Leone), and African Festivals and Games have now been added to the international circuit. Wittingly, willingly, and with infectious panache, post-colonial Africa has made its *entrée* onto the international scene. This time, unlike 1884, it is not only through the front door, but with the key to that door in its own hands.

However, with the loss of colonial identity went the loss of protection by the colonial powers. For the first time, law and order and defence became the responsibility of the African presidents and premiers, no longer that of a colonial governor. By and large, African countries had seen their territorial sovereignty jealously guarded under colonial rule.

Leaving aside such incidents as Fashoda, and the race for Nikki or Lake Chad as the accompaniment to the Scramble, once the colonial boundaries had been drawn their African inhabitants inside them were substantively guaranteed against foreign intervention and insulated against international action. For them, the meaning of the legal status of 'protectorate' could have its positive side as well as its negative one. This was a bonus repeated in April 1982, when Britain rushed to the rescue of its invaded dependency, the Falkland Islands. Exceptions to this principle of protection from intervention were two: the invasion of the enemy's colonies when intra-European hostilities were transferred to the African continent in 1914 and again, to a lesser extent, after 1940; and the deeply-felt affront of Italy's shocking, swaggering invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. Otherwise, colonial rule was intent on operating something like a total exclusion zone as regards the presence of another foreign power on 'its' African soil.

With the removal of this colonial protection, internal law and order has frequently collapsed and external security been weakened. In purely statistical terms, the quarter of a century following independence has thrown up more violent disturbances and more national disasters than in the whole of the colonial period: echoes, perhaps, of the sweet-music rhetoric of Sékou Touré's 'we would rather be poor in freedom than rich in chains' or Nkrumah's campaign slogan calling for 'the right to manage or mismanage our own affairs.' If the quality of personal dignity has often improved with the passing of colonialism, the same cannot always be claimed for the sanctity of human life in Africa. It has been estimated that more lives have been lost in twenty-five years of independent Africa than in a hundred years of colonial rule, and today, to Africa's shame, she leads the world in the misery of the refugee problem—itself the direct consequence of war and tyrannical regimes, of drought and famine. It is the scale, and not the fact, of death and disaster today that is without precedent in colonial Africa. Nor is it historical distance alone that projects such a sombre picture.

Africa, then, for the best as well as the worst of reasons, has indeed made its mark in the world, even though the argument is heard that it has yet to find its place in it.

The University of Bradford's Peace Studies Unit has reckoned that, globally, there have been one hundred and ten wars since 1945—a figure which has already risen since that calculation of a few years ago. By far the largest number of these have taken place in the Third World, that commonplace and convenient label to describe the bulk of the post-1945 decolonised parts of the globe. Some of these international wars have not only achieved the status of catastrophic conflicts, with their ferocity on a par with the so-called World Wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45. Many have also involved non-Third World powers, though the site of such Armageddons has obstinately and bloodily remained the Third World: Korea and Vietnam, Israel and Egypt, and now the Falklands, Chad and Lebanon. What is more, they have all had a positive impact on the

'outside' nations in the same way that the 'European' wars of 1914 and 1939 had on the African and Asian countries.

Of these hundred-plus 'wars' in the last thirty-five years, Africa has had more than its share of armed conflict over the past twenty. Such 'war's alarums' may be conveniently classified into four categories of armed conflict: *a*) border affrays, for example between Kenya and Somalia or Somalia and Ethiopia in the 1960s, or between Nigeria and Cameroon in the 1980s; *b*) civil wars, conspicuously those in the Sudan from 1958 to 1972, in Congo and Nigeria in the early and mid-1960s respectively, in Eritrea and Angola in the 1970s, and in Chad in the 1980s; *c*) African wars involving a non-African, international presence palpably on the ground, such as the Belgian airborne assault on Stanleyville in 1964, the Cuban and South African involvement in Angola since 1975, the side-switching Soviet presence in the Somali-Ethiopian war of 1977, and Shaba I (1977) and Shaba II (1978) with their subsequent involvement of an international 'fire-fighting' force drawn from Belgium, France and Morocco, leading in 1978 to the creation of a francophone Pan-African military force without reference to the OAU. As the Shaba aftermath indicates, along with, for example, the British and later Nigerian military presence in the follow-up to the East African mutinies of 1964, the whole of Nkrumah's clumsy and calamitous interference in the Congo, the UN's intervention in Katanga and the OAU's failed peace-keeping force in Chad twenty years later—this category of armed involvement has to be without prejudice to whether such a third-party force is invited in by one of the combatants or not. Finally comes *d*), African wars with an essentially African motivation and battlefield involvement, such as the Chimurenga war of 1973-79 in Rhodesia involving the self-styled 'front line states'; Chad; the continuing war in the Western Sahara; and the only one-to-one intra-African war *pur sang* to date, the Tanzania-Uganda war of, momentarily, 1972 and, far more spectacularly, of 1978-1979.

As all these categories are bounded by the actuality of armed conflict, no account is taken here of another military dimension to international intervention in Africa, the aid aspect of, for example, the signing of defence pacts (e.g. much of francophone Africa in the 1960s), the provision of mutual training facilities (e.g. Britain's annual army manoeuvres in Kenya), foreign access to domestic naval or air bases (e.g. the USA in Mombasa, the USSR in Berbera), the despatch of training missions (e.g. Canada to Ghana in the 1960s, Britain and North Korea to Zimbabwe in the 1980s) and the supply of instructors for African military academies (e.g. Indians in Nigeria, Israelis in Uganda); and of course, the sale of arms to eager African buyers, whether by government contract or on the open international market. Nor is mercenary involvement in African wars an issue discussed here (be it Germans in the Congo, Britons in Angola or South Africans in the Seychelles), on the internationally recognised grounds that, unlike guerillas, they tend to represent an individual's choice and responsibility rather than a form of national intervention. Despite, or perhaps because of, the generalisation

in Africa so far that 'guerillas' are Africans while mercenaries are 'foreigners' (neither definition is completely true), guerilla wars can be fitted into any of the four categories set out above.

Each of the categories of conflict might repay individual study. Some have already generated such attention, for instance the substantial literature on the Nigerian civil war or on the Mau Mau forest fighters and pseudo-gangs, and the growing literature on the Chimurenga war. What has been largely lacking to date from this welter of wars in Africa is the standard 'campaign history' by the combatant leadership, a lacuna only partially filled, in the Nigerian case, by the simultaneous publication of the war memoirs of the two opposing field commanders, Generals Obansanjo and Madiebo. Only limited strategic analysis has yet appeared on the Uganda-Tanzania war. While it would be premature to expect anything worthy of the name of an authoritative study of the ongoing wars in Angola and Chad, which in the end may prove one of the most informative and relevant of all studies of internal conflict and external intervention in the first quarter-century of independent Africa, a brief case-study of the Nigerian civil war will permit a number of revealing insights into the whole problem of local conflict and external intervention in post-colonial Africa.

In the history of international intervention in independent Africa, the most reassuring fact to emerge out of the Nigerian civil war proved to be the non-intervention by the superpowers in a situation which threatened to offer the complete recipe for such a move. Nigeria in 1967-69 did not become the focus of massive international involvement or the callous jousting-area of the superpowers.

For the international relations student, the explanation of why the superpowers did not convert crisis-struck Nigeria into their backyard playground for evening the cold-war score may well lie in the definition of the term 'intervention'. Unlike Korea or Vietnam, the Nigerian civil war did not result in the transfer of the cold war physically into the Third World. The superpowers did not intervene, singly or severally, in the name of international order and world peace. Nevertheless, as with the replay of the Vietnam war in the USA, the media made certain that the war should have an international interest. They brought Biafra onto every breakfast table in Europe and North America. In John de St. Jorre's telling phrase, the Nigerian civil war was the West's first telly war. Africa had suddenly become part of the world scene in a way it had never been for the previous thousand years.

The Nigerians themselves were, of course, adamant in their argument that this was a Nigerian affair, a domestic issue, not even an African one. This it could scarcely be, with no less than four African states, anglophone and francophone, East as well as West, recognising the breakaway Republic of Biafra and vociferously publicising and promoting the rebel cause. In the event, it was anything but a domestic affair. British commercial interests, France's (or at any rate President de Gaulle's) concern with the survival of *la Francophonie*, America's doubts about the attention

paid to the sanctity of the principle of self-determination, Scandinavian anxiety over genocide, the Soviet Union's determination to scotch a bourgois capitalist Biafra even at the risk of supporting an elitist Nigeria—all added to the spreading internationalisation of the issues involved. Also in evidence were British armoured personnel carriers, Russian MIG fighters and Egyptian pilots; French oil concession-seekers, American senators and British academics; Scandinavian relief-workers, Canadian missionaries and Irish priests; the triple attention and appeals of the OAU, Vatican and Commonwealth Secretariats; teams of international observers, polynational mercenaries, and the press corps from half the world—even recognition by remote Haiti. The pretence of it being an internal affair, the much publicised 'police operation', was shattered as soon as Nigeria appealed first to the UK and next to the USSR for arms, and then failed to prevent the issue being debated in the international forum of the OAU. One look at the conspicuous and continuing role of non-Nigerian actors in any date chart of the Biafran war must at once dispel the myth that here was a purely internal matter (see Table I).

If the Nigerians resolutely stuck to the story that the war was an internal matter, it was a pretence that their own soldiers and scholars dropped as soon as the fighting was over. The cessation of hostilities brought overt acceptance that Nigeria's civil war had indeed had all the elements (bar one) and the implications of an international war. All that it lacked, mercifully, was the act of physical intervention necessary for such recognition. The ultimate reaction to the conflict throughout post-bellum Nigeria has been one of 'Never Again': not only never again must we allow secession, already part of the thrust of the rationale of the new constitution of the Second Republic, but never again must we expose ourselves to the risks of hostile neighbours, allies with strings, holding-to-ransom arms suppliers, insensitive relief agencies and nosey-do-gooders, and all the other manifestations of unwelcome international concern which in 1967-70 threatened our rights of national sovereignty.

The theory of what can be held to constitute international intervention in independent Africa may perhaps stand in need of revision in the light of the 'polynational pot-pourri' which in the end characterised the nature of Nigeria's *sol-disant* domestic conflict. The unconcealed international dimensions to that civil war were too numerous and too profound to allow otherwise: diplomatic recognition of the secessionists, arms supplies and mercenaries from several countries, peace appeals by world leaders and peace talks held in the stage-managed publicity of third-country capitals, and the relentless attention of countless relief and charity agencies which, the moment hostilities were over, stimulated even the patient General Gowon's curt outburst of 'Take your blood-money and pack your bags.' There is today no doubt in the Nigerians' minds that, even if their country did not become the physical location of a superpower shoot-out during their civil war, that conflict precipitated such an avalanche of those whom Lagos stigmatised as 'foreign meddlers in the Nigerian crisis—European and, lamentably, Africans'—, that the net result was indistinguishable

from full-scale internationalisation of the conflict.

One could thus go so far as to argue that in the case of post-colonial Africa, the exercise of the external capacity to influence the internal decisions of sovereign governments must itself rank as a kind of intervention. Even if it does not manifest itself in the physical domination generally required by international lawyers to prove intervention, outside influence can lead to third-party interference and result in the internationalisation of local conflict. And that is precisely the underlying fear about intervention, internationalisation of the issue. It is the manifestation of intervention, not its intention or its consequences, which may need reformulation in the vocabulary of international relations in the post-colonial state.

If we accept the case for this reinterpretation of international intervention in its application to the Third World (in other words, shifting the infringement of sovereignty emphasis from 'intervention' to the potentially more dangerous 'internationalisation'), a redefinition which may include indirect influence as well as direct intervention as a factor in the internationalisation of internal conflict, another consequence follows. It will no longer be adequate to restrict the revised meaning of classical intervention to the superpowers as they are conventionally understood in post-colonial Africa's view of who the bogeymen really are (what Colonel Ellellou stigmatises in John Updike's novel, *The Coup*, as the 'white devils,' a category including all but blacks). Granted this fresh dimension to the international relations concept of intervention, it is possible to foresee, in the final decades of this century, the sovereignty of African countries violated not only by the present form of direct intervention, such as the Cuban presence in Angola or the South African thrusts into Lesotho and Angola or the role of the USSR in the Somali-Ethiopian war, but also by the exertion of international influence. Examples could be the withholding of arms and spare parts to the military of a client African state, as the USA once did to Iran and has since threatened to do to Israel; the imposition of an embargo on essential supplies to a landlocked country as, for example, constituted a Kenyan option against Amin's Uganda or as Zimbabwe and Zambia have often feared from South Africa. In sum, one might justifiably interpret the whole 'Camp David accord' as an example of the strategy of intervention-by-influence, of (in this case) deliberate yet limited internationalisation, but still an unambiguous instance of the influencing of another's sovereignty of policy and decision-making. There is no lack of diplomats in Africa who maintain that this kind of international influencing is exactly what 'linkage' is all about and to ask whether the proper term might not be 'leverage'.

Nor, one could argue, need such intervention be confined to acts by the nation-state in the Africa of the 1980s and 1990s. It could just as easily be effected by world bodies. For example, it does not require much re-adjustment—and none at all in the eyes of many African heads of state—to present the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the role of international intervenor when it insists on devaluation and reduced

government spending as the *quid pro quo* for financial support. Or again, to cite another current African opinion, it is not hard for some to view the World Bank in the same interventionist role *vis-à-vis* the domestic agricultural policies of African states on the grounds of the nature of its controversial blueprint, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.* Is not OPEC already a conspicuous example of an international cartel with a so far unlimited potential for influencing others' domestic conditions and what should otherwise be sovereign decisions? How far might not that kind of charge also be felt to be relevant by at least some members of the EEC, EAC or ECOWAS? For diamond producers, the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) may assume the same role. Marxist political economists have no hesitation in casting the multinationals in the role of the wicked uncle. To many, the key factor in this kind of international intervention and enforced internationalisation seems to be the institutional capacity for politico-economic blackmail. In another sense, the way the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) found it necessary to comport itself in Lagos during the civil war, and the sometimes where-angels-fear-to-tread behaviour of such relief agencies as OXFAM in Nigeria in 1968-69, could be construed as further instances of what international intervention can mean in Africa. So, too, has on occasion been the image of the World Council of Churches, seen by its enemies as supping with the devil, whether over Biafra in the 1960s, Rhodesia in the 1970s, or Namibia in the 1980s. In contemporary Africa there are clearly going to be alternative means of intervening internationally and influencing internally beyond the blunt military option.

Finally, the imperialism of '1984' may differ from that of 1884 through its absence of empire. Imperialism can be just as neatly effected by aid or by arms, both the giving and the withholding thereof. Nor need the new imperialists be restricted to superpowers. They could be from Cuba or from Israel or potentially, in contemporary Libya's case, we may yet witness independent Africa's first African imperialist. There are more ways of choking the African cat then by a surfeit of superpower cream.

TABLE I

THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR

An Outline Chronology of 'International' Events

1967

January-5
Meeting of Nigerian Supreme Military Council in GHANA.

March 23-26
GHANAIAN mission visits Enugu and Ojukwu visits ACCRA.

May 30
The new 'Republic of Biafra' secedes from Nigeria.

July 6
Beginning of the civil war.
August
SOVIET aircraft (MIG 17) delivered to Kano, L-29 jet trainers landed at Apapa.
September 14
OAU meeting at KINSHASA approves dispatch of mission to Lagos.
November 22
OAU CONSULTATIVE MISSION led by Emperor of ETHIOPIA meets in Lagos.
December 11
Okpara (B) leads mission to EAST AFRICA.
December 20
POPE PAUL's emissaries arrive in Lagos.

1968

February 9
COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY-GENERAL arrives in Lagos.
February 19
Azikiwe (B) visits EAST AFRICA and parts of FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA.
April 13
TANZANIA recognises Biafra.
May 6-15
Meeting in LONDON of senior ministers from Nigeria and Biafra under COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT auspices to discuss agenda for peace talks.
May 8
GABON recognises Biafra.
May 15
IVORY COAST recognises Biafra.
May 20
ZAMBIA recognises Biafra.
May 23-31
Peace talks in KAMPALA.
May 27
CZECHOSLOVAKIA places embargo on supply of arms to Nigeria.
June 12
Major debate in HOUSE OF COMMONS on arms supplies. FRANCE places embargo on supply of arms to Nigeria.
June 20-24
UK MINISTER OF STATE (Lord Shepherd) visits Lagos and battlefront.
July 5
BELGIUM places embargo on supply of arms to NIGERIA.
July 6
LORD HUNT visits Nigeria to assess relief needs.
July 15
OAU Consultative Committee meets in NIAMEY to sponsor peace talks, attended separately by Gowon and Ojukwu.
July 16
Arikpo (N) visits MOSCOW.
July 31
FRENCH government statement supports Biafra's case for self-determination.
August 5-9
Peace talks at ADDIS ABABA.
August 28
Lagos invites military observer team from UK, CANADA, SWEDEN, POLAND, OAU and UN.
September 9
GENERAL DE GAULLE issues personal statement in favour of Biafra.
September 23-30
LORD SHEPHERD's second visit to Lagos.
December 11
LORD SHEPHERD's third visit to Lagos.
December 13
JAMES GRIFFITHS and LORD BROCKWAY fly to Lagos.

1969

February 22
USA appoints special co-ordinator (Clyde Ferguson) for Biafran relief.
March 6
USSR fleet pays courtesy visit to Lagos.
March 12-13
Major debate on the civil war in HOUSE OF COMMONS.
March 24
HAITI recognises Biafra.
March 27-31
UK PRIME MINISTER (Wilson) visits Lagos and battlefront.
April 17-20
OAU Consultative Committee meets in MONROVIA.
May 9
Biafrans take ITALIAN oilmen hostage.
May 22
Count von Rosen leads SWEDISH mini-trainers in attacks on Federal troops.
May 30
General Gowon visits TOGO.
June 5
SWEDISH Red Cross plane shot down by Nigerians.
INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS COMMITTEE flights from COTONOU suspended.
June 30
Federal Government assumes relief responsibility from I.C.R.C.
August 1
POPE PAUL meets Biafran and Nigerian representatives in UGANDA.
August 7
General Gowon visits GHANA.
August 12
General Gowon visits DAHOMEY.
September 13
Federal Government signs new agreement on I.C.R.C. relief flights by day.
October 25
General Gowon visits ZAIRE.
December 3
UK MINISTER OF STATE (Maurice Foley) visits Lagos.
December 8
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES reconsiders its role in relief supplies to Biafra.
December 9
Major debate on the civil war in HOUSE OF COMMONS.
LORD CARRINGTON visits Lagos.
December 15-18
Discussions in ADDIS ABABA for further peace talks.

1970

January 12
Surrender of Biafra, flight of Ojukwu to IVORY COAST.

[Anthony Kirk-Greene's article 'Centennial 1984' was published in *Contemporary Review* Vol. 243, No. 1414.]

REFORM IN SOUTH KOREA

by Richard Sim

SOUTH Korea has had an eventful year, but a peculiarly bitter autumn. On 9 October, a bomb outrage at Rangoon Martyrs' Mausoleum killed 17 visiting South Koreans, including four of its best and most able cabinet ministers. President Chun Doo Hwan himself only narrowly escaped assassination. Although an element of mystery remains, there is little doubt that North Korea's hand lay behind the attack. Indeed, it was only last year that Canadian police foiled a North Korean murder plot against President Chun during his state visit to Ottawa. Thus, a mere six weeks after the unprovoked Soviet shooting down of one of its civil airliners, South Korea had suffered another grievous catastrophe, again almost certainly the result of communist policy. Sadly, for South Koreans, the dead may not be the only casualties in the outrages. They are almost certain to check, for a while at least, an interesting process of reform which had been emerging in the earlier months of 1983.

In recent months, the South Korean National Assembly had been unusually active. Allegations of self-interest and mismanagement had brought demands for government resignations from opposition members. Viewed from the outside this may seem like the normal workings of a democratically elected parliament; but this is not the case in South Korea. Real power rests with the indirectly elected President and most opposition figures are barred from political life. Yet the country's political stagnation contrasts markedly with its impressive economic successes. Despite the world recession gross national product has still been increasing at over six per cent per year in recent years. The country enjoys full employment, a high level of indigenous technology and an inflation rate of only about five per cent. These formidable achievements have wrought many notable changes in society: the population is changing, becoming at once more urban and politically mature. With these changes demands for democratic freedoms are growing and constitute a major challenge for the future. The choice before President Chun is whether to liberalise the political system now or to embark on a longer term policy of concession.

Since 1948 successive South Korean constitutions have provided for a strong executive President and a relatively unimportant elected national legislature. The current fifth constitution is no exception and President Chun Doo Hwan exercises enormous powers over his country's life.

Chun himself climbed to power as the army's nominee and as an opponent of the liberalising moves which followed the assassination of President Park on 26 October, 1979. At that time Park's successor, President Choi, had embarked on a limited programme of liberalisation by rescinding emergency legislation, releasing prisoners held under it and restoring civil rights to nearly 700 people including the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung. Meanwhile, General Chun Doo Hwan, who had

first pushed himself to prominence in December 1979, became acting director of the country's security service, the KCIA, on 14 April of the following year, 1980. Since he was already head of the army security command this appointment gave him total control of internal security. It was a move pregnant with serious political implications.

Although President Choi's liberalisation plans were undoubtedly well intentioned, they had been accompanied by a diffusion of power and an outburst of popular demands. April witnessed a number of labour strikes claiming massive wage rises to combat the soaring cost of living which had risen 28 per cent over the previous year. Pusan and Sabuk saw many violent clashes between workers and police. Student unrest had spread to all the university campuses. Ostensibly academic in character, student agitation soon became highly politicised with demands for the resignation of General Chun Doo Hwan, free trade unions, free press reporting and the abolition of martial law. The demonstrations were generally peaceful but there were ominous rumblings of worse to come when rioting erupted in Seoul, Kwangju, Chonju, Taegu, Suwon and Inchon.

The disturbances brought the military and General Chun to the forefront. From 17 May, 1980 martial law was extended throughout the country. Kim Dae Jung and six other leading opposition figures were arrested on charges of inciting student and labour unrest (they had called for a new constitution and presidential elections). These decisions combined to provoke an uprising on 19 May in Kwangju, capital of South Cholla province. The revolt spread throughout South Cholla and embraced over 100,000 people before being suppressed by the army on 27 May.

The army could now move decisively to the front of the political stage. At the end of May the Special Committee for National Security Measures (SCNSM) was established to co-ordinate governmental bodies with those of the martial law authorities. General Chun headed the SCNSM's executive committee. Throughout June the SCNSM organised a far-reaching purge of politicians, the security services, business and the teaching profession. Over 9,000 people were affected. Strict press censorship was improved and 172 magazines banned as 'obscene' or 'creating social confusion and class consciousness'. In August, 617 publishing firms were closed and in November the two leading news agencies were merged. Two independent broadcasting companies were absorbed into the state-run Korea Broadcasting Service. The triumph of the military was formalised in August 1980 with the resignation of President Choi and the elevation of General Chun to the presidency.

Chun, however, did present a new constitution which guaranteed human rights and confined the presidential term to one seven-year period. The provisions were generally regarded as an improvement and as no alternative was offered it duly won overwhelming approval in a national referendum on 22 October. Under the provisions of the new constitution all existing political parties were dissolved and 800 prominent opposition figures barred from politics. The destruction of effective opposition forces

and the government's dominance in the media paved the way for Chun's overwhelming victory in the country's electoral college in February 1981: by 4,755 votes to 404.

With liberal, clerical and student opposition broken President Chun's government was able to consolidate its control and even introduce some more liberal measures. During 1981 the government released 7,000 prisoners and on 25 September, responding to international pressure, the authorities admitted to holding 3,000 people without trial. Most detainees were, however, common criminals and the number of political prisoners probably did not exceed 500. On 5 January, 1982 the curfew was lifted — a notable achievement for a country that had had a curfew for over thirty years. Over the next twelve months there were a number of smaller amnesties, most notably on 3 March, 1982 when 2,863 people were released.

Kim Dae Jung himself had to wait until 23 December, 1982 for his release, when he was allowed to leave for the United States. Opposition to the government has only rarely broken out into violence in recent years. The most striking exceptions were the arson attack on the Pusan US information Office on 18 March, 1982 and the violent protest demonstrations which accompanied US Vice-President Bush's visit the following month. There exists a real danger that beneath the apparent calm the political life of the country is becoming more polarised. The tenor of student protests, for example, has changed and become more explicitly anti-US and anti-Japanese.

To date, however, Seoul has placed greater stress on improving its international image by diplomacy than by internal reform. President Chun, for example, was the first foreign head of state to be received by President Reagan following his inauguration in 1981. Chun followed this by a tour of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and by a number of state visits to Canada and Africa in 1982. This year a major foreign policy success was marked in January when the newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visited Seoul.

On this occasion the Japanese finally agreed to loan US$4 billion over a seven-year period at an average annual interest rate of only six per cent. This improved international standing contrasts starkly with North Korea's poor international image, largely a result of chronic indebtedness and involvement in narcotics smuggling. South Korea is also nurturing several prestige projects. In 1986 it plays host to the Asian Games and two years later to the Olympics. Seoul is also to be venue for some prestigious international conferences including those of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Despite Seoul's sensitivity to its standing, overseas human rights campaigns conducted from abroad have tended to make a negative impact. Although they may be a source of solace and comfort to individuals following an unpopular line, they are resented by most Koreans who have long memories of incidents of foreign arrogance passed down to them—memories which have been heavily reinforced by events this

century. Moreover, there is an acute sense of threat from the North. No peace treaty has ever followed the armistice agreement of 1953 and technically the two countries are still at war. The North continues a policy of armed infiltration and occasional provocation. The resulting atmosphere in the South is therefore more pliable to firm government. South Korea's remarkable economic blossoming has also generated sufficient self-confidence not to be over-impressed by foreign criticism.

Washington's attitude is the key foreign factor in South Korean political life. By an extraordinary effort North Korea has a military superiority over the South but this is vitiated by the presence of 38,000 US combat troops. More importantly still, the United States scores a decisive advantage over the North by its use of electronic weaponry, increased firepower and sophisticated intelligence gathering procedures. Nonetheless, President Carter's stand on human rights did alter (briefly) the position for the South Korean government and obliged a short-lived reappraisal in Seoul. Now, however, that has changed again and under President Reagan it is felt that the US government is prepared to sacrifice principle in the national interests, and national interests include the defence of South Korea from communism.

Change then, if it is to come, must emanate from within the Korean establishment. Traditionally, South Korean governments have justified their restrictive policy towards political liberty on two grounds: firstly, the need of the country for security against attack or subversion by North Korea; and secondly, the drive to raise people's living standards requires a clamp-down on any political activity of a type or size likely to impair its fulfilment. Chun's administration is no exception. It assiduously stresses the need for unity against the North and for stability in order to carry out a modernisation programme. Vitally important though these priorities are there is no doubt that the restrictions are much more severe than would usually be countenanced in a democracy. For example, although most newspapers are privately owned, self-censorship promoted by government pressure is the rule. There are special laws against criticising the constitution, the government or its policies. Many of those interned and mistreated have by no means been communist agents. The consequent climate of fear in dissident circles has been sharpened by extra-legal harassment and the inability of the courts to protect the rights of political suspects. (It should be added, however, that much greater freedom of expression exists in the South than in the North where there is not the slightest criticism permitted of monolithic communism.)

President Chun Doo Hwan himself appears to be aware of the need for a measure of reform. Recently he has ordered the re-instatement of 250 politicians whose civil rights had been suspended until 1988. The government appears reluctant to inaugurate more substantial reforms and indeed the list did not include major opposition figures such as Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Pil and Kim Young San. Of these Kim Young Sam is perhaps the most interesting case. After calling on the President to start to democratise the regime he has been kept under close house arrest.



A new political furore may develop over possible constitutional reform. Rumours abound that the new constitution may shortly be further amended. At the least there is a need to clarify the problem of succession. The President himself has repeatedly stated that he will not stay on after his current term of office expires in 1988, but many political opponents believe that another constitutional rewrite permitting such a development is imminent.

Chun's position has now been significantly reinforced by the recent incidents of arrant communist aggression. They have understandably strengthened the country's visceral anti-communism and made a liberalisation of the regime virtually impossible in the short run and difficult in the long. The problem is that a major storm could break if it appears that Chun is not willing to step down, because increasingly large numbers of South Koreans believe that the country's phenomenal expansion of the past twenty years must be matched by commensurate political reforms.

[Richard Sim was formerly the Senior Research Analyst for Asian affairs at Control Risks Ltd. and is currently Head of Research at the Institute for the Study of Conflict. He contributes entries on North and South Korea to the *Annual Register.*]

ANTARCTICA'S INDIAN SUMMER

by Peter J. Beck

IN July 1983, in Bonn six members of Greenpeace, dressed in penguin outfits and accompanied by fifteen stuffed and some one hundred and fifty inflatable penguins, attempted to remind delegates to the special Antarctic Mineral Resources meeting about the environmental dangers of resource exploitation in Antarctica.

The delegates, who represented the fourteen consultative parties to the Antarctic Treaty, were continuing the secret mineral regime discussions initiated at Wellington in January 1983 and guided by proposals drafted by Christopher Beeby of New Zealand (these proposals were leaked to the press by Greenpeace in July). The rather motley collection of penguins assembled in front of Bonn's Science Centre symbolised the opposition of the environmental lobby to the Beeby scheme—indeed, to the whole concept of an Antarctic minerals regime—although the Beeby proposals have attracted further criticism, such as on account either of the bureaucratic procedures involved therein or of their alleged emphasis upon political and commercial objectives at the expense of sound management principles.

'The penguins are watching', the delegates were told, but whether they felt threatened by the penguin invasion of Bonn is debatable, particularly as more serious preoccupations confront the Antarctic powers. In fact, recently there has been increased media and academic speculation regarding even the possible demise of the Antarctic treaty system—centred upon the Antarctic Treaty signed in Washington DC in 1959—on account of growing internal and external pressures.

For example, within the Antarctic club itself, that is, the exclusive decision-making grouping of fourteen consultative parties which includes Britain, the USA, Russia, France, West Germany, Australia and Argentina, there exist clear differences of view on the minerals regime question, a feature accentuated by the manner in which exploitation will raise sovereignty issues, hitherto contained successfully by the Antarctic Treaty. Even during the Falklands War of April to June 1982, and in spite of overlapping Antarctic territorial claims, Britain and Argentina continued to co-operate on Antarctic issues, such as illustrated by their joint presence at the Antarctic treaty meetings held at Hobart and Wellington in May and June 1982 respectively.

Although press reports tended to blame Soviet delaying tactics for the relative lack of progress of the Bonn talks in July, time will be required to overcome the obstacles posed by the sovereignty, environmental and other factors. In the meantime, the consultative parties remain confident that a minerals regime can be achieved *eventually*, thereby not only supplementing the Antarctic Marine Resources Convention signed in 1980 but also consolidating the Antarctic treaty system. Contrary to what some people have argued, the Antarctic Treaty has no time-limit. In fact, it may last indefinitely subject to a provision for review during and after

1991, and the achievement of a minerals regime would tend to favour such a trend, even if most experts believe that no actual mineral exploitation will occur until the early 2000s.

In turn, the Antarctic club's internal problems have been compounded by a growing external threat emanating mainly from the 'global commons lobby', that is, from Third World countries asserting that Antarctic decision-making and resource benefits are too important to leave to the fourteen consultative parties; thus, the lobby urges the participation of the whole international community, acting possibly through the United Nations in place of the Antarctic treaty. India proved one of the founders of this view, which has been stimulated recently by the UN Law of the Sea negotiations. In fact, in December 1982 the Law of the Sea signing ceremony led some delegates to point to Antarctica as another area of the world 'to which the common heritage of mankind applies.'

This observation was made by the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, a country which has emerged during the past year or so as perhaps the most articulate advocate for the Antarctic global commons lobby. On 29 September, 1982 the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, used the UN General Assembly to express the Third World's concern about the scramble for increasingly scarce resources: 'the day will come when Antarctica can provide the world with food and other resources for its development. It is only right that such exploitation should benefit the poor nations as much as the rich... Like the sea-beds these uninhabited lands belong to the international community.'

Malaysia attempted to maintain the momentum of this attack upon the Antarctic club at the Non-Aligned Summit held in New Delhi last March, and, while this meeting supported Malaysia's demand for a comprehensive review of Antarctic matters by the UN, it appears that lobbying by Argentina scaled down the extent of the Summit's support for an alternative to the Antarctic treaty. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Malaysia, supported by other nations, anticipates that the UN's involvement will result in an Antarctic counterpart of the Law of the Sea regime.

As a result, the global commons lobby has offered, and continues to offer, a serious threat to the Antarctic treaty system, and at the very moment when the consultative parties are grappling with their most challenging problem yet, the drafting of a minerals regime. In these circumstances both the consultative parties and commentators in the media and academic journals have devoted increased attention to the likely course of future developments.

Obviously, the intentions of such countries as Malaysia have been studied closely, but perhaps most analysis has centred upon India on account not only of its traditional place in the global commons lobby but also of its general power and influence in the international arena. In particular, India's level of scientific expertise and interest in Antarctica, in conjunction with Mrs. Gandhi's strong personal support and prompting, has led already to two Antarctic expeditions (1981-2, 1982-3) as well as to plans to establish a permanent research station there *circa* 1985. Would India stay outside the Antarctic treaty system and lead the campaign

against the Antarctic club, or would it follow up existing scientific contacts with the Antarctic treaty powers by signing the treaty, thereby serving to stabilise the Antarctic system and to undermine the strength and momentum of the global commons lobby?

In this context, India's accession to the Antarctic treaty (accession is the first stage of involvement in the sense of accepting the treaty's principles) on 19 August, 1983 must be interpreted as a major development in Antarctic affairs, particularly as India applied also for admission to consultative party status (the second, and more restricted stage, open only to those nations active in Antarctic research), and thus effectively to join the Antarctic club.

India's application, along with a similar request from Brazil, which also sent an expedition to Antarctica during the 1982-3 season, was considered by a special session of the consultative parties held in Canberra. Approval of both applicants has increased the number of consultative parties to sixteen, and the admission of India to consultative party status on 12 September 1983 must be interpreted as a turning-point for the Antarctic treaty system and as an episode enhancing the treaty's prospects of long-term survival. Of course, it might be argued that India intends to exploit entry in order to destroy the Antarctic club from within, or to exacerbate the existing internal divisions. Only time will tell, but the most likely future scenario is one in which the Antarctic treaty and any future UN involvement in Antarctic matters arising out of the Malaysian initiative are regarded as complementary rather than as alternatives. The UN will become more involved and interested in Antarctica, albeit most probably within the parameters defined by the Antarctic treaty system.

Undoubtedly, Antarctica is attracting increased international attention, and this trend will continue. In fact, the 1982 Falklands War performed a key role in focusing interest upon the Southern Oceans, including Antarctica, a point illustrated not only by the 1982 Shackleton Report's references to Antarctic resources and to the need to see the Falklands in a wider regional perspective but also by the post-war enhancement of British Antarctic policy in the form of a 60% increase in the funding of the British Antarctic Survey.

Apart from India, recent accessions to the Antarctic treaty include Spain and China, while the former's Antarctic expedition of 1982-3 suggests that Spain might apply for consultative party status.

Already, Antarctic marine resources, most notably a shrimp-like creature called krill, are being harvested, and in the long-term even Antarctic minerals may be exploited, if found in commercial quantities, as more accessible resources become exhausted.

[Dr. Peter J. Beck is Principal Lecturer in International History at Kingston Polytechnic. He has written and narrated a series of scripts on the BBC (External Services) on the Falklands dispute. He has given evidence to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.]

WILBERFORCE: REVOLUTIONARY AND COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY

by John Biggs-Davison, M.P.

ON 26th July, 1983 a National Service of Thanksgiving for the life and work of William Wilberforce (1759-1833) was held in Westminster Abbey. Thomas More, who died on the scaffold 'the King's good servant, but God's first,' having been Speaker both of the House of Commons and, as Chancellor of England, of the House of Lords as well, makes the obvious Patron Saint for politicians, wherever they may sit in Parliament. The saintly Wilberforce never held office, though with a different commitment he might have held the highest in the State. He is an inspiration and example for Backbenchers, and a distinguished Backbencher of today has written a timely and readable short life.* He wielded more influence than many Ministers. Small of stature, frail in health, his fine, carrying voice earned him the title of 'Nightingale of the House of Commons.' The Prince of Wales found his oratory irresistible albeit it was more conversational, in the later parliamentary style, than the philippics of his friend, the younger Pitt and those other abolitionists, Charles James Fox and Edmund Burke. When Wilberforce died on the very day that the House of Commons passed the Act of Emancipation men wept in the streets of London. As is inscribed on his memorial in the Abbey, 'he relied not in vain on God.'

In the Abbey service the High Commissioner for Sierra Leone, a state whose foundation was the emancipated Negro, read from Wilberforce's book, *A Practical View of the Prevailing Religious System of Professed Christians in the Higher and Middle Classes in this Country Contrasted with Real Christianity.*† In it the author invited 'true Christians' to check 'the fall of this country and of society by 'restoring the influence of Religion' and 'raising the standard of morality.'

His aim and that of the talented disciples gathered in Clapham was not, as in the current ecclesiastical trend, to politicise the church and to elevate the Social Gospel to the neglect of personal salvation but to change men and thus change society. Which is what happened in Galilee and on the Damascus road. Professor Anstey wrote of the 'Clapham Sect,' as they came to be known but not till after their founder's death:—

> From the assurance that their sins were forgiven they knew they could not only overcome the evil in their own hearts, but also conquer the evils in the world which they felt called to combat.

The aforementioned 'ecclesiastical trend' appeared in the Order of

---

* *Wilberforce: The Nation's Conscience.* By Patrick Cormack, M.P. Pickering & Inglis, Basingstoke, £3.95, re-issued in 1982 as *Real Christianity Contrasted with the Prevailing Religious System.*

† By William Wilberforce. Based on the American edition of 1829. Abridged and edited by James M. Houston. Introduction by Senator Mark O. Hatfield. Pickering & Inglis, Basingstoke.

Service at the Abbey which included a prayer for the 'International Agencies, especially the United Nations Organisation, that they may provide a conscience for the whole world and lead the nations to justice in our treatment of the underprivileged and the poor.' 'Underprivileged,' some who dislike that overworked word may be surprised to learn, occurs in Wilberforce's *Real Christianity*; but I suspect that he would have been puzzled by the notion that a bureaucracy, even an international bureaucracy, could 'provide a conscience.' Were he alive today he would have observed the double standards dominating the international agencies and the presence within them of slave owning and even slave trading regimes. The cause and achievement of Abolition was national and individual. The main instrument in the suppression of the vile trade in human flesh was the Royal Navy.

But, just as the 'internationalist' verse of the National Anthem was thought appropriate by those who wrote the Order of Service, so the Wilberforce commemoration had to be taken over by the tired, old-fashioned liberal establishment. In the House of Commons the new Liberal Member, Mr. Simon Hughes, claimed the occasion for his party on the ground that the Abolition of Slavery Act 1833 was passed under a Whig Administration. The Conservative, Mr. Peter Tapsell, retorted that Wilberforce was a High Tory.

Tory he was both in his support of the Corn Laws and the land, his struggle with the Whig Fitzwilliam interest in Yorkshire and, it may be said to the surprise of some, his support of electoral reform. It was in the spirit of what came to be known as Tory Democracy that Wilberforce through his popular campaigns and petitions brought Parliament closer to the people, to the good of the Constitution.

The Conservative Party as such made no claim that might have marred the national character of the thanksgiving. Wilberforce, however, as much as Michael Sadler, Shaftesbury and Peel, who was a Vice-President of his Society for Bettering the Condition of the Poor, commonly known as the Bettering Society, belonged to the Tory school that opposed moral law to economic laws and were pioneers of factory reform. Yet Wilberforce has been criticised by men who could not begin to emulate such a life work as the ending of the slave trade for indifference to the plight of the 'slaves' nearer home. This despite his championing of the chimney boys and his zeal for penal and prison reform.

By no means all the abolitionists or all the 'Saints' of Clapham were Tories, like Wilberforce and the banker, Henry Thornton. They also included the Whig MP, William Smith. In the Commons they spoke as one.

Social reformers they were; political revolutionaries they were not. Wilberforce shared the antipathy of Pitt, Burke and most of their countrymen for the atheist French Republic with its 'mad-headed professors of liberty and equality.' 'In so much of Europe, they have preferred a false philosophy before the lessons of revelation.' Jacobinism, like Bolshevism, was certainly for export. The bleeding head of a

murdered monarch had been thrown down as a challenge to all Christian princes. The London Corresponding Society expressed solidarity with the Convention in Paris. The tricolor appeared in English streets. Mob orators ranted of blood and Terror.

Wilberforce was a patriot. He believed that righteousness exalteth a nation; and he feared the judgment of 'an incensed God' upon Britons forgetful of 'the Author of all their mercies.' Hazlitt and Cobbett detested one who was willing in emergency to justify emergency powers. Wilberforce supported the suspension of Habeas Corpus both in 1794 and in 1816 as also the Combination Acts of 1799. The latter was little invoked and repealed twenty-five years later. Moreover, the Friendly Societies Act introduced by Wilberforce and a colleague shielded the early Trades Unions.

More potent an antidote than repression to revolution was the evangelical revival he led and that of the mistrusted Methodism. What John Henry Newman called 'the religious movement of 1833,' another cause commemorated this summer, burgeoned as Wilberforce passed to his reward. He had his cordial connections with the Tractarians. Three of William's sons followed Newman on the road to Rome. Like Pitt, Wilberforce had championed Catholic Emancipation.

Both statesmen entered the House of Commons aged twenty-one. In 1787, however, there was, in one sense, a parting of the ways, when Wilberforce exchanged gaming and the glittering social round and the party game for a prayerful and systematic Christian life. He recorded that 'God Almighty has set before me two great objects—the suppression of the slave trade and the reformation of manners in Britain.' Pitt remained his faithful friend and principal confidant. The difference, according to Wilberforce, was that Pitt, though a pure patriot, was 'not under the influence of Christian principles.' He did not mean that the Great Commoner was an infidel; a bishop attended his death bed. But Pitt had not shared the revelation and earnestness of 'the Saints.' Wilberforce was a prominent mourner at his funeral in the Abbey where he too would be laid.

It would be unjust to give Wilberforce too much credit for the abolition of the slave trade. The Bill had a long parliamentary career. Wilberforce's campaign lasted twenty years. It took another twenty-six to abolish slavery in most of the British Empire. From 1821 Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton took on the torch. The motto of this splendid Essex family is 'Whatsoever thy hand finds to do, do it with thy might.' Buxton made 'white slaves' of his followers. He built a vast popular movement, furnishing Parliament with two million signatures. Public pressure was probably decisive. In the Commons, Dr. Lushington, Lord Suffield, Lord Brougham and other Peers should not be forgotten, nor Granville Sharp who, sixteen years before the abolition of the slave trade in 1806, had obtained the Somerset judgment outlawing slavery on English soil. Sir James Stephen, with his enlightened imperial interest in African and Indian policy, came to be known as Mr. Mother Country. Wilberforce pursued his second

great cause, 'the reformation of manners,' simultaneously with the first. It challenged not one atrocious evil but the corruption and callousness of the age. It aroused hatred and contumely. It rejected both the hypocrisy of pretending to be 'religious' and the opposite hyprocrisy of pretending to be fashionably immoral, or amoral. The moral climate of society changed. Family prayers became the thing.

Wilberforce and his set did not shrink from appearing priggish; but his *Real Christianity* holds a balance between emotion, that must have its place, and excess of enthusiasm. The Catholic, let alone the Evangelical, will find much that is pleasingly familiar. What Wilberforce says about the importance of 'private devotions' to the particularly busy is reminiscent of St. Francis de Sales. What is lacking is a full theology of Church and Sacrament.

The spiritual is stronger than the material. The Methodist, Evangelical and Tractarian regeneration took Christianity to the new urban masses and British radicalism and socialism were largely unaffected by the alien atheism of French and then Russian Revolution. So Wilberforce's reformation was of major historical importance.

Yet abolition still stands out as one of the most unsordid deeds in the human story. There was a mint of money in 'black ivory.' The loathsome trade was not just an institution: it was 'the Institution.' It was the making of proud cities like Bristol and Liverpool, where Gladstones were involved. Belfast was different. Ulstermen are caricatured as hard and bigoted. But the merchants of Belfast considered entering so profitable a commerce, decided it was sinful and refrained. Only by twisting economics can economic determinists make out that abolition was to the country's economic advantage. What Wilberforce, Buxton and the nation achieved was as glorious as the evil they fought for so long was abominable.

[Sir John Biggs-Davison has been Conservative Member of Parliament for Epping Forest since 1974.]

LABOUR'S FUTURE

by John Hatch

DURING the first four months following the June 1983 election the Conservative Government seemed to have staggered on to black ice. It found itself incapable of standing upright over a series of policy statements, debates, a by-election and a personal scandal.

As the Government blundered from one fiasco to a worse, Labour's fortunes inevitably rose. Following the revelations of black clouds in the economy; a botched performance by the new Chancellor in announcing public cuts; a disastrous speech by the new Home Secretary on capital punishment; the near loss of supposedly safe Penrith; national shock over the decision to reduce nurses and doctors in the National Health Service; the Grenada trauma; the exposure of the antithesis of Victorian values practised within the Cabinet; together with the revealed dubiety of the Prime Minister's political judgement; Labour stood only three points behind the Conservatives.

What was more important than this whole series of disasters, however, was that the Conservative Government still retained a majority of 144 over all other parties in the House of Commons. All governments experience bad patches: but they need little skill to ensure that they do not have to fight elections during them. Before the Falklands' war of May, 1982, the Conservative Government had been one of the most unpopular in modern history, its Prime Minister less liked or trusted than any of her predecessors. The same situation might recur in 1984. But the election was not held in 1982 nor will be in 1984. It will not be held in the autumn of 1983. It was held in June 1983, and resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Conservatives. Unless catastrophe strikes, the next one will not be called until 1987/88.

So, although the Labour Party, through the Government's misjudgments and its own civilised election of a new, young, popular leader, has been given an unexpected respite in which to build fresh foundations, the figures which indicate the Himalayan altitudes it has to scale have not disappeared.

Moreover, it is not only one peak which has to be climbed. Beside Everest is another mountain, avalanches from which could engulf the Labour Party before it ever reaches the foothills of the main objective. For the moment Britain has become a three party state. In the General Election the Tories polled about 43 per cent, Labour 28 and the Liberal/SDP Alliance nearly 27. In fact, the Tory vote declined from 1979. Moreover, the anti-Government majority against the Tories increased by almost a million.

Of course, because of Britain's electoral system this did not prevent the Conservative Party from greatly increasing the number of its seats and gaining what is considered to be a 'landslide' victory. The fact remains that considerably more electors voted against than for the Government.

In 1983, therefore, it has become quite clear that it is the schisms amongst the opposition parties which have given the Government its massive majority and its power. This is hardly calculated to enthuse the Labour Party. The Alliance came within 700,000 votes of Labour's total—and this was the first election fought by the Alliance. It is easy to say that an electoral pact between Labour and the Alliance would defeat the Tories; such a pact is not going to be formed. If it were, it would certainly antagonise most of Labour's supporters, almost all their workers and many Alliance voters.

Yet the issue remains an immediate and grave challenge to the Labour Party. On the one hand, it could frustrate any chance of Labour winning the next election; on the other, it exposes the menace that the Alliance could replace Labour as the credible alternative to the Tories as a government.

It was largely because of this latter suspicion that Alliance candidates did so well in many constituencies last June. They persuaded the electorate that they had more chance of beating the Tories than Labour had. In this they were helped by three factors. In several regions, such as the West Country, parts of the North-West and North-East, East Anglia, certain Welsh and Scottish areas, there remained the remnants of the old Non-conformist, Liberal tradition. It could be resurrected. Secondly, many Liberal and especially SDP candidates came from middle-class backgrounds. This enabled them to attract the liberal elements who had been affronted by the Government's more draconian measures without having to be associated with what they considered the extreme policies of the Labour Party. But the third, and certainly most crucial factor was the activities of the Labour Party itself. Its fratricidal battles had been widely publicised. Its policy decisions, especially on defence and the economy, were known to be opposed by senior members of the Party. Their presentation was weak, indecisive and often contradictory. Once former members of the Cabinet, like Jim Callaghan, Lord Shackleton and Lord Lever, disowned them, they lost credibility. The Alliance seemed a surer haven for those who sought revolt against Thatcherism.

It is true that the Alliance has only 23 members at Westminster, despite so nearly overtaking Labour's vote. It is also true that the even spread of Alliance votes across the country is a severe handicap to their gaining more seats under Britain's current electoral system. Nor does there seem any chance of either of the main parties agreeing to change the system.

Nevertheless, most of the electorate now knows that a third party, or coalition, has become a credible alternative Opposition, that rejection of Thatcherism no longer entails supporting the Labour Party. As British people have always preferred to move to a medial position rather than to swing to an extreme, the appeal of the Alliance remains alive, particularly amongst non-political voters.

It may be, of course, that the Alliance itself will sucumb to its own tensions. There were signs of this possibility during the SDP's Salford

Conference and the Liberals' Assembly at Harrogate in September 1983. Policy differences and organisational competition at local level both foretold conflicts between the two parties in the future. But this is speculation. It cannot be taken into account in assessing the future prospects of the Labour Party.

Nevertheless, one further point about the Alliance, significant to Labour's prospect, must be made. Those who defected from the Labour Party to form the Social Democratic Party are sufficiently intelligent to have known that their defection was bound to weaken the forces of anti-Thatcherism. This was their central objective. They never seriously believed that they could form an alternative government, even with the help of the Liberals. Their focal aim was to gain the balance between Tory and Labour and then auction their support for the prize of some system of proportional representation. This would then guarantee their survival within the British electoral spectrum. Britain would become a replica of many continental European political scenes; government would depend on coalition negotiations, in which the SDP and the Liberals expected to participate. By acting on this tactic the SDP weakened Labour and made it even more difficult to re-capture office.

Before leaving this issue of internecine strife amongst anti-Thatcher forces, its corrolary must be mentioned. If right-wing members of the Labour Party deserted to the SDP, those of the extreme left committed similar hari kari. There were members who demonstrated that, objectively at least, they preferred the re-election of a Thatcher Government to its replacement by a reformist Labour Administration. Their tactics, though definitely not their personalities, remind me of the German Communist Party of 1931. There the Communists believed that their first objective must be to destroy the 'centrist' Social Democratic Party to clear the way for the main battle against the Nazis. They were even prepared to co-operate with the Nazis to achieve this objective—though I do not suggest that the Labour extreme left went to these extremes. Yet the consequence was strikingly similar. Germany got Hitler; Britain got Thatcher. The theory that a reformist Labour Government was a worse outcome than a continuation of Thatcherism helped to produce the result on June 9. If it continues between now and the next election—and there is evidence that the concept is retained by some individuals and organisations—it will certainly destroy the Labour Party as an alternative government.

It is for these reasons that Labour's battle against the Alliance for acceptance as the only genuine alternative to Thatcherism has to take priority against the ultimate war against Toryism. For, no matter how successful may be the efforts to revive the Labour Party, if, at the next election, voters are given the alternative of Thatcher Toryism and a more 'humane' form of the same philosophy, Labour cannot win an absolute majority. When Mrs. Thatcher told her conference that she had changed the ground of British politics, that opponents were now tip-toeing on to her ground, she was speaking the truth. Once the essentials of Thatcher

philosophy are accepted, like the dominance of the market economy, the need for new American nuclear missiles, the values of a meritocratic educational system, the priority for financial over service functions of public spending, Thatcher's philosophy has gained acceptance. Nothing short of a totally alternative philosophy can challenge the integration of those values into British political life into the 1990s. The Alliance accepts them. The Liberals have always done so openly. Those who left the Labour Party for the SDP chose them in place of their former commitment to Socialism. For the Labour Party the choice now is to offer a sharp alternative, not only to Thatcherite values, but also to Thatcherism couched in less abrasive—and less honest—language.

The challenge to the Labour Party first to regain an unquestioned claim to be the alternative to Tory government, and then to attack the citadel of Conservatism itself, has to start from a recognition of the magnitude of its June defeat. In that election Labour emerged with more votes than other parties in only three sections of the population. These are the unemployed, the trade unionists and the unskilled/semi-skilled. Yet it had lost support even in these groups since 1979 and could not gain 50 per cent from any one of them. It was the trade union movement which was mainly responsible for the formation of the Labour Party in 1900; yet in 1983 only 39 per cent of their members voted for it.

Perhaps of greater long-term significance is the discovery that the Party was only able to attract 17 per cent of the young, first-time voters, or 29 per cent of those actually voting. Nearly a half did not use their votes. Both the Alliance and the Tories secured more votes from this group than Labour.

The constituency situation is also grim. Draw a line from Bristol to the Wash; excluding London, Labour now holds only three seats south of this line (Ipswich, Thurrock and Bristol South). Yet as recently as October 1974 over a quarter of Labour's seats were in this region. Labour has lost 62 per cent of its seats in southern England.

Thus the Labour Party is facing a crisis deeper than at any time at least since adult suffrage was introduced in 1918. It is not just a 1983 crisis. Individual membership has been steadily declining for thirty years. Its share of the national vote has been reduced in eight out of the last eleven elections. The trade union movement which has supplied its mass battalions and finance is weaker than at any time for 70 years, partly as a result of mass unemployment, partly through its internal disputes, partly through legislation. The Party's finances are in an abysmal state and will deteriorate still further if the Government pursues its declared intention of altering the basis of trade union contributions by law.

Calculations vary as to the percentage swing which the Labour Party has to achieve to gain an absolute majority at the next election. It depends on how the gains needed from the Alliance and the Conservatives are divided. One reputable estimate is that about 6 per cent must be taken from Mrs. Thatcher and 8 per cent from the Alliance. Labour is second

in only 131 seats. But the precise figures are academic; it is certain that Labour will have to achieve a greater electoral conversion than at any time since 1945.

Again, the electoral figures and even the size of the necessary swing are likely to be more hypothetical to the real political future than they seem at present. The political scene has become more volatile than at any time during this century. The social character of the electorate has changed and is changing. World and national events will profoundly influence Britain's political climate over the next four years. Above all, there are now influential members of the Labour Party who realise that to survive it will itself have to build a new character.

When the trades unions decided in 1900 to combine with the small socialist societies to create a working class party there were some socialists, including Keir Hardie, who feared that the masses they were acquiring would dilute socialist philosophy. They knew from their own experience that the majority of trade union members were not socialists. They comforted themselves with the argument that once they had been organised into a political party they could be converted by socialist education. To a degree their hopes were substantiated. The rise of the Labour Party to government owed much to the National Council of Labour Colleges, the Workers' Education Association, the National Labour College, the Fabians, the Independent Labour Party, many smaller colleges and societies (even, during its early days, Ruskin College,) and, during the war, the Army Bureau of Current Affairs.

Yet, since the war, during the period when it has become possible to regard Labour politics as a profession, all these influences have dwindled. Little new has taken their place. Intellectuals may argue over fine points of political theology in various journals; but the vast majority of even Labour's active workers have been offered no broad political philosophy consonant with their daily life. One of its most intelligent and charismatic leaders, Ken Livingstone, can even declare that for him 'it would be a mistake to stand in a safe seat with a solid white skilled working class . . .' But most seats to be won by Labour broadly fit that descrption.

Now Labour has the most massive task of political education ever to face it. The electorate has rejected what it offered in June, or how it was offered. It has certainly rejected the Labour Party it saw before it at the last election. Can it change that image by 1987 or has it served its purpose, to sink into the kind of small sect seen in many European countries, without hope of power, seeking to do no more than join some potential coalition?

The answer to this focal question may well depend crucially on one major issue. After the war the first concern of British people was to ensure that the conditions of the 1920s and 1930s never recurred. Through a variety of factors a new prosperity was offered to the British during the 1950s and 1960s. It was led, at least at first, by Labour's remarkable success in recovering from the losses of wartime and building a new

economy, based on full employment and higher living standards for workers. But Labour had also created the Welfare State; so increased family consumption was underpinned by a new generation of community services. This individual-communal balance was essentially accepted by the Conservative administrations which succeeded Labour.

The change which Thatcherism has made in this broad consensus is that it has deliberately promoted the individual sense of self-interest and demoted the community concept. It has consciously played on that element in British society which has naturally developed powerfully in reaction to pre-war miseries and which has been encouraged to do so for just this reason by both the Labour Party and the unions. Thatcherism has capitalised on the materialist aspirations of the British people and subordinated their commitment to communal values. Whilst never yet able to return completely to the concept of private charity for the poor, sick, young and old, it has fostered an underlying conception that public community services diminish individual prosperity, that charity should resume its 19th century role.

The Thatcher governments have been aided in projecting this philosophy by progressive weakening of the British economy. For the first time since the industrial revolution began Britain now imports more manufactured goods than she exports. Whole traditional industrial areas of the country have been laid waste; traditional industrial activity in districts where the whole community has depended on it for a century and a half has been silenced, four million workers are unemployed, investment capital goes to industries abroad. Yet, for many still in work, the advance in living standards has continued. Today the top quarter of incomes receive 53 per cent of national income; the bottom quarter only 10 per cent. Here is the perfect context to appeal to the private greed of a majority.

So the future existence and prospect of power of the Labour Party will essentially depend on its ability to reverse this trend. Already the basic philosophy has sucked the SDP into its maws with David Owen's espousal of the social market. The Liberals have always believed in the power of the profit motive. If community values and services are ever again to gain acceptance by the British electorate the Labour Party alone can achieve it.

The Labour Party has two valuable assets in meeting this challenge. It has a new, realistic leadership; and the Government's reduction of National Health nurses and doctors has invoked the deep instinct of every section of the British people to preserve their basic communal services. Provided, therefore, that the new leaders immediately recognise this central issue of political debate and are allowed by all sections of the party to build a unified public argument centred on it, Labour may be already on the road to massive recovery.

Yet there is one more profound challenge to be met. British public life has not yet recognised the significance of the new micro-electronics' age. Its consequences are uncomfortable to all politicians. It may well be

that the traditional Protestant work ethic has become an anachronism. The early future lies with organisation and education for satisfying leisure, accompanied by investment in high technological education for a minority. This issue may already have overtaken the conventional attitudes towards full employment.

Neil Kinnock approached the perimeter of this consciousness when he spoke at Brighton of the paramount necessity for efficient wealth production. Technology beckons an age of unprecedented production with ever less labour or capital. The new philosophy of Socialism may well have to combine the organisation of the new productive techniques with expanded communal services, more equitable distribution of wealth, national and international, and a richer conception of leisure. There could be tension ahead between traditional Labour attitudes, especially in some unions, and the opportunities now open for a revolutionary vision of society. This challenge to Labour's traditions could see storm cones hoisted; it could also present Labour with scope to take an imaginative initiative which would change the history of Britain.

[John Hatch, a former tutor for the National Council of Labour Colleges and National Organiser for the Independent Labour Party, has been Director of the extra-mural studies department, University of Sierra Leone, Director of the African Studies Programme, Houston, Texas and Commonwealth Secretary of the Labour Party. He was Professor of Human Relations at the University of Zambia and was awarded an Honorary D.Litt. by Houston for services to International Education. He received a Life Peerage in 1978.]

The January issue of *Contemporary Review* includes *Reform in South Africa: a Tangled Web* by J. E. Spence, *Deadlock in Kampuchea* by Jonathan Luxmore, *Grenada* by Paul Rose and *Vladimir Bukovsky's Castle* by Michael Futrell (held over from the December issue).

MERCURIAL MELINA'S MARBLES

by Stephanie Ginger

THE British election of June 9th 1983 is over, and Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative government has embarked upon another term in office. A few thousand miles away in Athens, Greek Culture Minister Melina Mercouri is sharpening her swords for another bout in her controversial battle for the return of the 'Elgin' Marbles to Greece.

Mrs. Mercouri's campaign, if successful, could set a precedent for the gradual emptying of some of the greatest museums in the world. At least, that is the fear of the British government and officials of the British Museum where about 100 pieces of the priceless marble treasures have been housed since the 7th Earl of Elgin purchased them from the Turkish authorities in Greece between 1801 and 1803.

British Museum Director, David Wilson, said recently, 'If we start dismantling our collections it will be the beginning of the end of the museum as an international cultural institution. If we allow the marbles to go back to Greece, we will open the floodgates to demands from every country in the world that believes it has a case against Britain, and we will place an enormous amount of material at risk.'

The Greek Minister disagrees strongly with this opinion. 'Our intention is not to empty all the museums of their treasures,' she has said. 'We are talking about a totally unique case, given that these treasures, the so-called "Elgin" Marbles, constitute an inseparable part of a unique monument, the Parthenon, the symbol of ancient Greek culture'.

Another bone of contention is the matter of Lord Elgin's original purchase of the marbles from the Turks then occupying Greece. The British have historically maintained that the 247 feet of frieze, 15 metopes and a variety of pedimental statues that make up the marbles were obtained legitimately by Lord Elgin, the then British Ambassador of the Sublime Ports, to save them from destruction.

'Lord Elgin was guilty of vandalism,' was Melina Mercouri's immediate response to the claim. 'He took possession of archaeological treasures purely to decorate his country home in Scotland.'

The fact that Lord Elgin's workmen did much to destroy part of the remaining Parthenon during the enthusiastic removal of the metopes indicates that his motivation was not purely of an ecological nature. Mrs. Mercouri does not dispute, however, the fact that many of the treasures removed by Lord Elgin might not have survived the next 180 years in situ. She merely replies, in effect, 'The British say they have saved the marbles. Well, thank you very much. Now give them back.'

William St. Clair, in his survey of the subject *Lord Elgin and the Marbles* takes the view and provides evidence that Lord Elgin was more concerned with 'Improving British taste,' than with anything else. Even Lord Byron, a leading lobbyist against Elgin's action, seems to have failed

to appreciate their aesthetic value, terming them on one occasion as 'Phidian freaks.' The Greek contention that since Greece was occupied by Turkey at the time of the purchase, making it an illegal sale, holds little water. The majority of antiquities which reside in museums outside their country of origin have almost always been obtained by questionable methods.

The document allowing Lord Elgin to remove the marbles was certainly official, although ambiguous as to what Lord Elgin was permitted to remove. According to St. Clair, although the Turks were usually 'totally indifferent to ruins, especially ruins left by other peoples,' there were standing instructions, until Lord Elgin bought and shipped the marbles, that the Parthenon and its antiquities were to be left alone. In fact, Lord Elgin, having accomplished his ambition of purchasing the marbles, was to rue the day he decided to transport them back to England. All in all, their acquisition cost him £70,000 which included £5,000 to salvage the contents of a boat that sank off Kythera with its precious cargo on board, and the British government reimbursed him only £35,000. His dubious career after the Elgin Marbles affair was aimed at recouping his losses and getting out of debt.

Since Lord Elgin removed the Parthenon statues from Athens between 1801 and 1812 there have been repeated pleas for their return from scholars, politicians, poets and admirers of Greek culture. All to no avail. This year, however, for the first time, the Greek government with Culture Minister Melina Mercouri in the front line, will formally request them back. The move by the Greek cabinet came in May 1983 when the British Foreign Office explained that although there had been months of impassioned speeches, appeals and threats by Mrs. Mercouri, the Greek government had not formally asked for their restoration to Greece. A Greek government announcement quickly followed the Foreign Office statement, saying that Mrs. Mercouri was now 'fully authorised to pursue all necessary procedures,' and despite Britain's reluctance earlier in the year to consider her request, Mrs. Mercouri said at the time that she believed 'the British will be reasonable, will change the negative attitude held so far and will eventually agree to the Greek request.'

The Greeks are not alone in their belief that the marbles belong in Athens. At a UNESCO World Conference of Cultural Ministers in Mexico in July 1982 the request was backed by culture ministers from 56 other countries; twenty-six abstained and not one rejected the proposal. At the 35th General Assembly of the International Arts Association (AICA) in Helsinki in June of this year, AICA decided to submit its resolution for the marbles' return to UNESCO's special inter-governmental committee for the purpose of returning cultural heritage monuments to their countries of origin. 58 members voted in favour, three abstained and only one Briton and one Dane voted against the motion.

Even Opposition legislators in the House of Commons earlier this year were backing the request, and a Committee for the Restitution of the Elgin Marbles has been set up, with Professor Robert Browning of

Birkbeck College as Chairman and a veritable mixture of cultural and political representation among them.

This seems to have left the British government and the British Museum officials unmoved, since in order to remove anything from the British Museum an Act of Parliament would be necessary, which in itself requires a parliamentary majority.

The main problem for the British seems to be an anxiety not to establish a precedent which countries all over the world can follow, to reclaim antiquities taken from their places of origin hundreds of years ago. The then British Arts Minister, Paul Channon, said in May 1983 that returning the Marbles would be a 'disaster.'

Yet Melina Mercouri shows no sign of being thwarted by bureaucracy. At the end of May she made an unofficial visit to London which ended with a televised visit to the Museum where she ran her fingers over the spoils of Lord Elgin's Ambassadorship. Her visit was an emotional moment and characterised her love of the melodramatic. With tears in her eyes, she said, 'You must understand us, you must love us. We have fought with you in the Second World War. Give them back and we will be proud of you. Give them back and they will be in good hands.'

Before her visit to the marbles, Mrs. Mercouri told reporters of the Greek government's plan to build a new museum beneath the Acropolis in which to house the marbles and protect them from the severe pollution that plagues Athens. 'There, the marbles can be housed until Athens' atmosphere is clean enough for them to be replaced on the temples,' she explained. Whether the Acropolis museum would match the British Museum which is open 358 days a year from 9.30 to 5.0, with free photography allowed, would remain to be seen. However, the formidable Minister of Culture's patience seems to be flagging, and pleading with the British will undoubtedly turn to more official methods. She says that the next step will be to take the matter before the British courts, although when this will be remains vague.

She admits that the battle will be a long one and a tough one, but she insists: 'When you know you're fighting for something just, something which is right, it gives you wings. I will be alive and still a government minister when they are returned.'

The difference between the possible success and certain failure of the campaign lies in the Greeks' ability to distance themselves from the 'precedent' factor and present their claim using the uniqueness of the Parthenon Marbles as their weapon. The British may relent eventually, if the rest of the world sees that they are making an 'exception'. If in any doubt that an act such as the return of the Marbles to Greece may be viewed as 'establishing a precedent,' the Greeks are pursuing an already lost cause.

THE CHALLENGE OF MASS UNEMPLOYMENT

by S. G. Shanker

IN *Democracy and Human Nature* Robert Hutchins describes how:

> Equality and justice, the two great distinguishing characteristics of democracy, follow inevitably from the conception of men, all men, as rational and spiritual beings.

The key concept here is *rational.* Democracy was never meant to be solely defined in the crude terms of 'rule by the People'; it was to be 'rule by Reason, as manifested and articulated by the People'. To the early democratic theorists—empiricists and rationalists alike—the suggestion that a democratic decision might be irrational was tantamount to a contradiction in terms. The most famous phrase in modern political literature is Thomas Jefferson's ringing declaration: 'We hold these truths to be self-evident'; that is, so 'clear and distinct' that no *rational* man could possibly dispute them.

The arrival of media politics, however, with its army of consultants plotting the most effective colour combinations, profiles, and image 'shots', has vanquished this dream. We cling tenaciously to our Kantian heritage in the belief that, at least quinquennially, Reason once again reigns supreme. But if ever Reason is subjugated to the passions, it is at the time of an election. For elections are not so much national debates as confrontations between warring *Weltanschauungen,* and the victorious party is not the winner of the argument, but rather the bearer of the *Zeitgeist.*

The last election would be fought—so the pundits and opposition politicians were constantly advising us—over the problem of unemployment. But far from stimulating any probing rational analysis, the issue received scarcely any attention at all, and the election was ultimately decided by the question of Britain's nuclear deterrent in the 1990s: a flight from Reason if ever there was one. The great domestic issues confronting the Nation were thus swept aside by a neurotic obsession with Britain's military posture in the future; a trend which the Conservative Party did not so much manipulate as exploit. Just as, so it would seem, they were able to exploit the mood of anxiety that has been created by the transition to a post-industrial/post-service economy.

The Conservative Party's response to this metamorphosis rests reassuringly on traditional conservative principles: by pursuing an economic policy which will allow these changes to occur as unhindered as possible, we place ourselves at the mercy of a benevolent force watching over us. Once this revolutionary process has been completed, it will be up to future societies to adjust as best they can to their new socio-economic reality. Were we to interfere with the internal mechanics of this transformation, we could not help but create unwieldy apparatuses which by their very incoherence would inevitably lead to chaos. Indeed, to be a 'revolutionary' transformation just means, from a conservative point-of-view, that we cannot understand the dynamics of this new order, for our thought remains hopelessly fettered to an obsolete system.

In the midst of this exceptionally complex situation stands the windfall of North Sea oil, generating as much confusion as it does wealth. Labour and the Alliance both believe that these revenues should be used to harness and direct the forces released by post-industrialism in order to preserve the established goals and values of contemporary society. For them, the post-industrial revolution is not some Platonic phenomenon, impenetrable to human gaze. On the contrary, we *create* the revolution, and we alone are responsible for the social consequences that ensue.

To the Government, however, the post-industrial revolution is very much a transcendental phenomenon, and hence the only responsible course for us to follow is to employ any such good fortune as North Sea oil to cushion ourselves from the formidable social costs that we might otherwise have to experience. It would be a grave injustice to suppose that, because the Conservative Party councils a policy of cautious restraint, they are, therefore, guilty of indifference to the plight of the unemployed. Indeed, it would constitute an even more sorry comment on the moral condition of the Nation if such were the case.

A constant theme in recent political commentary has been that the government shrewdly sacrificed the welfare of the unemployed in order to appeal to the self-interest of a working majority. But those who offer this analysis as an indication of the government's obduracy seldom bother to reflect on the implications of such an assumption. That such a political tactic could work presupposes a disturbing imperviousness and selfishness running throughout society and overriding class barriers. Whether or not the government and society are indeed guilty of such callousness, the important point is that it is no longer surprising to encounter such a theme in the media. No more telling indication could be found of the shift to a Hobbesian perception of political society that has occurred.

Granted that there now exists a superficial similarity to the conditions which materialised at the advent of laissez-faire capitalism, it is not all that surprising to see the resurgence of traditional conservative arguments. The dramatic introduction of technological discoveries brings with it a hint of a return to the frontier spirit, where the more adventurous are prepared to hazard fortunes on technological innovations. Spectacular successes as well as failures only further serve to strengthen the impression of a return to a free-wheeling market where he who dares wins. But the parallels with laissez-faire capitalism in the context of a global economy governed by trans-national conglomerates are obviously minimal, and it is this disparity which lies at the heart of the Government's manifest inability to deal openly and convincingly with the unemployment problem.

Nineteenth-century 'laissez-faire capitalism' was characterised by the rapid displacement of agriculture by manufacturing industry as the primary source of employment, without any consequent decline in agricultural production. Post-industrialism has had precisely the same effect on industrialism: the 'service' and 'information' industries have since the early 1960s become the primary source of employment, while advanced computer technology has maintained the productive levels of industry at greatly reduced manning levels. But these very 'high-technology' sources

of post-industrial revolution also spell an extremely short-lived future for an employment reservoir in the service industries themselves, as well as the continuing decline of the work force in the manufacturing sector. Thus we are rapidly moving into the second stage of post-industrialism: the transition within an advanced technological infrastructure to a post-service economy. What makes this development particularly disturbing is the fact that there is virtually no new large-scale source of employment looming on the economic horizon.

Perhaps the most distressing feature of this situation is that these high levels of unemployment seem due as much to technological redundancy as to recessionary attrition. Many of the jobs that have been lost over the past four years have clearly disappeared because of obsolescence, and it is plainly futile to hope for a solution to the unemployment problem—in the form of a return to a state resembling full employment—from sustained reflationary growth. The brutal fact of post-industrial reality is that a high growth/high productivity/high unemployment society will no longer be an anomaly. Hence, to speak of opening new technological markets as a means of resolving this crisis is no less irresponsible than advocacy of public works schemes as a genuine panacea, and by fixating on the inefficiency of British manufacturing and the urgent need to compete in the advanced technological markets, the Government has quite seriously exaggerated the employment potential of modern capital-intensive industry.

The government is obviously aware of the post-industrial structural changes that are occurring: of the fact that profitability and job-creation are becoming incompatible objectives as capital-intensive technology continues to widen the profit/labour ratio; and of the rapidly diminishing labour-cost of technology as 'miniaturisation' progresses. So we are forced to ask ourselves what their reticence on this matter betokens. If their assumption is that market forces will resolve the unemployment problem, they cannot believe this in the sense that a revitalised economy would succeed in recovering the employment levels of the 1950s. If China, for example, were suddenly to make its agriculture capital-intensive, it would obviously not be with the hope that the displaced labour force would naturally find alternative means of employment (compare Mexico's present dilemma). Government would seem to believe that market forces rather than governmental directives offer the best method for edging the population into a new perception of society, with new attitudes towards work and leisure. Rather than trying to re-equip de-skilled industries, the choice would be to discourage the growth of artificial labour and to encourage the pursuit of highly-skilled private activities.

Since everything that we understand about post-industrialism points to the rapid contraction of the employment sector, the Government must, therefore, either anticipate a new type of society based on the post-industrial concept of work that is swiftly emerging, in which the reduced working numbers will be called upon to support a large contingent of unemployable compatriots (in much the same way that the young will increasingly have to shoulder the burden of supporting the elderly); or

else, they have quite simply refused to project beyond the need to impose a harsh discipline on employment and living-standard expectations, and have placed their faith in the hope that by creating sober attitudes to job-sharing, wage settlements, single-family wage-earners etc. market forces will somehow suffice to resolve the social problems that result. Neither possibility can be ruled out; nor, for that matter, are they mutually exclusive.

The Government has, unfortunately, responded to this bleak prospect with contradictory messages. On the one hand it is stressing the need for job realism, which can only be fully understood when seen against the background of the transformation into a post-industrial/post-service economy. Yet the Government also wants to preach the need for a return to 'Victorian' values: i.e. a return to the Carlylian work ethic in which every individual bears the moral responsibility for being unemployed. In other words, the government is trying both to explain that we have to change our attitudes to full employment and the nature of employment in general, yet they are also beginning to hint at the desirability of a return to primitive capitalist values which would once again make the prospect of full employment viable: viz. everyone can find a job if only he resorts to his own initiative rather than relying on the State. So while they are committed to driving home to the electorate the extent of the fundamental structural changes that are occurring internationally, they are also suggesting that the high unemployment rate is a self-created problem, largely due to socialist-inspired expectations, and remediable by a stringent dose of monetarist austerity.

The trouble with both of these arguments is that neither permits the possibility of a genuine solution to the unemployment problem, a shortcoming which must surely prompt us to reconsider whether the real nature of the problem itself has been fully grasped. An unsolvable problem shares this common trait with an unfalsifiable theory: both are founded on a conceptual, not an empirical confusion. Before we can begin to devise a political solution to the unemployment problem, we must be certain that we have understood the type of issue with which we are grappling, and hence the type of solution for which we should be searching. We regard the unemployed as the social casualties of post-industrialism, but from a different point-of-view they could equally be seen as the vanguard of social change, depending on what opportunities are bestowed upon them.

Our shared anxiety of what will happen when 'the work ethic runs out of work' rests in large part on our failure to perceive the extent to which the work ethic is changing. It is not surprising that, insofar as the concept of democratic society incorporates both a Romantic and a Puritan conception of the individual, the concept of work should manifest a similar bifurcation. The writings of Carlyle and Morris exemplify the widely different interpretations of work—work as moral duty and work as the vehicle of self-awareness—that are both subsumed under the work ethic. But the arrival of post-industrialism has undermined this opposition. Significantly, many of those activities that are now classified as leisure

pastimes were recently identified as labour (e.g. cooking, carpentry, craft-work, gardening, research); the difference lies in the shift in the point-of-view from which work is perceived, in which the Romantic conception is rapidly becoming paramount.

If we are to respond effectively to this conceptual revolution, we must cease to regard the aggregate wealth of our society simply in terms of the Gross National Product. So long as the Government remains enthralled by so narrow a conception of prosperity, however, it will be unable to capitalise on the creative possibilities offered by post-industrialism. It is noteworthy that, while there has been considerable debate about the advisability of investing North Sea profits in industrial programmes, there has been virtually no discussion of the alternative of using this resource to invest in education. Reason, it would seem, has only a limited role to play in the modern 'rationalised' economy. It is imperative, however, that we begin to perceive education as an ongoing productive experience: to the point where we no longer even distinguish between the concepts of work and education. Unfortunately, given the acceleration in the tempo of modern life, governments are reluctant to invest in a venture which does not promise immediate, tangible returns. But the benefits of education are measured over generations, and often in directions which it is impossible for us to anticipate. And it is precisely in these terms that the wealth potential of what are currently regarded as the unemployed is being squandered.

The Government's quintessentially conservative priority is not wealth-creation, but rather, wealth-preservation. Hence the Conservative Party has championed a policy whose primary objective is to bludgeon the work-force into an awareness of the roots and dangers of inflation. The ultimate question which this strategy raises is whether such a policy will prove to be the most effective method of educating the electorate about the sources of inflation; that is, whether submission amounts to the same thing as understanding. But then, the suggestion that it is the government's responsibility to educate the electorate on the danger and causes of uncontrolled inflation (let alone learn from the union representatives how this education is progressing, and what remain the predominant anxieties and prejudices of the work force) is an attitude which has been vigorously eschewed.

This is far from constituting a matter of negligence: at heart the issue we must confront is that the Conservative Party is basically intent on reforming the manner in which we perceive the relation of the individual to the State. Contrary to the rhetorical flourishes, the expectation of the monetarist zealots is not solely that tight fiscal policy will sow the seeds for a return to an idealised version of a capitalist arcadia that vanished over a century ago; a paradise in which microprocessors and fibre optics replace the energy unleashed by steam and electricity, thereby establishing a new free-market utopia where anyone is capable of becoming a captain of telematics. What the Conservatives hope to accomplish at this stage is to change society's perception of the nature and role of the State in order to bring about the rationalisation which the economy so desperately needs.

The Government in effect sees the most pressing danger confronting modern Britain as lying in the widespread alienation from the State that exists: an alienation which is not to be defined in terms of social *anomie*, but rather, is to be seen in quasi-Hegelian terms as estrangement from the ethereal nature of the State *qua* spiritual embodiment of the Nation, which as such demands not only political obedience, but equally important, civic gratitude and dedication. What the Conservatives want is thus a shift from the paternalist to the patriarchal State: rather than viewing the State as a repository of benefits, it is henceforward to be seen as a majestic structure commanding self-restraint and unstinting sacrifice. Authority, not Reason, is to reign supreme.

Alienation from the political as well as the productive processes is certainly one of the greatest misfortunes suffered by technological civilisation. Whether it is to be resolved in this conservative fashion or by liberal principles which seek to encourage perceptions of social responsibility by diffusing the political machinery and decentralising the decision-making procedure is the major question which the country is now forced to decide. If the Government has not clarified this matter, it is because the whole emphasis of their ideology denies the pedagogical responsibility of the State upon which the liberal insists. The Government's solution to the unemployment problem is not to educate the populace in the societal transformation which has been caused by post-industrialism, but rather to adopt a policy which seeks to minimise the presence of individual decisions and instead presents an impersonal mechanism which by itself will force the populace—workers and employers alike—to shift its perception of work as a natural right to a perception of work as a privilege.

It is difficult for the philosopher, given his fundamental commitment to the importance of conceptual understanding, to view this development with equanimity. In place of the liberal emphasis on a politically-neutral social education, the Conservatives have introduced a method of partisan indoctrination. This attitude is, of course, reflected in the Draconian measures being meted out to the universities, but it is also reflected in the increasing secrecy and imperiousness surrounding the executive. A society which has grown frightened by the escalating unruliness of the union structure might well, unwittingly, support a conservative ideological counter-revolution which will have a traumatic effect on the liberal traditions which the country has nourished. If the Conservatives prove successful the country will be faced with a vastly stronger form of government. Sadly, if they fail it looks like leading to very much the same result. On either count, the unemployed will be left to suffer the consequences of our inability to meet the conceptual challenges posed by post-industrialism.

[S. G. Shanker, who was awarded an IODE Fellowship and a Canada Council Doctoral Fellowship, will contribute the third article in his current series, 'Principles of Political Education,' in the February, 1984 issue.]



RAPHAEL DRAWINGS AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM

by Muriel Julius

FEW men who lived a mere 37 years have left so rich a legacy of beauty as the painter Raphael. To commemorate the quincentenary of his birth, the British Museum has mounted an outstanding exhibition of his drawings. It consists of 202 works, of which 165 are almost certainly by Raphael, 17 by his principal assistants, and the rest remain subjects for discussion and dispute among scholars.

The drawings come entirely from English collections, principally those of the Museum itself, the Ashmolean, Oxford, the Royal Libary at Windsor, and the Duke of Devonshire's collection of Chatsworth. The exhibition has been so arranged that it is easy to follow Raphael's progression from pupil to prodigious master. Drawings frequently present a more private view of an artist's vision than his finished work. This is particularly true of Raphael. Instead of the classical calm one anticipates, even the earliest surviving drawings are animated by an energetic imagination. They display a delicate fluency, a probing curiosity that outstripped the graceful refinement of his master, Perugino. The range is vast. Some drawings seek to resolve a system of drapery, or (No. 61) the exact position for the toes of the left foot of the infant Christ: others are of mothers and babies in impetuous swirls of the pen, or very precise studies of a single head or detail of landscape.

In his notebooks, Leonardo used the word 'write' to describe the activity of drawing images as well as words. 'Write,' he would instruct himself, 'the tongue of the woodpecker. Write the three chief positions of the wings of birds in descent.' Raphael's approach was quite different. All his drawings are the means to an end. They show the intentions that lead the way into his paintings.

The exhibition divides Raphael's career into four main periods. The Umbrian period c. 1497 to 1504: the Florentine period, 1504-1508: the early Roman period, 1508-c. 1512; and the later Roman period, c. 1512-1520.

Raphael was born in Urbino in March, 1483. His father, Giovanni Santi, a minor painter, died when he was eleven, and soon afterwards he entered the studio of Perugino, then the leading painter of the Umbrian School, a master to whom he remained devoted. His work had qualities of simplicity, order and clearly articulated composition. But by 1506 his gently drooping figures with vapid expressions had become outmoded, and long before Raphael had absorbed all his expertise.

Raphael was clearly a prodigy. By the age of seventeen he had received his first independent commission. At about this time he executed an allegorical painting, *The Knight's Dream*, now in the National Gallery, London. It is included in the exhibition, together with its cartoon, pricked for transfer, which is also in the National Gallery. Seeing them together provides a rare chance to observe the Renaissance practice of transfer-

ring the cartoon onto the surface to be painted. Of the same size, the outline was either traced through with a sharp instrument or, as in this case, by pricking with a series of small holes through which a dark powder, known as 'pounce,' was brushed or blown, to leave a dotted contour on the surface beneath.

The Coronation of the Virgin, now in the Vatican, but at one time requisitioned by Napoleon and taken to Paris, was painted in 1502/3. It is a large work in two detached, stylistically distinct scenes. The upper portion is festive, with putti and angels surrounding the Virgin and Christ; but below, the apostles, gathered round a flowering tomb, display a wide range of psychological expressions. Among the preparatory drawings (No. 24) of two bearded apostles, an astonishing tenderness of expression is displayed for so young an artist.

An even more remarkable achievement is the first signed and dated work, *Lo Sposalizio* (The Betrothal of the Virgin), 1504. Derived from a fresco by Perugino in the Sistine Chapel, Rome, the eye descends from a marvellously designed domed basilica across a vast forecourt to the group watching the betrothal ceremony.

A drawing (No. 31) of a young woman, 'a pure and beautiful ideal head,' as one expert described it, is a study for the fourth onlooker on the left of the picture. This head bears a marked resemblance to that of the Madonna del Granduca, in the Palazzo Pitti, considered to be one of Raphael's masterpieces. This particular drawing, now in the Ashmolean, was once part of the collection of 200 Raphael drawings owned by Sir Thomas Lawrence (1769-1830).

In 1504, shortly after this achievement, Raphael went to Florence, then the focus of artistic innovation in Italy. There he was caught up in the cyclonic rivalry between Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, as they fought out the duel of their cartoons, one of *The Battle of Anghiari*, the other of the *Battle of Cascina*, for the Great Hall decorations for the Palazzo della Signoria. Both works depict dynamic, violent men in combat. Although so different from the calm serenity of his previous work, Raphael met this challenge with characteristic determination. His subject, *The Twelve Labours of Hercules* (Nos. 64-67) demonstrates this new involvement in aggressive action. They show his readiness to widen his expressive range and explore the tensions and movements of the male nude.

During the four years in Florence, Raphael painted many of the best of his Madonnas. Also, what must be one of the world's most variously loved pictures, the small, gem-like panel, just over 8 in. x 11 in., his *St. George and Dragon*, now in the National Gallery, Washington. In it, Raphael displays his skill as master illustrator, the skill that flowered so magnificently later in Rome. Experts still dispute the origin of this painting, but it was first recorded in England in 1627 in the possession of the third Earl of Pembroke. Apparently, the fourth Earl swapped it with King Charles I for the Holbein drawings (now back at Windsor). With the King's death in 1649, and the dispersal of a superb Royal Collection,

the painting went to France, passing through five owners until purchased by Catherine the Great of Russia. Two drawings (Nos. 35 and 36) are included, but the finest preparatory sketch is in the Uffizi. When Raphael arrived in Florence, Leonardo was 31 years and Michelangelo 8 years his senior. Yet almost immediately he was admitted to be their equal—the High Priests of the High Renaissance.

No three personalities could have been more varied. Michelangelo, a genius able to express with equal force his talents for sculpture, painting, architecture and poetry, but uncompromising, irascible, lacking beauty or grace. Leonardo, urbane, aloof, impersonal, the Universal Man *par excellence*. He was artist, engineer, inventor, botanist, surgeon, yet the 5,300 pages of his extant notebooks, filled with every conceivable kind of observation, were entirely objective. The art historian, the late Kenneth Clark, wrote 'of his affections, tastes, his health, opinions we know next to nothing.' Yet Vasari described him as 'beautiful, affable, liked by everybody.'

Of Raphael, the same author observed: 'He was endowed by nature with all that humility and goodness which made him show himself sweet and agreeable to everybody under any circumstance.' And at the end of his tragically short life, the favourite of Popes, the intimate of princes and cardinals, besieged by patrons for works, Vasari commented that 'he lived more like a prince than a painter.' Raphael had unrivalled powers of assimilation which enabled him to absorb any innovation that could enhance his talents. To quote Lord Clark again: 'Titian, Rembrandt, Velasquez, Michelangelo are essentially themselves from the first. With Raphael, each new influence seems to lead to the discovery of something unexpected in himself. His figures have a quality that cannot be learnt, that inner harmony that we call grace.'

In 1508, at the age of 25, Raphael was invited to Rome by Pope Julius II. In him, he found a patron with the means, vision and opportunity to employ him on the large decorative projects that were to prove his greatest artistic achievement.

Pope Julius determined to make Rome visibly the capital of Christendom. He ordered the demolition of the ancient basilica of St. Peter's, and a new church, designed by Bramante, to be built in its place. By bringing Raphael from Florence, and with Michelangelo already working on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, he decisively shifted the centre of the High Renaissance to Rome.

In the catalogue of the British Museum exhibition, by J. A. Gere and Nicholas Turner, in which every drawing is illustrated, there are two columns of conflicting opinions about the portrait drawing (No. 140) of Pope Julius. Its sketchy character is explained on the grounds that it was made directly from life and, in view of the Pope's notoriously impatient temperament, in a hurry. It shows a baleful but formidable thin-lipped personality, an impression heightened in the newly-cleaned painting now hanging in Room 8 of the National Gallery, London.

The Pope had tired of living in the gorgeously decorated apartments

of the detested Alexander VI, and chose for himself a suite of rooms on the second floor of the papal palace. A team of artists were already at work but, once satisfied as to Raphael's supreme ability, he was given responsibility for the entire decoration. Thus began his work on the first two rooms known as the Stanze. They were not large. Raphael made them majestic. Single-mindedly, he concentrated on the preparatory studies, many of which are included in the present exhibition (Nos. 85-111).

The most remarkable of these rooms is the first—the Stanza della Segnatura. Intended for use as the Pope's private library, its theme is the human intellect. The two principal frescoes represent Philosophy and Theology; known respectively as *The School of Athens* and the *Disputa*, or *The Debate on the Holy Sacrament*. The composition is in two horizontal sections, the hemicycle of divine beings above is set against an infinite heaven—the ultimate expression of space composition Raphael had learnt from Perugino.

The limitations of the human intellect to comprehend the mystery of the Faith is suggested by the irregular grouping of theologians on the ground. The many drawings for this fresco reflect the painstaking process of trial and error by which Raphael achieved his final result. (Nos. 85-99).

With the exception of the full-scale cartoon in Milan, few drawings for *The School of Athens* have survived (Nos. 100-102). It is set in an imposing vaulted basilica, probably reflecting Bramante's plan for St. Peter's. Steps lead up to coffered arches, beside which great niches contain classical statues (No. 101). At the centre, the principal protagonists, Plato in the likeness of Leonardo symbolises Natural Philosophy, conversing with Aristotle, representing Moral Philosophy. Seated below them is Michelangelo as Heraclitus in the traditional pose of melancholy, no doubt included in homage to his work on the Sistine ceiling.

Continuing the conceit, then current, of giving mythological characters the features of real people, alive or dead, Bramante in the guise of Euclid ponders a mathematical problem. Perugino is included and, to the far right, standing beside the painter Sodoma, is a self-portrait of Raphael, wearing the same black cap as in the early self-portrait at Hampton Court and the later one in the Uffizi in Florence.

It was Pope Leo X who commissioned the cartoons for the tapestries intended for the Sistine Chapel, on which Raphael worked from 1515 to 1516. Some of these cartoons, subsequently purchased for Charles I, are on permanent loan to the Victoria and Albert Museum. In them, Raphael established the 'Grand Style' of classical figure composition that was to influence artists the world over until the 18th century.

[Muriel Julius was formerly Art Critic of the *Evening News*. The exhibition of Raphael's drawings continues at the British Museum, London, until January 1984.]

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEW

by David Fingleton

ROSSINI. *Il Barbiere di Siviglia.* Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields/Neville Marriner. (3 records) Philips 6769 100.
BIZET. *Carmen.* Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra/Herbert von Karajan. (3 records) Deutsche Grammophon 2741 025.
VERDI. *La Traviata.* New York Metropolitan Opera Orchestra/James Levine. (2 records) WEA 25-0072-1.
MOZART. *Così fan Tutte.* Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra/Riccardo Muti. (3 records) EMI SLS 1435163.
VERDI AND PUCCINI. Operatic Arias. Kiri Te Kanawa/London Philharmonic Orchestra/Sir John Pritchard. CBS D37298.
RICHARD STRAUSS. Four Last Songs and other songs. Jessye Norman/Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra/Kurt Masur. Philips 6514 322.
MOZART. Symphonies 29 and 39, and Symphonies 28 and 41. Dresden Staatskapelle Orchestra/Sir Colin Davis. Philips 6514 205/6 (2 records—available separately).
BACH. Violin Concertos. Anne-Sophie Mutter and Salvatore Accardo/English Chamber Orchestra/Accardo. EMI ASD 1435201.
BRAHMS. Double Concerto/Tragic Overture. Anne-Sophie Mutter and Antonio Meneses/Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra/Herbert von Karajan. Deutsche Grammophon 410 603-1.
TCHAIKOVSKY. 'Nutcracker Suite'/RACHMANINOV. Symphonic Dances. Martha Argerich and Nicolas Economou (pianos). Deutsche Grammophon 410 616-1.

WITH Christmas in sight, I thought it might be helpful to deal this month with some new releases from the more popular repertory—the sort of works that would be appreciated as presents or could happily be chosen in exchange for record tokens. There can be few more popular operas than Rossini's *Barber of Seville*, Bizet's *Carmen*, and Verdi's *La Traviata*, and Mozart's *Così fan Tutte* comes only a short way behind. All these have recently appeared on record, and all, to a greater or lesser degree, can be recommended.

Rossini's 'Barber' may be an evergreen favourite, but over the past twenty years it seems to have proved an elusive opera to place really successfully on record. Not since the marvellous Glyndebourne set of 1963, superbly conducted by Vittorio Gui with Sesto Bruscantini's immortal Figaro and Victoria de los Angeles' enchanting Rosina, has there been a recording to which one could listen with unalloyed pleasure. Now, thanks to Philips and to Neville Marriner, there is. This new recording, digital, of course, and thus immensely clear and well balanced, marks Marriner's operatic recording debut. From the assured, polished, and highly dramatic, as well as musical way he has with the score, few would ever guess it. Needless to say, his own Academy of St. Martin-in-the-Fields play the music gloriously and, as a band, have just the right dimensions for the work, and the decision to use a fortepiano, rather than harpsichord, as continuo, admirably played by Nicholas Kramer, is entirely justified by the results. Marriner's cast is as near ideal as one could wish, and with the exception of Domenico Trimarchi's splendidly orotund Doctor Bartolo, is taken entirely from the younger generation of today's leading singers. In Thomas Allen there is a Figaro who measures fully up to his illustrious predecessors in the role: not merely highly dramatic

and abundantly witty, but also quite gloriously sung. Likewise, Agnes Baltsa, surely now one of the leading mezzo-sopranos of our time, is a quite remarkable Rosina: so powerfully does she characterise her part that you can actually see her Rosina before your eyes, and her rather smokey voice with its ringing top seems ideal for the role. Francisco Araiza is an accomplished and sweet-voiced Almaviva and Robert Lloyd a predictably successful Basilio. This is truly a recording of a favourite opera that has no weak links and one which will give everlasting pleasure.

Unfortunately, my praise for Deutsche Grammophon's new recording of *Carmen* cannot by any means be so unreserved. It is conducted by the great Herbert von Karajan, who last recorded the opera back in 1964, for Decca. This was one of the late lamented John Culshaw's earliest opera recordings in stereo, brilliant sound and brimming with sound effects, and still provides magnificent listening. That 1964 version had the great Leontyne Price, then in her prime, as Carmen, and the Italian tenor Franco Corelli as a memorable Don José. This new version may be more refined, and certainly has fine digital sound, but I found it less attractive. First and foremost, Karajan's decision to use actors, rather than the singers, for the spoken dialogue—the Oeser edition with dialogue, rather than the Choudens with Guiraud's recitatives, is primarily used—is an unhappy one. As is so often the case, the actors' voices bear all too little relationship to the singers' and the actors, being French, of course speak that language far more idiomatically than the polyglot cast. Moreover, Karajan 1983 lacks the zest and bite of Karajan 1964. The music is played with great care and affection, but tempi tend to be slow and the sheer guts of this most passionate of operas often seem lacking. For all that, the cast is a strong one, with Agnes Baltsa making a most musical, profound Carmen, though one who, at times, seems to lack the essential humour and sex appeal of the character. José Carreras is a strong, yet sensitive, Don José, Katia Ricciarelli sings Micaela as beautifully as one would expect, but her enunciation and French pronunciation leave much to be desired. The one French speaker amongst the principals is the Belgian José Van Dam, and he makes an admirable Escamillo. Taken overall, then, this is a beautifully made recording which falls down on its dialogue and perhaps more fatally on Karajan's concentration on refinement at the expense of excitement.

Among the autumn's cinematic treats, Franco Zeffirelli's superb film of Verdi's *La Traviata* has been high on the list. Now a two-disc recording of the soundtrack has been made available, but sadly the rewards here are much more slender than in the cinema. Inside the sleeve the opera's conductor, James Levine, prints a disclaimer which explains that the exigencies of a soundtrack recording 'produce an effect very different from a complete opera recording produced under studio conditions.' He is certainly right about that. This recording has, frankly, lamentable sound, contains all the cuts, especially in Acts 2 and 3, which, while merely irritating in the cinema, seem disastrous on record, and despite the good work of Teresa Stratas, who, even in the film, is more impressive drama-

tically than vocally, Placido Domingo and Cornell MacNeil, and the sensitive conducting of James Levine, the overall effect is of a great opera diminished. My advice is to see, and revel in, the movie, and then to buy a really fine recording: either Carlos Kleiber's for DG with Ileana Cotrubas as Violetta and Domingo again as Alfredo, or Callas's breath-takingly dramatic live recording made in 1958 at Lisbon's San Carlos Opera House, with the young Alfredo Kraus as a superlative Alfredo, would yield far greater dividends.

Happily, I need express no reservations about EMI's new issue of Mozart's *Così fan Tutte*, taken from live performances at last year's Salzburg Festival. The occasional cough or shuffle, or resonant footsteps on stage, are an altogether small price to pay for a performance that is gloriously alive, admirably recorded and quite superbly conducted by Riccardo Muti, who shows an impeccable ear for balance and absolutely breathes with his singers. These are a first-rate team: all excellent and none of them attempting to spoil the enterprise with a 'star' performance. Francisco Araiza displays honeyed tones and true Mozartean style as Ferrando, Agnes Baltsa is wittier as Dorabella than as Carmen and sings every bit as well, José Van Dam is a splendidly urbane Don Alfonso, our own Margaret Marshall contributes a beautifully sung Fiordiligi, and James Morris's Guglielmo and Kathleen Battle's highly attractive Despina fall no way behind their colleagues. This is a recording to cherish: one that gives every bit as much pleasure the tenth time you play it as the first, and that surely is what a truly successful recording is all about.

If your record token isn't big enough to buy a complete opera set, but it's opera you want, then you could do a lot worse than to turn to one of Kiri Te Kanawa's latest recordings. This CBS issue of Verdi and Puccini arias shows her in resplendent vocal form, and even if one or two of the roles which she has yet to sing on stage seem to lack the final ounce of dramatic conviction, this merely makes one yearn for her to tackle the complete work in the opera house. She is most sympathetically accompanied by Sir John Pritchard, and the record offers not only such familiar pleasures as Leonora's 'D'amor sull'ali rosee' from *Il Trovatore and* 'Ah fors' e lui' from *La Traviata* on the Verdi side, and Tosca's 'Vissi d'arte' and Butterfly's 'Un bel dì' on the Puccini one, but also has such comparative rarities as an aria from Puccini's *Le Villi*, and Doretta's 'dream' from *La Rondine*, as well as a mouth-wateringly gorgeous performance of 'O mio babbino caro' from *Gianni Schicchi*. This, too, is a record to cherish.

So, still on a vocal plane, is Jessye Norman's truly magnificent performance of Richard Strauss's Four Last Songs. This great American soprano not only displays vocalism at its peak with her golden tone and wonderful long-breathed phrasing, but also succeeds in getting right beneath the skin of these remarkable final songs, making them an unforgettable dramatic and emotional experience. She is impeccably accompanied by that fine conductor Kurt Masur with his Leipzig Gewandhaus Orchestra, and there are other, almost equally wonderful Strauss songs, including 'Morgen' and

'Cäcilie' on the other side. This is truly a record for the connoisseur.

Turning to orchestral music, another East German orchestra, the Dresden Staatskapelle, may be heard to marvellous effect in Mozart symphonies—their Mozart has always been magnificent—conducted by our own Sir Colin Davis. Sir Colin seems to have established a fine rapport with the East Germans, and these recordings of the 28th, 29th, 39th and 41st ('Jupiter') symphonies offer both immaculate orchestral tone and a depth of interpretative understanding that make them truly rewarding listening. Sir Colin seems especially strong on finales: the last movements of both the 39th and the 'Jupiter' are flawless and memorable, and the two earlier symphonies also both receive immensely satisfying treatment. Philips have contributed admirably clear, warm and lifelike digital recordings to put these two issues straight into the front rank. Let us hope that there are many more Mozart symphonies to come on record from Sir Colin and the Dresden Staatskapelle.

Two outstanding concerto records both involve the formidable young German violinist Anne-Sophie Mutter, and in both she has partners. In her Bach recording she has teamed up with the fine Italian virtuoso Salvatore Accardo for a memorably beautiful performance of the great Concerto for Two Violins in D minor, and she also plays, with the English Chamber Orchestra directed by Accardo, the concertos in E major and A minor. All three works receive totally satisfying performances, with Mutter displaying a maturity of approach to this great, but elusive, music that goes well beyond her years. For her other recording—the great Brahms Double Concerto—she has teamed up with the Brazilian cellist Antonio Meneses, still in his twenties, and is conducted by Herbert von Karajan, the conductor who first discovered her. Together with the Berlin Philharmonic, on truly top form, they deliver a performance of quite remarkable power, virtuosity and musicality: again, a record that one can play with the utmost pleasure again and again, and one which no lover of Brahms's music should be without.

For something altogether different, and decidedly seasonal, I would suggest that you try a fascinating new record from Deutsche Grammophon which offers Tchaikovsky's ever enjoyable 'Nutcracker Suite' arranged for two pianos. The arranger, the young Cypriot pianist Nicolas Economou, is also one half of the performing team, the other being that tempestuous virtuoso Martha Argerich, and his work is dedicated to his little daughter Semele and to Ms Argerich's daughter Stephanie. I have no doubt that the small girls must have much enjoyed hearing the suite for the first time, and so, no doubt, will you. The textures are agreeably translucent and the arrangement as a whole is pleasantly light and unstuffy. It's also quite superbly played by the pair of them who, on the other side, tackle Rachmaninov's Symphonic Dances opus 45, his final work, in its lesser-known original version for two pianos. Once again, their technique and musicianship take the breath away.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE IMPORTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SERVICE

Dear Madam,

May I take this opportunity, on the occasion of the Volunteer Centre's tenth anniversary, to inform your readers that two major national voluntary organisations, The Volunteer Centre and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations have recently sent policy statements to all Members of Parliament calling on government to steer a careful course between providing support and dominating, even unintentionally, the direction taken by volunteer effort. The NCVO's discussion document, *Agenda for Action* calls for legislation to give VAT relief to charities, to simplify charitable giving companies and to make individual charitable donations tax deductible. The Volunteer Centre's document *Central Government Policies Towards Volunteers* calls for a government policy towards volunteers that will enhance the volunteer contribution, and not one which sees volunteers as a substitute for services that should properly be provided through statutory channels.

All the major parties recognise the importance of a voluntary sector. But will the Government give it the opportunity, resources and power to do its job? NCVO presents the new Parliament with a 12-point programme. Among the most important are:

> Public acknowledgement and support of the complementary role of voluntary organisations to that of the state in meeting the changing needs of British society.
>
> Encouragement of the growth of local development and resource agencies for voluntary bodies in each local authority area by allocating annual central matching grants totalling some £5½ million.

Almost anything that people do without pay or compulsion can be described as volunteering, but the work of volunteers that most interests central government is generally that which benefits others.

Successive governments have placed stress on different aspects according to their overall policy objectives and standpoints. In recent decades the volunteer contribution in the health and personal social services has attracted most attention, but this should not obscure the importance of what volunteers do in sport, the arts, recreation, environmental matters, commerce and political life. Voluntary work is usually thought of as what is done through the formal structures of statutory or voluntary organisations; but the potential of volunteering through informal networks has been increasingly recognised, along with the part played by mutual aid groups.

Yours faithfully,
ANGELA WHITCHER

The Press Officer, The Volunteer Centre,
29 Lower King's Road, Berkhamstead, Herts HP4 2AB.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT

HAROLD MACMILLAN: A PICTORIAL BIOGRAPHY

Harold Macmillan. A Life in Pictures. Ruth Dudley-Edwards. Macmillan. £12.50.

Many of us are waiting eagerly for the official biography of Harold Macmillan by Alistair Horne, distinguished winner of historical prizes. It is sad to learn that it will not appear until Mr. Macmillan has left us. He is soon to be ninety, but there is every reason to think that he will outlive a good many of his older admirers.

In the meanwhile Alistair Horne has written a tantalising introduction to a sparkling 'Life in Pictures' by Ruth Dudley-Edwards. Anyone who has read her life of Patrick Pearse will know her form. Her book must, I suppose, be regarded as authorised, published as it is by the great house of Macmillan. But I am not likely to scoff at the authorised biographies of living persons, having written one jointly with Tom O'Neill of President de Valera while the latter was still alive. I remember Conor Cruise O'Brien writing of the latter book that it 'portrayed the old gentleman as he would wish to see himself'. I suppose that the same might be said here. But the book is not less valuable on that account.

I only take serious issue with one passage and I do it in a spirit of understanding. In relation to Mrs. Thatcher, she writes: 'Macmillan has had to come to terms with a Conservative Prime Minister who has taken even more radical measures than he would have been prepared to advocate. Stockton memories have made him unhappy with the present level of unemployment, yet he has come to admire his successor's "swordsman" qualities.' She has quoted him earlier as drawing a distinction between the 'gownsman,' such as R. A. Butler, and the 'swordsman' as he felt that he became after the experiences of the First World War. The distinction is stimulating. But in regard to Thatcherism the sleight of hand involved in the use of the word radical is a little too obvious. Hitler may be thought to have been more radical and more of a swordsman than Baldwin, for example, but no one detested Hitler, or fought harder against him than Macmillan. Rightly or wrongly Mrs. Thatcher's economic policies are the antithesis of those (within the Conservative framework) which were pursued by Macmillan, and which he every now and then reaffirms.

Ruth Dudley-Edwards speaks admiringly and correctly of the magnificent style he has acquired in later years. Alistair Horne writes perceptively on that subject. He mentions Macmillan as a late developer and continues: 'The "Supermac" image was, in fact, but a glaze on the portrait, achieved only after a lifelong struggle against innate diffidence, insecurity and sometimes acute depression. It took me a long time to believe that, even as PM, he would sometimes be physically sick with nerves on the day preceding a major speech. But it was quite true...' This last point I can confirm. In 1950, or thereabouts, I spoke with him (I a Minister, he then in Opposition), at a dinner in Birmingham. My wife sat next to him and noted that during the meal he ate nothing. He kept correcting and re-correcting his script. Horne points out, however, that 'after he became Prime Minister, somewhere between the triumphant Commonwealth tour of 1958 and the equally triumphant general election of 1959, a new self-confident Macmillan appears on the scene. The

first incumbent of No. 10 to emerge as a TV personality has arrived'. All this is well brought out in the photographs, which are a personal selection from Macmillan's own archives.

Harold Wilson, quoted by Ruth Dudley-Edwards, has written of him: 'Macmillan's role as a poseur was itself a pose.' Whatever the precise meaning of those words, there is no doubt that since he reached his full stature as a statesman he has found an 'act' which is entirely natural and which gives the utmost pleasure to all who hear him or see him.

FRANK LONGFORD

PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HIS TEAM

Gambling With History. Laurence I. Barrett. Doubleday. £12.95.

As *Time* magazine's senior man in the White House, Laurence Barrett has been very close to President Reagan, particularly so during the campaign of 1980 and in the first two years of his Presidency. He has had the benefit of many long talks and some access to otherwise private Cabinet meetings, and has produced as a result a valuable archive for all who are interested in this most unusual and fascinating of Presidents. Not the least of its merits is its roll-call of, and commentary on, Presidential aides and Cabinet Officers. Alexander Haig, Reagan's first Secretary of State, did not last long: too choleric of temper, too outspoken in public and private, rapidly and sadly undoing the high reputation he had won as aide to Nixon and as Commander in NATO. What is especially unfortunate is that everything he said about unrest in Central America has been proved true. But all the aides are men and women of unusual strength of character and personality: James Watt, ex-theologian Dave Stockman, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Bill Casey of the CIA, one-time historian turned OSS operative, and the inner group of Messrs. Baker and Weinberger. We get here a vivid and revealing glimpse into the lives of the men around the throne.

It is, however, the man himself who is and rightly at the centre of the stage. There are many correctives here. Reagan as a performer in little-known B movies is replaced by a portrait of a strikingly handsome, well-trained actor, at ease with words, his own and other people's, still writing most of his own speeches and thoroughly professional. He moved to the Right from a Democratic youth and background, chiefly because of his dislike of the Communist grip on the film industry. His anti-Communism, says Barrett, 'is a vividly personal emotion.' 'His denunciation of Soviet immorality when he held his first White House press conference had almost as much to do with Stalin's assault on Hollywood as it did with Brezhnev's invasion of Afghanistan.'

This book will no doubt be one of a legion as election year dawns, and as the campaign for November generates its excitements. It will be hard to displace, since it is strong in detail and in personalities. What it makes abundantly clear is the President's remarkable ideological consistency, since, indeed, the campaign against Ford for the nomination in 1976: the campaign for lower taxes (there have been three tax cuts since 1980), for a firm line on defence (made legitimate, if it was needed, by the 'rescue mission' in Grenada in October 1983), and for 'setting the people free of big Government.' He likes to quote Jefferson's line, 'If we let the federal government tell us when to sow and when to reap, we shall soon want for bread.' If he does run again, if (after the assassination attempt of March 1981) his wife allows him to do so (Mr. Barrett's account of 'The thing that happened to Ronnie' is the most moving chapter in

his book), he will—for his defence policy, for his economic efforts and for the evidence of his own sheer guts and obvious humanity—be very hard to beat.

ESMOND WRIGHT

PALER THAN BLACK

Beyond The Pale. Nicholas Mosley. Secker & Warburg. £8.95.

Nicholas Mosley has not whitewashed his father's Fascist shirt. In filial devotion to the man in whose presence he stammered, there is a grey apologia for the trained heavies who purported to protect a movement which chose to wear a military type uniform, ape Mussolini (himself once a Socialist) and quite deliberately march into the areas inhabited by an ethnic minority already the victim of his new friend Adolf Hitler. That in historical perspective, British solidity after three hundred years without civil war makes these antics seem of little importance still poses problems about what conditions would permit the Fascist equivalent of a Euro-Communist to take over the nation. In a sense that is how Mosley comes over.

The Patrician family man and womaniser who lived in circles far from the East End who was one of the most brilliant orators and magnetic politicians of his time wore many colours and might have been a Prime Minister. Something irrational drove him to aspire to the role of superman, his interpretation of his much admired Nietzsche's idea. The nearly Prime Minister with a passion to end unemployment became the would be dictator with crackpot economic theories funded by the Duce and flirting with Hitler. Mosley appears to be so vain that he was carried away by his admirers and gave them what they wanted while standing somewhat apart from them. Ambivalence abounds—or is this the greywash of son Nicholas striving hard to make loyalty and truth meet?

By way of filial loyalty, my parents saw Mosley first, in the New Party as a hope for an end to unemployment and poverty; an old lady warmly shook my hand at an SDP meeting last year and told me how the last time she had felt so enthused with politics was when she heard Oswald Mosley speak for the New Party. She had attended no meeting since. I shuddered a little.

It was not long before he became to them what Hitler came to mean to his enemies—and his abandoned friends in the Brownshirts who genuinely believed National Socialism to be just that. Anyone reading back numbers of the "Blackshirt" can have little doubt that home grown death camps and British gas chambers would have graced our countryside. Moreover, in their fear of Mosley, my parents found themselves ejected unceremoniously from the Free Trade Hall, my mentor Jack Griffin a miner, recalled how the Blackshirts wore razor studded vests and my uncle went off to die in Spain embracing another totalitarian faith as the only apparent way of stemming the black tide. Indeed, only the Communists profited from Mosley and his ilk. Both fed from the crisis in democracy which the Old Parties had failed to meet. The other answer was the 'New Deal'.

However, to put the danger into perspective and decide whether Mosley would have been a quisling one awaits the lifting of the Government blackout on his sympathisers and his interrogation. I suspect that the scum and thugs who chanted and broke windows in Whitechapel had the support from Ladies and Gentlemen in the most respected circles of British Life. Such were those who in Germany saw Hitler as a barrier to Bolshevism and sacrificed democracy and used slave labour. Was our own Middle and Upper Class different and do those who defend South Africa or Latin American Dictatorships today differ

greatly from those who apologised for Mosley? Do those who defend Afghanistan, Poland or Stalin's purges differ in their mentality? The Red and The Black merge into the Grey and feed each other.

PAUL ROSE

THE MODEL CONSCIOUSNESS

Barthes: Selected Writings. Susan Sontag. Fontana/Collins. £4.95.

The literary criticism of the French scholar Roland Barthes has been influential in the past thirty years largely because of his original contribution to linguistic studies, particularly semiology. Still fairly unfamiliar as a science, if, strictly speaking, it can be called one, this study of signs and symbols has had an effect on sociology, politics, and even literature because of the centrality, in all life and commerce, of the wide range of means of communication. The general science of signs comprises all systems of signification; all means through which human beings—individually or in groups—communicate or attempt to do so by signal. Clearly, it includes gestures, advertisements, food, objects, clothes, music and primarily language itself. Indeed, semiotic analysis would seem either to be too generic a term for useful deployment or would appear to be reducing all forms of behaviour to a kind of language. Those forms other than the verbal ones are referred to by Barthes and others as 'metalanguage', thus sidestepping rather than solving the problem which is itself, ironically enough, a problem of signification. It seems to be like the cobbler's children, without shoes for its own use.

Nevertheless, Roland Barthes had powers more creative than strictly analytical and, in spite of his brilliant work on the means of expression, he did not mistake the means for the end. It is the breadth of his more recognisably literary work which Susan Sontag is concerned to show. In her introductory essay, 'Writing Itself: on Roland Barthes', she provides an illuminating guide to the complex and ambivalent body of his writing. As his standpoint moved from that of a narrowly radical, almost pedantic theoretician, the natural tenor of his innovative thought asserted itself and much of his own work became an embodiment of his theories. It is unusual that a writer can sustain creative energy at a high pitch and, almost in the same breath, describe his own mental processes and even generalise from these to the nature of language. This was Barthes's chief gift. The subject matter of the essays printed here varies from the qualities of aestheticism to Greta Garbo and Striptease (in separate pieces, of course); from Balzac, Flaubert and Mallarmé to photography and encyclopaedias. Barthes was the discoverer of the genius of Brecht in the theatre and he saw dramatic representation as the most *avant-garde* of art forms. In one of his most attractive books, *Writing Degree Zero*, his delight in the theatre as radical form is obvious: he regarded dialogue as active and creative, whilst literature was static, instantly in the past when completed as text and therefore a matter of history. As history, its value to Barthes was that it could be viewed alongside contemporaneous texts as examples of the language of its time. Dialogue was art: literature was history.

Susan Sontag has achieved her aim of giving us a collection of Barthes's most important essays and also sharing her understanding of so delightful a writer and critic.

BETTY ABEL

THE HALO AS MASK

In the Dorian Mode: A Life of John Gray, 1866-1934. Brocard Sewell. Tabb House. £18.

For many years now, Father Brocard Sewell has been grappling with the enigmatic figure of the Nineties poet, John Gray. First, in 1963, came a Gray symposium. Then, fifteen years ago, Father Sewell presented Canon Gray to us in the guise of a slender *Footnote to the Nineties*. Now comes a bulkier offering: an altogether excellent, well constructed, nicely written, 240-page biography, providing also a useful selection of Gray's poems, with contextual explications, and the appendiculate *bonnes bouches* of two of his hard-to-come-by pieces. A splendid package deal . . . and yet . . . Father Gray—well named for he ever remains a grey figure—contrives, the most devotional prying notwithstanding, to maintain his insubstantiality. That he wore in life a mask is indisputable. It was observed, remarked upon: but never broached. And prising fingers have failed these five decades all-but to lift the death-mask. Like his eponym, Park, Gray is a prime puzzle. Could one but unscramble his anagrammatic code, as *Inventa sum ergo deipara immaculata* after inordinate labour yields the programma *Ave Maria gratia plena Dominus tecum*, we might confront the nature of the shy being we see only through a speculation darkly.

The whole of John Gray's life was a series of variations on the theme of mysticism and—not to be confused—mystery. Born, in 1866, into the working-class home of a Bethnal Green carpenter, Gray resentfully left school at thirteen to take what seemed his ordained place in Woolwich Arsenal. But he aspired. He uplifted himself. Moving, practically as well as symbolically, from the forge to the Temple—chambers at No. 1 Cloisters—by way of a clerkship, Civil Service Lower Division, and, amazing achievement, the library at the Foreign Office. A tribute to his brains—and, perhaps, a hostage to his beauty.

In 1891 he met Oscar Wilde. Their friendship lasted only two years, but of its intimacy there can be sparse doubt. His resemblance to Oscar's Dorian Gray was a beautiful case of Nature imitating Art. Wilde fostered the poet in the peasant. In a whirl of hedonism, young Gray, now poet and dandy, produced *Silverpoints*, his first wafer-thin volume of *poèmes noires*. Three years later, in 1896, came *Spiritual Poems*, a very different work. Gone were the luxuriant 'Barberisms': snuffed out the incense of modish decadence. The St. Augustine syndrome had interposed. What hands had borne the taper that lit the candles of a new purity in the very sullied sanctuary of his heart? Christ came to him in the masque of a wealthy little homosexual Jew, Marc-André Raffalovich. Out of this *grandeur à deux* was delivered up God's fool.

Gray proceeded to the Scots College in Rome, where he must, with his purple hyacinths and his tortoise, have revived recollections of his equally orchidaceous predecessor, the tonsured clerk, Fr. Rolfe, of unblessèd memory. Then, ordained priest, it was to Edinburgh, where he began his ministry at the slumland church of St. Patrick's in the Cowgate. The Wildean acolyte become priest was not required to linger over long in the Cowgate. André built him a church, St. Peter's, amid the more refined pastures of Morningside. And there for twenty-seven years Father Gray dedicated his dessicated self to the care and cure of souls. It is wrong to think of him simply as an autodidact. He was also a polymath. Neither was he merely a shipwrecked Nineties poet cast up hidebound and dry on the shores of the northern see. One could wish that Father Sewell had made more of those Edinburgh years of the cold priest

with the Mayfair-Morningside tones overlaying the old Cockney accent, whose progress from sacristy to sanctuary was described as a procession of one, whose elegant hesitations were, it was reverently whispered, consequent upon his consideration of what was the correct protocol with God. And did he not surely make crypto-pastoral visitations to Wilfred Owen and Siegfried Sassoon during their wartime *crises de nerfs* in Craiglockhart?

Even so, this is a most absorbing book. Out of its pages start to life old names and sere significances long wrapped in the tissue-paper of shoe box memories. Strange ones, like Michael Field—Miss Bradley and her niece Miss Cooper—self-marooned upon their Surrey Lesbos—near Reigate, actually—an altar to Dionysos in the garden. The Canon's locus, St. Peter's, survives, but internally desecrated, savaged as brutally as the ancient liturgy. The Canon, too, I have it on the finest authority, survives. He has been seen on a number of occasions moving aloofly about his old presbytery and church.

'You are joking, Father,' I said.

'Indeed, I am not,' the present incumbent told me. 'No, I am speaking the mere truth.'

RICHARD WHITTINGTON-EGAN

SHORTER REVIEWS

The Crown and the Swastika (Robert Hale. £9.95). This is a provoking and intriguing study of 'Hitler, Hess and the Duke of Windsor' by Peter Allen. He is concerned particularly with the relations of the Duke of Windsor, after his abdication in 1936 and his marriage to Mrs. Simpson, with Nazi Germany. Mr. Allen has done a great deal of research, both in Europe and America, among official and private documents. As he points out, however, the documents under British control relating to the Duke's activities are officially closed and unlikely to be revealed. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Duke was sympathetic to Hitler and his regime from early days. His notorious visit to Germany, discussions with leading Nazis and with Hitler himself in 1937 are evidence of his approach. Their main common viewpoint was fear of Russian communist domination. After his abdication, he still regarded himself as a person of great influence in British affairs. This view was also held by the Germans who, Mr. Allen argues, regarded him as a potential and compliant British leader after Britain fell. After the outbreak of war, the Duke was attached as a Major-General with the British Military Mission based in Paris. He still retained contacts with dubious characters, either German spies or sympathetic to the Nazis. As always, he was indiscreet and voluble in his talk. After the fall of France in 1940, he and the Duchess moved first to Spain and then to Portugal. There is little doubt that at this time the Germans thought that Britain was too weak to resist invasion and that she wanted peace. This was also the view of the Duke. In Spain, he was surrounded by German agents who encouraged him in this view and his future role as British leader and possible restoration to the British throne. Among these, principally, was the notorious Walter Schellenburg, of the SS internal security service, with instructions from Hitler to persuade the Windsors

to stay in Spain and be available for negotiations upon the British seeking peace. It seems extraordinary how much reliance the Nazis placed upon the Duke's political standing and influence when, in fact, he had none. Late in July 1940, the Windsors moved to Lisbon to await the ship to take them en route to the Bahamas to which the Duke had been appointed Governor. It is clear that he tried to avoid and delay this appointment, wishing to remain in neutral Portugal or Spain. The climax of Mr. Allen's account took place on 28th July. Sir Walter Monckton, the Minister for Information, had arrived in Lisbon to persuade the Duke to sail on 1st August. However, according to Mr. Allen's research and deductions, there was, on the 28th, a secret meeting between the Duke and Hess, at which Monckton was present. A seven point plan for peace was drawn up and taken to London by Monckton. This was 'the climax of the Duke's clandestine intrigues with the Nazis.' The evidence for the Duke's meeting with Hess 'is based ultimately on Schellenburg's cables to Germany . . . which have not appeared elsewhere so far as I can find.' Mr. Allen concludes in general that 'there can be no doubt from the evidence that he lent himself to their intrigues, although whether he did so by inclination or foolishness, readers will have to judge for themselves.'

Flush. (The Hogarth Press. £7.95). At this period of the publication of the Virginia Woolf *Letters* and *Diaries*, the reissue of *Flush* is a graceful corollary. The new introduction by Trekkie Ritchie, drawing, *inter alia*, upon the *Diaries*, both places *Flush* in the context of its creation (as an antidote to the stress of the composition of *The Waves*) and agreeably relates the life of poor Pinka, the Woolfs' own spaniel, to that eponymous animal. There is also an additional Browning bibliography.

M.T.

The Pierhead Painters (Barrie and Jenkins. £18.00). This is a delightful volume of 'naive Ship-Portrait Painters 1750-1950' by Roger Finch. He has brought together 158 photographs, some in colour, of ships built between these years in Britain, America and Europe, with explanations of each. These paintings were frequently painted by journeymen artists, awaiting the ship on its arrival in port, and often intended for purchase by members of the crew and any passengers. In the result, they are not usually of high artistic merit, but of great interest for the accuracy of detail. We are shown the development of the merchant vessel from sail to steam during two hundred years. This obviously provides an important record for study, and enjoyment as well. The book is superbly produced in coffee table size.

A Scots Hairst (Hutchinson, £5.95). This harvest of essays and short stories by James Leslie Mitchell is now published as a paperback. It was first published in 1967 and is reprinted with the original arrangement notes, and Introduction by Ian S. Munro. The volume includes his five Scottish short stories, seven essays and fragments from unfinished manuscript in his pen name, Lewis Grassic Gibbon. The volume also includes, under the name of Mitchell, selections from Arbuthnott School Essay Book, from his poems and four short stories.

HALF-YEARLY INDEX JULY-DECEMBER 1983

VOLUME 243

LS—Literary Supplement

ABEL, Betty: LS 51, 221, 332.

ARCHER, Clive: Nordic Society, 57

ARNOLD, Guy: East and West Africa: Poles of Attraction, 173.

BASU, Ranajit: The Role of Opposition, 35.

BECK, Peter J.: Antarctica's Indian Summer, 297.

BIGGS-DAVISON, M P , Sir John: Wilberforce: Revolutionary and Counter-Revolutionary, 300. LS 50.

COLVIN, Claire: LS 274.

COOK, Mark: LS 274.

CORRESPONDENCE: 42, 160, 271, 328.

DALLAS, Roland: The Papal Trips, 19

DYKES, M.P., Hugh: Inside Europe, 118.

EDWARDS, Rev Francis, S J.: Reformation and Excommunication, 133

ELSOM, John: Posters and Prejudice, 30 Ibsen and Lost Bohemia, 137. To Merge or Not to Merge . . ., 256.

FINGLETON, David: Quarterly Record Review, 38, 324.

GARFINKLE, Adam M : Violating Salt II, 123.

GINGER, Stephanie: Abortion in Greece, 253. Mercurial Melina's Marbles, 311.

GOFF, Martyn: The Video and the Child, 95.

GOLDWERT, Marvin: The Liberal and Latin America, 196.

GUNNELL, Bryn: (poem) In the Barn, 205.

GUNSTON, David: The Strangest Wall in Britain, 157

HATCH, John: Labour's Future, 304.

HAWTHORNE, Melville: The Evil of Superstition, 99.

HUFTEL, Sheila: Coleridge's Books, 206.

JULIUS, Muriel: Raphael Drawings at the British Museum, 320.

KASER, Michael: Albania's Muscular Socialism, 89.

KERNOHAN, R. D : Mrs. Thatcher's North Britons, 143.

KIRK-GREENE, Anthony: Centennial 1984: a Second Scramble for Africa?, 232. Conflict and Intervention in Post-Colonial Africa, 281.

LANNON, Tom: The Spirit of Sterling Bridge, 209.

LINDSAY, Kenneth: LS 105, 276.

LITERARY SUPPLEMENT: 45, 105, 161, 213, 279, 329.

LONGFORD, Lord: LS 217, 219, 279, 329.

LORAINE, Dr. John A.: LS 107.

McCAULEY, Martin: Poland and the Papal Power, 128

McGEEHAN, Robert: East-West Strategic Stability, 8.

MITCHELL, M.P., Austin: Can Labour Come in from the Cold?, 240

MONEY, Ernle, LS 164.

MOXON-BROWNE, E.: Spain at the Threshold of the European Community, 169.

MUNRO, Hugh: Northern Ireland—the Realistic Solutions, 72.

NARPATI, B : International Financial Markets in Hongkong and Singapore, 113.

NIECKE, Peter: Care for Handicapped Children, 148.

OXLEY, William: (poems) Paradise Man: Moment of Freedom, 156.

PEEL, J. H. B.: (poem) Ash Wednesday, 266.

PHILLIP, George: The Conflicts in Central America, 223.

POEMS, 156, 205, 266.

QUARTERLY CINEMA REVIEWS: 101, 267.

QUARTERLY FICTION REVIEWS: 45, 213.

QUARTERLY RECORD REVIEWS, 38, 324.

ROSE, Paul: Votes and Seats, 26. LS 163, 331.

ROWSE, Dr. A. L.: Oxford Then and Now, 261.

St. JOHN, Ronald Bruce: Libya's 'New' Foreign Policy, 15.

SCHOETTLI, Urs: New Horizons for Liberal International, 150.

SHANKER, S G.: The Perils of Post-Industrialism, 189. The Challenge of Mass Unemployment, 314.

SHIPMAN, David: Quarterly Cinema Reviews, 101, 267.

SHORTER REVIEWS: 55, 112, 167, 223, 279, 334

SIM, Richard: Reform in South Korea, 292.

SMITHERS, Sir Peter: Political Power and the Future of Man, 198.

SPENCER, Sir Kelvin: The Civil Application of Industrial Energy, 83.

STAJNER, Hart: What After Kreisky?, 186.

SUTER, Keith D: Australia's New Government, 1.

VANSON, Frederick: (poem) Far West, 266.

WADE, Rosalind: Quarterly Fiction Reviews, 45, 213. LS 109, 220.

WHITTINGTON-EGAN, Richard: LS 54, 108, 111, 165, 218, 278, 333.

WILKINSON, Professor Paul: The Lebanese Powder Keg, 64. Teaching the History of Conflict, 246.

WRIGHT, Professor Esmond: LS 49, 161, 167, 277, 330.

ORBIS

has reached its 50th issue—a very special issue indeed—with unpublished work by Abse, Betjeman, Bradbury, Fry and many others.

Price to non-subscribers £3. 1983 subscription £7 (including No. 50) 1983/84 subscription £13.

Mike Shields, Editor,
199 The Long Shoot, Nuneaton, Warks CV11 6JQ UK.

GREAT LITTLE PLACES
for BED and BREAKFAST in Britain
COMFORT WITH ECONOMY

Write for your complimentary copy of our Good Room Guide, listing our selection of over 180 inspected small hotels, inns and quality guest accommodation.

Send 1st or 2nd class postage to Guestaccom,
190 Church Road, Hove, E. Sussex BN3 2DJ
Brighton (0273) 722833

NAVVYMAN

by Dick Sullivan

The definitive history of navvies and navvying, 1760-1940.

Paperback £5.75. Hardback £8.75. Carriage paid.

From bookshops or from Coracle Books, 1 Prince of Wales Passage, Hampstead Road, London NW1 1EE.

Is your business words?

A unique, practical and amusing guide to grammar for the professional

BRUSH UP YOUR GRAMMAR
Queens English Society sponsored

Available from: SOLO PUBLISHING, 105 Great North Road, Eaton Socon, Cambridgeshire

Retail price @ **£2.50** *including post and package*

THE BEATS

A scholarly study of the Beat Literary Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.

Edited by Ann Charters, University of Connecticut.
(Dictionary of Literary Biography, Volume 16.) About 750 pages in two volumes. Bibliographies. Cumulative Index to Volumes 1-16.
A Bruccoli Clark Book. Published by Gale Research Co., Detroit, USA, 1983. CIP: L.C. Card No. 82-24257. ISBN 0-8103-1148-8. $148.00/set.

ARTSLINE gives advice and information on the arts in London for people with disabilities and special needs. **ARTSLINE** has plenty of ideas on things to see and do in London this Christmas.
Telephone: **01-625 5666/7** Monday to Friday 10 a.m.-4 p.m.
Saturday 10 a.m.-2 p.m. (Closed December 24-26).

48 Boundary Road, London NW8, England.

16 MAY 1984

If you were born in the USA you believe in a Republic. If you were born in the UK you believe in a Monarchy. Born in east Europe — a Communist: in west Europe, a Capitalist. On the north side of the Mediterranean, a Christian — on the south side a Muslim. And so on through the "57 varieties" of each.

These fundamental beliefs are held by us (the exceptions simply prove the rule) without any thought on our part. This proves that we are programmed. The media do not create but cater for this inherent conditioning of the masses, which applies, in varying degrees, to all countries. Common decency, human dignity—and perhaps survival—depend on all sides of public issues being brought out into the open. For generations we have been conditioned to accept one side of public issues without considering any other side. If you doubt this, you should send for your copy of "The Delegate." It is independent, free and impartial and is compiled by Peter Thomson, Haughhead Farm House, Uddingston, Lanarkshire, U.K. G71, who is a former County Judge.

Printed by H. G. LEATES LTD., 45-47 Alexandra Street, Southend-on-Sea, Essex, and published by the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW CO. LTD., 61 Carey Street, London, WC2A 2JG Tel. 01-242 3215 All business matters should be addressed to the publishers